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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study was to unveil the effectiveness of current strategies put in place to 
thwart the root causes of corruption and its damaging effects on economic growth and political 
development in the Gauteng Provincial Government. To achieve this purpose, this thesis looked at 
the incidence of political corruption in South Africa in general and Gauteng in particular, in an 
attempt to ascertain the implication of the political and historical legacy of corruption on 
democratic governance. This work is an attempt to raise awareness and understanding of the 
problem of corruption, more a step toward transparency and accountability. The research project is 
positioned within the qualitative paradigm at the preliminary stage to establish a historical 
background of political corruption.  And within the quantitative research at the second stage that 
required establishing from the preliminary research a sizeable sample of (approximately 100) key 
individuals and people in the field of corruption to which detailed questionnaires were distributed. 
 
The main findings as shown from the Gauteng experience were that in Gauteng, cases of 
corruption were widespread in almost all departments where public servants exploited state 
structures and used them to extract benefits for their own gains. However, the departments the 
most vulnerable to corrupt practices were those of Housing, Safety and Security, Transport and 
Public Works, Education, Welfare, Local Government and Health. As discovered, areas such as 
affirmative action, tendering or the expanded provision of benefits (e.g. in Housing, Welfare or 
Education) are areas that are vulnerable to corruption and are all associated with 
transformation/democratization projects. However, the incidence of corruption in the province can 
be explained by Gauteng’s lack of a “traditional” culture base that may make leaders especially 
susceptible to acquisitive and individualistic forms of behaviour. 
 
As a result corruption impacts negatively on the political process by undermining the legitimacy 
of the state and economically by impeding developmental strategies, as “corruption leads to loss of 
much needed revenue and human talent for development, distorts priorities for public policy, and 
shifts scarce resources away from the public interest … Political instability, corruption, and 
underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing” (Elliot: 2001:926). 
 
 vi
In terms of anti-corruption measures, the study has found that Gauteng is on the right path, as anti-
corruption measures applied in the province suit those applied at the national level, that in turn are 
in the same line with international practices. The study argues that while Gauteng anti-corruption 
measures have succeeded in reducing corruption levels, they have not stopped it, as new cases 
surface almost every week in the local press. Thus there is still room for improvement if the 
Gauteng government aims to succeed. 
 
The researcher has recommended that there is a need for common guidelines and coordination 
strategies amongst internal departmental anti-corruption units that have been established and the 
initiation in each department of its own monitoring and evaluation capacity. This means the build-
up and the improvement of internal audits and controls by higher authority applicable to both 
officialdom and the business sector. Finally the study assumes that many other examples of 
strategies to fight corruption could be provided, however, the ones provided are sufficient to argue 
the point that in many cases the fight against corruption cannot proceed independently from the 
reform of the state. In many ways it is the same fight.  
 
The study’s major conclusions concern those general assumptions about the relationship between 
democracy and good governance, which characterize certain theories concerning the causation of 
corruption, need to be revised.  Even the most authoritarian systems, as was apartheid, were able 
to control the levels of corruption and keep it at an economically viable level. To this end, other 
mechanisms such as accounting standards and audits and direct accountability of leadership in 
government need to be strengthened alongside with the protection of whistleblowers. But the end 
result is that several factors associated with these mechanisms have highlighted the fact that 
transparency and the resulting exposure have increased opportunities for graft. In more democratic 
and open societies, besides greater civic engagement, the chance of closer monitoring and 
exposure of corrupt officials and politicians is higher than in no democratic society. Freedom of 
the press and of association leads public interest groups to expose abuses of power. While 
democracy seems to decrease corruption, both variables interact strongly with the level of 
transition. Hence the needs for more research on the actual effect of democratization in 
government departments that will serve the cause of anti-corruption campaign better.         
 
 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PAGES 
 
DECLARATION  ………………………………………………………………………………....ii  
DEDICATION …………………………………………………………………………………    iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ………………………………………………………………………iv 
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………….. v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ………………………………………………………………………...vii 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ……………………………………………………………xiii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  …………………………………………………………...  xv 
 
Foreword …………………………………………………………………………………………xix 
 
PART ONE:    
CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF CORRUPTION .........….…2 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  CONTEXTUALIZING THE CONCEPT……………………………….. 3 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………..………………. ……………3 
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES………… ………………………………………………………………..    3 
1.3 FOCUS OF THE STUDY………….……………………………………………………………………...   4 
1.4 THE CHOICE OF THE STUDY.…………………………………………………………………………… 6 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS…………………………………………………………………………..   16 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  METHODS, SOURCES AND MEASURE OF CORRUPTION ……...21  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION.………........  ……………………………………………………………………    21 
2.2 SOURCE AND DATA... .………………. ………………………………………………………..  22 
2.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF CORRUPTION INDICES ............. ……………………………………………….........  26 
2.4 PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION ………………………………………………………………...  27 
2.5 THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI).  .......     …………………………………………….34 
2.6 THE BRIBE PAYERS INDEX (BPI) ....... …………………………………………………………... 37 
2.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ......... …………..…………………………………………………. 41 
 
 viii
CHAPTER THREE:  UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL CORRUPTION…………………44 
  
3.1 INTRODUCTION …….…………………………………………………………………………….. 44 
3.2 THE QUEST FOR DEFINITION .………. ………………………………………………………… 45 
3.3 WORKING DEFINITIONS ………………………………………………………………………..… 46 
3.4 FORMS OF CORRUPTION  ………………………………………………………………………….. 52 
3.5  POLITICAL VERSUS BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION . …………….……………….…………………. 54 
3.6 PUBLIC OFFICE VERSUS PRIVATE DOMAIN .… ……....……………………..……….……………….… 57 
3.7 DEVIATIONISM …………………………………………………………………….…………………..   61 
3.8 EXPANSION OF CORRUPTION             ……………………………………………………..........................62 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:   CORRUPTION KEY FACTORS ……………………..………………...  67 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION    ………………………………………………………………………………………...67 
4.2 THE CAUSAL MODEL…………………………    ……………………………………………………….. 68 
4.3 KEY FACTORS PROMOTING CORRUPTION……………………………………………………………….. 73 
4.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ……………………………………………………………………...78 
4.5 THE AFRICAN PATRIMONIALIST APPROACH …………………………………………………………….. 82 
4.6 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMEMSION ……………………………………………………….........................94 
4.7 THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK ………………………………………………………………... ………97 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:   THE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION...……………………………………100 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION…..………………………………………………………………………….......100 
5.2 THE COST OF CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA……………………………………………………101 
5.3 LESSONS FROM OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES……………………………………………………103 
5.4 POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION   ………………………………………..109 
   
CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICAL LEGACY ………………………...114 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ……..…..  ………………………………………………………………………. 114 
6.2 THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION ……………………………………………………………………….  115 
6.3 TYPOLOGY OF CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA ………………..……………………………………… 119 
6.3.1 BEFORE 1994 ………………………………………………………………………………………..  120  
 ix
6.3.1.1 STATE DEPARTMENTS ……………………………………………............................................  120 
6.3.1.2 HOMELAND ADMINISTRATIONS..………………………………………………………………….  123 
6.3.2 INCIDENCE IN POST-1994 SOUTH AFRICA……………………………………………………… 124 
6.3.2.1 The Department of Welfare and Population Development ……………………………127 
6.3.2.2 The Department of Home Affairs  ……………………………………………………128 
6.3.2.3 The Department of Correctional services ……………………………………………133 
6.3.2.4 The Department of Defence …………………………………………………………….. 137 
6.3.2.4.1 The Arms Deal……………………………………………………………………….... 137 
6.3.2.4.2 The Yengeni Scandal …………………………………………………………………..141 
6.4 CHAPTER SYNOPSIS ……..………………………………………………………………........... 147 
6.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  .…………………………………………………………………….   151 
 
PART TWO: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GAUTENG CASE...…………………..   154 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN:   RESEARCH DESIGN………………………………………………….155 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  ……. ………………………………………………………………………………155 
7.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE SURVEY……………………………………………………………………………..155 
7.3 ORGANISATION OF THE SURVEY   ……………………………………………………………………...  156 
7.4 RESPONSE RATES ………. …………………………….………………………………………………...157 
7.5 PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS ….………….…………………………………………………………160 
7.6 KEY FINDINGS ………………………………………………………….………………………………..170 
7.7 RELIABILITY OF THE RESULTS ………………………………………………………………………..…173 
 
PART THREE:  
DETERMINANTS AND OUTCOMES OF CORRUPTION IN GAUTENG…………………174 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: EXPLAINING CAUSALITY: THE INTERPLAY OF THE THREE  
CLUSTERS OF CORRUPTION   ……………………………………………………………… 175 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION    ….……………………………………………………………………. … …..175 
8.2 THE INTERPLAY OF THE CLUSTERS    …………………………………………………………….176 
8.3 THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY ……………………………………………………...177 
8.3.1   Regulations and Authorizations   ………. ………………………………………………….178 
8.3.2   Recruitment and Affirmative Action    ……………………………………………………..182 
 x
8.3.3   Tax and Procurement Regulations    ……………………………………………………….. 195 
8.3.3.1 Procurement administration in Gauteng  ………………………………………………….. 197 
8.3.3.1.1 Objectives   ………………………………………………………………………. 197 
8.3.3.1.2 Tender procedures    ………………………………………………………… ………198 
8.3.3.1.3 Lack of Transparency ……………………………………………………………. 202 
 8.4 INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY OR ACCOUNTABILITY   . ………………………………… 209 
8.4.1 Internal Control Mechanisms   …. …………………………………………………… 210 
8.4.2 Penalty Statutory   …… ………………………………………………………………. 217 
8.4.3 The Quality of Bureaucracy or Institutional Capacity   ….. …………………………. 220 
8.4.4 The Gauteng Bureaucracy …………………………………………………………………. 222 
8.4.4.1 The Office of the Premier    ………………………………………………………... 223 
8.4.4.2 The Department of Education ….  …………………………………………………. 225 
8.4.4.3 The Department of Health ….   ……………………………………………………. 233 
8.4.4.4 The Department of Safety and Security .…..  ……………………………………… 237 
8.4.4.5 The Department of Transport    ….…………………………………………………. 246  
8.4.4.6 The Department of Local Government   …   ………………………………………. 251 
8.4.4.7 The Department of Housing    ……………………………………………………… 255 
8.5 SOCIO-CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION…………    ………………………… 259 
8.5.1 Social Dimensions   … ………………………………………………………………. 259 
8.5.2 Cultural dimensions   … ……………………………………………………………... 267 
8.5.3 The Human Factor ……………………………………………………………………………279 
8.5.4 Concluding Remarks ………………………………………………………………………….283 
 
CHAPTER NINE: COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY INTO PROVINCIAL CORRUPTION..286 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION    …………………………………………………………………………. 286 
9.2 THE MOERANE COMMISSION   … ………………………………………………………… 288 
9.3 THE HOUSING DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS    …………………………………………. 294 
9.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS    ..………………………………………………………………. 304 
 
CHAPTER TEN: CORRUPTION CONSEQUENCES IN GAUTENG    ………………. 308 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION    ………………………………………………………………………. 308 
 xi
10. 2 QUALITATIVE RESULTS OR DIRECT EFFECTS    ………………………………………….. 309    
10.3 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OR INDIRECT EFFECTS    ……………………………………… 331  
 
PART FOUR: APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION... 348 
 
 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK    ……………. 349 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION   …….. ……………………………………………………………………….. 349 
11.2 THE HOLISTIC APPROACH    ……………………………………………………………… 351 
 
CHAPTER TWELVE:  GAUTENG CORRUPTION RESISTANCE STRATEGIES    ….. 360 
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………………………………360 
12.2 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ……..   ..………………………………… 361 
12.3 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AND PUBLIC WORKS    …………..………………………………. 365 
12.4 HOUSING DEPARTMENT    ……………………………………………………………………….. 371 
12.5 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES AND POPULATIION DEVELOPMENT …….   ……………….. 375 
12.6 DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY    ………………………………………..…………… 380 
12.7 THE GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION    …………………………………………………. 382 
12.8 STRATEGIES CONSTRAINTS    …………………………………………………………………... 383 
12.8.1 THE POLITICAL WILL    ……………………………………………………………………….. 383 
12.8.2 PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS  . ………………………………………………...………………386 
12.8.3 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION ……….   ..…………………………………………………. 390 
12.9 RECOMMENDATIONS    ………………………………………………………………………….. 394 
 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: MAJOR FINDINGS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS     ……. 398 
 
13.1 INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………………………………398 
13.2 THE NEW POLITICAL SITES …..………………………………………………………………………….400 
13.3 THE IMPACT OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION IN GAUTENG   …………………………………………………404 
13.4 THE ORIGIN OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION IN GAUTENG    …………………………………………………407 
13.5 THE SCOPE  OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES   ……………………………………………………….. 408  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY    ………………………………………………………………………….....     411 
 
 xii
APPENDICES   ………..…………………………………………………………………………...429 
 
A. LETTER REQUESTING ACCESS TO GAUTENG PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENTS……………………429 
B. STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS   ……………………………………430    
C.  STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ACADEMICS, BUSINESS AND NGOs    
……………………434 
D.  SOUTH AFRICA’S MAP   ………………………………………………………………………..1 
E. GAUTENG’S  MAP   ………………………………………………………………………….. 154 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii
 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
A. TABLES: 
  
1.1 1998-1999 Budget   ………………………………………………………………      14 
1.2 2002-2003 Budget    ………………………………………………………………..     14 
1.3 Provincial Equitable Shares: 1998/99-1999-00    ………………………………….      15 
2.4 Perceptions of Government Corruption    ………………………………………….      31 
2.5 Perceptions of Corruption in Provincial Government    ……………………………     31 
2.6 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)    …………………………………………….      35 
2.7 Corruption Perceptions Index: 1988-2003 ………………………………………      36 
2.8 1999-2002 TI Bribe Payers Index (BPI) ranking leading exporters    …………….      38 
3.9 Petty vs Grand Corruption....................................................................................... .    56 
5.10 How Serious is Corruption a Problem Globally ....................................................... ...104 
6.11 The Arm Deals Package   …………………………………………………………    138 
6.12 How Does South Africa Measure up in Africa in 2004 ...........................................    150 
7.13 Types of organisations and Responses rates    …………………………………….    158 
7.14 Sources of Corruption   ……………………………………………………………    161 
7.15  Instances of Corruption   ...………………………………………………………….   162 
7.16 Extent of Corruption    ………………………………………………………………  164 
7.17 Causes of Corruption    ……………………………………………………………… 164 
7.18 Root Causes of Corruption    ………………………………………………………    165  
7.19 Attitude Towards Corruption    …………………………………………………    166 
7.20 Proportion of Officials Involved    …………………………………………………    167 
7.21 Controlling Corruption    …………………………………………………………      168 
7.22 Disclosing of Assets     ……………………………………………………………     168 
7.23Confidence in Commissions of Inquiry    ……………………………………………      168 
7.24 Ratings    ……………………………………………………………………………   170  
7.25  Key Findings    ………………………………………………………………………  171 
8.26 Factors Impacting on Administrative Corruption     ……………………………….    177 
8.27 Distribution of Persons Employed in the Gauteng Government    ………………….  193 
8.28 Misconduct and Discipline (2001-02 and 2002-03)   ……………………………….  219 
8.29 Dockets Received and Members involved: July 1996-June 1998   …………………. 242 
 xiv
8.30 Enquiries Received and Members Convicted: 1996-2001   ………………………… 244 
8.31 Poverty Head count and ratio per Province .................................................................263 
10.32 Total Amount of Corruption   ………………………………………………………..311 
10.33 Number of Cases of Police Corruption: 1996-2000    ………………………………..312  
10.34 Police Alleged Offences: 2001-2002    ……………………………………………....312 
10.35 Consequences of Corruption     ……………………………………………………..  313 
10.36 Unauthorized Expenditure in Gauteng    ……………………………………………  317 
10.37 Perceived State Ability to Enforce the Law (2002)    ………………………………. 318 
10.38 Perceptions of State Enforcement Capacity, by Province (2002)    ………………...  319 
10.39 Ability to solve national Problem (2002)    ……………………………………….… 326 
12.40 PSC Survey of Provincial Hotlines (Gauteng)   …………………………………….. 364 
12.41 Typologies of Anti-Corruption Strategies    ………………………………………...  391 
 
B. FIGURES 
 
12.01 The World Bank’s “Multi-pronged” Anti-Corruption Strategy   …………………. . 393 
 
 xv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS: 
 
AA  : Affirmative Action 
ACDP  : African Christian Democratic Party 
ACU  : Anti-Corruption Unit 
ANC  : African National Congress 
APNAC : African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption 
AU  : African Union 
BAC  : Business Against Crime 
BI  : Business International 
BPI  : Bribe Payers Index 
CASE  : Community Agency for Social Enquiry 
CAVT  : Computer Audio Visual Technology 
CBO  : Community-Based Organisation 
CCA  : Country Corruption Assessment Report (South Africa) 
CDU  : Christian Democrats (Germany) 
CEER  :  The Wall Street Journal – Central European Economic Review  
CPI  : Corruption Perceptions Index 
CSC  : Customer Support Centre 
CTMM : City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
DA  : Democratic Alliance  
DASA  : Daimler Chrysler Aerospace South Africa 
DET  : Department of Education and Training 
DG  : Director General 
DP  : Democratic Party 
DRC  : Democratic Republic of Congo 
EADS  : European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
EIA  : Environmental Impact Assessments 
EIU  : The Economist Intelligence Unit  
FA  : Federal Alliance 
FDI  : Foreign Direct Investment 
FF  : Freedom Front 
 xvi
FH  :  Freedom House   
FMS  : Financial Management Systems 
FPP  : Fraud Prevention Project 
GCA  : Global Coalition for Africa 
GDE  : Gauteng Department of Education 
GDH  : Gauteng Department of Housing 
GDP  : Gross Domestic Product 
GGP  : Gross Geographical Product 
GI  : Gallup International 
GPG  : Gauteng Provincial Government 
GPG  : Gauteng Provincial Government 
GPSC  : Gauteng Provincial Service Commission 
GSSC  : Gauteng Shared Services Center 
HOD  : Head of Department 
HSRC  : Human Sciences Research Council  
ICAC  : Independent Commission Against Corruption 
IDASA : Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
IFP  : Inkatha Freedom Party 
IMD  :  Institute for Management Development,  
IMF  : International Monetary Fund 
IOC  : International Olympic Committee 
ISS  : Institute for Security Studies 
IT  : Information Technology 
KPMG       :  Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (names of its principal founding members - 
whose initials form the name "KPMG." ) 
LHDA             : Lesotho Highlands Development Authority 
MEC  : Member of the Executive Council 
MP  : Member of Parliament 
MPL  : Member of the Legislature 
MTC  : Metropolitan Trading Company 
NACF  : National Anti-Corruption Forum 
NACU  : National Anti-Corruption Unit 
NATIS : National Traffic Information System 
 xvii
NCPS  : National Crime Prevention Strategy 
NGO  : Non-Governmental Organisation 
NNP  : New National Party 
NP  : National Party 
NPO  : Non-Profit Organisation 
NSW  : New South Wales    
OSEO  : Office of Serious Economic Offenses 
PAC  : Pan-African Congress 
PACU  : Provincial Anti-Corruption Unit 
PFMA  :  Public Finance Management Act 
PRS  : Political Risk Service 
PSA  : Public Service Act 
PSC  : Public Service Commission 
PTB  : Provincial Tender Board 
PWV   : Gauteng’s name between 1993-1996 that meant Pretoria, Witwatersrand and 
Vereeniging.  
RAU  :  Rand Afrikaans University 
RDP  : Reconstruction and Development Programme 
SAFA  : South African Football Association 
SALDO : South African Land Development Organisation 
SALGA : South African Local Government Association 
SAMWU : South African Municipal Workers Union 
SANDF : South African National Defence Force 
SAPS  : South African Police Service 
SARS  : South African Revenue Service 
SCOPA : Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
SIU  : Heath Special Investigating Unit 
SMS  : Subsidy Management System 
SMT  : Strategic Management Team 
SSC  : Shared Services Center 
TI  : Transparency International 
TI  : Treasury Instructions 
TI-SA  : Transparency International South Africa 
 xviii
TPA  : Transvaal Provincial Administration 
TSA  :  Transparency South Africa 
UDM  : United Democratic Movement 
WB/UB  : University of Basel  
WEF  : World Economic Forum 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xix
Foreword 
 
To understand political corruption one has to refer to Robert Payne’s book The Corrupt Society 
(1975:175-184) to encounter the story about Lord Acton, who was born in Naples in 1834 and was 
a historian who regarded “power” as tainted with evil. He noted that once a class, a political party, 
or a church has obtained power, it becomes intolerant of the claims of other classes, other political 
parties, and other beliefs. More importantly, “among all the causes which degrade and demoralize 
men, power is the most constant and the most active”.  Then in 1887, in a letter addressed to the 
historian Mandell Creighon, Lord Acton struck out at the corruption phenomenon. This letter 
remains the locus classicus for the nineteenth-century study of corruption, in which he isolated the 
virus, identified it, and discovered that it was much dangerous, more prevalent, and more 
infectious than anyone had suspected. 
 
Acton’s statement “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” represents 
his central finding and as emphasized by Friedrich, “it touches the paradox of power and morals”. 
Friedrich notes that “the meaning of Lord Acton is focused on the moral depravity which power is 
believed to cause in men: they no longer think about what is right action or conduct, but only 
about what is expedient action or conduct” (2001:16).  As an aristocrat, Lord Acton based his 
study of history on direct observation of complex historical events. Ironically he was no stranger 
to corruption. He stood for parliament, won the election, and resigned a few months later when it 
was learned that his agent had been accused of bribery and corruption for stuffing the ballot boxes. 
 
Lord Acton’s “discovery” more than one century ago is still relevant today. In the 1990s, in both 
developed and developing countries, the corruption phenomenon became a central preoccupation 
of statemen and policy-makers. In all sectors of activities, accusations of corruption are rife with 
its devastating effects on both governments and corporate organizations resulting in governments 
falling, companies being declared bankrupt and prominent politicians and company CEOs losing 
their top positions and to contemplate another future. In extreme cases, corruption brings about the 
collapse of the fabric of society of the country as was the case in Haiti, former Zaire, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Kenya, and to some extent Zimbabwe, to mention a few examples. From this analysis, 
political corruption can be understood as an issue related to power and power relations. 
 
 
 xx
Literature on corruption revolves around the issue of power and particularly the use of public 
power that should be distinct from the private. This implies the exercise of public functions by a 
public official who is in a position of responsibility and whose decisions or actions affect a 
specific public or the whole community.  Any deviation from this responsibility will affect the 
community in one way or another, as public power should be exercised to the benefit of all and not 
of one or a clique. Any deviation becomes an act of abuse as far as the public sector is concerned. 
Officials can be anyone from the President and top political leadership down to the lowest state 
functionaries. As pointed out by Makumbe, regarding this point, “the key issue in understanding 
corruption” and in trying to distinguish it from other problems of power is namely the abuse of 
public power viewed as “the malevolent, unaccountable, dishonest exercising of public power” 
(1999:4).   
 
Thus the problem of corruption seems to be a particular state-society relation considering the 
crucial role of the state, as reflected in most definitions of corruption. From this perspective, 
corruption is referred to as the behaviour conducive to private gain of someone who represents 
both the state and the public authority. This study serves as a response to a need to find adequate 
anti-corruption measures in the fight against public sector corruption in South Africa.
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PART ONE 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF 
CORRUPTION  
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Chapter One 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE CONCEPT 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Nowadays, reports of corruption are on the increase. Newspapers and news broadcasts 
remind us daily that corruption must be confronted as a matter of urgency, and that it is 
detrimental to both social and economic development, regardless of the state of a country's 
development. The subject remains too sensitive and tends to evoke a particular pattern of 
reactions. Current debates among political scientists worldwide often centre on the issue of 
corruption as a characteristic of non-Western countries. Bribery, extortion, fraud, kickbacks, 
and collusion have resulted in retarded economies, predator elites, and political instability. 
While no one can deny that the magnitude of its incidence is one of the foremost problems in 
the developing world, and a preeminent problem in Africa, corruption remains a universal 
phenomenon, as it has existed throughout history. It is not something that is exclusively, or 
even primarily, a problem of developing countries. Despite efforts in many parts of the 
world to contain it, corruption is still a prominent feature of everyday life. 
 
Economic and social devastation that widespread corruption causes leads African countries to 
slide into deeper economic trouble, as corruption has a deleterious, often devastating effect on 
administrative performance, economic and political development. Corruption in Africa is not 
only a big blow to democratic efforts but also probably the biggest factor that holds back 
economic growth and undermines the democratic nature of the society. As a result, the 
institutions of governance obviously are laid bare to all the corrupting influences that distort 
good governance, public service and a sense of public morality. Needless to say, without free 
institutions of good governance open to public scrutiny and criticism, corruption cannot be 
defeated. Mismanagement, misuse of public funds for private profit and abuse of power by 
elected officials during their tenure in office will prevail. 
 
The problem of political corruption has received considerable attention worldwide. 
Although its existence is acknowledged everywhere in the world and throughout history, it 
is obviously more common in some societies than in others and more common at some 
times in the evolution of a society than at other times. Recently, there has been a flurry of 
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empirical research on the causes and consequences of corruption. Some observers have 
argued that corruption can have positive effects, under certain circumstances, by giving 
firms and individuals a means of avoiding burdensome regulations and ineffective legal 
systems, for instance (Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967; Huntington, 1968). However, counter-
arguments are widely accepted. A number of studies show that corruption leads to 
economic inefficiency and waste, because of its effect on the allocation of funds, on 
production and on consumption (Johnston, 1982; Kaufmann and Gray, 1998; Klitgaard, 
1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Mauro, 1998). 
 
Therefore, corruption is generally inimical to development, for it has prompted the 
collapse of regimes in many African countries.  Seen from this angle, corruption appears 
to be one of familiar features of Migdal’s  “soft state” (1988) though its incidences in 
developed countries are also well acknowledged. With the failure of developmental 
schemes of the 1970s in the third world the state lost its ability to perform the necessary 
public functions and corruption became a way of life as the state was “captured” by 
corrupt public officials at all levels. The looting of state property is systematic in some 
countries.  The consequences are often disastrous and harmful for the concerned country. 
Bottelier points out, “recent econometric studies in several countries indicate that 
increases in corruption are associated with decreases in economic growth”  (1998:3).  
 
In South Africa, the first decade of democracy (1994-2004) has been characterized by a 
growing public outcry about allegations of corruption within government institutions. 
Allegations of corrupt practices in the country’s public sector are made almost everyday in 
the local press and many people believe that no government institution can escape the 
widespread corruption that exists in every nook and cranny of their lives. This period 
coincides with the advent of democracy in the country, which was expected to lead to 
more transparency and accountability on the part of public officials in contrast to the old 
apartheid regime. But to the contrary, it has been reported that “corruption has stifled 
development efforts and plagued poverty alleviation strategies. In some provinces and 
local authorities, corruption has led to the slow implementation or disintegration of 
important services, such as pension payments, improvement of local infrastructure and the 
awarding of government subsidies” (Briggs, 1998:2).  
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A number of surveys conducted during 1996 and 1997 by IDASA confirm this perception. 
One survey published in February 1996 detailed popular beliefs about ethics and 
corruption in South Africa: 46% of the sample felt that government officials were engaged 
in corruption and only 6% believed there was clean government, while 41% thought that 
public corruption was increasing (POS Reports, No 3, Feb. 1996).  
 
These new allegations and revelations of unethical behaviour by public officials are a sign 
of a profound malaise and with this has come the realization of the need to regulate such 
behaviour in order to stop the rot.  But part of the problem with corruption is that despite 
the consensus on its devastating effects, the study of corruption has remained outside the 
scope of mainstream social science scholarship. Although there is the anti-corruption 
crusade of the regime of good governance that has been embraced by many international 
agencies such as the world Bank, the African Union, NEPAD and about twenty African 
states, the treatment of the subject is still left to the sensational lenses of journalists and 
civil society. 
 
However, when corruption occurs, either in a corporate environment, or in a public sector 
of a country, it raises a number of questions and issues for corporate and public managers. 
The questions relate to what forms corruption takes, who is involved, and why it exists. 
The issues relate to how we cope and deal with corruption in general and within specific 
cultural and national contexts. The first three questions deal with understanding the 
underlying causes of the phenomenon and its manifestation in different government 
spheres. The last issue—how we cope and deal with corruption—seeks to identify the 
appropriate strategic response by the government to corruption. 
 
1.2. Objectives of the Study 
 
The objectives of this study are to unveil the effectiveness of current strategies put in place 
to uproot corruption and to emphasize its damaging effects on economic growth and 
political development in the Gauteng Provincial Government. To achieve this purpose, 
this thesis looks at the incidence of political corruption in South Africa in general and 
Gauteng in particular, in an attempt to ascertain the implication of the political and 
historical legacy of corruption on democratic governance. Is present-day corruption in 
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South Africa largely a legacy of the secretive authoritarian style of the apartheid 
government? Does democratisation make South Africa better protected against 
corruption? These questions entail an empirical analysis of the economic, political and 
socio-cultural factors that determine the perceived level of corruption in the country. A 
good understanding of the extent and nature of corruption is key to developing appropriate 
strategies for intervention. 
  
There are mechanisms in place in the new South Africa, as a democratic entity, that are 
intended to guarantee the practice of good governance for a better life for all. Thus, the 
1996 Constitution of the Republic (Act 108 of 1996) stipulates that Public Administration 
must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, 
including a high standard of professional ethics that must be promoted and maintained as 
well. Efficient use of resources, accountability and transparency of public administration 
as a whole, good human-resource management and career-development practices, and 
maximization of human potential, must be cultivated. By the same token, since June 1997 
the Code of Conduct for the Public Service has been promoted locally with a degree of 
success in raising ethical awareness but its disciplinary approach may not endear it to 
officials.  
 
The fundamental problem on which the study focuses is the role played by the elite, both 
old and new in the abuse of power for personal gain in South Africa in general. It is a fact 
that the new order has experienced, on the one hand, a rise in ostentation, conspicuous 
consumption and, on the other hand, the emergence of new political and economic elites. 
More and more, critics contend that the lifestyles of these elites sometimes mean they live 
beyond their means and finance their personal budget deficits through corruption, 
undermining by so doing the gains that have been made since 1994. Therefore, the study 
will refer to the social dynamic and political context surrounding the incidence of the 
phenomenon during the old minority rule and today under the rule of the majority. 
 
 Meanwhile, it should be noted that the public sector in South Africa suffers from an 
ethical deficit and there is a malaise of greed, self-enrichment, entitlement and dishonesty. 
President Nelson Mandela acknowledged this state of affairs in his opening address to 
Parliament (5 February 1999): 
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“Our hope for the future depends on our resolution as a nation in dealing with the 
scourge of corruption. Success will require an acceptance that, in many respects, we are a 
sick society. It is perfectly correct to assert that all this was spawned by apartheid. No 
amount of self-induced amnesia will change this reality of history. But it is also a reality 
of the present that among the new cadres in various levels of government you find 
individuals who are as corrupt as - if not more than - those they found in government. 
When a leader in a provincial legislation siphons off resources meant to fund service by 
legislators to the people; when employees of a government institution, set up to help 
empower those who were excluded by apartheid, defraud it for their own enrichment, then 
we must accept that we are a sick society. This problem manifests itself in all areas of 
life”. 
 
Faced with this moral decrepitude, what is needed is the promotion of a service that 
promotes public interests rather than private interests.  
 
1.3. Focus of the Study 
 
This study focuses on political corruption in the Gauteng provincial government (GPG) 
following the new dispensation in April 1994. A province comparatively (in a South 
African context) endowed with wealth and opportunities. The illustrative material of this 
study will be taken overwhelmingly from the experience of governance in Gauteng in the 
post-1994 for many reasons. First Gauteng emerges as one of the leading provinces in the 
country and South Africa’s economic powerhouse. Another point favouring the choice of 
Gauteng as a case study is my own proximity to the material to be used for the completion 
of the study and the relative accessibility to personalities, press reporting, and media in 
general. But mainly, I must stress the economic importance of the province as a 
consideration influencing our selection of a case study.  Therefore, my choice of Gauteng 
can be explained in different ways thanks to the prominent role played by the province 
both economically and politically in South Africa. A brief history is necessary.  
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1.4. The Choice of the Case Study 
 
As everywhere in the country, Gauteng is an entity in transition. Thus the period under 
consideration symbolizes wthat we can identify as a transitional one, from the 
authoritarian control of apartheid that was challenged and destroyed through liberation 
struggle and political democratization to a free and nonracial society. Under such 
circumstances, when oppressive structures are being replaced by democratic ones and by 
legitimate and accountable institutions, the level of corruption – as is the case in 
transitional periods – will increase and reach a peak before it is reduced with increasing 
levels of democratic checks and balances. Thus, the period between 1994 and 2000 has 
been characterized by allegations of widespread corruption and political scandals in 
Gauteng before coming down after the second democratic elections of 1999. By this time, 
the implementation of almost all democratic institutions was finalized though this is a long 
process. 
 
The demise of apartheid followed by the subsequent transformation of South Africa to 
democracy conveyed the need for more sound socio-economic and political information 
that should accompany the whole process and in so doing meet multiple and complex 
development challenges. This study is one aspect of this challenge. 
 
Gauteng – meaning “place of gold” in SeSotho – is South Africa’s smallest yet most 
dynamic and productive province. Covering a mere 1.4 % of the country’s surface area 
(18,810 sq km) Gauteng with its more than eight million inhabitants is the second most 
populous province after KwaZulu/ Natal. It is the most cosmopolitan of South Africa’s 
provinces – the most “rainbow” of the “rainbow nation”.  
 
The Gauteng province is situated in the north-eastern part of South Africa and was 
previously known as the PWV region as stated in the 1993 transitional constitution. Its 
boundaries are defined as “those that existed when the constitution took effect on 4th 
February 1997” (SA Institute of Race Relations, 1996/97 Survey: 533). South Africa’s 
interim constitution created nine new provinces where there had previously been four. On 
10 May 1994 the central government assumed the powers of the four former provinces 
(Transvaal, Orange Free State, Cape Province and Natal) and the homelands, leaving the 
  
9
                                                
new provinces without any power. Powers would be allocated to the provinces once they 
had established new administrations that were capable of administering such powers.  
 
The PWV region comprises the three urban areas of Pretoria (South Africa’s capital city, 
where the emphasis is on government services), Johannesburg (the provincial commercial, 
financial and mining headquarters of South Africa) together with the rest of the 
Witwatersrand, and the southern Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark industrial complex, known 
also as the “Vaal Triangle”.  The concentration of financial, industrial and mining 
activities can justifiably highlight the dominant economic role Gauteng is playing in 
shaping the economic landscape of the country as a whole. 
 
The province is home to 70 % of the country’s work force and is the vibrant business heart 
of Southern Africa. Since gold was discovered in 1886 on the Witwatersrand (literally, 
“ridge of the white water” in Afrikaans), the Gauteng region has been the engine that 
transformed South Africa from a pastoral society based primarily on agriculture to a 
modern industrial state. In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)1, the population (an 
estimated 8,02 million people in 2000), generates about 36% of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product and has an urbanization level of more than 89%. Figures from Central 
Statistical Services show that in 1994 the province contributed almost half (49,3%) of the 
state’s total income from direct taxation. The province’s Gross Geographical Product 
(GGP)2 amounted to R103 900 million in 1991, while in 1992 the estimated GGP of about 
$40 000 compared very well with the GDPs of countries such as Ireland ($43 300 
million), New Zealand ($41 300 million) and Chile ($41 200 million). According to Hall 
et al. (1994), in 1992 Gauteng had a larger economy than some of the richest countries in 
Africa, such as Egypt (GDP of $33 600 million) and Nigeria (GDP of $29 700 million). In 
per capita terms Gauteng’s GGP is higher than those of all the other South African 
provinces and therefore is relatively well-off economically and reflects all the dynamics of 
the South African political economy. Further, Gauteng has the second lowest rate of 
unemployment after Western Cape and the lowest rate of poverty and illiteracy.  
 
 
1 The total market values of goods and services produced by workers and capital within country borders 
during a given period (usually 1 year). 
2 GDP of a region, here Gauteng. 
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Yet, despite its wealth and economic accomplishments, Gauteng has not escaped the 
social problems that plague urban and industrial centers around the country. Gauteng is 
still facing severe shortcomings. As highlighted by studies (Kok, 1998:3), poverty and 
inequality in the distribution of resources and opportunities are definitely encountered 
here. Poverty in Gauteng displays many of the same features as poverty elsewhere in 
South Africa: its burden is borne mostly by black residents and women. Moreover, 
distorted education, health and welfare systems are unable to cope with the demands of an 
increasing population; the formal economy has not grown sufficiently, nor in the right 
way; and apartheid urban development policies have resulted in a huge housing shortage 
and an uneven distribution in basic services and facilities. 
 
Another study (G. Gotz and M. Shaw, 1996:217) describes how Gauteng, which has been 
seen as a symbol of hope for some relief from apartheid, is also very much a symptom of 
the apartheid disease. The reason can be found in the sudden collapse of apartheid which 
meant that Gauteng is faced with a deluge of socio-economic and settlement problems 
without the benefit of a slow build-up which may have allowed solutions to be sought 
even by sluggish bureaucracies (Schlemmer, 1998:28). 
 
Subsequently, the new authorities have to cope with those historical inequalities. As a 
result, apartheid policies have left crucial distortions in the spatial structure of the 
province with the more affluent formerly “white” cities of Gauteng surrounded by belts of 
relatively impoverished townships and more than a hundred of informal settlements. 
According to Gotz and Shaw the sheer number of people who have reached out for the 
dream has meant that for most it has remained unattainable. The system condemned them 
to the margins of a relatively undeveloped economy; it refused to incorporate them as 
anything but labour of lower status in the service of the privileged (1996:217).  
 
On the other hand, Gauteng, unlike most of South Africa’s other eight provinces, as noted 
by Lawrence Schlemmer, was not a former Boer republic like the Free State, nor a centre 
of colonial administration like the Western Cape or Kwa Zulu-Natal, nor does it have at its 
core any particular language or ethnic dominance. Gauteng is a modern construct. It holds 
the other provinces together and its historical roots reflect forces that made the nation-state 
of South Africa possible. As a province, it represents a series of bridges between the 
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disparate elements from which South Africa emerged (1998:23). Most observers of 
politics in Gauteng generally agree that political trends and styles in the province 
inevitably exert great influence on the rest of the country. Consequently, politics in South 
Africa cannot be properly understood without understanding the politics of Gauteng 
(Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996:247). 
 
Accordingly, Gauteng, as a modern construct and unlike several other provinces, 
possesses a public administration that was created from scratch: it did not incorporate 
homeland administrations. Even the headquarters was moved from the old Transvaal 
Province in Pretoria to Johannesburg. Moreover, many of Gauteng’s staff are newly 
recruited to the Public service. Therefore to a greater extent compared to other provinces 
one would not expect Gauteng to have inherited the corruption and habits of the apartheid 
era. Thus Gauteng is a “best case” scenario and an obvious choice for the study of 
corruption.  
 
The inheritance of old habits is illustrated in a 1997 Report on the Provincial 
Administration of Gauteng following an investigation by a task team. The Report shows 
that with the implementation of the interim Constitution in 1993 and the Public Service 
Act in 1994, the Provincial Administration of Gauteng was established. The 
Administration inherited functions, assets, liabilities and personnel from the former RSA 
Public Service (National Departments and the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA), 
and the Administrations of the previous Houses of Representatives, Delegates and 
Assembly. Each of these components had their own corporate culture, legislation, 
procedures and policy measures regulating the administration processes. 
 
In addition when the headquarters of the old TPA was transferred to the Provincial 
Administration of Gauteng new base in Johannesburg, there was a lack of uniform 
application in the relocation policy for staff. For instance, traveling allowances were paid 
to some staff, but not to others, and this created resentment among personnel; as the 
Report has found out. Finally in the period since the creation of the province, its managers 
have developed their administrative capacity and the Gauteng Provincial Administration 
has taken the national lead in putting many of its systems in place, so much that national 
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It must be pointed out that under the provisions of the 1993 transitional constitution, each 
province elects its own legislature whose members hold office for five years. Executive 
authority is vested in a premier, who must implement provincial legislation, develop and 
implement provincial policy, and co-ordinate the different branches within the provincial 
government. The members of a provincial legislature must elect the premier at its first 
sitting after election, who holds office until a vacancy occurs or “the person next elected 
premier assumes office”. Once elected the premier must appoint the provincial cabinet, 
known as the executive council from among the members of the provincial legislature. 
Members of the Executive Council (MECs) head the various government departments. A 
premier may be removed from office by a two-thirds majority of the provincial legislature 
for serious misconduct or violation of law or for inability to perform his functions. No 
person may hold office as premier for more than two terms. A provincial premier, together 
with his executive, must resign if the legislature in the province passes a motion of no 
confidence in the premier by a majority of its members. 
 
 In Gauteng the African National Congress (ANC) is by far the strongest party: in the 
1994 elections, it won a clear majority (58%) of the legislative seats - 50 out of 86 – 
making Gauteng one of the seven provincial governments ruled by the ANC. The National 
Party (NP) won 24%, the Democratic Party (DP) and the Freedom Front (FF) 6% each, the 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 3%, and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and 
the Pan-African Congress (PAC) 1% each. At its inaugural meeting on 7 May 1994 in 
Johannesburg the PWV provincial legislature elected Mr Trevor Fowler (ANC) as its 
speaker and Tokyo Sexwale was sworn in as Premier of the PWV province, but chose to 
leave Public Service for the business sector in 1997 after three successful years in office. 
Dr Mathole Motshekga whose mandate was tarnished by several allegations of political 
corruption and mismanagement replaced him.  In the 1999 elections, the ANC won again: 
gaining 50 out of 73 seats in the legislature. Motshekga failed to keep his position as 
Premier. Mbhazima Shilowa was elected to head an executive committee of ten members. 
The Democratic Party (DP), now Democratic Alliance (DA) with13 seats, and six other 
parties - New National Party (NNP), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Freedom Front (FF), 
United Democratic Movement (UDM), Federal Alliance (FA), African Christian 
Democratic Party (ACDP) - represented the opposition.  
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The 2004 elections witnessed the African National Congress winning a landslide victory 
and achieving 70% of the vote in the national elections. At the provincial level, the ruling 
party made a clean sweep of all the provinces, including the Western Cape and KwaZulu- 
Natal, until then loyal constituencies for the New National Party (NNP) and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) respectively. Everywhere in the provinces, there were new faces 
among premiers, except in Gauteng where the Premier Mbhazima Shilowa was the only 
incumbent to be retained, as he is seen to have succeeded in restoring stability after years 
of turmoil in the province. This would be his second term in office. The ANC won 68.4% 
of the vote and got the majority of the seats - 51 out of 73.  The DA, the official 
opposition, got 15 seats, the IFP 2 seats while the ACDP, the Independent Democrats 
(ID), the PAC, the UDM and the VF+ secured 1 seat each. When Shilowa announced his 
cabinet, all MECs came from the ANC’s ranks.  
 
However, the promise of “a better life for all” through jobs and housing has attracted 
thousands of illegal immigrants as well as unskilled South Africans to the province, 
resulting in squatter camps and crime. Although it is the wealthiest and most urbanized 
province, there are hundreds of informal settlements that constitute important pockets of 
severe poverty and unemployment. Gauteng is tackling these problems with vigour – with 
additional resources provided by the business community. The provincial administration is 
generally given high marks for its investment-attracting, job-creating initiatives and for its 
careful control of its budget. The province employs some 130 000 public servants most of 
them in the service departments of education, health and welfare. As everywhere in the 
country in the aftermath of the 1994 elections, there have been problems of poor 
administration and financial mismanagement. The government has responded quickly and 
decisively to allegations of corruption and malfeasance, but corruption is still part of the 
provincial state apparatus and constitutes one of the public sector’s great problems.  
 
Gauteng’s budget is the largest of the nine provinces and, like the other provinces, is 
heavily dependent on transfers from the national government, as reflected in the 1998/99 
budget and 2002-2003, as well. 
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Table 1: 1998-1999 Budget: 
Revenue  Rm Expenditure Rm 
Total own revenue      978.5 Wages and salaries    8774.3 
Transfer from national govt  14095.0   Other goods and services    6299.0 
Total Revenue 15073.5 Total Expenditure 15073.3 
Source: Gauteng Province, GEDA, 1998:55 
 
Table 2: 2002-2003 Budget: 
Revenue Rm Expenditure Rm 
Total provincial sourced   1 105.0 Education & Health 15120.0 
Total national payments 21 693.0 Social services and other   7420.0 
Total Provincial Revenue 22 798.0 Total Prov.  Expenditure 22 540.0
Source: Gauteng Province, GEDA, 2002:58 
 
Constitutionally, each province “is entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised 
nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to it”, 
which means that the amount allocated to each province may change from year to year 
depending on national income and what is determined to be “equitable”, as it is reflected 
in the tables above. The provincial equitable share for 1999/2000 for each province, 
according to the 1999/2000 Survey (p. 382), was calculated using a formula based on a 
province’s demographic and economic profiles. 
 
The formula was based on recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal Commission and 
the 1996 census results. The main factors of this formula include: an education share 
based on the size of the school-age population in the province; a health share based on the 
use of the public health system; a social security component, based on the size of the 
population to whom social security grants are made, including the elderly, the disabled, 
and children; a basic share determined according to a province’s total population. 
However, the elements of this formula were not prescriptive. The provincial cabinet in 
each province proposed the amount budgeted for each function and the provincial 
legislature ultimately determined the provincial budget. The following table shows 
provincial equitable shares for the period 1998/99 and 1999/2000. 
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Table 3: Provincial equitable shares: 1998/99 - 1999/2000: 
 1998/1999ه 1998/1999ط 1999/2000 1999/2000ه 
Province Rbn Rbn Rbn Rbn 
Gauteng 12.1 12.0 13.2 12.9 
Source: 1999 Budget Review; ه = budgeted figures; ط = adjusted figures 
 
Provincial own revenue refers to revenues that provinces collect for deposit into their own 
revenue accounts and over which they therefore have control. Examples are license fees, 
gambling taxes and the income from provincial roads. Currently these account for only 
5% of provincial revenue, including Gauteng.  
 
To summarize, Gauteng appears to be the place of all opportunities and the place to do 
business in South Africa. The province is the dynamo of the South African economy, 
contributing almost 40 per cent of the nation’s GDP. The vast majority of new investment 
coming into South Africa is placed in Gauteng, mostly in the form of mergers and 
acquisitions. Like South Africa’s, the Gauteng economy is currently in a state of transition 
– no longer dominated by the extractive minerals industry and agriculture, but based 
increasingly on the manufacturing and services industries. The United States has been the 
biggest single investor in Gauteng, as in the rest of South Africa since 1994 but the spread 
runs from Europe to the Far East.  
 
According to Business Map, since 1994 there have been investments in Gauteng from 
France in the electronics, financial services and infrastructure sectors; from the UK in 
trade, mining and financial services, from Switzerland and Australia in mining and 
quarrying. “Investment South Africa” has facilitated investments of over R36 million in 
Gauteng, mostly in pharmaceuticals but also in financial services, agro-business and 
information technology.  Gauteng’s Investment Monitor shows major investments in 
property development, chemicals, manufacturing, banking and technology sourced from 
domestic corporations and from Italy, Denmark, Germany, United States, Malaysia and 
Australia. 
 
 For all these reasons Gauteng, in Kok’s terms, is therefore, a magnifying glass for South 
Africa as a whole (1998:3). 
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Furthermore, until 1997, Gauteng was viewed as one of that province where the incidence 
of corruption was “statistically insignificant” (NP Corruption Barometer, 1994-1998:12). 
After 1997, this situation has changed. Afterward, an overview of the incidence of 
corruption in Gauteng shows that the province has been plagued by corruption in various 
departments. Some indices show that “corrupt practices, here, take place in the form of 
theft, bribes demanded, mismanagement, and poor treatment of the public by government 
officials. But fraud, nepotism and extortion have been pinpointed too” (TI-SA, 1997). 
According to the 1998 New National Party Corruption Barometer, “a total amount of 
between R161, 5 million and R356, 5 million was involved in corruption in Gauteng 
between July 1994 and June 1998” (1998:13).  
 
During the past ten years, numerous sensational scandals have marked the history of 
Gauteng government. The multiplication of political scandals produced an increased 
sensitivity to the issue of corruption. The frequency and extent of these scandals brought 
corruption to light culminating in the 1997-1998 political upheavals caused by the Jessie 
Duarte’s case, which led to the Moerane Commission of Enquiry into the alleged 
corruption and mismanagement in the Department of Public Safety and Security. This was 
followed by a series of investigations into the administration of housing subsidies in the 
Department of Housing. Both investigations constitute the two case studies of this thesis.  
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into four parts and contains thirteen chapters. Part I, which contains 
six chapters, lays out the development problems posed by corruption and some analytical 
and definitional issues that arise from general discussions of corruption. Part II with a 
unique chapter provides the study’s survey on societal attitudes fostering corruption in 
Gauteng.   Part III consists of three chapters, which largely focus on the causes and 
consequences of corruption in Gauteng. It identifies root causes of corruption, which call 
for both institutional and societal reforms to address them. The fourth and final part 
assembles three chapters that design a legal framework for developing strategies to these 
problems and provide an overview of anti-corruption efforts in Gauteng to date, including 
the study’s recommendations and general conclusions. 
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The first chapter sets out the general aims of the study, the focus and choice of the study 
and its structure. The outcome of the discussion clearly shows that corruption flourishes in 
the climate of unethical leadership and bad governance. Faced with the challenge it poses, 
the major objective of the study is to unearth the efficacy of anti-corruption measures, 
using Gauteng province as a case study. A key characteristic of the province is that its 
bureaucracy was created largely from scratch and hence might be considered less 
vulnerable to inherited official abuses derived from the apartheid era. In this sense, 
Gauteng emerges as a “best case” scenario for examining corruption. 
 
The second chapter explores the methodology and sources used in this study to collect 
data. Besides the empirical approach that has been developed in studying corruption in 
Gauteng, two principal methods have been used to get information, namely, the qualitative 
historical investigation and the quantitative research. Econometric studies provided other 
sources of data identified in this thesis. In addition, the chapter is concerned with a brief 
treatment of the various ways in which corruption can be measured or evaluated 
statistically focussing on the econometric research and especially corruption indices such 
as the “Corruption Perceptions Index” and the  “Bribe Payers Index”, as well. The last 
section emphasizes the limitations of the study. 
 
The third chapter supplies a fuller survey of the analytical approaches to corruption, 
beginning with a discussion of the problems of defining corruption.  The thesis will follow 
“public office centred” notions of corruption by drawing upon Joseph Nye’s broad 
conception of corruption as “behaviour which deviates from formal duties of a public 
role” for personal gain, an understanding of the term that accords closely with South 
African official usage.  The discussion of definitions is followed by a review of the 
essential concepts associated with corruption, addressing the distinctions between political 
and bureaucratic corruption as well as between public office and private domain. The 
chapter rounds off with an overview of the extent to which corruption may be seen as a 
by-product of bureaucratic systems or rather a deviation from the normal functioning of 
bureaucracy. 
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Chapter 4 deals with causes of coruption or the structural factors contributing to 
corruption. The review addresses a wide range of the explanations that are commonly used 
to account for corruption. While the causes of corruption in South Africa seem to be 
related to the functioning of the bureaucracy, the same cannot be said in many African 
countries where existing clientelist networks or neo-patrimonialism between economic 
and political agents offten undermine the efficiency of the bureaucracy. This chapter also 
supplies an account over the expansion of a modern bureaucracy under a leadership 
styling itself on values and assumptions suposedly derived from pre-colonial social 
relations. In addition, it discusses a sensible range of the literary sources that characterises 
corruption as chiefly a problem that arises from the existence within single polities of 
contradictory cultural norms. Finally corruption is fairly prevalent in certain modern 
European democracies and was also a feature of the colonial regimes that presumably 
replaced patrimonial systems of government. Its occurrence is also expanding – or at least 
is attracting more international concern and attention. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a wide range of development consequences in Africa where corruption 
negatively affects the development process at the administrative, economic, political, and 
social levels.  By maping out the circumstances that promote corruption and the resulting 
consequences in African countries, this study aims to make South African policy makers 
aware of the deleterous effects of corruption from the experience of other countries on the 
continent.        
 
Chapter 6 presents a causal typology of South African corruption to highlight the extent to 
which corrupt behaviour of the past can impact on current societal attitudes on the part of 
the elites. This is an illustrative chapter that emphasizes the role of the elites within a 
deteriorating situation and not simply corruption perceptions. It makes it easier to 
understand South African corruption: what its main causes appear to be, what kind of 
corruption it represents, what its effects may be, and whether it appears to be increasing or 
losing ground?  
 
Chapter 7 addresses the study’s empirical analysis that culminates in the organization of 
the survey, sampling procedures, data collection methods, location of research subjects 
before presenting the results of the survey, which will be used in the chapters that follow 
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to explain causes and consequences of corruption in Gauteng. Three different 
questionnaires were submitted to three separate groups: members of the legislature 
standing committees; business people undertaking government contracts, and people 
within civil society as well as local universities. The questionnaires adopted a standard 
format used widely elsewhere in comparable reaserch. 
 
Chapter 8 applies both survey findings and analytical apparatus for explaining causes of 
corruption, so as to investigate the key locations for venal practices in Gauteng. The 
discussion revolves around institutional attributes that encourage corruption such as new 
regulatory environment that concerns itself with affirmative action in recruitment, 
procurement and tendering to promote black empowerment. Drawing upon official 
investigations to identify the main patterns of corruption and the degree to which these are 
checked by official sanctions, the chapter tackles a comprehensive assessment of each of 
the Gauteng’s government departments, before accentuating socio-economic and cultural 
dimensions of corruption with poverty and inequality emerging as key factors of 
corruption. 
 
Chapter 9 analyzes the findings of two Commissions of Inquiry that clearly show how bad 
the situation is in some provincial departments. Concerned departments here are those of 
Safety and Security and Housing where misconduct of elites resulted in a huge political 
scandal in the government, which deeply dented the image of the whole province. The 
waves of these scandals and the mounting number of cases of dubious behaviour during 
the mid-1990s and the beginning of 2000s have changed the nature of the problem. 
Corruption no longer appeared to be a marginal or exceptional problem but was seen as an 
endemic one. The causal model – “crime and punishment” and the “principal-agent” 
theory – developed earlier applied to these cases. 
 
 
Chapter 10 carries on with the consequences of corruption on a large scale economically 
and politically. The negative consequences of corruption are felt throughout society, as 
corruption gives rise to a whole succession of social costs. Corruption poses a serious 
development challenge by undermining economic development in generating considerable 
distortions and inefficiency; and politically by undermining democracy and good 
governance in subverting formal processes. The effects of corruption in Gauteng emerge 
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to be costly – not perhaps as damaging as in poorer provinces, but nevertheless 
representing a considerable restriction on state capacity. Provincial corruption also 
imposed indirect costs – on public perceptions about the rule of law, about state 
effectiveness and social justice. 
 
Chapter 11 sets out a legal framework to assist government develop strategic responses to 
public corruption. The framework identifies a range of institutional and societal reforms to 
address the causes of corruption. After presenting the inventory of possible initiatives, the 
chapter introduces a scheme for deciding what needs to be done and with what sort of 
political and economic support. Hence, combating corruption is part of the broader goal of 
creating more effective, fair and efficient government.  
 
Chapter 12 contains an evaluation of Gauteng’s anti-corruption initiatives and 
recommendations. The discussion evolves from preventive corruption reviewing relevant 
theory and international practices, enriched by a comprehensive survey of the various 
measures instituted by different departments.  
 
Chapter 13 draws on general conclusions by arguing that causes of corruption in Gauteng 
can be linked to its democratization. It is most likely to occur in those official sites or 
those procedures most closely linked to democratic or transformation dimensions of 
government. Moreover, the absence of a traditional cultural base for many leaders may 
make them especially susceptible to acquisitive and individualistic forms of behaviour. 
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Chapter Two 
METHODS, SOURCES AND MEASURE OF CORRUPTION 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
To achieve its purpose, this thesis looks at two principal methods that are used to get 
information, namely, qualitative historical investigation and quantitative research, as the 
research focuses on the origins of political corruption in Gauteng.  
 
Qualitative historical investigation is crucial at the preliminary stage, an exercise aimed at 
establishing a historical background of political corruption. This level of investigation 
provides an insight into how senior officials of both the apartheid state and the new 
administration were involved in dishonest practices resulting in large-scale 
misappropriation. It also helps to clarify those situations where actors' behaviour is 
discretionary.  Data was collected via different sources of information including: 
documents (primary and secondary), archives, interviews and direct observation.  
 
The quantitative stage of research entailed establishing from the preliminary research a 
sizeable sample of (approximately 100) key individuals and people in the field of 
corruption to which detailed questionnaires were distributed. The limited number of 
respondents was the result of budget constraints, but mainly of the targeted individuals’ 
casual attitude in the sense that after accepting the questionnaire, they pulled out of the 
survey at the eleventh hour. Therefore, I decided to only work with consenting individuals 
or organisations. The retracting attitude justifies to some extent the secret nature of 
corruption that makes people reluctant to talk or to answer questions. I had to take this into 
account. 
 
A crucial issue for this study was determining which category of respondents to survey: 
which category of public servants, which category in the private sector and which 
category within the academic institutions. The criteria used to identify organizations that 
were included in this research were developed through a process of consultation with the 
heads of department or their switchboard. After the stage of identification, identified 
organizations were than approached to participate in the survey. There were three 
questionnaires: one for selected departments in the provincial government, including 11 
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different Committees, known as "Standing Committees" at the Gauteng Legislature. These 
Committees deal with issues, which are either related to the work of a specific MEC, or 
issues that address internal matters. The Legislature's Committees are extremely important 
in the process of making new laws and amending old ones. The main reason why 
Committees are formed is to allow MPLs to specialize and gain competence in particular 
areas. The second questionnaire focussed on selected business people and in particular 
black empowerment companies doing business with the Gauteng government; and the last 
one was intended for academic institutions (the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), 
the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) and Pretoria University), along with the civil 
society. 
 
2.2. Sources and Data 
 
But how do we study political corruption in Gauteng? What are the potential sources of 
empirical data on corruption in Gauteng? My approach in studying corruption in Gauteng 
was empirical and as such was in the same vein with that of international literature on the 
topic. However, since corruption involves exchange of government property by 
government officials, it has attracted the attention of many economists. Rose-Ackerman, 
for instance, argues that “economics is a powerful tool for the analysis of corruption. 
Cultural differences and morality provide nuance and subtlety, but an economic approach 
is fundamental to understanding where corrupt incentives are the greatest and have the 
biggest impact” (1999:xi).  
 
Importantly, research has shown that types and amounts of corruption not only vary 
among and within societies, but also these contrasts reflect political and economic 
influences, history, and culture, and in turn affect societies and their development in 
important ways (Johnston, 2001:865). In this vein, how can we measure corruption when 
simple definitions are so challenging? For, the problem is that conceptually it is not even 
clear what one would want to measure. It is very difficult to compare historic or cultural 
determinants of corruption among societies. 
 
Because of corruption's illegality, its measurement is necessarily indirect and entails 
guesswork. Currently there are several corruption indices that are based on responses to 
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standardized surveys by business people, risk analysts, and the general public in a variety 
of countries.  
 
During the 1990s, indeed, a number of quantitative studies were published based upon 
quite subjective and commercial indexes of aggregate country levels of corruption. One of 
these studies was that of Mauro (1995) who brought corruption into renewed field of 
economic growth studies among economists. Mauro used mainly data from a commercial 
organization, Business International (BI), which in 1980 made an extensive survey of a 
large number of commercial and political risk factors, including corruption, for 52 
countries. The study was an econometric one of the effects of country corruption level on 
the growth rate, and the results indicated that there was indeed a significant negative 
impact. 
 
Though unbundling the lines of causality may be difficult, we can, however, rely on these 
empirical studies that have acknowledged the considerable economic and social costs of 
corruption.  A number of scholars (Andvig et al., 2000:35; Lambsdorff, 1999:1) put 
emphasis on the significance of these studies - known as econometric research - that is a 
fairly new undertaking.   
 
Econometric literature copes with the exploration of the causes of corruption. This new 
approach is based not only on empirical studies but also on corruption indexes and cross-
country data that mainly focuses on determining causes and consequences of corruption at 
a fairly general level. Although it has a rather macro-directed orientation, it can also be 
used at sub national level. Drawing from these scholarly works we come up with several 
sources of data, as supplied by Lambsdorff (1999):  
 
i. The cross-country analyses: in an attempt to determine the causes and 
consequences of corruption, academics such as Lambsdorff (1999) have concentrated 
lately on cross-country analyses, which are mostly based on professional studies of the 
degree of corruption in various countries. Such assessments are sometimes compiled by 
agencies to determine country risks and the data gathered is sold to investors.  
 
ii. Surveys: these sources have been compiled in recent years, notably since the mid 
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1990s and have proved useful for investigations of corruption. A number of quantitative 
studies have been published based upon quite subjective and commercial indexes of 
aggregate country levels of corruption that have contributed to cross-country assessments 
of the extent of corruption. As such perceptions are commonly a good indicator of the real 
level of corruption, the data provided interact with various regressions data such as 
macroeconomic, political or social.  
 
iii. Court Cases of public officials: Goel and Nelson (1998) and Fisman and Gatti 
(1999) have adopted this approach. They used the number of public officials convicted of 
abuse of public office in various states of the USA. They assumed that this might serve as 
an indicator for actual levels of corruption.  Goel and Nelson (1998) related this variable 
to the real per capita total expenditures of the local government, arguing that state 
intervention and public spending give rise to rent-seeking activities and hence corruption. 
The authors report a significant, positive association between these variables, though the 
correlation might be explained differently. As governments increase their spending, the 
judiciary branch may also be allocated more funding, resulting in higher conviction rates, 
as proved in Singapore and Hong Kong. In this case, conviction rates are not an adequate 
indicator of the actual incidence of corruption, but rather, reflect the quality of the 
judiciary (1998:107-20).  
 
iv. The media:  with less academic rigor, the media has been engaged in formulating 
various correlations between perceived levels of corruption and human development, 
competitiveness, judicial quality, credit ratings or the spread of newspapers (see Galtung, 
1997). Since many other explanatory variables are absent, remarks Lambsdorff, however, 
such correlations risk being misleading, in that they present spurious relationships 
(1999:1). However, according to Andvig et al. (2000:36), investigative journalists are in 
many ways in a better position to collect data than social scientists.  
 
The public exposure of journalists gives them a larger supply of informants. This means 
that stories from the media are important sources of information also for social research on 
corruption when it comes to establishing facts, as proved by one of the leading researchers 
in the field of corruption, Alan Doig (1984). Nevertheless, due to their impressionistic 
nature, media sources present their evident biases when comparing corrupt transactions 
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across countries and across time. The bias created is likely to be serious also when it 
comes to empirical research and we cannot rely on second hand information. Thus, there 
is the need to restrict those data, which have been conducted with at least some sense of 
academic rigor.  
 
v. Corruption indices: those often applied come from the Transparency International 
(TI) such as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Bribe Payers Index (BPI). 
These indices are a composite index including many other individual sources, i.e. the 
Political Risk Service (PRS), the Institute for Management Development (IMD), the 
World Bank and University of Basel (WB/UB) or the World Economic Forum (WEF) (see 
Lambsdorff, 1999) or an older source compiled by Business International (BI) as provided 
by Mauro (1995).  But, today it is Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) that is the most well known and most used both in research and in the public 
debate. Transparency International appears to be convinced that it has succeeded in 
constructing a successful index that is able to rank countries in a reliable way to the degree 
corruption is perceived to be a problem. For instance, the 1999 corruption index includes 
99 countries and is based on 17 different polls and surveys conducted by 10 independent 
organizations, not by TI itself. Thus, the combination of several sources is the strength of 
the CPI, argues TI, because this improves the reliability of the index and reduces the 
possibility of misinterpreting the responses from individual countries, as observed by 
Lancaster and Montinola (1997).  
 
What arises from these studies shows that ideally the data applied in research on 
corruption should be based on direct and first-hand observations of corrupt transactions 
made by unbiased observers who are familiar with the rules and routines in the sector 
under scrutiny.  More aggregate numbers should then be constructed on the basis of such 
observations. As I found out during my investigations, these kind of empirical studies 
hardly exist. Corrupt acts are complex transactions taking place behind closed doors where 
independent researchers normally have no access, nor the appropriate social networks for 
picking up and checking data. Generally, they have to contend with indirect information.   
 
All these approaches have been initiated in the course of this study by using professional 
studies as well as information drawn from my own survey, which was conducted between 
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2001 and 2003. These approaches form the study’s core focus. They are an example of 
why professional studies have relied on perceptions of corruption as a better indication of 
real levels of corruption.  To this material I added several official reports from the Auditor 
General, the Public Protector, the Special Investigating Unit, the Public Service 
Commission, the Department of Safety and Security, the Public Accounts Committee in 
the Gauteng Legislature, and of course, newspaper clippings.  
 
2.3. Significance of Corruption Indices  
 
Until recently, there were two ways to create patterns and analyses, as Andvig et al. have 
disclosed (2000:37). Researchers have to bring in information that is relatively unreliable, 
and then try to process it and make explicit the large and hardly determinable margins of 
error in the field. Or alternatively, they can decide to let the uncertain and imprecise 
information about patterns pass, and consider it as not amenable to serious research. The 
last strategy has been the dominant one.  
 
Tanzi suggests that while there are no direct ways of measuring corruption, there are 
several indirect ways of getting information about its prevalence in a country or in an 
institution, Thus useful information can be obtained from (1998:21): 
 
Reports on corruption available from published sources including newspapers and 
the Internet. 
Case studies of corrupt agencies such as tax administrations, customs, police or 
some other institutions. Unfortunately, while there are many such studies, often the 
reports are internal and are kept confidential. 
Questionnaire-based surveys that can be related to a specific agency or to a whole 
country. These surveys – often used by the World Bank in its work in Africa and 
other places – measure perceptions of corruption rather than corruption per se. 
Countrywide surveys are available from: 
- Global Competitiveness Report (Geneva) 
- Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (Hong Kong) 
- Transparency International (Berlin) 
- Political Risk Services (Syracuse) 
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Other organizations include: Freedom House (FH), Gallup International (GI), The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Institute of Management Development (IMD), 
International Working Group (developing the Crime Victim Survey), The Wall Street 
Journal – Central European Economic Review (CEER), University of Basel (WB/UB), 
and World Economic Forum (WEF). These organizations are partly non-profit 
development agencies, and partly consultancy companies specializing in strategic business 
information and market analysis. 
 
Researchers and business people are now widely using the results obtained from these 
surveys from many countries. The Transparency International index is the most used for 
the assessment of the perception of corruption. However, it is worthy to point out that 
people have a tendency to confuse these indexes with actual measurements of corruption, 
as the indexes reflect perceptions and not objective and quantitative measures of actual 
corruption. Thus perceptions are subjective and based on differing experiences and 
comparisons. They may reflect the openness of corruption rather than its actual extent. 
 
2.4. Perceptions of Corruption 
 
In the Gauteng context, it can be pointed out that in the wake of the 1994 elections, the 
general perception held by the public as well as studies on political corruption in South 
Africa have shown that its incidence appears to be most concentrated in provincial 
governments.  
 
Previously, Gauteng was seen as a province “clean of corruption” and as a model of 
probity and efficiency. This led the then Premier Tokyo Sexwale to claim, in the early 
1997, “three corruption free years” for the province. However, between 1994 and 1997 it 
was widely thought that Gauteng, like other provinces, was plagued by corruption in 
various departments. A provincial-wide demand for an end to corrupt activities in 
government and business had reached unprecedented levels, according to IDASA’s 
surveys. 
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These public perceptions of pervasive corruption in the Gauteng Administration are 
supported by a wide range of documented facts: the simultaneous processes of 
transforming the public service, designing new political and social institutions and most 
importantly redistributing public resources and social assets have created fertile ground for 
corruption. Certainly, the period between 1994 and 1998 was characterized by financial 
and managerial problems in provincial governments, including Gauteng. 
 
This led Paseka Ncholo, the Director General of Public Service Administration, to publish 
in August 1997 a Report on governance within the nine new provinces. The Report (see 
the 1997/98 Survey: 484) revealed, among other things, the severity of problems 
encountered by provincial administrations. Gauteng, though relatively well functioning 
could not escape from some degree of difficulty in its governance. The problems 
identified in the Report included grossly inadequate financial, information and human 
resources management systems, chronic shortages of skilled staff, a lack of discipline, and 
the prevalence of fraud and theft in many departments.  
 
Also openly questioned was the financial and capacity problems experienced by most 
provinces during that period and the sustainability of some of the provincial governments. 
An earlier auditor-General’s Report on the accounts of the former Provincial 
Administration PWV for 1994/95 had already found out that deficiencies and 
shortcomings covering a broad spectrum of the provincial administration activities were 
indicative of weak internal control measures. 
 
In another Report on provincial governments accounts for 1997/98, the Auditor-General, 
Mr. Henri Kluever, revealed that the management of public funds by the provinces was “a 
source of grave concern” (1999/2000 Survey:381). He quite clearly identified the factors 
that impacted on good governance in the provinces that included:  
late rendition of appropriation accounts;  
weaknesses in internal control systems;  
shortages of skilled financial staff;  
slow pace and level of co-operation with audit staff; and 
insufficient control over accounts and bank reconciliations.  
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Moreover, it was projected in November 1997, as indicated by the South African Institute 
of Race Relations (Survey 1997/98:485) that most provinces would overspend their 
budgets for the 1997/98 financial year. It was estimated that overall provincial over 
expenditure might total some R8bn – approximately 10% of the budgeted provincial 
allocation of R80.8bn. Projected overruns for Gauteng were R1.4bn.  
 
The incapacity of the provinces to raise their own revenue, and their consequent 
dependence on the central fiscus, raised the issue of the role and powers of the provinces, 
and indeed whether they are performing a role which merits the resources allocated to 
them – or whether their functions should rather be basically administrative. 
 
In Gauteng, Moleketi, the MEC for Finance and Economic Affairs, announced in August 
1997, that a report from the provincial Auditor-General, Mr. Shauket Fakie, showed that 
the Gauteng government had incurred unauthorized expenditure of some R404m in the 
1995/96 financial year. He described this as a “mockery of accountability” the process 
whereby the legislature’s public accounts committee gave retrospective approval for 
expenditure if satisfied it was necessary (Business Day, 11August 1997). Moleketi vowed 
to impose real spending limitations on departments, which were forced to make “hard 
choices” on spending priorities. This followed his claims in early March 1997 to begin the 
1997/98 financial year “on a clean state”, after additional funds were received from the 
national fiscus (R1.6bn) and from the Limpopo Province (R38m), the latter to cover the 
costs of people from Limpopo who had been treated at Gauteng’s medical institutions (SA 
Institute of Race Relations, 1997/98 Survey). 
 
Although views varied regarding the reasons behind financial difficulties in the provinces, 
observers believed, earlier in 1992 already, that the abolition of the homeland system – 
contrary to widespread expectation – should not be expected to yield an economic 
“dividend”. This statement was echoed by the minister of Finance, Mr. Trevor Manuel, 
when in January 1998, he attributed provincial problems to the fact that “the government 
was now obliged to provide services for many more people out of a revenue base that had 
not grown in proportion. This was because, in particular, per capita government spending 
in the “independent” homelands had been less than that in the remainder of South Africa. 
The government was now seeking to provide equal services to the entire population and 
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resources had therefore to be stretched much further” (1997/98 Survey;485). Otherwise, 
reintegrating the ten homelands proved to cost more in equalizing public spending than it 
would save in dismantling ethnic bureaucracies, as warned by the chief executive of the 
South African Institute of Race Relations (1997/98 Survey: 486).  
 
In the wake of these political developments, corruption was, in February 1997, identified 
by the International Finance Corporation – the private investment arm of the World Bank - 
as the most serious government-related constraint to doing business in South Africa 
(1997/98 Survey: 482). This led President Nelson Mandela to call for a campaign of 
“moral regeneration” and to finger-point “elements of the new administration that become 
as corrupt as the apartheid-era civil servants they had replaced”. Several provinces took 
disciplinary steps against people implicated in misconduct. Some, like Gauteng, adopted 
austerity measures in their budgets. 
 
Meanwhile emphasis should be put on the fact that in Gauteng, as was the case in several 
provinces ruled by the ANC, tensions were high within the ruling party due to the result of 
disputes over the leadership of the party at provincial level. In Gauteng, Mr. Tokyo 
Sexwale, the premier, announced in June 1997 his intentions to resign as provincial 
premier in January 1998 for a career in the private sector. For his replacement, there was a 
perception that the national leadership had attempted to impose its choice of leader on the 
province. After intensive and laborious negotiations, Dr Motshekga was elected as new 
premier, at a meeting of the ANC’s provincial general council in September 1997. And 
when Motshekga took over as premier of Gauteng, allegations of corruption within the 
Gauteng Administration were rife. 
 
Thus, IDASA’s Public Opinion Survey reported the results of seven separate national 
surveys conducted between the 1994 and the 1999 elections. In its survey of South 
Africa’s formative democratic culture in September – November 1995, it found that 
already, 46% of South Africans felt that “almost all” or “most” public officials were 
involved in corruption and there were strong provincial impacts on the belief about 
corruption. In 1995, 1997, 1998, IDASA used demographic analysis in order to assess 
public perception of official corruption. The demographic analysis also revealed a strong 
impact of political geography. This is true for the entire sample as well as among blacks 
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on the one hand, and among white, coloured and Indian respondents on the other hand. 
Moreover, these racial and ethnic differences contribute to some glaring geographic 
variations in this important element of the South African political culture. Those living in 
Limpopo and Gauteng (and to a lesser extent Northern Cape and Western Cape) hold 
consistently much more cynical and pessimistic attitudes about government dishonesty 
and corruption than other South Africans. 
 
Table 4: Perceptions of Government Corruption (by Province) 
 Gauteng KZ/Nat E.Cape W.Cape N.West F.State Limp. Mplga N.Cape
1995 54 44 41 42 37 25 73 36 52 
1997 48 61 58 41 43 39 49 37 45 
1998 53 71 68 46 46 54 36 32 66 
Source: IDASA (1995 – 1998), p.7 
 
Table 5: Perceptions of Corruption in Provincial Government (by Province) 
 Gauteng KZ/Nat E.Cape W.Cape N.West F.State Limp. Mplga N.Cape
1997 44 49 64 28 38 36 51 32 35 
1998 51 64 63 30 47 54 56 35 48 
Source: IDASA (1995-1998), p.7 
 
At first glance, one would ask whether these perceptions- surveys - are telling us very 
much or not. If we were to understand the perceptions as an indicator of the real extent of 
corruption than according to the table, Gauteng administration would be more corrupt than 
say Mpumalanga. This is probably untrue. All that we can say is that public perceptions in 
Gauteng are more critical – this may prompt the Gauteng government to pay more 
attention to the problem. 
 
According to IDASA, in general the highest levels of perceived corruption are located 
among respondents in KwaZulu Natal and the Eastern Cape. This is true both with regard 
to beliefs about public servants in general, as well as about provincial government. There 
is also some important shifts within provinces with regard to public perceptions of 
corruption (Limpopo where they have improved notably, and KwaZulu Natal and Eastern 
Cape where they have deteriorated significantly). Some plausible factors are:  
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1. the presence or absence of the legacy of homeland administrations from province to 
province;  
2. the differing legacies of different homelands with regard to corruption;  
3. the way in which governments in different provinces have communicated their 
strategies in fighting corruption to their respective electorates. 
 
In 2000, the South African Afro Democracy Barometer survey found that 45% of South 
Africans thought that “most” or “almost all” government members of provincial 
government were involved in corruption and 46% had a negative perception of corruption 
in their local government councils. In terms of measuring perception of corruption 
throughout the different spheres of government, a survey conducted among experts in 
August – October 2000 by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) found that 33% of the 
respondents of the perception of the involvement of government institutions in corruption 
predominantly condemned the provincial government. 
 
Thus provincial government in general is perceived to be more corrupt than the national 
government. It is likely that, as argued by Lala Camerer, provincial and local government 
officials were seen to be more likely than others to be involved in corrupt practices, 
because they are at the interface of service delivery with citizens and private sector 
contractors. These officials often hold a monopoly over particular resources or services 
such as the issuing of licenses and are therefore in potential rent-seeking positions 
(2001:30).  
 
In my research the Gauteng case can therefore be considered as a sort of a platform for the 
analysis of more general patterns of corruption in democratic systems. In terms of 
categories of corruption, it is arguable that forms of corruption vary among, and within 
societies. Theory tells us that these contrasts reflect political and economic influences, 
history, and culture, and in turn affect societies and their development in important ways. 
An overview of the incidence of corruption in Gauteng shows that the province is plagued 
by corruption in various departments. Some indices show that corrupt practices here take 
the form of theft, bribes demanded, mismanagement, and poor treatment of the public by 
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government officials. But fraud, nepotism and extortion have been pinpointed too (TI-SA, 
1997).  
 
Early studies have shown that between July 1994 and June 1998, the categories of 
corruption that were most prevalent in Gauteng were fraud, theft, maladministration, 
nepotism and bribery (NP Corruption Barometer, 1998:108).  
 
The Gauteng choice is justified not only by the huge interest the corruption phenomenon 
has reached in the province, but also by the public exposure thanks to numerous 
commissions of inquiries in corruption and mismanagement. These commissions provide 
an enormous amount of material for the analysis of corruption in Gauteng. From data 
emerging from these inquiries it is possible to understand and to explain the Gauteng case.  
  
But corruption scandals are not always a bad thing as they can play a catalyst role in 
generating reforms. This has been expressed by Rose-Ackerman who acclaims the 
positive role played by the media in these terms: “corruption scandals fueled by an 
independent press have spurred reform in a number of political systems and can then be a 
sign of a country’s growing political maturity. They show that citizens are beginning to 
recognize the difference between the public and the private spheres and to complain when 
the border is crossed” (1999:225). It can be pointed out that the most frequent response to 
corruption by the provincial government was the appointment of internal or departmental 
commissions of inquiry, tasks teams or instituting departmental disciplinary procedures. 
 
To understand corruption in the Gauteng provincial administration, this study asks: what 
are the root causes of corruption? Which factors or circumstances determine the size and 
incidence of corruption in such a democratic society? What are its potential causes and 
what are its effects on the economy of the province? 
 
In Gauteng, the simultaneous processes of improving a market economy, which previously 
was a reserved white playground, transforming political and social institutions and 
redistributing social assets to the majority of its inhabitants have created fertile ground for 
corruption. The expansion of corruption in the first five years of transition coincided with 
significantly higher levels of poverty and inequality in large parts of the province. Thus 
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confronting corruption in Gauteng requires a more complex approach that highlights the 
diverse factors underlying the persistence of corruption and provides a foundation for 
tailoring strategies to the particular contours of the problem in the province. As 
emphasized by recent studies, an effective strategy for anticorruption must be based on an 
understanding of the root causes of different forms of corruption and their variation. 
Without it, policymakers run the risk of treating the symptoms without remedying the 
underlying conditions (The World Bank, September 2000: xix). 
 
2.5. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): 
 
In line with the new undertaking, the most frequently applied indexes are those developed 
by Transparency International, sometimes in combination with indicators of democracy, 
press freedom, etc. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is the best well known and the 
most comprehensive quantitative indicator of cross-country corruption available both in 
research and in the public debate. 
 
The demonstrable impact of these corruption perception indexes on the development 
process in Africa today is significantly negative for the whole region, as this affects 
business confidence and, in turn, investment behaviour. The index ranks countries on a 
scale from 10 to zero, according to the perceived level of corruption. A score of 10 
represents a reputedly totally honest country, while a zero indicates that the country is 
perceived as completely corrupt. Table 6 indicates that we are perhaps dealing with very 
specific conceptions of corruption here, which may not take important cultural and 
normative variations into account. 
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Table 6: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): 1995-2004:  
    (African Countries only) 
COUNTRIES 1995 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Botswana 
South Africa 
Egypt 
Uganda 
Cameroon 
Kenya  
Tanzania 
Nigeria 
Ivory Cost 
Senegal 
Morocco 
Malawi  
Tunisia 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Zimbabwe 
Ghana 
Zambia 
Ethiopia 
Angola 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Algeria 
Gambia 
Sudan 
Congo (DRC) 
Sierra Leone 
Libya 
n.a 
5.6 
2.7 
n.a. 
n.a. 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6.1 
5.2 
2.9 
2.6 
1.4 
2.5 
1.9 
1.9 
3.1 
3.3 
3.7 
4.1 
5.0 
5.0 
5.3 
4.2 
n.a 
n.a 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6.0 
4.8 
3.6 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
2.2 
1.0 
2.4 
2.9 
n.a 
3.2 
5.3 
4.5 
5.4 
2.9 
3.4 
2.6 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6.4 
4.8 
3.4 
2.1 
2.2 
1.9 
2.7 
1.6 
2.7 
3.1 
3.7 
2.9 
4.8 
4.5 
5.7 
2.7 
3.9 
2.6 
3.5 
1.7 
1.7 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
5.7 
4.4 
3.3 
2.2 
1.8 
1.9 
2.5 
1.4 
2.1 
3.2 
3.3 
2.8 
4.9 
4.4 
4.7 
2.3 
3.3 
2.5 
2.5 
1.8 
2.6 
3.0 
2.7 
2.6 
2.5 
2.3 
2.2 
2.2 
2.1 
6.0 
4.6 
3.2 
2.6 
2.1 
2.1 
2.8 
1.6 
2.0 
3.0 
3.2 
2.8 
5.0 
4.1 
4.1 
2.3 
3.6 
2.6 
2.3 
2.0 
3.1 
3.2 
2.8 
2.7 
2.8 
2.2 
2.0 
2.3 
2.5 
 
Source: Transparency International (1995-2004). 
 
 
The score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, 
risk analysts and the general public. It appears that corruption is perceived to be pervasive 
in Cameroon, Kenya and Nigeria, which are among the top corrupt countries in the world. 
Meanwhile South Africa’s scorings have deteriorated with the score dropping from 5.6 in 
1995 to 4.4 in 2003 and 4.6 in 2004. In the meantime Botswana emerges as the least 
corrupt country in Africa for the last ten years. These scores reflect perceived levels of 
corruption among politicians and public officials. Those countries that have scored less 
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than 3 out of 10 are prey to high level of corruption. Although there have been claims that 
corruption is endemic in developing countries only, this is definitely not the case.  
 
Table 7: Corruption Perceptions Index: 1998 – 2004 (Selected Western countries only) 
 
RANKING COUNTRIES SCORE 
 
1988 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
Europe, USA, Japan 
 
1988 
 
2001 
 
2003 2004
47 29 35 
 
43 Italy 4.6 5.5 5.3 4.8 
49 49 55 51 Czech Republic 4.8 3.9 3.9 4.2 
50 42 50 49 Greece 4.9 4.2 4.3 4.3 
53 31 40 42 Hungary 5.0 5.3 
 
4.8 4.8 
58 24 17 17 Belgium 5.4 6.6 7.6 7.5 
61 21 21 24 Japan 5.8 7.1 7.0 6.9 
62 22 23 23 Spain 6.1 7.0 6.9 7.1 
64 25 25 27 Portugal 6.5 6.3 
 
6.6 6.3 
65 23 22 22 France 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.1 
68 17 18 19 United States 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.5 
69 15 13 13 Austria 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.4 
71 20 16 15 Germany 7.9 7.4 7.7 8.2 
10 81 87 95 Russia 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.8 
Source: Transparency International 
 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) displayed in Table 7, shows that corruption is by 
no means perceived to be a plague confined to the developing countries. Former Soviet 
Bloc countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe have very low ranking, while a 
number of leading industrial countries have scores that highlight the serious corruption 
problems that they must address. Europe and North America have shown all too clearly 
that corruption is not a topic on which industrialized countries can moralize to anyone. 
There is a growing concern that some leading countries in Europe, America and Asia 
(Japan) covered by the survey clearly display this trend. In all these countries, not only 
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allegations of corruption have received more attention but also concerns about corruption 
are finally becoming part of policy-making for many governments in the world. 
 
However, CPI ranking is especially unfavourable to Third World countries. Nigeria, 
Cameroon and Kenya top the list of the world’s most corrupt nations. This is cause for 
concern and the situation is not getting any better. In fact, it may be getting worse, as Tom 
Nevin (2000) has stressed. TI has recently been reviewing the impact of the CPI and ways 
to improve the application of surveys to raise public understanding of corruption. One 
result was the inclusion of 99 countries in 1999, compared to 85 in 1998 and 52 in 1997. 
 
Transparency International's annual CPI shows that Africa is still the region most affected 
by corruption. In the 2004 CPI, a full 106 out of 146 countries scored less than 5 on a 
scale of 10, meaning that corruption was perceived as a serious problem.  
    
2.6. The Bribe Payers Index (BPI): 
 
Politicians in Third World countries often view the CPI list, which is published every 
year, as a finger pointing exercise by the First World. To avoid looking at one side of the 
picture only, Transparency International created a Bribe Payers Index (BPI) in 1999. The 
BPI ranks 19 leading exporting countries in terms of the degree to which their 
corporations are perceived to be paying bribes in foreign countries. From the TI’s new 
listing, it appears that bureaucratic officials in the former Soviet bloc, Asia, Latin America 
and Africa are the least trustworthy and most susceptible to bribes. As there are recipients 
of bribes to grease a commercial transaction, there must also be the providers.  
 
“The data provides a disturbing picture of the degree to which leading exporting countries 
are perceived to be using corrupt practices”, says TI chairman, Peter Eigen. The index 
undertaken in 14 leading emerging market economies shows that companies from many 
leading exporting nations are widely seen as using bribes to win business. The BPI reveals 
that on a scale of 0 – 10, where 10 represents a corrupt free exporting-country, the best 
score among 19 leading exporting countries was 8.3, while the worst score, representing a 
great propensity to use bribes, was 3.1.   
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Table 8: 1999-2002 TI Bribe Payers Index (BPI) ranking leading exporters. 
 
RANKING COUNTRY SCORE 
1999 2002  1999 2002 
1 2 
Sweden  8.3 8.4 
2       1 Australia 8.1 8.5 
3   5 Canada   8.1 8.1 
4 4 Austria 7.8 8.2 
5 3 
Switzerland 7.7 8.4 
6 6 Netherlands 7.4 7.8 
7 8 United Kingdom 7.1 6.9 
8 7 Belgium 6.8 7.8 
9 10 Germany 6.2 6.3 
10 13 United States 6.2 5.3 
11 9 Singapore 5.7 6.3 
12 11 Spain 5.3 5.8 
13 12 France 5.2 5.5 
14 14 Japan 5.1 5.3 
15 15 Malaysia 3.9 4.3 
n.a. 16 Hong Kong n.a. 4.3 
16 17 Italy 3.7 4.1 
17 19 Taiwan 3.5 3.8 
18 18 South Korea 3.4 3.9 
19* 20 China  3.1 3.5 
n.a. 21 Russia n.a. 3.2 
Source: African Business, January 2000:21; and Transparency International 2003:267.  
  - *(including Hong Kong) 
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China was seen as having the greatest willingness to pay bribes abroad, followed by South 
Korea, Taiwan, Italy and Malaysia. Sweden, Australia and Canada achieved the most 
favourable results. 
 
Frank Vogi, the TI’s vice-chairman contends that the two indices - CPI and BPI - are 
closely inter-related as it is fashionable these days to be against corruption and to demand 
that countries clean up their houses before aid is granted. While the BPI is a distinct 
survey commissioned by TI, the CPI is a “poll of polls” and the two indices are created 
with different methodologies and are not directly comparable. Eigen concludes that 
“however, the BPI and CPI are two sides of the same coin: the former ranks the home 
countries of the payers of international bribes, the latter ranks countries in terms of degree 
to which they are perceived to be the homes of bribe-takers, the public officials who abuse 
their office for public gain (African Business, January, 2000:21). 
  
In 2002, the TI published its second Bribe Payers Index (BPI) of leading exporting 
countries, a major survey that tracks corrupt practices among international businesses. 
Interviews were conducted with 835 private sector leaders in 15 major emerging market 
economies, including South Africa. About 55 people were interviewed in each country, 
ranging from top executives at major national and international companies, chartered 
accountants, foreign chambers of commerce, national and foreign commercial banks and 
senior partners at commercial law firms.  
 
Within the 21 leading exporting economies, Russian and Chinese companies were 
perceived to bribe most frequently, and Australian, Swedish and Swiss companies least 
frequently. In a notable development, scores were found to have improved slightly since 
the 1999 survey: companies are marginally less likely to bribe now than three years ago. 
However, important exceptions to this trend were companies from Britain and the US, 
which are now perceived as slightly more likely to bribe than they were in 1999 (TI 
2003:266). The US was ranked the most likely to use other means, such as diplomatic, 
political or financial pressure – even military as is the case with the Iraq War – to gain an 
unfair advantage, followed by France. South Africa featured high on these surveys as 
likely to accept bribes, as the arms deal procurement has demonstrated. 
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The consensus in anti-corruption circles is that politicians and public officials from the 
world’s leading industrialized countries are ignoring the problem in their own backyards, 
while focusing on the high level of corruption in developing countries. An example of 
international corruption has been given by Lesotho where multinational companies have 
all been involved in building or tendering for aspects of a massive hydroelectric dam 
project. They have been charged with improperly paying millions of rands in foreign 
currency to intermediaries who, after taking a cut, deposited the balance into a secret 
Swiss bank account held in the name of the top executive of the dam project. Lesotho set 
an important regional precedent in the treatment accorded to international companies 
offering bribes. 
 
The Lesotho corruption trial (TI 2003: 252, 257) that started in May 2000, ended in June 
2002 with the conviction of Masupha Ephraim Sole, former CEO of the Lesotho 
Highlands Development Authority (LHDA), who was sentenced to 18 years in prison on 
bribery charges. Evidence confirmed that Sole’s Swiss bank account had been credited 
with millions of rand from international consultancy firms involved in the dam 
construction project. Following this conviction, companies from Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, South Africa and Switzerland were due to go on trial late in 2002. The 
Gauteng provincial Government subsequently announced its intentions of disqualifying all 
companies concerned – “if found guilty of bribery” - from bidding for contracts in the 
Blue IQ project with regard to the Rapid Rail Link. 
 
This case had been seen as a rare example of a Western company being prosecuted for 
bribery under the national law of a developing country (TI 2003:73). 
 
Whether in the public or private sphere, corruption results in the abuse and misuse of 
scarce resources that significantly affect an entire economy through multiple effects. 
Corruption is negatively associated with developmental objectives. Controlling or 
eradicating corruption, therefore, takes on even greater significance in the quest for 
development (Hope & Chikulo, 2000:1). Both recipients of bribes and providers are 
equally guilty of corrupt practices and should be prosecuted.  
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2.7. Limitations of the Study 
 
Finally, one preliminary problem that deserves attention is that of evidence which must be 
faced but cannot be solved, as pointed out by McMullan (1970:319). From this viewpoint, 
arguments and statements about corruption cannot be demonstrated by factual or statistical 
evidence of the type normally acceptable as a basis for political or sociological 
generalization. There are plenty of reports, histories and trial records exemplifying 
corruption in different countries, but corruption is not a subject that can be investigated 
openly by means of questionnaires and interviews. Even if it was, in principle, possible to 
quantify the phenomenon, there would be no practical possibility of doing so. Despite this 
difficulty, we cannot refuse to discuss important topics simply because the best type of 
evidence is not available. 
 
As shown by recent studies Tanzi (1998); (Lambsdorff (1999); Andvig et al. (2000), the 
construction of causal explanation of political corruption is hampered by the difficulty of 
measuring the frequency of corrupt exchanges. It is difficult to measure whether 
corruption is increasing or decreasing. Information about corruption is scarce and can be 
misleading. For many public officials, corruption remains such a sensitive subject that the 
inclination is to avoid to address it at all. I established in the course of the research that no 
government or non-profit agency keeps exact records on corrupt exchanges. Part of the 
problem with corruption is that it operates best under the cloak of secrecy.   
 
Difficulties surrounding the study of corruption are even more serious for a crime that 
often has no visible victims. As we found out those who think to blow the whistle are 
afraid to go ahead as the potential risk of losing their jobs becomes quite high. In some 
cases, even money is used to pay for one’s silence. Nowadays, there is an outcry 
demanding the protection of whistleblowers, as we will see later in this study. Besides 
whistle blowing, corrupt acts are sometimes discovered by chance.  That is why the 
discovery of corrupt acts, as della Porta and Vannucci have contended, are influenced both 
by the investigative strategy of the state’s repressive apparatuses, as well as by the degree 
of tolerance for illegal activities among certain social groups, or within public opinions at 
large (1999:24). Even recent experiments with indexes of corruption based on experts’ 
perception are facing serious criticism in terms of their reliability.  
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In a methodological essay, entitled “What Cannot be Analyzed in Statistical Terms”, 
corruption was cited as the classic example of an observable phenomenon that was not 
quantifiable since “there cannot be statistics on a phenomenon which by its very nature is 
concealed” (Frederik Galtung, 2001:224). But these assumptions have changed since the 
first publication in 1995 by Transparency International of its (TI) Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) followed by a remarkable growth in empirical research on corruption, fuelled 
to a great extent by growing international interest in finding the means to curb it. This 
initiative has been bolstered by support and interest from multilateral organizations, 
foundations and researchers at universities in several countries. Most comparative 
empirical studies range from surveys and polls on a variety of aspects of corruption to 
recent secondary analysis of corruption data, and studies of public integrity and 
institutions. 
 
To overcome these limitations, I made use of opinion surveys – which is now the most 
frequently used diagnostic tool in the assessment of corruption levels. Evidence from the 
survey indicates a wide range of viewpoints among Gauteng public officials, civil society, 
academics and business people. The survey also includes interrogations and collection of 
documents of important cases of corruption that occurred in Gauteng after the 1994 
dispensation. According to Transparency International, survey samples include polling of 
the general population, the private sector and segments of public administrations 
(2001:224). Thus the introduction of these additional sources did not only give me the 
possibility of collecting new information, but it also allowed me to compare the 
functioning of different institutions charged with oversight of public administration. 
 
One research shows that anthropological field methods are particularly fruitful and more 
valuable information on corruption practices can also be collected through interviews, and 
preferable informal interviews that can uncover the popular and local semiotics and ethics 
concerning corruption (Andvig et al., 2000:68). Focus group discussions have also been 
fruitful in some situations. Case studies, whether of particular institution or specific 
interactions or episodes, are also fruitful. Finally, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2000) 
underline the significance of methodological triangulation: approaches and methods 
should be combined and used in parallel, for instance, interviews can be combined with 
  
43
observations and newspaper reports or court hearing to substantiate and verify the 
findings.  But prior to this probing, it is of the utmost importance to understand,  “what is 
corruption”? How can it be defined in the South African context? To attempt answering 
this question will require raising some of the major problems encountered in the challenge 
to define corruption. 
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Chapter Three 
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter supplies a critical discussion of the meaning of corruption. Although the 
concept of corruption is difficult to define and to measure precisely because of its secret 
nature, however, there is a comprehensive literature dedicated to defining it. Theobald 
states that, corruption, “like many other forms of behaviour when placed under the 
scrutiny of the social lens, proves to be an elusive and complex phenomenon: in fact the 
more one examines it the more difficult it becomes to separate from other forms of social 
exchange. The task of definition is not made easier by the fact that corruption, by its very 
nature, is inseparable from questions of public morality and morality in general” 
(Theobald, 1990:1). 
 
But, most analysts who have discussed corruption have found it difficult to convey a clear 
sense of what is meant by the term that often leads to confusion as corruption comes in 
many forms that differ from one society to another. Thus, there is no one clear standard 
definition and the term has a multiplicity of meanings. All over the years, social scientists 
interested in corruption have defined it in a variety of ways. 
 
Empirical evidence dating back from the 1970s clearly suggests that corruption cannot be 
isolated from its societal context. “Which norms are the ones that will be used to 
distinguish corrupt from non-corrupt acts?”, ask Heidenheimer (2001:10). “Any attempt to 
analyze the concept of corruption, cautions Friedrich, must contend with the fact that in 
English and other languages the word corruption has a history of vastly different 
meanings and connotations” (2001:15).  
 
Therefore, among the multitude of scholarly studies of corruption, there are as many 
proposed definitions of the concept as there are authors. This is why “this lack of an 
agreed definition of corruption is one reason a general theory of corruption never 
emerged” (Collier, 1999:2). Faced with this “definitional quagmire”, in Johnston’s terms 
(1994:3), scholars such as Lancaster and Montinola, have pointed out that these “problems 
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of definition … have thus far constrained most students of corruption to ideographic single 
case studies … the lack of cross-national empirical studies prevents a more complete 
understanding of general causes of political corruption” (1997:185). Nevertheless, before 
formulating any working definition of corruption that can serve as a tool to guide further 
study of the problem, let us discuss a range of issues that often crop up when trying to 
understand the concept. 
 
3.2. The Quest for Definition  
 
 Since there is no unanimity in approach to defining corruption, one can merely note that 
the norms and specifics of one society do not always agree or correspond to the norms of 
another society. What emerges from this debate is that the term corruption is a relative 
concept. Like most activities, corruption is decidedly bounded on social, economic and 
political system and the historical experience of the country. What South Africans regard 
as legitimate, excusable or at least accepted business exchanges would be felonies in 
Congo or in Bosnia. This problem of normative evaluation has been illustrated by Arnold 
J. Heidenheimer (1970; 2002) who refers to this behaviour as “black”, “gray” or “white” 
corruption” (2001:152): 
 
• “Black corruption” indicates that in that setting that particular action is one, which a 
majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and would want to 
see punished on grounds of principles. This behaviour is judged particularly corrupt 
and heinous if both public officials and the public judge it corrupt and both want it 
restricted. This is an extreme case of corruption such as “a public official involved in 
heroin trafficking”, in “car hijackings” or in “children rapes” that this category in that 
both groups find the acts reprehensible and demand punishment for the culprit. 
•  “Gray corruption” indicates that some elements, usually elites, may want to see the 
action punished, others not, and the majority may well be ambivalent. This type is 
considered as the most difficult to define and to detect, and consequently is potentially 
most destructive to a political system organized along democratic principles. For 
instance, organized crime syndicates can succeed only by colluding with corrupt 
functionaries of the state in the criminal justice system. Such officials are easily 
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“bought” by syndicate members, who are able to amass huge profits, as the demand 
for their goods is high in a restricted market created by the illegality of their goods. 
•  “White corruption” signifies that the majority of both elite and mass opinion probably 
would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of corruption that they 
regard as tolerable. This implies that they attach less value to the maintenance of the 
values involved than they do to the costs that might be generated as the result of a 
change in rule enforcement.  This is “petty” or “routine” corruption as members of the 
public bribe traffic officials to avoid arrest for speeding or another related offence.  
 
3.3. Working Definitions 
 
Generally, when we think of corruption what comes to mind are images of immorality, 
depravity, dishonesty, decay or alteration; images of something that is in the process of 
decay, disintegration, decomposition or putrefaction, or of someone morally depraved and 
wicked, open to dishonest practices, especially bribery. The term corruption comes from 
corruptus the past participle of the Latin verb corrumpere, to destroy or rumpere (as com-, 
rumpere), to break. “This implies that something is destroyed or badly broken. This 
something might be a moral or ethical code or, more often, an administrative rule or a law. 
The person who breaks it derives therefore from some recognizable benefit for 
him/herself, family, tribe, party or some other relevant group” (Hope, 2000:18). 
 
This approach brings us close to the definition of corruption with which we shall primarily 
be concerned in this study; one that relates specifically to the sphere of government and 
administration, to the discharge of public duties. Heidenheimer refers to the Oxford 
English Dictionary that identifies political corruption as “perversion or destruction of 
integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour; the use or existence of 
corrupt practices, especially bribery or fraud, in a state, public corporation, etc.” 
(2001:6). 
 
Despite definitional ambiguities, most scholars agree that corruption in the public sector is 
broadly viewed as the “use of public office for private gain” (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998:7). 
This broad definition encompasses most of the illicit practices one finds within any single 
organization. Other definitions of corruption have been offered. For instance, 
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Heidenheimer (1970: 4-6; 2001:7-8) has identified usages that seek to define corruption in 
terms of one of three basic models or concepts, as follows: 
 
1. The largest group of social science writers that include David H. Bayley, G. Myrdal 
and J.S. Nye, have followed the Oxford definition and relate their definitions of corruption 
essentially to concepts concerning the duties of the public office, and deviations from 
norms and regulations binding office holders or public office-centered definitions. In this 
context, “corruption, while being tied particularly to the act of bribery, is a general term 
covering misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not 
to be monetary” (Heidenheimer, 2001:7). 
 
2. Another group (J. Van Klaveren, N. Leff, Rose Ackerman) develops definitions that are 
primarily related to demand, supply, and exchange concepts derived from economic 
theory or market-centered definitions. They are based on theories of the market where 
office bearers regard the office as a business through which they must maximize their 
income. The office then becomes a “maximizing point” (Klaveren, 1970:39), and the size 
of the income is directly dependent on the market situation and the talents for finding the 
points of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve. 
 
3. A third group (James C. Scott, Friedrich) discusses corruption more with regard to the 
concept of the public interest or public interest-centered definitions. Writers here feel that 
the first set of definitions is too narrowly conceived and the second set too broadly 
conceived. They tend to maintain that the embattled concept of “public interest” is not 
only still useful but necessary to illustrate the essence of concepts like corruption. The 
point here is that corruption occurs when a public officer and power holder, charged with 
certain responsibilities, is induced by monetary and other rewards to take actions 
favourable to the provider of rewards and, hence, damage the public and its interests. A 
corrupt act, in this sense, violates responsibilities in the civil order since common interests 
are violated for special advantage in the sense of transgressing public duty and misusing 
public functions. Although this approach has been found unable to give one answer that 
everyone accepts due to its broadness and ambiguity, it may, however, raise important 
questions to consider in judging situations.  
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4. The fourth criterion, as underlined by Gardiner (2001:25, 32), defines corruption by 
public opinion definitions, by the people who are both the ultimate authorities in 
democratic nations and the ones who by their complacency and their collusion may 
contribute to corruption taking place or who by their vigilance and integrity may assist 
authorities in monitoring public officials. The picture is about how the people in a nation 
define corruption. Why should public opinion be used to define corruption? It should be 
noted that effective action against corruption would be difficult or impossible if public 
opinion does not correspond to the statute’s definitions as public opinion may vary 
according to circumstances. The ‘black”, “gray” and “white” corruption illustration 
applies quite well to this approach. 
 
Otherwise, in trying to come to grips with the concept of corruption, one becomes acutely 
aware that there are divergences regarding “corruption” as defined in the official laws of 
each country, “corruption” as it affects the public, and “corruption” as defined by public 
opinion. 
 
This thesis’ concern will mainly lie with actions specifically related to the sphere of 
government and administration. Therefore, the thesis’s working definition of corruption 
will be centered on the public office-centered approach, related to public duties, and 
deviations from norms and regulations binding office holders, in a much broader sense. In 
this respect we refer to Nye’s celebrated definition that identifies “corruption” as: 
 
 “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family’, private clique) pecuniary or status gains, or violates 
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes 
such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a 
position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reasons of ascriptive relationship 
rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for 
private-regarding uses” (Nye, 1970:566-567). 
 
From this perspective, corruption may relate to the misuse of authority or office for 
personal gain, which may not be monetary. Thus a public official is seen to be corrupt if 
he or she accepts “inducements” to do something that is his or her responsibility to do in 
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the first place, or if he or she does what he or she is supposed to do as duties associated 
with a public role because of private, pecuniary or status gain. In other words, corruption 
can be understood as “improper and selfish exercise of power and influence attached to a 
public office or to the special position one occupies in public life” (Santhanam Committee 
Report: 1964:5). 
  
In South Africa, the word corruption is used to refer to a dishonest, bribable, fraudulent or 
dishonourable action by a political office-bearer, public official or other person. Every 
such corrupt action will be an unaccountable action. Thus it is obvious that “an 
accountable government and public administration will have to be uncorrupted” (Cloete, 
1996:28). The statutory definition of corruption is contained in the Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1992 (Act 94 of 1992) that defined corruption as “the abuse of (public) 
power for illegitimate or illegal gain or profit” (Country Corruption Assessment Report, 
April 2003:28). Nevertheless, the Report stipulates that there are four criteria, which have 
to be met: 
 
1. There must be an offer and/ or receipt of a benefit; 
2. The benefit must not be legally due; 
3. It must be for a person holding office; and lastly, 
4. The purpose, for which the benefit is given and/or received, must be to influence a 
person in the exercise of his/her power to do something or not to do something. 
 
According to Bauer, former South African Auditor General Peter Wronsley underlined 
this viewpoint by assuming that “corruption is the abuse by the incumbent of a public 
office or position of his statutory or regulatory authority or discretionary power, whether 
by omission or commission, so as to improperly benefit himself and/or others” 
(2000:218). 
 
Otherwise, anyone who “gives or offers to give any benefit” not “legally due” to any 
person who has any power or duty “by virtue of any employment” with the intention to 
influence or reward the person to “commit or omit to do any act in relation to such power 
or duty” is guilty of corruption (Republic of South Africa 1992:2-3).  
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Also declared to be guilty is anyone who has such power or duty by virtue of employment 
and “receives or attempts to receive” a benefit for committing or omitting to do any act in 
relation to such power or duty. Thus, it is clear, a corrupt act involves at least two parties, 
a “corrupter” on the one hand, and the “corruptee” on the other hand. It implies an 
exchange of some benefit that is not legally required in return for favourable treatment 
relating to the exercise of the powers or responsibilities of an office (Syed and Bruce, 
1997:3). Examples of such deviant behaviour are “preference given to certain tenders, 
irregular granting of contracts, and deviations from laid down rules and procedures”  
(Bauer, 2000:219). 
 
This definition of corruption in terms of Act 94 of 1992, as President Mbeki has pointed 
out, “is predicated mainly on the notion of inducement and seems to ignore the inherent 
conflict of interest between public and private interest” (1999:4). In other words, the 
benefit from corruptible behaviour by the public official does not necessarily have to be of 
a financial nature but can be related to the irregular advancement of the individual, family 
members or friends. What appears to be the most important aspect of corruption is that 
private gain was secured at public expense. 
 
However, the new Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act no 12, 2004 
provides a workable definition of corruption and reinstates the common law crime of 
bribery and extends the scope of the Act to all public officials, private persons and their 
agents. In terms of offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to public officers, the 
Act states: 
 
“Is guilty of the offence of corrupt activities relating to public officers, any public officer 
who, directly or indirectly, accepts or offers to accept any gratification from any other 
person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benfit of another person; or 
person who directly or indirectly, gives or agrees to give any gratification to a public 
officer, whether for the benfit of the public or for the benefit of another person inorder to 
act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner that amounts to the 
illegal, dishonest, unauthorized or misuse or selling of information … or the abuse of a 
position of authority … or any other unauthorized or improper inducement to do or not to 
do anything….” (Act no 12, 2004, 28 April 2004). 
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The Act no 12, 2004 makes provision for new offences within the broad category of 
corruption. 
  
All these approaches are better known as formal and social. Legal definitions are 
examples of formal definitions. Meny (1996:310), quoted in Syed and Bruce (1997:3), 
suggests that the “advantage of this approach is that it provides “safety and certainty” and 
gives a clear statement of what constitutes corruption”. The problem here is that this 
approach excludes many forms of illicit behaviour that most of ordinary citizens would 
consider as corrupt. The requirement of two parties involvement, for example, rules out 
any activity such as theft, fraud, favouritism that an official may engage in alone, or at 
least without a “corrupter”. While many of these acts may be identified as corrupt, they 
fall outside the strict legal definition. 
 
 Obviously, while the legal definition suffers from being too narrow, the social approach 
or public opinion definitions uses broad generalizations and principles. It places emphasis 
on morality, viewed as the “political” definition. The major problem with the social 
definition is that it is too vague as it depends on finding a consensus as to what is integrity 
or what qualifies as morality. The benefit of this approach however, as stressed by Talha 
Syed and David Bruce (1997:3) is that, it provides us with a way to evaluate more 
narrowly focused formal definitions. In addition, it can serve as a useful check, bringing to 
our attention major incongruencies between what members of the public view as corrupt 
and what any one definition identifies. Without such a check, any formal definition, which 
simply seeks clarity and, some measure of objectivity is in danger of sidestepping 
important ethical principles and values and thus becoming irrelevant. 
 
Therefore, having worked through various components of a definition of corruption, we 
can now express our own. In this study, public sector corruption can be understood as: 
“The privatization of government functions by people in position of trust for personal 
gains”.  
 
This is a behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil 
servants, whether policy-makers or administrators, through which they improperly and 
unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power 
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entrusted to them. This implies “the utilization of official positions or titles for personal or 
private gain, either on an individual or collective basis, at the expense of the public good, 
in violation of established rules and ethical considerations, and through the direct or 
indirect participation of one or more public officials whether they be politicians or 
bureaucrats” (Hope, 2000:18). 
 
This definition clearly suits the Gauteng investigations as well as several other 
manifestations of abuse of power on the part of public officials as dealt with in this work. 
However, as Klitgaard has claimed, “definitions are not static. Societies’ understanding of 
what counts as “corrupt” evolves. Over time societies have been able to make finer 
distinctions between “bribe” and allowable “reciprocity” or “transaction” - and have been 
more able to make these distinctions practically effective. And at any time in a society we 
are likely to find at least four different definitions of a bribe: “that of the more advanced 
moralists; that of the law as written; that of the law as in any degree enforced; that of 
common practice” (1988:23). 
 
3.4. Forms of Corruption 
 
Corruption can manifest, in one form or in another. But the forms that are the most 
identified and considered in corruption literature include bribery, embezzlement, fraud and 
extortion, perceived to be at the root of some basic varieties of corruption. This study 
refers to Andvig and Fjeldstad’s typology (2000:14-18) of the forms of corruption one 
expects to find in a given administration: 
 
1. Bribery: paying or receiving money or favours in a corrupt relationship to secure 
himself a personal benefit. A bribe is any amount of money paid to a civil servant 
who misuses his public power to distribute benefits to companies or individuals. 
These benefits or favours may include fraudulent acquisition of documents such as 
import/export licenses and quotas; large state contracts in civil engineering 
projects, construction works or defense supplies, etc.  Bribery also comes under 
different forms according to the culture of the country and common names are 
kickbacks, gratuities, baksheesh, sweeteners, speed or grease money, and payoffs. 
In South Africa, the most used term is cool drink or ukunyoba in iXosa that often 
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involve the payment of something to a policeman to avoid a fine or to a public 
agent at the licensing department to jump the queue or at the Metropolitan Council 
to escape having your water and electricity cut off.  
2. Embezzlement: is the theft of state assets by state agents who steal from the public 
institution where they are employed and from resources they are supposed to 
administer on behalf of the public. While legally not considered as corruption, 
embezzlement is nevertheless included in the broader definitions of corruption and 
does not involve what scholars call the “civilian” side. In Gauteng, events in the 
Health Department and the Department of Transport and Public Works concerning 
the theft of state properties – as pointed out in the course of this work - was not 
less than another form of embezzlement, a power abuse that cost millions to these 
departments. In many African countries, embezzlement is still a fundamental part 
of the resource extractive capacity of the ruling elite, as last developments in 
Congo-Kinshasa have shown with the looting and pillaging of economic resources 
by its elites. Also the nationalization of white farms in Zimbabwe and their 
redistribution to the members of the ruling families goes into this category.  
3. Fraud: is the use of false representations, manipulation or distortion of information, 
facts and expertise by public officials to gain an unjust advantage. Fraud occurs 
when politicians and state agents take a share for “closing their eyes” on economic 
crimes, and more serious when they have an active role in it. Many cases of fraud 
were reported in Gauteng, as we will see. 
4. Extortion:  the use of force, threats or persistent demands by the state or its 
security services to extract money or other resources from individuals, groups and 
businesses. There is also what is labeled as ‘informal” form of taxation. This is 
when “various state officials extract “under the table” fees and “gifts” from 
individual citizens as they approach the state as clients, customers, patients, school 
children, etc., as stated by Andvig and Fjeldstad (2000:17). 
5. Favouritism: crudely put, it is the unfair favouring of one person or group at the 
expense of another. According to the corruption literature, favouritism is closely 
related to corruption insofar as it implies a corrupted (undemocratic, “privatized”) 
distribution of resources. Otherwise, favouritism is the penchant of state officials 
and politicians, who have access to state resources and the power to decide upon 
the distribution of these, to give preferential treatment to certain people. 
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Clientelism and nepotism are the most known forms of corruption. Clientelist 
favouritism is the rather everyday proclivity of most people to favour their own kin 
(family, clan, tribe, ethnic, religious or regional group). Favouritism and cronyism 
is for instance to grant an office to a friend or a relative, regardless of merit. In 
South Africa, mainly whites view affirmative action policy as a discrimination 
against them to favour blacks. Nepotism: is when an office holder is giving 
preference to his proper kinfolk and family members (wife, brothers and sisters, 
children, nephews, cousins, in-laws, etc.) to secure positions in the state apparatus. 
Cases of nepotism were rife in the public service in Gauteng between 1996 and 
1999, but after investigations there was not enough evidence to prove it.  
 
3.5. Political Versus Bureaucratic Corruption 
 
While this study’s focus is on public sector corruption which incidence can have political 
implications, it is important to clarify the ambiguity that exists between bureaucratic and 
political corruption, as both are located within the institutions of government such as 
legislature, courts, bureaucracies and statutory bodies (parastatal corporations or 
commissions) 
 
1. Political corruption is the use of state resources for personal use and/or political 
legitimation. The abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain with the 
objective of increasing power or wealth. Similarly, it is useful to distinguish between 
"grand corruption," which involves corrupt politicians and policy-makers such as senior 
officials, cabinet ministers, and heads of state, and "petty corruption". Grand corruption3, 
is located at the highest levels of political authority and the figures involved are significant. 
These officials establish and implement the laws in the name of the people but are corrupt 
themselves. Here are well and highly placed public figures who abuse their positions to 
extract huge bribes from national and international corporations. Sometimes they are 
involved in contract scams when dealing with procurement supplies if they are not busy 
embezzling and siphoning large amounts of money from public treasury into private bank 
 
3 The expression "grand corruption" was first used by George Moody-Stuart in The Good Business Guide 
to Bribery (Berlin, Transparency International, 1994). He defined it as "the misuse of public power by heads 
of state, ministers, and top officials for private pecuniary profit." 
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accounts. The ‘arms deal’ is the best-case scenario and to some extent the ‘floor-crossing 
policy’ in parliament that allows legislators to swap allegiance by crossing to another 
party for their sole and own benefit. This floor-crossing policy came after legislation has 
been tailored to benefit them. 
 
2. Bureaucratic or administrative corruption is incidence of corrupt practices in the 
interaction between citizens and officials in the public service. But the interaction occurs 
at “low level” or “street level” known as petty corruption, at the implementation end of 
politics. This involves those who execute government policy or low-level officials such as 
agency bureaucrats, immigration and customs officials, policemen, etc. Petty corruption is 
what citizens will experience daily in their encounter with public administration and 
services like hospitals, schools, licensing department, taxing officials, and so on. One can 
understand why it is frequently referred to as  “routine corruption”.  
 
In addition, the TI Source Book suggests that “there are two quite separate categories of 
administrative corruption: the first occurs where, for example, services or contracts are 
provided “according-to-rule” and the second, where transactions are “against-the-rule”. In 
the first situation, an official is receiving private gain illegally for doing something, which 
he or she is ordinarily required to do by law. In the second situation, the bribe is paid to 
obtain services that the official is prohibited from providing. “According-to-rule” and 
“against-the-rule” corruption can occur at all levels of the government hierarchy and range 
in scale and impact from “grand corruption” to more ordinary, small scale varieties” 
(1996:1-2). 
 
By way of illustration, the Global Corruption Barometer 2004 paints a picture of people 
around the world gravely concern about these forms of corruption in political life, as 
shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Petty vs. Grand Corruption 
  
Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004 
 
The general public believe that political or “grand corruption” is a more serious problem 
than “petty corruption”. The TI Global Corruption Barometer 2004 rated “grand 
corruption” among the four most urgent problems, while “petty corruption” rated slightly 
lower. The other most urgent problems identified by the Barometer were unemployment 
and insecurity (3.5), followed with a score of 3.4 by poverty, high prices or inflation, and 
“grand” or “political corruption”. Environmental problems, “petty” or “administrative 
corruption”, and human rights violation come next with a score of 3. Anyway “grand 
corruption” was considered a very big problem by substantially more respondents around 
the world (57%) than those who said the same about “petty corruption”. 
 
This distinction shows clearly that the incentives underlying both corruptions are quite 
different and should be treated separately. Nevertheless, the significance of this separation 
can be understood in terms of analytic purposes only. Bureaucratic and political corruption 
can be treated as dimensions of the same phenomenon as demonstrated by numerous 
studies. From this perspective, scholars such as Theobald have concluded, “although 
administrative roles are more narrowly circumscribed than those of politicians, 
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nonetheless, it is clear that “all administrative roles have a political dimension”. 
Subsequently, administrative and political corruptions are just different sides of the same 
coin” (1990:18). Theobald’s viewpoint has been corroborated by Andvig and Fjeldstad’s 
research  (2000) that explains this ambiguity while adding the simultaneous incidence of 
both political and bureaucratic corruptions that tends to go along and to be mutually 
reinforcing. They assume that “political corruption is usually supported by widespread 
bureaucratic or petty corruption, in a pyramid of upward extraction. And corruption in 
high places is contagious to lower level officials, as these will follow the predatory 
examples of, or even take instruction from, their principals” ((2000:19).  
   
It is thus difficult to understand why corruption occurs, without understanding the role of 
the state. Therefore, this study’s conceptual definition of public sector corruption as the 
“abuse of public power for private gain” becomes clearer and more comprehensive. 
 
3.6. Public Office versus Private Domain 
 
The separation between political and bureaucratic corruption leads us to another 
separation: that between the public office and the private domain following the Weberian 
separation of politics and administration. As the incidence of political corruption is located 
within public institutions, it is therefore arguable that a conception of public office 
obviously depends upon the existence of a public domain, which is recognizably separate 
from the private sphere. For the purpose of the present review, it is important to put the 
discussion in perspective. One notes that government inquiries in South Africa have 
produced evidence of corruption by public officials as well as members of the private 
sector, making people aware that something was going wrong in the public service. Here 
as well elsewhere corruption within public offices is a serious problem in its own right and 
a symptom of deeper crises. In a recent survey of more than 150 high-ranking public 
officials and key members of civil society from more than 60 developing countries, the 
respondents ranked public sector corruption as the most severe impediment to 
development and growth in their countries (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998:7). 
 
Recent research emphasizes the importance of the public office. It has been suggested that 
the public sector is a qualitatively different sphere of human affairs from the private 
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sector. The state and public officials are responsible for administering public resources on 
behalf of the entire society. Unlike the private sector, adult members of society have no 
choice but to pay taxes and rates in order to meet the salaries of the public officials who 
administer their resources (Colm Allan, 1999:2). In Africa especially, the public sector 
plays such a large and central role in the society, usually encompassing economic 
activities left to private firms in many nations of the industrialized West. Often there are 
few or no alternatives to the party or ruler in power (Klitgaard, 1988:10). 
 
The management of such a big sector requires some degree of accountability and 
efficiency. This is reflected in some working definitions that we have employed in the 
core of this paper. That is why terms such as misappropriation, mismanagement and 
maladministration became key words in the study of political corruption. 
Misappropriation means taking (money) for a wrong or dishonest use, fraud, 
embezzlement or thieving. Mismanagement is the organization, the running or handling of 
something badly or wrongly. While maladministration is defined as acts of commission or 
omission that lead to a loss of public resources but don’t result in private gain. In terms of 
Public Administration, all three concepts lead to unprofessional conduct, which implies 
incompetence and failure to comply with obligations under an Act or Regulation. This is 
the use of power for unauthorized purpose, otherwise, abuse of power. 
 
Scrutinizing these definitions give us insight into the structural conditions which give rise 
to weak financial controls, poor management, and enable the maladministration of public 
resources. It is these structural conditions that facilitate individual acts of corruption on 
the part of public officials. 
 
Generally speaking, many people in positions of trust have put their own interests first and 
the general interest of the country last. Some politicians and top businessmen continue to 
rob the country of its wealth by “confusing their pockets with the Treasury”. As a result, 
the widespread failure to administer public resources in an effective and accountable 
manner has a more damaging impact on social well being than individual instances of 
corruption. 
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In terms of public office, despite the fact that the existence of bureaucratic forms of 
organization has been acknowledged in all areas of human activity, it is arguable that it is 
in the state apparatus where these forms first emerged. There is general agreement among 
scholars that any conception of public office is strongly influenced by Max Weber’s ideal 
type or rational-legal bureaucracy. 
 
Regardless of difficulties in developing countries to implement this model, as seen, 
Weber’s bureaucracy has been described universally at all times as “ideal”. Its main 
characteristics remain its hierarchical order constituted of corps of officials whose 
recruitment and promotion hang on criteria such as educational qualifications and 
professional experience; regularly salaried and graded according to rank and 
qualifications; and who are appointed to fixed jurisdictional areas governed by clearly laid 
down rules and procedures. Theobald (1990) stresses that, “the core characteristics of this 
type of bureaucracy are impartiality, impersonality and, above all the strict separation of 
incumbent and offices”. Moreover, “the development of the nation state in the nineteenth 
century resulted in the consolidation of modern public administration; the appearance of 
the career public servant who allegedly makes decisions on the basis of neutral, 
universalistic criteria and scrupulously segregates public affairs from personal interests” 
(1990:2-3). 
 
The South African public administration is based on the same type of bureaucracy, as 
evidenced by its history and its political environment. Not so incidentally, Weber’s notion 
of bureaucracy was modeled on the Prussian idea of service in which the Junker class was 
conscripted into state service. The royal servants remained although they received fixed 
salaries, “the legitimate collectors of elastic and often very lucrative emoluments of 
office”, which entitled them to the private appropriation of a certain share in the fees, 
collected both on behalf of the ruler and on behalf of the municipal and ecclesiastical 
treasuries within their jurisdictions (Rosenberg, 1958:103). They were rewarded by being 
exempt from taxes, which by contemporary standards, might be thought to be a form of 
corruption. 
 
During the apartheid era, there were perceptions that the South African bureaucracy was 
relatively effective and comparatively efficient in contrast to other colonial 
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administrations in Africa. Scholarly studies (Lodge, 1998; Posel, 1999) show that white 
domination of the state during colonization and apartheid did not give opportunity to 
blacks to govern as elsewhere, may have hampered what Lodge portrays as “the 
persistence of old pre-industrial cultures of tribute” (1998:157). Perhaps the nature of the 
apartheid state justified these perceptions as expressed by Lodge in the same work: “as a 
fairly industrialized and extremely coercive state the apartheid order may have been less 
susceptible to many of the forms of political corruption analysts have associated with 
other postcolonial developing countries” (Lodge, 1998: 162). Posel notes, though, that 
after 1948 and particularly after 1960 “inefficiency and low productivity plunged to new 
depths” resulting in “complaints about lethargy and mediocrity in the civil service that 
spanned the job hierarchy” (1999:108). 
 
To put this concern into perspective, Payne had pointed out before that, “by its very 
nature, every bureaucracy tends to become a conspiratorial organization. Every 
bureaucracy becomes a closed society demanding implicit loyalty from its members. 
Implanted in all members are the needs to serve the bureaucracy first and the public 
second. The bureaucracy’s mistakes must be covered up, its black sheep removed as 
silently as possible” (1975:24).  Posel calls this, “the quiescence of white civil servants”, 
when referring to the apartheid bureaucracy. This is a familiar picture of bureaucracies in 
the African countries known as “neo-patrimonial states”.  
 
Subsequently, it is necessary, at all costs - to maintain the fiction that bureaucracy works 
only for the public interest and is not in the least concerned with the perpetuation and 
increase of its own powers. The power wielded by a bureaucracy is so great that the 
temptations of corruption must always exist. In South Africa, “the massive expansion of 
the apparatus of the state, the vast complexity of the apartheid system and the strongly 
administrative bias of much of apartheid legislation, all contributed to the enormous 
powers wielded by civil servants”, as noted by Posel (1999:111). While this picture is 
“workable” in a dictatorship, it would be difficult to sustain it in a democratic state with its 
checks and balance systems. 
 
 Power generates corruption. Wherever men exercise power there is the presumption that 
some of them will be corrupted by it. The apartheid bureaucracy could not slip out of this 
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rule of the game: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Lord 
Acton, 1887). 
 
3.7. Deviationism: 
 
There has been some debate over unethical practices in the public sector that have been 
seen as deviation from the norms of public offices. Analysts believe that one of the most 
difficult governmental problems to solve is unethical behaviour by public officers and 
employees. Arguably, bureaucratic roles in Max Weber’s ideal type of rational-legal 
bureaucracy are commonly conceived in terms of a set of rules and procedures, which are 
precisely formulated so that non-compliance is immediately and unequivocally apparent. 
The problem of unethical practices in the public sector persists, however, and will 
continue as long as government leaders continue to tolerate and, even worse, contribute to 
the problem. 
 
The most serious ethical problem involves public officers who exercise broad 
discretionary authority since opportunities to do favours in exchange for gifts and 
gratuities are manifold. However, explanations to this behaviour are given indicating that 
in fact, the vast body of literature on formal organizations clearly demonstrates that public 
officials exercise public duties that involve an element of discretion or flexibility in the 
interpretation of the Law. Indeed writers such as Theobald have argued that “without this 
area of discretion bureaucracies could not function; rigid adherence to the rules would 
rapidly bring administration to a standstill. Therefore to base one’s conception of 
corruption on deviations from the norms of public office when such deviations are usual, 
if not necessary, is to invite confusion” (1990:4). Despite these objections, this trouble 
exists in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government in all political 
systems and at all levels: local, provincial and national, in both developed and developing 
countries. 
 
Thus ethical problems are not limited to this type of blatant conduct only. The range of 
unethical and corrupt practices covers almost every aspect of the practice of government. 
Common corrupt practices that can be detected in any public administration include: 
public officers and employees doing favours for friends and relatives, stealing government 
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equipment and supplies, using public motor vehicles for private purposes, refusing to 
provide government information to citizens without justification, etc. Generally speaking, 
corrupt practices have the effect of poisoning the well of the public trust and confidence in 
any democratic form of government. They affect the work of government managers, 
supervisors, and their staffs. These tax-supported employees are charged with the day-to-
day responsibility for collecting garbage, enforcing the law, paving and maintaining 
streets, regulating utilities, protecting the environment, zoning for land use, and a myriad 
of other visible and behind the-scenes services for which ordinary people pay. 
 
Obviously, ethical problems, as Zimmerman (1994) held, “are associated with 
misfeasance and nonfeasance as well as malfeasance. The failure of a responsible officer 
to remove an incompetent public servant is a violation of the fiduciary duty of the officer. 
Similarly, holders of positions with no duties are sinecurists defrauding the taxpayers” 
(1994:vii). The countless consequences of such acts are those presented by Zimmerman 
who ascribes them to the ingenuity of the human mind. Therefore, as he notes, “if 
improper behaviour becomes common in a government, the burden placed on taxpayers 
will become a significant one. Such behaviour will undermine citizen support of the 
government, and public policies will be implemented without the cooperation or with the 
opposition of citizens. As a result, the effectiveness of the policies will be weakened and 
the costs of implementation increased” (Zimmerman: 1994:1). 
 
Other scholars argue that there is no excuse for unethical behaviour in the practice of 
government. Fraud, waste, and abuse have no place in government, and their costs in 
reduced or poor quality services requires that we refuse to accept unethical conduct on the 
part of government officials at all levels (Steinberg and Austern: 1990:5). 
 
3.8. The Expansion of Corruption 
 
As the debate continues, it emerges so far that the question of how to stem corrupt 
behaviour is receiving serious international attention with several organizations such as 
the World Bank or Transparency International themselves being dedicated players. Such 
bodies emphasize the negative effects of corrupt practices on development and pledge to 
implement policies which sharpen the responses against corruption and reduce the 
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possibility of personal enrichment by corrupt officials.  The International Monetary Fund, 
the OECD and the UNDP initiatives to curb corruption led to the development of 
particular anti-corruption programmes to assist countries in tackling the problem. At the 
beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century research on corruption was a small 
field. Nowadays, however, a large number of articles and reports are published on a 
regular basis and academics have brought to light a new flurry of empirical research on the 
causes and consequences of corruption.  
 
But corruption is not a new game. It is an ancient problem. In China, at the times of the 
Shang dynasty (ca. 1766-1122 B.C.), there was an entirely different attitude toward the 
corruption of the state and the corruption of tyrannical rulers, as argued by Payne (1975). 
There, when the emperor became tyrannical, ruling in a purely arbitrary fashion and out of 
touch with the people, it was believed that the “Mandate of Heaven” had been removed 
from him and at such times it was the right and duty of the people to overthrow him and 
even to destroy him. The Mandate was granted to the emperor in trust and he retained it 
only so long as he ruled virtuously, in conformity with the wisdom of the ancient sage-
kings. When he failed, he lost all the prerogatives of kingship and was regarded as corrupt 
(Payne, 1975:124). In India, two thousand years ago, Kautilya, a prime minister of an 
Indian king, discusses corruption in his Arthashastra, a treatise on public administration 
(Bardhan, 2002:321).  
 
Today, many governments have made corruption explicitly a crime and the degree of 
attention paid to corruption is soaring. Likewise, the American Constitution made bribery 
one of two explicitly-mentioned crimes, which could lead to the impeachment of a US 
president. Corruption’s new political significance led The Financial Times to proclaim the 
year 1995 as the “year of corruption”. Why this sudden attention now when one knows 
that corruption has always been with us from the beginnings of times?  Is it because with 
democracy there are high expectations today than in the past? Or is it because the media is 
now paying more attention to the phenomenon that always existed but was often ignored? 
There is no tailor-made answer to these questions due to the lack of reliable statistics and 
the inner nature of corruption itself. 
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However, it is interesting to emphasize the significance of several arguments advanced in 
the corruption literature that assume that corruption is simply attracting more attention 
now than in the past, as Tanzi has suggested (1998:4-5):  
  
1. The end of the Cold War has halted the political hypocrisy that had made the rulers 
in some industrial countries ignore the political corruption that had mushroomed in 
particular countries, such as former Zaire, Nigeria or Ghana. As long as these 
countries remained in the right political camp, there was a tendency to overlook 
obvious cases of high-level corruption. 
2. Perhaps because of lack of information, or reluctance to talk about it by those 
familiar with these countries, there was also a tendency not to focus on corruption 
in the centrally planned economies such as the Soviet Union. Those imitating them 
through highly regimented economic activities such as Nicaragua and Tanzania 
experienced a considerable quantity of corrupt practices. Donor countries also 
played down this problem in countries, which they assisted financially, even in the 
face of misuse or misappropriation of foreign aid.  
3. The increase during the last decade in the number of countries with democratic 
governments and free media has created an environment in which discussion of 
corruption is no longer a taboo. In Russia, for instance, the media has responded 
with a vengeance to its newly acquired freedom. 
4. Globalization has brought into frequent contacts individuals from countries with 
little corruption with those from countries where corruption is endemic, leading to 
the increase in the international attention paid to corruption. 
5. The growing role that has been played by nongovernmental organizations, such as 
Transparency International, in publicizing the problem of corruption and in trying 
to create anti-corruption movements in many countries and empirical studies of 
corruption have contributed to a greater awareness of this problem. 
6. The great reliance on the market in economic decisions has created an environment 
in which the pursuit of efficiency has acquired greater importance and where 
distortions attributed to corruption attracts more attention. 
 
These entire hypotheses, though not exhaustive, illuminate the growth in reportage of the 
phenomenon that culminated in a peak in corruption activities in the last decade. 
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Meanwhile, we have to keep in mind that political corruption is a difficult topic to define 
and investigate empirically. As A.J. Heidenheimer has observed, "the phenomenon has 
been neither neatly measured nor illuminated by much highly visible scholarship. It 
belongs to a third category of political phenomena that has been subject to academic 
attention only occasionally. Most members of established academic disciplines have left 
the investigation of political corruption to journalists and other purely descriptive or 
impressionistic writers" (1970:v). 
 
Even in a country like the USA it is surprising that political science, while developing a 
sizable literature on political corruption, has hardly made it a central topic of investigation. 
A number of American scholars concede that despite its frequent occurrence, 
governmental corruption has undergone surprisingly little systematic investigation (Peter 
de Leon, 1993:9).  
  
In South Asia, Myrdal’s account of the disinterest of Western scholars in the problem of 
corruption led him to call their attitudes an example of “diplomacy in research” and 
identified “the taboo on research” on corruption as, indeed, one of the most flagrant 
examples of this general bias (1970:230).  Whereas Andreski argued that “the conspiracy 
of silence on the part of the great majority of European intellectuals, due to inverted 
racialism, prevents the dissemination of knowledge about this phenomenon” (Klitgaard, 
1988:9). 
 
Although the problem itself is not new, opportunities to work in this area have emerged 
only recently. Indeed, corruption is no longer a taboo topic, but one that policymakers, 
businesses, civil society organizations, media, and donors from all regions are confronting 
openly. Finally, to define corruption in a distinct country, one must understand the 
problem within the norms of that country. As Kpundeh underlines, “one of the major 
impediments to understanding bureaucratic fraud in African countries is the difficulty of 
defining the problem. Corruption is a heavily culture-laden concept tied directly to the 
predominant ethical values and social standards of each society” (1995:53).  
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After defining corruption and exploring the essential concepts associated with it, this study 
attempts to achieve its designed purpose by tackling the fundamental factors that mostly 
promote corruption. 
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Chapter Four 
CORRUPTION KEY FACTORS                                                       
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is about a cause and effect relationship involved in cases of corruption. 
Athough the incidence of corruption in South Africa does not reach endemic proportions, 
as it is the case in many parts of Africa; nevertheless, new scandals and allegations of 
unethical behaviour by public officials are of great concern. What are the underlying 
factors that lead to corrupt practices and the circumstances that promote corruption in 
formal relationships in a country such as South Africa? Otherwise what are the causes of 
corruption? In what conditions does corruption occur and who are involved in it? As far as 
causality is concerned, the World Bank has established that “the causes of corruption are 
usually complex and rooted in a country’s policies, bureaucratic traditions, political 
development and social history” (1998:2).  
 
Many analysts have assumed that an understanding of the root causes of corruption may 
lead to ways to overcome it, or at least to curtail its practices and mitigate its effects to 
such a degree that it no longer poses a threat to orderly public life (Le Vine, 1975:79). 
Therefore, the key to understanding the incidence of corruption is to begin by taking a 
close look at laws and institutions and subsequently, the incentive structures that regulate 
the behaviour of market participants.  
 
In addition, the chapter contains the causal model of corruption that provides a framework 
to help understand the causes of corruption before tackling the general typology of factors 
and circumstances contributing to corruption in South Africa, and analysing its main 
features in neo-patrimonial states in Africa. Its international dimensions, its expansion and 
its growing interests and attention in most countries and international agencies, including 
the Wolrd Bank, will form part of the conclusion to this chapter. 
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4.2. The Causal Model 
 
Research on the origins of corruption worldwide confirms that corruption is rooted in 
poorly functioning institutions, as well as in policies that undermine free trade and 
competition (Rose-Ackerman (1999); Mauro (1995); Treisman (2000).  
 
In an earlier discussion, Lambsdorff (1999:2) provides a comprehensive review of this 
literature that gives first insights into the causes of corruption and shows how empirical 
research on the causes of corruption is focused on political institutions, government 
regulations, legal systems, GDP-levels, salaries of public employees, gender, religion and 
other cultural determinants, poverty, as well as the role of colonialism and/or apartheid. 
However, the main problem that is often difficult to assess is whether corruption causes 
other variables or is itself the consequence of certain characteristics. But certain forms 
such as government involvement, poor institutions, inequality and absence of competition 
may all contribute to corruption.  
 
Recent studies have shown that corruption and the effects of corruption will often feed 
back into the various phenomena that have been labeled “causes”. Otherwise, the “causes” 
and “effects” of corruption are closely interrelated and can hardly be separated (Andvig et 
al., 2000:80, 91). These indicators and corruption are sometimes two sides of the same 
coin and could help to observe the correlations that have been reported, but as warned by 
Lambsdorff, one has to refrain from drawing iron-clad conclusions with respect to 
causalities (1999:2). Meanwhile, considering corruption as being caused by some factors 
otherwise independent of it, simplifies the empirical understanding and explanations of the 
phenomenon.  
 
Therefore, in an attempt to explain the causes of corruption, we will refer to a conceptual 
framework based upon two models supported by economic analysis as drawn by Tugrul 
Gurgur and Anwar Shah (2000:4-6). Economists are using either Becker’s “crime and 
punishment” model or Klitgaard’s “principal - agent” theory.   
 
According to Gurgur and Shah, these two models can be formulated as follows: 
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1. The first one puts more emphasis on an individual who compares the expected utilities 
of legal and illegal behaviour, where the latter involves some probability of detection 
and punishment. Fundamental propositions of this model are that the incidence of 
illegal behaviour is positively related to the potential gains from illegal activity and 
negatively related to the probability of conviction and the punishment. In Becker’s 
framework gains from legal activities are explicitly defined, on the one hand as the 
government wage, promotion, and public pension. On the other hand, potential gains 
from corrupt behaviour are assumed to be a function of variables describing the size 
and scope of the public sector. The more government involvement in market 
operations, the more opportunities for corruption become evident through discretion 
on regulations and allocation of resources. The bigger the government is, the more it 
allows corrupt officials to discover and auction more profitable parts of the 
government. Hence the role of institutions of accountability that have been pictured as 
mechanism that leads to detection and punishment of offenders. While Becker limited 
these institutions to the judiciary, it seems now they can be extended to political 
institutions and civil society as well. 
 
2. The second model or the principal-agent theory, used by leading scholars of the field 
such as Rose-Ackerman, Klitgaard or della Porta and Vannucci, treat corruption as an 
information problem on behalf of the “principal” who fails to control the “agent” 
properly. In this context the citizens who elect a politician are considered as the 
principals and the politician as the agents. The models primarily rely on the 
information problems in explaining the incidence of corruption. The monopoly power 
of officials and the degree of discretion they enjoy in exercising this power create 
formidable information problems in explaining the incidence of corruption. As a 
result, the principal-agent models heavily emphasize the importance of monitoring 
power of institutions and horizontal competition within the government as an antidote 
of corruption. 
 
As one can conclude, there is little difference between the crime-and-punishment model 
and the principal-agent model in explaining corruption. In both models corruption is 
viewed as a function of two major sets of variables: opportunities for corruption and 
controlling power of institutions. The first set deals with a range of variables from the size 
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of government to state intervention in the economy. Government wage and remuneration 
practices belong to this category. Whereas the second one captures various institutions 
such as internal control mechanisms, judiciary, and political institutions, and civil society, 
as observed by Gurgur and Shah (2000:8). Thus these two models will help to provide 
further insight into the understanding of causes of corruption.  
 
Nonetheless, it can be pointed out that while econometric studies provide useful empirical 
results in exploring causes of corruption, however, the regression results ought to be 
interpreted with some care, and should not be considered as substitute for historical 
analysis. According to Lancaster and Montinola (1997:185-206), in terms of analytical 
approach and methodology, comparative research on corruption should include three 
related tasks: 
 
1. The provision of causal explanation of co-variation among cases and correlation 
between corruption and other variables. Otherwise, empirical surveys or case 
studies may be necessary. 
2. The development of theoretical models that incorporate differences in context in 
order to illuminate causal relations. Cases studies may contribute to the 
understanding of certain aspects of corruption and thus, lay the foundation for new 
hypotheses 
3. Empirical verification of theoretically derived models or regressions to estimate 
numerical values for coefficients in theoretical models. Lack of objective data 
reduces the value of empirical verifications. Consequently, step one and two in this 
approach become more important and can support theoretical models and improve 
our understanding of corruption. 
 
In the same vein, “to understand the logic of corruption, it is necessary to analyse the 
relationship existing in the state between the agent, the person delegated to take decisions, 
and the principal, on whose behalf that agent acts” (della Porta and Vannucci, 1999:16). 
Consequently behind every corrupt exchange there are three subjects: principal, agent, and 
corrupter and the functioning of a democratic government cannot, in fact, be conceived 
outside this system of principal-agent relationships between electorate, elected officials, 
and bureaucrats.  
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In exploring governmental corruption causes functionalist writers have distinguished three 
categories of theoretical explanations: systemic, institutional, and individual. Scholars 
such as S. John Kpundeh and M. Johnston, highlight the importance of using all three 
explanations to analyze corruption since each explanation has several drawbacks. To base 
explanations of corruption solely on one of them is to take the easy way out (Kpundeh, 
1995:6). Theoretical rationalizations of corruption may be explained within the scope of 
these recognizable categories:  
 
1. Personalistic Explanations: Corruption is the work of people, and when individuals or 
small groups are found to have broken the rules governing public roles, it is tempting to 
search for causes in the personal qualities (real or imagined) of those involved. Personal or 
individual level analysis of corruption holds that corruption is simply a consequence of 
human nature as human beings are all subject to greed and can behave corruptly to 
rationally maximize their gain. 
 
Bribes and extortion are typical examples seen among public servants. Individual 
explanations associate corruption with individuals who, provided with enough 
opportunities, will act corruptly. In this case, corruption may be motivated by conditions 
such as personal financial problems, especially indebtedness; a corporate climate 
conducive to corruption, for example the “everyone else is doing it syndrome”; 
disgruntlement and malice, for example officers who think they have been wronged may 
want to get even; rivalries and cooperation problems; low pay and perks; ego, and the 
“Robin Hood syndrome” - to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor through fraud 
(Jones, 1993:2). 
 
Other explanations include “excessive consumption of alcohol, extramarital activities, 
speculative losses, excessive gambling, “causes related to vanity”, administrative 
disorganization and “the thirst for illicit enrichment” (Klitgaard, 1988:xi). 
 
2. Institutional Explanations: Are useful as a framework to help describe corruption as a 
deep-seated problem, rather than merely as the workings of a few bad individuals. Most 
institutional corruption can be attributed to structural problems - ordinary matters of 
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administration such as inefficient auditing procedures or uncertain communications among 
sections of large organizations. Institutional fraud occurs when a pattern of private gain (in 
goods and funds) operates in a particular institution. 
 
3. Systemic Explanations: Governments, as noted earlier, almost never act in isolation. 
Systemic explanations originate in the interaction between government and the public. 
The pressures, demands, and influence brought to bear upon government by interested 
individuals and groups are important forces in shaping actions and decisions. The 
demands of government rewards frequently exceed the supply, and routine decision-
making processes are lengthy, costly and uncertain. This approach is the most 
comprehensive explanation because it regards corruption as a form of influence within the 
political system, rather than the failing of individuals and institutions. Thus, the causes of 
corruption may be classified in the same way: individual, institutional and systemic.  
 
John Makumbe reduces these approaches to two dimensions for the abuse of public power 
must be seen in a wider perspective than that of the public sector only. The first dimension 
is the “behavioural” one or micro dimension of corruption, which refers to the behavioural 
aspects of corruption namely corrupt acts and attitudes that involve “individuals”. The 
second one is the “structural” or “systemic” dimension of corruption that should be a 
reference to the social and economic structures and processes of corruption. It refers to 
“the culture” or “the way things are”. This is how “the system” works or how “the system 
allows thing to happen, be that by design and /or by default (1999:4).  
 
What is important with this approach, to quote from Johnston, is that “it shifts the focus of 
analysis from individual actions judged against external (and, at times, static) standards to 
the significance of officials and clients’ conduct within an institutional and political 
approach” (1996:326). Such an approach gets us closer to our selection of the Gauteng 
provincial government where many departments are dealing with these corrupt practices. 
This is a framework of analysis that will be used to explain the effects of corruption on 
political institutions and political development. 
 
However, functionalist studies of corruption have shown that the system and the 
individual are both involved in malfeasance. This perspective underlines the fact that any 
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analysis of political corruption must take into account the strong relationship between the 
roles of both the system and the individual. Scholars such as Peter de Leon believe that 
“both the individuals and the system are held at fault. However, it is primarily the system 
and its inherent rewards and choke points that sometimes urge the individual to act in 
unsanctioned manners. The system must, as a consequence, indeed be more responsible 
than the immediate perpetrators” (1993:45). 
 
From a functionalist perspective, it might be emphasized that, in practice, individuals 
operate within a system and, by so doing, affect that system, just as the system dynamics 
affect individual behaviours. It explicitly implicates both the system and individual as 
culpable. As political corruption represents a problem of sufficient size and cost to warrant 
attentions, therefore, public policies need to be devised that will address the long-term 
reduction of the problem. In this period of global attention to government’s failings, it is 
arguable that if only government officials were more honest, or if only the rules of 
government could keep them honest, government’s performance would improve. It is true 
the public loss of faith in its governmental processes and leaders is calculated as part of 
the cost of corruption. 
 
 
4.3. Key Factors Promoting Corruption 
 
The causes of corruption are complex and may be traced to a breakdown in public-private 
sector relations. Literature on corruption shows that it comes in many forms and can 
involve: “the misuse of policy instruments - tariffs and credit, irrigation systems and 
housing policies, the enforcement of laws and rules regarding public safety, the 
observance of contracts, and the repayment of loans - or of simple procedures” (Klitgaard, 
1988:xi).   
 
Experience teaches that the incidence of corruption entails various mechanisms that go 
along with all corrupt exchanges and that clarify how corrupt deals, which are sealed in 
secrecy, are made. The involved parties have to identify each other as corrupt partners and 
find a way to do business. The corrupter makes the advance and the payment and the 
corruptee receives the payment and then the delivery of what each has promised without 
being caught. The rule of the game consists of delivering without being detected.  
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Jones (1993) describes intent and opportunity, as the two factors that facilitate fraud and 
corruption. The perpetrator must have intent, which may arise from personal or 
environmental factors. There must also be opportunity to undertake the fraudulent or 
corrupt act. Opportunity may arise by chance or may be created by careful planning and 
conniving.  
 
In the same vein, Wilson (1989) has identified three theories, which explain opportunities 
for governmental corruption, as follows: 
(1)  A particular political ethos or style, which attaches a relatively low value to probity 
and impersonal efficiency and relatively high value to favours, “personal loyalty, and 
private gain” that can lead to corruption. There is the assumption that the poor may want 
help and not justice. Inherent in this are values that produce irresistible demands for 
favouritism, and thus corruption. 
 
(2) The process of ordinary people facing extraordinary temptations. Thus, corruption is 
not the result of defects in character or cultural values, but is a consequence of a social 
system, which rewards people with power, wealth, and fame only if they are daring 
enough to seize them. The assumption is that public officials are human who can resist 
minor temptations if everyone else does and if someone is checking, but cannot be 
expected to be honest when everyone is stealing.  
 
(3) Governments’ work cannot be carried out without corruption. That is why they are 
constituted in such a way that all departments and units must be put together formally 
and constitutionally. In the example of the United States, the contention is that “what 
the founders have put asunder, the politicians must put together if anything is to be 
accomplished”. 
 
But as emphasized by Klaveren, “the root of corruption lies exclusively in the appetitus 
divitiarum infinitus, the insatiable avarice that is one of the human weaknesses against 
which battle was already waged by scholastics” (1970:40). For the World Bank (1999), 
  
75
corruption is a symptom of institutional dysfunction, thriving where economic policies are 
poorly designed, education levels are low, civil society is underdeveloped and the 
accountability of public institutions is weak. Nevertheless, recent studies (Klitgaard at el., 
(2000:86); Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2002:7-10), have highlighted the relevance of the 
mechanisms that make this “human weakness” work by underlining its wants. According 
to these scholars, corruption requires: 
 
1. Seeking and finding corrupt partners and negotiating contracts. In this case as partners 
may cheat each other, there might be safeguard mechanisms against opportunistic 
behaviour such as “established degree of social embeddednes” that implies for 
instance being colleagues in a certain institution or network, family and kinship ties 
are all conditions that outlive the duration of deals.   
2. Making payments and enforcing corrupt agreements. One of the parties gives a 
valuable asset to the other, which could be kept in the case of a non-performance of 
the deal. A most typical example is that public servants may ask for part of the bribe in 
advance before setting out to make the necessary arrangements for the services. This 
disallows the bribers from reneging, but it may then provide the public servant with a 
potential to behave opportunistically. 
3. Delivering what is corruptly purchased or agreed upon; all done discreetly. Therefore a 
series of problems could block the way of realization of anticipated effects of 
corruption such as “a change of mind or a change of the person holding office” 
remaining a possibility. This represents a critical moment for the corrupter, who can 
no longer be sure that sums paid in the past will be acknowledged as before” (della 
Porta and Vannucci, 1999:42). 
 
In short, as disclosed by Lambsdorff and Teksoz, “each stage of the process displays 
considerable risks of denunciation, forcing corrupt relationships to have a close nature vis-
à-vis the outsiders. … Illegal and hidden by their nature, corrupt deals put the partners of 
such deals at the mercy of one another. Even long after the service in question is rendered, 
the partners remain in a binding relationship of mutual dependence, which can also serve 
as a basis for extortion or hush money” (2002:10). 
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Empirical evidence suggests that while the global dimension of corruption does not need 
to be proved anymore as no country is completely free of all corruption, however, 
conditions are pervasive in developing and transitional countries. This is not because of 
racial element or that people in these countries are different from people in the developed 
world but because the environment is ripened for it. Many reasons related to 
underdevelopment have been singled out to explain this state of affairs. Perhaps it may be 
the motivation to earn income that is extremely strong due to severe poverty; perhaps the 
absence of a strong sense of national interest or perhaps the weakness of social and 
governmental enforcement mechanisms and poor health policies. As pointed out by Gray 
and Kaufmann, “not only is motivation strong, but opportunities to engage in corruption 
are numerous” (1998:7).  
 
In general terms, corruption arises from institutional attributes of the state and societal 
attitudes toward formal political processes. Institutional attributes that encourage 
corruption include wide authority of the state, which offers significant opportunities for 
corruption; minimal accountability, which reduces the cost of corrupt behavior; and 
perverse incentives in government employment, which induce self-serving rather than 
public-serving behavior. Societal attitudes fostering corruption include allegiance to 
personal loyalties over objective rules, low legitimacy of government, and dominance of a 
political party, such as the African National Congress (ANC), or ruling elite over political 
and economic processes.  
 
Consequently, from an institutional perspective, corruption arises where public officials 
have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives. This means the more 
activities public officials control or regulate, the more opportunities exist for corruption. 
Furthermore, the lower the probability of detection and punishment, the greater the risk 
that corruption will take place. In addition, the lower the salaries, the rewards for 
performance, the security of employment, and the professionalism in public service, the 
greater the incentives for public officials to pursue self-serving rather than public-serving 
ends. 
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From the economic viewpoint, since the ultimate source of rent-seeking behaviour is the 
availability of rents, corruption is likely to occur where restrictions and government 
intervention lead to the presence of excessive profits. In Klitgaard’s terms, “a monopolist can 
charge a price higher than the price that would prevail in a competitive market. The extra 
earnings thereby obtained are called “monopoly rents”. When the structure of the economy or 
the government encourages monopolies to exist, a number of people may strive to gain that 
monopoly”  (1988:43).  
 
Paolo Mauro notes that a key principle is that corruption can occur where rents exist - 
typically, as a result of government regulation - and public officials have discretion in 
allocating them. The shift from command economies to free market economies has created 
massive opportunities for the appropriation of rents (that is, excessive profits) and has often 
been accompanied by a change from a well-organized system of corruption to a more chaotic 
and deleterious one (1998:10). For Huntington, corruption is of course, one measure of the 
absence of effective political institutionalization. Public officials lack autonomy and 
coherence, and subordinate their institutional roles to exogenous demands (1968:59-71).  
 
Correspondingly, one key feature in all provincial departments is the vast amount of 
discretionary power that is held by a variety of public officials that allows them to make 
decisions that affect the lives and businesses of members of the community. Discretionary 
decision-making is one area where there is often the potential for corrupt conduct to occur. 
According to Rose-Ackerman, “the distribution of valuable benefits and costs is generally 
under the control of public officials who possess discretionary power. Private individuals 
and firms who want favourable treatment may be willing to pay to obtain it. Corruption is 
a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the state apparatus” 
(1999:9). 
 
As an institution, the kind of administration in Gauteng is susceptible to corruption, as 
generally is the case with most of institutions be they public, private or non-profit. For a 
better understanding of conditions or opportunities of corruption, this work refers to 
Klitgaard’s (1988) famous formula: 
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“C = M+D-A” or Corruption (C) equals Monopoly power (M) plus Discretion by officials 
(D) minus Accountability (A). 
 
Otherwise, corruption tends to be where “someone has monopoly power and the discretion 
to decide over a good or service and is not accountable to anyone whereby others can see 
what that person is deciding” (Klitgaard et al, 2000:27). In fact, “the problem with 
corruption lies in the lack of transparency and accountability on the part of public integrity 
systems” (TI Source Book, 1996:1). This formula provides guidance and offers a sound 
baseline for understanding the propensity toward corruption. It is applicable to both public 
and private sectors whatever the country. 
 
It emerges from this framework that these structural factors are similar to those we have 
identified in South Africa, and that can significantly explain the prevalence of corruption.  
But any study of corruption cannot be undertaken without the prior understanding of the 
conditions under which it is occurring. As the boundaries of corruption are hard to define 
and depend on local laws and customs, our first task will consist in contextualizing the 
issue and in mapping out the origins of corruption in South Africa, and abroad.  
 
4.4. The South African Perspective 
 
In South Africa, the passage from authoritarian rule (colonialism and apartheid) to 
democracy includes vacuums of authority by the removal of authoritarian controls, 
conflicts of values and a new elite attempting to catch up with the old, decentralisation, 
privatisation and the opening of the economy to international participation (Camerer: 
1996). 
 
Corruption occurs in South Africa, “when an employee forsakes his or her duty for 
benefit; puts personal interests above those of the people and ideals he or she is pledged 
to serve. In its simplest form corruption exists when any form of unearned compensation 
or benefit is given to a person for any act or omission related to his duty for which he 
receives a salary” (Stefan Grobler, 1999).  
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However, the most common reasons identified by scholars (Camerer, 2001:43) as the 
main causes of corruption in the country’s public sector are: 
 
1) Weak checks and balances and mismanagement; 
2) Greed and self-enrichment;  
3) General decline in morals and ethics: 
4) The recruitment process and affirmative action policy; 
5) Socio-economic conditions, mainly poverty;  
6) Other root causes of corruption originate from “criminogenic asymmetries4”, 
which are “structural disjunctions, mismatches and inequalities in the spheres of 
politics, culture, the economy and the law (Passas, 1997:2)”.  
 
Evidence from current studies suggests that apart from the general framework invoked 
above, there are new sources of stimulation regarded as the root causes of corrupt 
behaviour in post 1994 South Africa, as reassessed by Lodge (1998:161). They are: 
a) non-meritocratic processes of bureaucratic recruitment and promotion inherent in 
certain kinds of “affirmative action”,  
b) tendering principles which favour small businesses - and which require much more 
efficient administration if they are to be handled honestly,  
c) increasing shortages of skilled manpower in the public service especially in its 
financial control systems,  
d) a range of new sources of public finance, including foreign-derived development 
aid, 
e)  nepotism arising from political solidarity.  
 
 
A telling illustration of the most important causes of corruption at all levels of government 
– either national, provincial or local is contained in Hubert’s survey where individuals 
 
4  Asymmetries are criminogenic in that 1) they generate or strengthen the demand for illegal goods and 
services; 2) they generate incentives for particular actors to participate in illegal transactions; and 3) they 
reduce the ability of authorities to control illegal activities. Asymmetires are conducive to corruption both 
directly and indirectly through the creation of illegal markets that operate best with the collusion of 
authorities. 
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were asked to indicate the importance of 20 social, economic, political, organizational and 
individual factors, which are mentioned as causes of corruption in literature on the issue. 
While most of the 20 factors were considered to be important by the majority of the 
experts, more than 80% of the panel was convinced of the importance of the eight 
following causes: 
 
1) Norms and values of individual politicians and civil servants (90%) 
2) Lack of control, supervision, auditing (89%) 
3) Strong interrelationships between business, politics, state (88%) 
4) Lack of commitment by leadership (providing a bad example) (84%) 
5) Misorganization and mismanagement (84%) 
6) Government, state officials and organizations’ values and norms (83%)  
7) Increasing strength of organized crime (82%) 
8) Public sector culture (values/norms) (82%). 
 
Besides, a number of scholars have established a relationship between corruption and 
poverty. Although poverty is an underlying cause of corruption, it cannot be the only one, 
as it emerges from our analysis. As we found out, poor people are not corrupt. Those who 
are “stealing” are people in position of trust in government spheres. Otherwise, it would 
be hard to explain why rich and wealthy countries are plagued by corruption. Therefore, 
corruption is both a cause and a consequence of underdevelopment. 
 
Dieter Frisch tackles this issue by explaining: “by diverting scarce resources to low or 
non-priorities, corruption is in large part responsible for the neglect of fundamental needs, 
particularly basic needs such as food, health, and education. Corruption therefore becomes 
the cause of underdevelopment and poverty in general... [The] result is a vicious cycle: 
corruption is the cause of underdevelopment and poverty; on its part, poverty contributes 
to an extension of corruption, for he who cannot honestly meet his basic needs may be 
constrained to resort to less honest means of subsistence. Therefore, corruption is both a 
cause and a consequence of underdevelopment” (The TI Source Book, 1996:2). 
 
Furthermore, we are still witnessing in South Africa, a human tendency that highlights 
some feature of substantial appreciation for services rendered. “Unfortunately, in 
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Grobler’s view, this tendency when metamorphosed in monetary form becomes the root of 
evil – especially if it is allowed to take the form of monetary payment. More often than 
not the compensation is concealed in many clever and innovative ways, but is not limited 
to money only” (1999:38). Among these services, the following fearures have been 
acknowledged: all expenses-paid holidays, free liquor and meals, free hunting/fishing 
trips, free invitations to sporting events (rugby, cricket), sexual favours (Gauteng Housing 
Department), excessive discounts or free services (see Yengeni’s case), and undeserved 
benefits for friends, family or colleagues (see Duarte’s case). 
 
Quoting from the authors of Corrupt Exchanges, definitively, there is corruption when the 
following conditions are met (della Porta and Vannucci, 1999:17):  
  
a. a secret violation of a contract that, implicitly, specifies a delegation of 
responsibility and the exercise of some discretionary power. 
b. an agent who, against the interests or preferences of the principal acts in 
favour of a third party, from which he receives a reward.  
c. the principal is the state, or better, the citizenry 
 
At this stage of collusion, corruption become quite systematic, meaning that opportunities 
have been identified and relationships established, that, mechanisms for payment exist, 
and that deliveries are routinely made. It is worth noting that once the coalition is in place, 
it becomes difficult to detect and even more difficult to investigate the various ring 
members. As an illegal agreement between various role players, corruption is always 
covered. As stated by Klitgaard at el, “corruption prefers a stable, secretive environment” 
(2000:86). 
 
The above conditions are clearly the reality of most departments in Gauteng. Several 
departments have been singled out, and mainly the Department of Safety and Security 
where the police are tasked with protecting citizens and their property and investigating 
crimes. Certain agents end up taking bribes to stop pursuing certain crimes or in order to 
lose a docket. There is also the case of the Licensing Department agents in Johannesburg 
who have the monopoly of issuing car documents and driving licences which are goods 
that are in much demand by people who do not necessarily qualify for them, such as 
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syndicates of car hijackers and other criminals. This situation creates a market and rent-
seeking environment favourable to corrupt individuals. In Departments such as Housing 
and Public Works that control massive tenders which unscrupulous private sector 
companies may try to influence through corruption the risk of corrupt exchanges is high. 
In all these cases, public officials directly participate in and benefit from the operations of 
illegal markets. 
 
These few cases show that the perceived corruption in public administration by 
bureaucrats and elected politicians has thus found significant confirmation. Through the 
analysis of these case studies, the exposure of what had been the “hidden face” of public 
power, as della Porta and Vannucci have expressed, demonstrates that the market for 
corruption has, for many years, represented the determining factor for a vast range of 
(frequently illegal) activities based on the appropriation of public resources by state 
functionaries, in collusion with other role players outside public administration (1999:13).  
 
But a look at pre-bureaucratic systems and new states in Africa shows how traditional 
values based on “clientelist networks” between economic and political agents may 
undermine the functioning of African bureaucracies. 
 
4.5. The African Patrimonialist Approach 
  
Amidst the more recent calls for transparency, accountability and adherence to democratic 
principles and practices, at the time when unethical behaviour and practices appear to have 
increased significantly, there are many problems related to the process and content of 
socio-economic development and general service delivery in most Third World countries, 
as corruption is seen as “one of the foremost problems in the developing world” 
(Klitgaard: l988: x). 
 
New African states were not only bureaucratic autocracies but also political and economic 
monopolies now lacking in accountability, transparency and the rule of law (Dia, 1993). 
The expansion of state activities within a rapidly increasing bureaucracy took place in an 
environment of weak supervision and in the midst of deteriorating social and economic 
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conditions. The result was the emergence of a politicized bureaucracy that began to 
engage in centralized economic decision-making and patrimonialism. 
 
Otherwise, these states were characterized by patrimonial domination, one of the varieties 
of pre-bureaucratic systems. Under this system, a ruler could legitimately engage in a self-
or family-centered distribution of the national income, but whether or not he tried to do so, 
no one could seek to challenge his decision-making as illegitimate or corrupt. For the 
patriarchal ruler knew no distinction between his authority over his household and that 
over the rest of his realm. He wielded his power at his own discretion, unencumbered by 
rules, insofar as he was not limited by tradition or by competing powers. The ruler’s 
officials and officers were likewise unencumbered by any rules other than the changeable 
ones embodied in the ruler’s instructions. If the officials diverted many resources to their 
private ends, they were not breaching any rules, unless these were embodied in atypically 
specific instructions from the ruler himself. In that case deviance constituted 
insubordination rather than corruption. Today these practices still exist in many African 
governments under one form or another. Clientelism, patron-client relationship are some 
forms of patrimonialism. 
 
Undeniably, the post-independence governmental bureaucracy that emerged in most 
African countries contributed to patrimonial economic management and incentives, 
whereby clientelism in administrative decision-making replaced moral and political 
legitimacy, and political and personal loyalty and obedience were rewarded more than 
merit (Dia, 1996). This process, inevitably, led to a cooperative and institutionalized abuse 
of public office for private and personal gain (Hope, 2000:18). This is the case almost 
everywhere on the African continent where good governance is nothing but a pipe dream.  
 
In these countries, poor quality, high costs, wastage, fraud and corruption characterize 
services, signs that they are governed badly. Nevertheless, in Africa, as well as in many 
other developing countries in the world, it may be wrong to label these states as corrupt 
for practices accepted within the norms of the society, which may have never internalized 
the values of a “Western” type of bureaucracy. 
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In addition, most social scientists are all aware of what corruption is even though they 
may differ on what its scope and effects are. From an African perspective, corruption is 
shown to be linked to the climate of unethical leadership and bad governance which have 
produced opportunities for it to become a problem of concern and to move to the top of 
the policy reform agenda in many countries on the continent. In terms of development, 
until recently, corruption has led to the distortion of policies and induced waste. 
 
On the other hand, one can claim that the late 1990s have not been good years for Africa’s 
surviving autocrats or for the shaky new democratic regimes that appeared in the early 
1990s. For instance, in the post-Cold War society, corruption literature has shown that 
despite the fact that corruption has created a few millionaires, it has generally proven very 
detrimental to the living standards of most Africans. In September 2002, the African 
Union (AU) meeting in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa started putting in place new 
mechanisms to tackle widespread corruption, which, according to a new report5 costs the 
continent about $148 billion annually. The report relates how corruption slows 
development by deterring investors, increasing the cost of goods by up to 20 percent and 
affecting poor people the most.  
 
In Kenya, former president Daniel arap Moi’s government was faced with a funding crisis 
when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank refused to tolerate the 
escalating levels of corruption in public office.  In 1997 the IMF suspended a US$220 
million structural adjustment facility to Kenya because of concern at Nairobi’s failure to 
tackle corruption. In 2000, these key lenders reinstated a freeze on programme aid to 
Kenya after accusing arap Moi’s regime of bad governance and fiscal indiscipline. 
Massive loss of public funds led to the government having to print more bank notes. 
 
The newly elected President Mwai Kibaki  (December 27 2002) along with Kenya’s new 
Parliament pledged to tackle the ills, such as graft and poor management, that have driven 
Kenya’s economy into doldrums. This move prompted Bretton Woods’s institutions to 
promise in February 2003 that funding of the country could resume by the middle of 2003 
if the new government took credible measures to fight corruption. 
 
5 Known as the “Draft African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption”, agreed by African 
Union ministers meeting (Addis Ababa, 18-19 September 2002).  
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Similarly, the World Bank expressed concern at alleged corruption in Cote d’Ivoire, and 
planned to blacklist companies accused of corruption from its programmes. Both 
institutions are tightening their procurement guidelines, and the African Development 
Bank is beginning to follow suit.  
 
In 1999, the Nigerian military regime’s international credibility was further undermined as 
several new scandals emerged involving Sani Abacha’s military cronies, family and 
business associates who sweept away about some $150 billion earned from oil sales alone 
over a period of 15 years.  It is not for nothing that Nigeria has been labeled “gangster’s 
paradise” by many observers. Here, “corruption is so much a way of life that evidence of 
it is thrown about with impunity because there is no rule of law. Public officials flaunt 
wealth they could never ordinarily afford at home and abroad”, writes Rose Umoren 
(1999). Many have seen the pledge of “zero tolerance” of corruption from the new 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, as his litmus test.  
 
The rapid collapse of Mobutu’s long-term and decadent kleptocratic regime in the former 
Zaire was seen as a new liberation. Indeed, many researchers regard the post-
independence regime of the late Mobutu as one of the most corrupt in Africa. He 
converted state institutions into instruments for his personal enrichment and that of his 
supporters. Ironically, Mobutu himself a beneficiary of the corrupt system which he had 
implemented in the country, acknowledged that corruption was a major economic and 
social problem in Zaire. Before his assassination, the Congolese were wondering whether 
they had not traded Mobutu for another “Mobutu” in the person of Laurent Kabila, who 
proved to be one of the most controversial leaders of our times on the continent. However, 
things did not improve after the takeover by his son Joseph Kabila. The looting of state 
resources by the “newcomers” is an ongoing affair. "Illegal exploitation remains one of 
the main sources of funding for groups involved in perpetuating DRC conflict"6.  
 
In Zimbabwe, as the cost of living skyrocketed to unsustainable levels with prices of basic 
commodities beyond the reach of many, the scourge of corruption has taken root in most 
 
6 See the “UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
of the DRC, United Nations, 28 October 2003. 
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spheres of society. The level of corruption in both the public and private sectors became 
so serious that some members of parliament, judges and civic organizations called for an 
investigation into various cases that threatened the continued viability of vital public 
institutions, notes Business in Africa (June 1999). Besides, donors closed their doors on 
further lending pending the resolution of the widely publicized standoff with the IMF, 
which froze a $193m balance of payment support. The World Bank, the European Union 
and the African Development Bank also withheld their support (African Business, January 
2000). With a domestic debt estimated at nearly US$3bn, which, with a Treasury Bill rate 
of 58%, and costing more than US$1,5bn/year to service – 25% of GDP, economic 
implosion looks like a real possibility, notes Tony Hawkins (Financial Mail, July 7, 
2000). During the last legislative and presidential elections, Mugabe led a violent and 
bloody campaign against members of the opposition and white farmers, in the name of 
land appropriation and restitution or redistribution, which claimed the loss of many human 
lives, to win the elections. 
 
These few examples show that in most African countries and on several occasions, the 
wrong development decisions have been taken - resources squandered and very often, 
long-term indebtness incurred which the world’s poorest will be expected to pay. Social, 
environmental and economic degradation are all aggravated by corruption, which erodes 
the very core of sustainable development. In his closing remarks during the meeting of the 
Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) in Washington D.C. in February 1999, the US Vice-
President Gore expressed his concerns about the effects of corruption on development in 
these terms: “corruption accelerates crime, hurts investments, stalls growth, bleeds the 
national budget, and – worst of all – undermines our faith in freedom”. He described 
corruption as an enemy of democracy – for “democracy lives on trust, and corruption 
destroys our trust” (Business in Africa, June 1999:19).    
 
Nowadays, current debates among political scientists often center on the issue of 
corruption as a feature of the so-called developing nations in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. When discussing the practical problem of the incidence of corruption in Africa, 
for instance, the analysis seems to be influenced by Eurocentric cultural prejudices mainly 
based on the “culture of corruption” that covers the whole of the political, judicial and 
administrative sectors in Africa, as Jean-François Médard points out (2001:379). While 
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this assumption was true with regard to some African post-independence states in the 
1960s, the same cannot be said for today after the upsurge of global watchdog bodies such 
as Transparency International. It is wise to avoid generalizations, as most of African states 
are no longer “patrimonial”. For instance, the World Economic Forum (WEF) that rates 
African countries for good governance placed Botswana first in a new survey (2003), 
pushing South Africa into fourth place. The study ranked 21 countries on the rule of law, 
impressions of corruption, and the enforcement of contracts. Botswana was ranked as the 
least corrupt and best in adhering to contracts and the rule of law (http://archive.mg.co.za, 
13 June 2003). 
 
Nonetheless, recent studies have shown that political, cultural and economic factors at 
once lie at the root of this multidimensional problem. For the sake of this study, attempts 
have been made to deeply understand its underlying causes by singling out one of the 
dimensions of the phenomenon. As Sadig Rasheed argues, “over time, the post-
independence state in Africa has generally evolved as an undemocratic, autocratic and 
patrimonial entity. Being essentially an embodiment of and a vehicle executing the 
unquestioned will and whims of an unaccountable supreme ruler and ruling elite. It 
became an ideal breeding ground for the very forces making for unethical behaviour. Even 
with the transition to greater political liberalization, overt paternalism is a quality which 
the state has yet to effectively rid itself of” (1995:46). 
 
It is in that context that the problem of political corruption in Africa in particular, and 
worldwide in general has received considerable attention. While it is increasingly 
recognized as a preeminent problem in developing nations, in Africa, systemic corruption 
has resulted in “retarded economies, predator elites and political instability”, according to 
Klitgaard’s Controlling Corruption (1988). Moreover, “systemic corruption generates 
economic costs by distorting incentives, political costs by undermining institutions, and 
social costs by redistributing wealth and power toward the undeserving” (Klitgaard et al, 
2000:4) 
 
Thus it can be pointed out that, from a Western point of view, the impression is often 
sustained that corruption tends to be more prevalent in developing countries. Observers 
such as Klitgaard have described the quasi-hypocritical attitude of Western writers as 
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tantamount to racism. Klitgaard noted that, “early writers, such as Max Weber (1904), 
Talcott Parsons (1958) or P.J Marshal and Glyndwyr Williams (1983)7, on “the backward 
nations” and colonies sometimes emphasized corruption as a sign of the moral weakness, 
even inferiority, of the “natives” (1988:9). Their typical reactions were to point out 
apparent venality and lawlessness. Though the West can claim no monopoly on the 
abhorrence of bribery, nepotism, and official venality, some Western authors did use 
allegations of corruption as a blunt instrument to condemn Africans. In some cases they 
mistakenly classified as corrupt the manifestations of different mores and modes of 
socioeconomic organizations: in other cases they used corruption as an excuse for colonial 
occupation, notes Klitgaard.  
 
Later authors - such as Gunnar Myrdal (1970) or Stanislav Andreski (1970) - have 
condemned the parochial and self- serving perspective of such Western writers as 
emblematic of imperialist thinking. But even in more recent times, Samuel Huntington 
(1979:318) has argued that, in Latin America, corruption tends to be more prevalent in 
“the mulatto countries”, those with significant proportions of blacks. But Huntington 
attributes this not to race per se but the lower degree of social stratification in such 
countries (in this case, the “mulatto countries”). It is significant to note that contemporary 
scholars such as Heidenheimer (1970) have abundantly described the way Western 
societies developed techniques to contain the proclivities of officials to utilize the powers 
of their office for private-regarding purposes.  
 
In these societies the acceptance by officials of favours for themselves, their families, or 
friends was viewed as instances of corruption because these officials infringe upon the 
principle of keeping their public and private accounts strictly separate. This separation of 
accounts is based upon the depersonalization implied in the rigid separation between the 
private household and the public office and upon the official’s acceptance of formal, 
impersonal, legal norms as exclusive guides to the exercise of this powers. However, 
public offices in developing countries were characteristically not structured to force their 
incumbents to keep clearly distinct private and public accounts. 
 
 
7 See Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (1998:8). 
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The concept of distinct private and public accounts in the study of corruption is a much-
debated and somewhat disputed topic opposing the Western and the non-Western culture 
of office. The office in African traditional systems was subjected to what Heidenheimer 
has labeled “contradictory obligations” consisting in the formal rules of the “office” being 
based on family ties and not on prescribed universalistic norms for the administration of 
the law and government agency programs. Nepotistic practices were legal and remained a 
virtual mode of recruitment on the one hand.  Comparatively, in Britain these practices 
would now “cause a sense of guilty in both giver and receiver”, whereas in Africa “the 
sense of guilt on the part of the receiver would be mingled with a sense of family duty 
done” (Heidenheimer, 1970:182) 
 
In another study David Apter came to same conclusions: “nepotism is considered a grave 
offense in Western bureaucratic practices, yet in African countries, providing jobs for 
members of one’s family is socially compulsory. In African countries, there is the notion 
that people’s identification and relationship with the state and its institutions are much 
weaker than identification and relationship with the family” (1963:6).  
 
Otherwise, each member of the family expects reciprocity for the service provided. 
Therefore, a successful job for one is a gain for other relatives who see themselves 
employed already. One has the obligation to take care of family members because there is 
belief that neglecting one’s family is morally unacceptable. Thus, generosity is one of the 
most appreciated human qualities by most African people and no one should deny it to 
fellow Africans. The end result is the development of relationships based on 
“connections”, custom and power and may explain the aetiological connection between 
gift and bribe (Alatas, 1990). 
 
In the context of postcolonial society, this situation creates in McMullan’s terms  “a clear 
disharmony between the government and the traditional society on which it is imposed 
and which it seeks to change” (1970:321). As observed by Heidenheimer (1970), middle 
and upper-echelon officials in these countries, especially those who have gone through 
periods of colonial tutelage, operate between a suprastructure of “Western” attitudes and 
values and an infrastructure of indigenous traditions and ethics. Suprastructure values 
stress technical expertise and impersonal rationality in the management of public affairs. 
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The infrastructure values emphasize reliance and obligation toward kinship, friendship, 
and other primary groups. Officials were most thoroughly immersed in suprastructure 
values during the tattered periods of colonial rule, whereas infrastructure values were 
rooted in advance.  
 
The consequences of colonization on customary practices resulted in the quasi-nihilism of 
African values when it became possible for the colonizer to transform pre-colonial 
practices such as customary gift giving into bribery.  In this regard, a writer such as 
Williams has pointed out that “the imposition of colonial rule disrupted but did not 
completely destroy established practices and attitudes. One important consequence of 
colonial rule was that new perspectives caused people to reassess established practices - 
what had been customary became illegal” (1978:45). 
 
This clash of old customs and attitudes with the new forms of government contribute to 
the prevalence of corruption. The customary exchange of gifts is one example. An analysis 
of the development of public office morality in former colonies in Africa suggests that 
public-office morality has declined and that the incidence of corruption has increased 
during the postcolonial period after full independence was achieved. The fairness of 
linking independence to “increase of corruption” in this manner might well be challenged 
from the perspective of more functional modes of analyses, but it nevertheless constitutes 
an analytically important historical baseline. 
 
The bottom line here is that “an act is presumably only corrupt if society condemns it as 
such and if the doer is afflicted with a sense of guilt when he does it; neither of this apply 
to a great deal of African nepotism” (Leys, 1970:32). It must be noted that kinship systems 
do not cause corruption. No traditional society encourages and condones corruption and 
other immoral conduct as a means to help a member. In this context, “a gift is not 
necessarily a bribe” for it depends on the circumstances and intent. So an act is only 
considered corrupt if the general public disapproves it.  
 
These contradictory cultural norms can be also explained in terms of the notorious 
“Weberian ideal type” of patrimonial domination, which is opposed to the type of 
traditional domination. This contradiction emerges from the dilemma posed by the legal-
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rational exercise of authority and the norms of loyalty and support for a bureaucracy based 
on familial and clientelist networks. It is understood that individuals seek out patrons as 
they move upward socially and materially; such individuals also come to accept ties of 
solidarity from their own clients viewed as fundamental to their security and continued 
advancement. These patron-client ties are termed by Richard Joseph “prebendal politics” 
(1987:55). A “prebend”, in Max Weber understanding, is an office of state, typical of 
feudal Europe and China, which an individual procures either through examinations or as 
a reward for loyal service to a lord or ruler. While Joseph applies “prebendal politics” to 
Nigeria, it can be said that the model can be applied to other post-colonial states. 
 
Describing these practices, Richard Joseph demonstrates that these two features of the 
system – prebendalism and clientelism – are mutually reinforcing: “To obtain and keep 
clients, one must gain a prebendal office; and to be sure that in the distribution of 
prebendal offices an individual or his kin have a reasonable chance of procuring one, 
clients must be gathered together to make their collective claims and to prove that the 
potential holder of prebendal office is a person of consequence whose co-optation would 
be rewarding to the “political entrepreneurs” (1987: 57). Yet, the weakness of a prebendal 
order, acknowledges Richard Joseph, is its fundamental instability in part attributable to 
the absence of a continuous authoritative force and a legitimizing ideology: “offices can 
be won and exploitated, but they can also be snatched away”, either by a dissatisfied Chief 
or by rival contestants”.   
 
Jean-François Médard addresses similar questions and argues that corruption in Africa is 
closely associated with “neo-patrimonialism” and clientelism and that the basis for 
entrenched corruption in Africa is mainly due to the lack of distinction between public and 
private” (2001:379-80). Neo-patrimonialism is a patrimonial situation that covers the 
arbitrary power of the chief and does not function within a traditional framework. This is 
the case that is found in contemporary Africa, where the public and private sectors are 
formally differentiated, and where we can speak of corruption only when this distinction is 
not respected, in spite of the contradictions between traditional and modern cultural 
norms. 
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Finally, the significance of this study may be underlined by pointing out the fact that in 
most African countries, the genesis of rampant corruption may be found in the wake of 
independence when most African countries drifted from a bureaucratic administration that 
emphasized good governance to one that emphasized the sovereignty of politics.  The 
passage from family-based, patrimonial, and neo-patrimonial economies to a capitalist one 
was intricate and dented beyond scholars thinking more than a decade ago. This transition 
has been labeled by Andvig and Fjeldstad “a period during which the societies may be 
stuck in low-trust, low-activity equilibria where the rationing of trust gives rise to 
networks where extensive corruption is an indicator of their existence” (2000:30).  
 
Besides, the state in Africa is still playing a central role in the citizens’ lives by mobilizing 
politics and by attempting to achieve broad goals of human dignity, prosperity and equity. 
The state, in most cases, is still seen in the context of primitive accumulation, while 
political parties became private armies - as the recent Zimbabwean case has shown - 
organized to fight electoral warfares in the quest for conquering the state and political 
power. Consequently, violations of human rights, pillaging of state resources and all forms 
of undemocratic government practices and actions are taking place with little or no 
restraining structures to counter them. The famous cases of all those millionaires in power, 
some of them, at the top of the hierarchy - explain the enthusiasm among young people to 
make a career in the public sector, especially entry to the training systems for the customs, 
police, inland revenue or any other authority with high potential for corruption. It is easy 
enough to find examples in Africa, with Mobutu’s Zaire and Abacha’s Nigeria merely the 
most extreme. Elsewhere, the use of political patronage to benefit a small number of 
presidential followers is all too commonplace. The written law may prohibit bribery, but 
every day procedures are often very different, and businesses are caught in the middle. 
 
Another important issue that affects indicators of development and good governance in 
Africa is the paradox of state legitimacy and developmental capacity. Africa’s weak 
average performance in comparison to their counterparts in the developing world is well 
documented. Pierre Englebert in his analysis of the determinants of state capacity 
maintains that “the strategies of power of domestic elites are framed by the degree of 
institutional resemblance, or historical legitimacy, of the postcolonial state. These 
strategies, in turn, affect policy choices and the quality of governance. African states 
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suffer on average from greater legitimacy deficits than other regions, and this contributes 
to the continent’s generally weak economic performamce” (2000:71).  
 
Englebert’s account of the origins of neopatrimonialism in Africa offers more valuable 
insights into this phenomenon. Modern African leaders, by trying to get their countries out 
of the paradoxal situation they found themselves in, typically embarked on what Englebert 
identified as “two alternative paths”: “they either tried to legitimate the state by forcing a 
new national identity upon their societies, or used its resources to create and sustain 
networks of support for their regime” (2000:97). In the first instance, referred to as the 
“revolutionary-centralizing trend”, they dissociated from the customary source of power, 
attempted to launch revolutionary processes of national integration by imposing the new 
state on the lives and minds of their citizens. This was the era of “nation building”. 
 
However, failures of nation building led the African elites to a new strategy: to 
accommodate or domesticate power and allegiance by bringing closer their counterparts. 
In this strategic reversal, these leaders attempted to substitute the instrumental legitimacy 
of neopatrimonial policies for their lack of moral claim to rule, and resorted to clientelistic 
networks to prevent state fragmentation. This became the most frequent type of rule in 
Africa. These networks take place in the margins of the formal political system and 
provide foundations to the power of elites but not to the postcolonial state itself. Most 
Africanist scholars claim this to be the true root of African neopatrimonialism, as earlier 
described (see Mobutu, Abacha, Arap Moi, Mugabe…). The ultimate consequences of 
neopatrimonial rule are the low and steady deterioration of the quality of governance and 
generally the collapse of the formal state witnessed in Africa all over the last decades. . 
 
But all governments are not equally corrupt, as the case of Botswana has shown.  
Botswana represents an African “best case”. Several writers such as Kenneth Good (1997) 
or Pierre du Toit (1995) have suggested that particular features of Botswana 
administration limit corruption. Botswana is the only state in Africa to have maintained 
since the 1960s, continuous political freedom and regular national and local elections. 
There are several reasons that explain the uniqueness of the Botswana case, as suggested 
by John Holm (2000:288) and Kenneth Good: 
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a The country is relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnicity;  
b The economy has grown at a steady rate for over thirty years;  
c It has a relatively small population compared to most states in Africa;  
d The extent of democratic accountability emerged over past decades. This last 
quality makes the difference between Botswana and other African states; and  
e The political leadership came from a social group that had already, during the 
colonial period, accumulated capital as wealthy cattle ranchers; hence they had no 
need to use the state for their own private benefit. 
 
4.6. International Dimensions 
 
Contrary to the belief by Westerners in the effectiveness of the colonial state, it is notable 
that during colonization, violence and bad governance often marred African politics. 
Wraith and Simpkins portray Britain during the 1800s has having been a “corrupt society” 
before corruption was then quite remarkably eliminated. There was what Leys has labeled 
the “corruption of norms” when describing “the prevalence and the robustness” of the 
practices the Victorian reformers regarded as corrupt but according to the previously 
obtaining moral code these practices were not corrupt but indeed were actually quite right 
and desirable. For instance, the average landlord thought it quite natural, and to that extent 
desirable, that his tenants should use their votes on behalf of his favoured candidate and 
did not hesitate to put pressure on them to this end. Further, jobbery, sinecures, rotten 
boroughs, treating, and other colourful political practices of the period were practiced 
openly (2001:68). Before the reform movement, the use of public office for private gain 
was a recognized public practice in English history. Other illustrations of the “corruption 
of norms” of “good governance” included the practices of continuously giving gratuities 
to the British Administrative Officer during his visits to the village under the supervision 
of the local king in colonial Nigeria (Brownsberger: 1983:222). 
 
Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject has many good examples. Forced labour offers the most 
important illustration of the absence of a conception of good governance. In British East 
Africa during the 1950s, there are good examples of forced labour long after it was 
supposed to have been suppressed (1996:157, 164). Another example is Dan Jacobson’s 
account of the colonial civil servant in Kenya during the 1920s who was engaged in 
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intense rivalry with an askari for the sexual favours of two under-age girls. The matter was 
covered up by the colonial authority and only came to light when an outsider blew the 
whistle in London. Thus “good governance” during colonial time is an exaggerated issue 
as these illustrations shoe, though they are not comprehensive. 
 
As Gunnar Myrdal observes, Great Britain, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries 
where corruption is now quite limited, were all rife with it two hundred years ago and 
even later, indeed until the liberal interlude between Mercantilism and the modern welfare 
state (Heidenheimer, 1970:544). What is true is that corruption has been prevalent at 
various times in all cultures and is not the monopoly of particular cultures or regions. Not 
so many years ago, corruption flourished in the countries we now call “developed”.  
 
Donatella Della Porta and Yves Mény suggest in their book Democracy and Corruption in 
Europe (1997) that corruption remains strong in European democracies despite denial of 
its presence that “tended to mask the problem by a refusal to countenance it, corruption 
being non-existent or marginal”. Furthermore the two scholars argue, “European 
democracies viewed corruption as the lot of southern or developing societies while 
democracies, with sturdy bureaucratic traditions, experienced no more than the odd 
scandal to which no society can be altogether immune” (1997:2).  
 
History tells of stories of the selling of offices in Europe. Under the conditions existing in 
sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe, sale of public offices became the norm. In 
many parts of Europe the reemergence of a powerful merchant class and the growing 
importance of a highly developed money economy soon resulted in something like a  
“refeudalization” of large parts of the career officialdom. For in order to meet pressing 
financial demands, rulers adopted, to varying degrees, the practice of selling offices, 
which became objects of trade and exchange. The purchasers of these offices served in 
them as a matter of right, and thus the king was prevented from choosing his officials on 
the basis of their ability or reliability. Royal rulers during this period of absolutism were 
still not subject to any significant constitutional rules that limited their choice of 
alternative techniques for achieving the goals of the state. Today they would have run as 
much chance of being accused of corruption for selling judgeships. So it was widespread 
corruption in Elizabethan England. The present-day corruption scandals in most 
  
96
economically and politically “advanced nations” show that the phenomenon is not 
something new.  
 
However, the “1970s saw corruption and the related theme of patrimonialism moved to 
the forefront of the analysis of politics in the third world. The consensus has been that 
both phenomena, though by no means absent from developed countries, have become 
much more pervasive in the societies of Africa, Asia and Latin America” (Theobald, 
1990:79).  
 
Some forms of corrupt behaviour and corruption scandals in recent years have shaken the 
Western world and led to changes at the highest levels of the governments of the 
Netherlands, Germany, UK, Israel, Japan and the US. For instance, in Germany, the 
German parliament imposed in February 2000 a huge fine on former chancellor Helmut 
Kohl’s conservative party, the Christian Democrats (CDU) for breaking campaign 
financing laws and hiding undeclared donations in Swiss banks. The CDU was asked to 
return more than R126 million in state campaign support because of widespread financial 
transgressions under Kohl. The fine was the biggest punishment in German history and 
half the amount of money parliament gave the CDU each year to run its operations and 
heavier than expected by the party that had run the country since the end of the Second 
World War. 
 
In 1999, the world of sports through the Olympic movement was rocked by the greatest 
corruption episode in its history. In March 1999, the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) expelled six members for accepting bribes during Salt Lake City’s successful bid to 
stage the 2002 Winter Games. The ejected members were: Agustin Arroyo (Ecuador), 
Sergio Fantini (Chile), Zein El Abdin Gadir (Sudan), Jean Claude Ganga (Congo-
Brazzaville), Lamine Keita (Mali) and Seiuli Wallwork (Samoa).  This was a crisis that 
threatened the future of the Olympic movement. IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch 
who ignored calls for his resignation lost his position during the 2001 elections.  
 
In France, a Paris court in November 2003 convicted three former executives for 
mismanagement and misappropriating money from state-run oil company Elf and 
sentenced them to prison and heavily fined in one of the largest graft scandals ever to hit 
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France. Former Elf chairman Loik Le Floch-Prigent was fined Є375 000 and Є1 million 
for former director Alfred Sirven. Both were sentenced to five years in prison and Andre 
Tarallo, another executive known as Elf’s “Mr. Africa” was sentenced to four years and 
fined Є2 million. 
 
But these examples are just the visible part of the iceberg and serve to illustrate that large 
bribes have been reported to have been paid to get foreign contracts or to get privileged 
access to markets or to particular benefits. This is what observers have called 
“transnational bribery”, that is, an expanding phenomenon that has considerable power 
capable of undermining both economic growth and political stability (Cockcroft, 
1995:73). Thus corruption is no longer the lot of developing countries.  
 
Chronologically, the end of the 1980s witnessed the growing public recognition and 
discussion of the issue by various institutions including international aid organizations 
such as the World Bank, and its international development agencies.  
 
4.7. The Role of the World Bank: 
 
Among these international aid organizations, the evolving role of the World Bank 
deserves to be singled out as it impinges on its strategies in assisting countries in the fight 
against corruption. 
 
While the Bank has always been concerned about the integrity of its operations, it did not 
explicitly talk about “corruption” as such in the context of its development strategies 
before the mid-1990s. What seems to us today an obvious economic issue was then 
considered too politically sensitive, or simply too political per se, and thus outside the 
limits of the Bank’s non-political mandate. Even the vast majority of other bilateral and 
multilateral development agencies did not lend a helping hand to curb corruption. 
However the Bank did raise the issue of corruption in discreet but direct ways with certain 
governments. 
 
In the 1980s, as the nature of the Bank’s business evolved from “hard” infrastructure 
projects to policy frameworks (with the advent of adjustment lending), the Bank began to 
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help countries reform trade regimes, financial sectors and investment laws to help mitigate 
the effects of rent-seeking behavior. Increasingly it also began to address the need for 
institutional strengthening, public sector reform and good governance in its client 
countries. Landmark documents include the 1983 World Development Report on Public 
Management, the Africa Long Term Perspectives Study in 1989, and two Governance 
reports in the early 1990s. 
 
As the 1990s progressed - with the end of the Cold War bringing increased openness 
within countries - global concerns about corruption intensified. In addition, evidence of 
how corruption undermines development also accumulated. It became clear that the Bank 
and its other partners in development would need to address the issue more directly than 
they had done in the past. 
 
In 1996, in his second year as President of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn threw 
down the corruption gauntlet. During the Annual Meetings that year, Mr. Wolfensohn 
captured the world’s attention when he vowed to fight the “cancer of corruption” that 
undermines development. Subsequently, the both 1996 and 1997 World Development 
Reports discussed corruption. In the summer of 1997 the Bank’s procurement guidelines 
were amended to specifically address corruption in Bank projects. Most notably, in 
September 1997 the Board approved a comprehensive anti-corruption policy Framework 
for the Bank. Seminars and programs have been launched around the globe concerned 
with corruption and what to do about it.  
 
In South Africa in general and in Gauteng in particular, one can note a new willingness 
among top public officials to discuss openly the challenges of corruption in the province. 
For the last decade there is now an abundant body of literature that includes academic 
books, media reports and journal articles that deal with the subject.  The discussion of 
relevant materials related to the topic is an indication of the study contribution to a subject 
that not very long ago still was swept under the carpet.  This is within the context of this 
growing international interest in corruption that the Gauteng experience is taking place 
 
Having discussed corruption as abuse of power for private gain that involves a hidden 
exchange between the public agent and a briber, it is significant to note that in Africa the 
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abuse of power by the incumbents has reached endemic proportions in many states. 
Nowadays, the expansion of a modern bureaucracy under a leadership styling itself on 
values and assumptions derived from pre-bureaucratic or neo-patrimonial features shows 
how it is difficult to draw a line between private and public interest.   
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Chapter Five 
THE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the upshots of corruption in South Africa in general.  What effects 
does corruption have on both political and economic systems? What lessons can South 
Africa learn from other African countries? The body of theoretical and empirical research 
that objectively addresses the economic impact of corruption has grown significantly in 
recent years since corruption has been identified as particularly a developmental problem. 
 
There is general agreement that corruption has a deleterious, often devastating effect on 
administrative performance and economic and political development. It is one of the major 
obstacles to development, and its effects on development are disastrous, as we shall see. 
Scholars have pointed out “corruption impedes rather than promotes economic growth, 
stifles entrepreneurialism as well as squandering scarce national resources. And far from 
promoting political development, corruption leads to serious political decay in that it 
weakens administrative capacity and undermines democracy, stability and national 
integration” (Theobald, 1990:125). 
 
Though corruption leads to a change for the worse, those involved are embarking on the 
destruction of values and resources. Yet more, corruption is not a “zero-sum game”. There 
must be a third person that pays what the others share: a natural or legal person, or a larger 
and more complex entity such as the state, the nation or the community”, argues 
Mamadou Koulibaly (2000:22). The one who is paying is the poor who is directly affected 
since corruption increases the price for public services, lowers its quality and often 
restricts poor people’s access to key services. 
 
As pointed out by Peter Eigen8, “corruption in large-scale public projects is a daunting 
obstacle to sustainable development, and results in a major loss of public funds needed for 
 
8 Transparency International Chairman. 
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education, healthcare and poverty alleviation; both in developed and developing 
countries…Corruption robs countries of their potential” (TI CPI 2004).  
 
5.2. The Costs of Corruption in South Africa 
 
Although little research has been conducted in South Africa on the costs of corruption, 
both in terms of actual monetary value and trust in public institutions, the last study on 
corruption in the country9 shows clearly how harmful corruption is. According to this 
report, corruption is costing South Africa's private sector up to 50 billion rands a year.
 It also poses a major challenge to provincial and local governments, undercutting their 
ability to deliver services to the poor. Almost 2 billion rands were lost in 2003 to 
corruption in social welfare, and the labour ministry may have lost as much as 1 billion 
rands. This led President Thabo Mbeki, to say corruption was a major hindrance to 
development: "It constrains our ability to fight poverty, negatively affects economic 
development, damages social values and undermines democracy and good governance."10  
 
There is some evidence to suggest that in both developing and developed countries the 
prevalence of corruption provides strong inhibitions and obstacles to development. Not 
only are politicians and administrators affected by the prevalence of corruption, but also 
businessmen and, in fact, the whole population. Fundamentally, it undermines sustainable 
development and exacerbates inequality by affecting the poor disproportionately. For 
instance in terms of health performance, the World Health Report 2000 released by the 
World Health Organization in mid-June 2000 shows that Southern African countries have 
the worst performing health systems in the world and are the least likely to provide their 
citizens with a long and healthy life.  
 
In this report, South Africa was among those countries that scored the lowest out of 191 
countries. Although South Africa ranked 57th in terms of the amount of money spent on 
health, it was 182nd when it came to the effectiveness of its spending and ranked 142nd 
when it came to the fairness with which health resources were distributed. Overall, South 
 
9 The National Integrity Systems TI Country Study Report – South Africa 2005 released by TI and the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on 21 March 2005. 
10 Mbeki’s opening address in Pretoria at the second Anti-Corruption Summit, 22-23 March 2005. 
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Africa rated 175 out of the 191 countries surveyed, after Botswana 169th and before 
Swaziland 177th (Sunday Times, 25 June 2000). The disjuncture between expenditure and 
performance suggests that South African public health is an important field for corruption, 
waste and mismanagement.  
 
It is worth nothing that corruption is as destructive to a society as the rush for quick and 
easy money, which makes fools of those who can work honestly and constructively. A 
recent study of corruption in Gauteng (Kalombo, 2005)  shows that the consequences of 
government malpractices are deleterious as corruption is: 
 
1. siphoning away a large chunk of public resources which could have been 
productively employed elsewhere in the economy, as was the case of Jessie Duarte who 
was found to have used state funds to take a friend on an overseas visit. There were 
millions of rands misappropriated in the Gauteng Housing and Land Affairs Department 
headed by Dan Mofokeng, as it is demonstrated in this study. 
2. undermining effectiveness and efficiency of the government; for instance Duarte’s 
department was plagued with factions and was under the control of inept political and 
administrative heads, giving a negative image to the whole Gauteng government. The 
same can be said about the appointment by the ANC national leadership of the Negota 
commission of inquiry to probe a string of allegations of maladministration and corruption 
against the Premier Motshekga. This resulted once again in a negative image of the 
government and ended up undermining its effectiveness and efficiency. 
3. reducing efficient mobilization of resources and management of development 
activities; as people in top government positions devoted their time to respond to questions 
put to them by the investigative officers to help the numerous commissions of inquiry. 
4. directing gains from investment in the industrial sector to conspicuous 
consumption; as demonstrated by the case of the late Mayor of Ekurhuleni metro, 
Bavumile Vilakazi who once was described as someone having completely “lost control 
of spending”.  
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5. generating allocative inefficiency by permitting the least efficient contractor or 
most costly supplier with the highest ability to bribe those who award government 
contracts, as the Ndinzani’s case11 proved.   
 
Recent studies underscore the significance of the costs of corruption in transition countries 
such as South Africa where corruption has large, adverse effects on private investment and 
economic growth. Dieter Frisch, has observed that “corruption raises the cost of goods and 
services; it increases the debt of a country (and carries with it recurring debt-servicing 
costs in the future); it leads to lowering of standards, as sub-standard goods are provided 
and inappropriate or unnecessary technology is acquired; and it results in project choices 
being made based more on capital (because it is more rewarding for the perpetrator of 
corruption) than on manpower, which would be the more useful for development” (T.I. 
Source Book, 1996:2). 
 
Whatever reason, generally, corruption kills the development spirit. As Dieter Frisch has 
noted, by diverting scarce resources to less or non-priorities, corruption is on the larger 
part responsible for neglect of fundamental needs, particularly basic needs such as food, 
health and education. Corruption therefore becomes the cause of underdevelopment and 
poverty in general. 
 
5.3. Lessons from Other African Countries 
 
Corruption studies in Africa have demonstrated how evidence of the devastating impact of 
corruption on development is accumulating (World Bank, October 6, 1999). Although its 
incidence varies among African countries, ranging from rare (Botswana) to widespread 
(Ghana, Zimbabwe, Kenya) to systemic (Nigeria, former Zaire, Cameroon), the majority 
of the countries are in the range of widespread to systemic, as shown in Table 10. Where it 
is rare, it is relatively easy to detect and control. But, at the other extreme, where there is 
 
11 The Provincial Tender Board awarded a helicopter ambulance service to Ndinzani Aviation Services 
despite the fact that its chairman Peter Malungani was a member of the Board and that Ndinzani never 
existed before applications closed for the tender. This was a visible conflict of interests on the part of 
Malungani. The court ordered the Board to review its procedures after the Gauteng Tender Board had 
granted the tender to Ndinzani despite impropriety surrounding the award. Europ Assistance claimed among 
other things that its R7,9 million bid had been increased to R13 million without its knowledge. At the same 
time, Ndinzani’s original bid was dropped from R21 million to R14 million.  
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systemic corruption, “the likelihood of detection and control is somewhat minimal as an 
incentive and further practices are put in place to perpetuate the system. In other words, 
institutions, rules, and norms of behaviour are adapted toward the ultimate goal of 
predatory gain” (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998:8). 
 
Table 10: How serious is corruption a problem globally? 
 
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 
 
Transparency International's 2004 Global Corruption Barometer, a survey of the general 
public that measures attitudes towards corruption, indicated that the poor are the group 
most affected by corruption. Half of low-income respondents believed petty corruption to 
be a very serious problem while only 38 per cent of high-income respondents agreed. The 
poor also reported the greatest impact of corruption on their personal and family lives. 
In Africa, the extent and magnitude of this scourge is difficult to estimate, due to its 
illegality and the painstaking efforts the culprits take to conceal it. As seen, corruption is 
not a zero-sum game. Evidence from empirical cases in many countries on the continent - 
maybe with the exception of South Africa for a lot of features - highlights the deleterious 
effects on economic development and exposes the factors, which have combined to 
hamper efforts to combat corruption in the region. Among several factors – and to get in 
line with corruption scholars – this study has singled out inefficiency and waste; 
aggravation of the budget deficit problems; negative impact on foreign investors and 
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contraction and collapse of the economy, as underlined by Ayittey (2000:105-108), as 
follows: 
1. Corruption breeds inefficiency and waste. In a corrupt system, state institutions 
decay and breakdown. Nobody cares because tenure of office and promotions are based 
not on competence and merit but on personal loyalty to the president, ethnicity, and, 
sycophancy. Institutions such as the civil service, the judiciary, parliament, and the police 
disintegrate and fail to function since they have all been perverted. For example 
contractors and suppliers fail to deliver. Who you are and how big a kickback you offer 
matters more than how well or efficiently you perform a job. As a result, work done is 
shoddy. The former Zaire is a worst-case scenario with roads poorly constructed and wash 
away at the first drop of rain. Telephones do not work, postal services are non-existent, 
and the entire communication system is in shambles and cost the country billions in lost 
output. The former president Mobutu was fraudulently using a satellite line until he got 
exposed a year before his ousting from power by Laurent Kabila. The educational system 
has sharply deteriorated. Hospitals lack basic suppliers and patients are often asked to 
bring their own bandages and blankets. When Mobutu fell ill, he flew to Europe for 
treatment. In short, the rot is not confined to one area but seeps into all areas of 
government institutional breakdown and the failure to provide the most basic essential 
services creates an environment inimical to development. The cost of doing business in 
such an environment increases enormously. Even though the state soaks up scarce 
resources, it fails to fulfill its role in facilitating economic growth or deliver essential 
services.  
 
2. Corruption aggravates the budget deficit problem. In countries such as Sierra 
Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimababwe and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (former Zaire), expenditure figures are padded. Ghost workers 
proliferate government payrolls. The “ghost workers” are fake, retired, or dead persons 
whose names remain on the payroll for fraudulent officials to claim their wages. In one 
government departments in Sierra Leone, 75 per cent of the staff were found to be 
nonexistent (West Africa: 5-11 September 1988). In Ghana, tens of thousands of “ghost 
workers” were identified workers and do not show up for work regularly, partly because 
their salaries are so low that they need to work elsewhere to make ends meet.  The 
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government began a campaign a few years ago to get rid of them, yet nothing happened 
because the government finally said that it lacked the money to fire the “ghost workers” 
(Pascal Zachary, 2004).  
 
In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni has ordered a clean up exercise of all payrolls in 
government institutions to get rid of “ghost workers” (The Monitor, Kampala, September 
1, 2005). In Kenya, the government is considering a sweep of its civil service to track 
down "ghost workers". “Cleaning out these "ghost workers" would, along with tightened 
tax collection controls, help bring the deficit down from a predicted 62bn shillings to 
about 47bn shillings (£390m; $621m) for the year to June 2004”, said the Finance 
Minister David Mwiraria (BBC News, Friday, 18 July, 2003, 13:34 GMT). The 
Government of Tanzania has recently launched its’ integrated HR and Payroll systems 
covering about 280,000 public servants. This means that improvements towards more 
effective human resources and payroll management in order to reduce “ghost workers” 
(KPMG East Africa, 2001) 
 
However, the problem of "ghost workers" is a widespread problem and is by no means 
confined to these countries. In DR Congo, “ghost soldiers” cost the Army 10 million US$ 
each month during the last two years of transition. There were 344,000 soldiers on the 
payroll, but 170,000 of them were identified as “ghosts”, and no one knows the destination 
of the 10 million (Le Soft, 14 June 2005).  In June 2003, the main Zambian civil servants' 
union has called for a crackdown on what it says are more than 20,000 ghost workers, 
contributing to a budget over-run of 600bn kwacha (£80m; $132m). In 2001, the Nigerian 
civil service almost ground to a halt in a search for ghost workers - many of whom, local 
observers say, are back on the books. And in the Central African Republic, Prime Minister 
Abel Goumba has asked banks to make it easier for civil servants to open accounts, in the 
hope that cash payments can be scrapped to aid the removal of “ghosts” from the payroll 
(BBC News, Friday, 18 July, 2003, 13:34 GMT).  
 
Revenue collectors are notoriously corrupt, pocketing part of the tax proceeds and waiving 
taxes if they receive large enough bribes. African budgets are chronically in deficit, which 
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is often financed by printing money. That in itself often aggravates inflationary conditions 
in the economy, occasioned by shortages and supply rigidities.  
 
3. Corruption drives away foreign investors. Africa has remained a wilderness to 
foreign investors for a variety of reasons: weak currencies (except notably in extractive 
industries, where output is priced in dollars), exchange controls, a feeble local private 
sector, poor infrastructure, small domestic markets, stifling bureaucracy, political 
instability, an uncertain legal system, and corruption. According to reports, despite some 
elaborate investment codes and guarantees of profit repatriation, Africa “attracts less than 
5 per cent of the direct investment going to the developing countries, an estimated US$2.5 
billion or so in 1994” (the Economist, 12 August 1995:11). In 1995 when a record US$231 
billion in foreign investment flowed into the Third World, Africa’s share fell to a miserly 
2.4 percent. Some international observers ask why should foreign investors be condemned 
when Africa’s kleptocrats do not invest in their own countries? Herman Cohen, former U5 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the early 1990s remarked: “Over the last 
10 years, Africans themselves have exported US$20 billion a year into bank accounts in 
Europe [and the US] buying real estate. So if Africans don’t have confidence in their own 
continent, why should the rest of the world?” (Africa Insider, July 1994:4). 
 
4. Corruption leads to economic contraction and collapse. Incapable of attracting 
foreign investment or spurring domestic investment, a corrupt government is also 
incapable of efficient economic management and of eliciting the sacrifices necessary for 
the development effort. Extractive like the colonial state when Africa’s resources and 
wealth were plundered for the development of metropolitan European countries, today the 
predatory African states exploit and extract resources from the productive members of the 
society. These resources are then spent lavishly by the ruling elites on themselves or 
siphoned out of Africa. As a result, the economy limps along or contracts. The contraction 
is accelerated by large-scale capital flight out of the formal economy. People lose faith in 
the ability of the government to provide basic services (housing, health care, water and 
electricity), jobs, and to combat corruption. A growing sense of alienation and disaffection 
among the population as a whole sets in. 
 
The Nigerian scholar Claude Ake was quoted as saying:   
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“Most African regimes have been so alienated and so violently repressive that their 
citizens see the State as enemies to be evaded, cheated and defeated if possible, but never 
as partners in development. The leaders have been so engrossed in coping with the 
hostilities, which their misrule and repression has unleashed that they are unable to take 
much interest in anything else including the pursuit of development. These conditions were 
not conducive to development and none has occurred. What has occurred is regression, as 
we all know only too well” (Ayittey (2000:107). 
 
Recent events in Zimbabwe, and in other parts of Africa (DRC and the Great Lakes 
region, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Angola, Zambia, Ivory Cost...) illustrate Ake’s 
contention. 
 
While the devastating effects of corruption on development in Africa are more a reality 
than a myth, the same cannot be said about South Africa, which finds itself in a class of its 
own. Indeed, for the past ten years, one of the things the new democratic South African 
government has focused attention on is corruption. The reasons for the government 
attention are first and foremost to avoid the repetition of what is witnessed in the rest of 
Africa as discussed above. It is arguable that while the corrupt act is inherently 
undemocratic, there is no simple correlation between levels of democracy and levels of 
corruption. Nonetheless, democratic regimes - like the one in South Africa - over the long 
run arguably engender more powerful antibodies against corruption than systems where 
political liberties are stifled. From evidence elsewhere it is established that a regime that 
has frequent elections, political competition, active and well-organized opposition forces, 
an independent legislature and judiciary, free media and liberty of expression is bound to 
generate more limits on the scope and frequency of corruption than one that does not have 
them. 
 
However, it is also true that democratic systems also provide incentives and opportunities 
for corrupt behaviour, notably the enormous costs of mounting election campaigns, the 
capture of political parties by economic elites, the politicization of the state apparatus by 
elected officials and the desire of the latter to compensate for political uncertainty by 
building up a capital stake through corruption. These phenomena are particularly strong in 
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fledgling democracies where a procedural transition has not been accompanied by real or 
substantive democracy. Nonetheless, democracy is a necessary condition for eradicating 
corruption, even if the democracies themselves are not immune from it.  
 
All these factors provide a framework against which to assess the successes of anti-
corruption measures. General perception is that the competition between political actors 
will create public accountability, which will inhibit the embezzlement, favouritism and 
wastefulness that have ruined the political economy of many African countries, and led to 
gross public disenchantment.  
 
5.4. Positive versus Negative Effects of Corruption 
 
Is corruption a bad thing for society or organizations? Is it possible that, on balance, 
corruption might be useful rather than harmful? And how then may one have the will to 
speak of apologies for political corruption? Is corruption worth fighting at all? Let us now 
consider the effects of corruption by analyzing its normative nature. There is a large body 
of literature dealing with the effects corruption has on development as well as cures to 
fight it and scholars have fought intense battles to agree for a common definition. 
However, our review will be marked by the fierce debate between scholars that has 
evolved around the tonic and toxic effects of corruption on development. 
 
As one can note, much of the social scientific literature on corruption consists of a debate 
over whether in general corruption helps or hinders development. Parties involved in this 
academic debate have been categorized in two groups: the moralists and the revisionists. 
The former are accused of attempting to see corruption as evil and of importing 
inappropriate, value-laden assumptions into their analyses. On the other hand, the 
revisionists having challenged the earlier assumption that the public consequences of 
corruption were overwhelmingly negative, share the belief that certain kinds of corruption 
may perform functions that are more or less beneficial from the perspective of the society 
at large as well as beneficial for the interests of those directly involved. Obviously, many 
of them have argued that corruption can play a positively useful role in developing 
countries. 
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Heidenheimer (1970:480-81) has identified three rather distinguishable conceptual 
frameworks that have influenced the literature and been evolved in it: 
 
1.  The first category is that of writers who have been inspired particularly by the 
structural-functional schools in sociology and anthropology and who perceive corruption 
as fulfilling a positive function, particularly with respect to social integration. Robert K. 
Merton appears to have had with his study, “Some Functions of the Political Machine” 
(1957), an enormous influence on students of political corruption. Merton’s persuasive 
theoretical presentation has inspired many writers such as students of political 
development like David Bayley, Jose Abueva and James Scott. However, not all writers 
who attribute some positive functions to corruption should be considered “functionalists”.  
 
2.  A second group of writers related more directly to the market-based definitions of 
corruption has ascribed positive functions to corruption as a regulatory instrument for the 
informal allocation of scarce licenses and services. Preeminent scholars of this school are 
V.O. Key who argued that corruption serves to regulate, control, “license” and keep within 
bounds certain practices like prostitution and gambling. Robert Tilman described 
bureaucratic black marketeering in the developing countries that serves the function of 
maintenance of government. While economists like N.H. Leff have suggested the utility 
and the role corruption can play in developing countries.  
 
3.  The third group is that of writers who are basically institutionalists and relate to the 
public-interest definition of corruption. They perceive corruption as fulfilling a useful 
function as the least of the evils that may become prevalent in political systems during 
periods characterized by political degeneration and the decay of political institutions. 
Samuel Huntington who believes in calling a “spade a spade”, is one of the most 
outstanding theorist of this school. Nevertheless, as held by Carino, the revisionists’ 
careful balancing of good and bad effects seems to be a recognition that everyone knows 
corruption is not really beneficial but positive effects should be acknowlegded so that one 
does not condemn a country completely (Klitgaard, 1988:30). 
 
Moving from this perspective, Klitgaard stylizes three categories of arguments that 
corruption may, on occasion, be socially beneficial. They are the economist’s reminder, 
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the political scientist’s reminder, and the manager’s reminder. To sum up, he comes to the 
conclusion that these three “reminders” have some common features. First, they refer to 
the benefits from specific corrupt acts, not from systematic corruption pervading many or 
most decisions. Second, the putative benefits depend upon the assumption that the 
corruption transgresses a wrong or inefficient economic policy, overcomes limitations in 
an imperfect political system, or gets around imperfections in organizational rules. In 
short, if the prevailing system is bad, then corruption may be good (1988:33). 
 
But such blanket statements about the utility of corruption will not help in assessing the 
effects of corruption on particular instances. For the purposes of this study, it will be 
worthwhile to analyze the emerging negative consensus of scholarly studies on the 
subject. A review of particularly useful studies will help keep in perspective the damaging 
effects of corruption. 
 
As evidenced by recent works on the topic in developing countries, it seems clear that the 
harmful effects of corruption greatly outweigh the occasional social benefits. 
Comprehensive empirical studies conducted in the mid-1970s in Asia have demonstrated 
that the contention that corruption may have some beneficial effects could be overstated. 
Studies of corruption in Philippines sponsored by the College of Public Administration of 
the University of the Philippines since the mid-1970s have revealed that “graft and 
corruption has strongly affected development efforts negatively, belying the so-called 
“revisionist hypothesis” prevalent in the West which considers corruption as either a 
necessary step in the development process or a means of speeding it up. Instead the 
research has found that corruption leads to the favouring of inefficient producers, the 
unfair and inequitable distribution of scarce public resources, and the leakage of revenue 
from government coffers to private hands. Less directly but no less perniciously, 
corruption leads to loss of confidence in government”, as Ledivina Carino - quoted by 
Klitgaard (1988:37-38) - has stated. 
 
Another comprehensive empirical work carried out in Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, 
Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and sponsored by the Canadian Foreign 
Aid Agency in the late 1970s has shown that the case studies documented socially harmful 
effects from corrupt activities, and the positive effects were seldom encountered. Again 
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Carino points out that a major negative effect of corruption is its role in displacing goals, 
as employees pursue their own pecuniary interests rather than the objective of the 
organization. Energies of the staff are then spent in pursuit of their corrupt business 
interests, leaving behind what is their expected primary work. 
 
From the economic side, Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that those economists who 
look favourably upon corruption generally have a limited point of view, a narrow 
definition of goodness and an oversimplified model of the corrupt marketplace (1978:95). 
Corruption leads to economic inefficiency and waste, because of its effect on the 
allocation of funds, on production, and on consumption. Robert Klitgaard notes: 
“corruption is one of the foremost problems in the developing world. As poor countries 
slide into deeper economic trouble, the economic and social devastation that widespread 
corruption causes cannot be evaded or excused” (1988:x). One should remember that the 
failure to bring under control corruption can threaten the viability of democratic 
institutions and market economies. 
  
Furthermore, corruption can reduce economic growth by lowering incentives to invest (for 
both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs). Corruption can also be expected to reduce 
growth by lowering the quality of public infrastructure and services, decreasing tax 
revenue, causing talented people to engage in rent-seeking rather than productive 
activities, and distorting the composition of government expenditure. Corrupt politicians 
may be expected to spend more public resources on those items on which it is easier to 
exact large bribes and keep them secret - for example, items produced in markets where 
the degree of competition is low and items whose value is difficult to monitor. Thus these 
large effects suggest that policies to curb corruption could have significant payoffs. 
Therefore, there is no adequate evidence to the claim that corruption might be beneficial in 
the presence of a slow bureaucracy (Paulo Mauro, 1998:12). 
 
In exposing the very bad side of corruption, a number of writers use the metaphor of 
disease to discuss it. Noonan, the author of Bribes and Klitgaard agree that, “next to 
tyranny, corruption is the great disease of government. Skilful surgeons need more than a 
single way of curing the disease” (Klitgaard, 1988:xv). Functionalists find that corruption 
reflects an ongoing, functioning part of the political system. Simcha Werner observes: 
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“the functionalists came to regard corruption as an inherent aspect of the normal growth-
decay life cycle” (Peter de Leon, 1993:26). For Wraith and Simpkins, in Africa corruption 
flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and the weeds which it so much resembles, taking the 
goodness from the soil and suffocating the growth of plants which have been carefully, 
and expensively, bred and tended (1963:12-13). In its introduction to African politics 
Richard Hodder-Williams sees corruption as a cancer, which is dysfunctional to the 
political and economic system (1984:111). 
 
We think it is worthwhile, at this stage, to set to rest the academic debate on the general 
harmfulness of corruption. Nevertheless, the academic debate does not resolve the 
argument   over whether in general, corruption is harmful or useful to development. 
“When we get down to cases, notes Klitgaard, we find less disagreement than the 
academic debate would indicate over the effects of corrupt acts. They are, for the most 
part, bad. Corruption is eating away at many developing societies, condemning their 
people to greater poverty and political subjection (1988:194). Nowadays, “corruption”, 
has become a “large global industry” – in Kaufmann’s terms - that costs nations as much 
as 1.500 billion US dollars a year, or five percent of the world economy (Kaufmann, 
2004).   
 
From this discussion, it appears that corruption is toxic with very few exceptions. There is 
little or no support left for the view that corruption has positive effects on development. 
Thus, in general, corruption is harmful to economic, political, and organizational 
development. But all forms of corruption are not equal. Some forms are more harmful 
than others. Some countries more corrupted than others. Having said that, the question, 
“What can be done to stop corruption?” finds its legitimacy, as it will be addressed in the 
third part of this research where a framework for strategies will be presented. 
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Chapter Six 
SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICAL LEGACY  
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is an assessment of the incidence of political corruption in South Africa in 
general. It is an attempt to ascertain the implications of the political and the historical 
legacy of corruption on democratic governance through the survey of selected case studies 
before and after 1994. The study uses these cases to demonstrate to what extent does 
political legacy within the country influence the behaviour of current political leaders. The 
main merit made is to argue that there is a link between past and current political 
corruption. 
  
According to The World Factbook 2004, South Africa is a middle-income, emerging 
market with an abundant supply of natural resources; well-developed financial, legal, 
communications, energy, and transport sectors; a stock exchange that ranks among the 10 
largest in the world; and a modern infrastructure supporting an efficient distribution of 
goods to major urban centres throughout the region. However, growth has not been strong 
enough to lower South Africa's high unemployment rate; and daunting economic problems 
remain from the apartheid era, especially poverty and lack of economic empowerment 
among the disadvantaged groups. High crime and HIV/AIDS infection rates also deter 
investment. South African economic policy is fiscally conservative, but pragmatic, 
focusing on targeting inflation and liberalizing trade as means to increase job growth and 
household income. 
 
In South Africa, the perception exists that, not only have violent, interpersonal street 
crimes increased in recent years, but “white-collar crimes” and corruption, however 
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broadly or narrowly defined, are also rife in private and public institutions. And various 
reasons, mostly related to the corrupting nature of the apartheid regime are given for this 
status quo, as we shall see. 
 
Many questions should be asked about both the accountability and the efficiency of a 
public official in order to understand the concept. How can one explain this behaviour? 
Why does corruption seem to be increasing just when the government is serious in 
combating it? Is it because there is more corruption now than before 1994?  
 
Two assumptions on which the study is based show that: (1) There is a widespread belief 
that the incidence of corruption in South Africa is a legacy of an authoritarian past.  The 
problem with apartheid indeed was that it was a political system based on the 
predominance of one race over another. It was an exclusive, authoritarian, secretive and 
dictatorial society where absolute power was in the hands of a white minority. As such, it 
was susceptible to bureaucratic venality as is the case with most authoritarian and 
secretive governments.  Quoting from Van der Merwe12, Briggs noted that: “when a 
society, economic system or political system [e.g., apartheid] operates in a way that allows 
for the abuse of power for the benefit of the few at the expense of the rest – including the 
environment and future generations – that system needs to be cited as corrupt as well” 
(Briggs, 1998:2). 
 
(2) There is a strong belief that both democratization and transparency has made 
government less secret, more open to public scrutiny and more susceptible to strong 
criticism from opposition parties, the public and the media and that therefore, government 
is better protected against corruption.  Ostensibly, this assumption seems reasonable. 
Experience has shown that lack of transparency and accountability in a system, whatever 
it is, is the beginning of all troubles. Today, transparency seems to be what Michel 
Camdessus13 has called “the new global golden rule”, as “the lack of transparency” is 
found to be at the origin of the recurring crises in the emerging markets and a pernicious 
feature of the “crony capitalism” that has plagued most of the countries in crisis (Business 
Report, May 18, 1999:12).  
 
12 Van der Merwe was the former chief executive of Transparency International- South Africa (T-SA). 
13  Michel Camdessus was the chief of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the time. 
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6.2. The Culture of Corruption 
 
Perceptibly, the pre-94 incidence of corruption was noteworthy and went back a long way, 
as Professor Alf Stadler told the author during an interview with him (July 2000). He 
depicted a gloomy picture of what was happening at that time when there was what he 
called a “conspiracy of silence” about corruption. As a youth he knew the case of a Dutch 
immigrant, a respected citizen living in a good suburb and employed in the Public Works 
Department. He built a beautiful house in Bramley entirely with material stolen from his 
workplace. Everyone knew this, and no one seemed to think the less of him, let alone 
report him to the authorities. “This was the time where the culture of at least conniving in 
corrupt practices was widespread among whites”, Stadler observed. “I do not think this 
situation to have changed too much now”14.  
 
On the other hand, Deborah Posel described how the “ race and ethnicity of apartheid civil 
servants were deeply and powerfully inscribed in both their conditions and culture of 
work. Their habit of “collective quiescence” as workers was produced and reproduced in 
the paradoxical confluence of two different versions of the purpose and meaning of their 
work” (1999:118). 
 
The problem of corruption in the new South Africa is perceived to be serious such that the 
government, in order to achieve good governance, has made it one of its priorities. The 
national government announced in May 1996 its National Crime Prevention Strategy 
(NCPS) that places corruption as a priority crime concern on its agenda. In order to root 
out corruption in government departments nationwide, the Heath Special Investigating 
Unit was instituted. In its 1997-1998 Annual Report, the Unit denounced the “real boom” 
in the sphere of corruption, maladministration and misappropriation of state funds and 
public assets. It expressed its concern about the gravity of the matter to the business sector 
in these terms:  
 
 
14 Professor Alf Stadler: Interview, July 2000. 
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“The unfortunate truth is that a shockingly large proportion of the South African 
community appears to regard public funds and assets as “fair game” for corrupt schemes. 
This attitude extends into other fields and when it comes to contracting with the State, 
invoicing the State for services, dealing with State property, dealing with blank State 
cheques, etc, members of the public and private concerns, often in collusion with State 
officials, plough into the State’s resources, destroying substantial portions of the crop 
destined for the community at large. We are faced with a crisis, a national crisis, and a 
problem far more serious than what the ordinary man in the street perceives it to be. We 
have to accept the fact that South Africa has lost substantial assets over the years through 
corruption and maladministration” (1998:5). 
 
This alarming warning highlights the perception that corruption and dishonesty have 
become a feature of South African political and economic life, as indicated by many 
government inquiries such as the “White Commission” (1994), formerly known as the 
“Browde Commission”, the Negota Commission (1998), the Moerane Commission 
(1998), the King Commission (2000) or the Joint Report on the Arms Deal dossier (2001) 
- that have produced evidence of corruption by public officials as well as members of the 
private sector, making people aware that something was going wrong in the public office. 
A number of surveys conducted by independent agencies from 1995 confirm that 
perception as well. 
 
Apart from IDASA, there were other surveys published in the same period, such as the 
World Value Survey (1996) and Transparency International Corruption Perception index 
1997 released in Johannesburg at the end of July 1997 that confirmed a growing 
perception among local public and foreign businessmen that official corruption in South 
Africa was widespread.  It can be pointed out that surveys are about perceptions. And 
perceptions do not reflect the extent of corruption in any society. But as emphasized by 
Professor Wilmot James of IDASA, “popular perceptions are part of the political reality, 
and they highlight in striking fashion the challenge to government, its supporters, and its 
critics, in developing fair judgment of political officialdom” (Idasa: 1996).  
 
Understandably, analysts view corruption in the South African context, "as an act of 
wrongdoing, which typically involves unethical behaviour and illegality, and usually 
benefits accrue to either of the parties involved". This generic definition, points out 
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Anthony Minnaar, embraces corrupt practices such as bribery, fraud, embezzlement, 
wrongfully influencing decisions and nepotism. All of these acts involve a breakdown of 
ethical behaviour and moral standards where the law is disregarded and not respected 
(Minnaar, 1999:4).  
 
But, all these practices are not new in South Africa. It is arguable that, contrary to the 
assumption that during the white rule the public sector was free of corruption, evidence 
has shown that was not the case. Indeed, despite the massive expansion in the size and 
power of the bureaucracy, "its effectiveness was seriously eroded by emerging structural 
inefficiencies and skills that arose, in part, from the determination to keep vast categories 
of the workforce white and, if possible, Afrikaner", as expressed by Deborah Posel 
(1999:99).  
  
Most documented studies of corruption show that political corruption has a long history in 
South Africa’s politics where there is a culture of corruption, as noted by the Pickard 
Commission of Inquiry after investigating corruption and other irregularities in the 
Department of Development Aid. Studies have shown that "South Africa during the 
apartheid era provided an environment, which was structurally conducive to corruption 
where systems and habits shrouded in secrecy resulting in a lack of transparency and 
accountability advantageous to criminality. The pervasive and almost obsessive secrecy 
that came to surround the way in which people operated in society was infectious, 
spreading from the public into the private sector" (Camerer, 1996: 28). 
 
In the South African public view, few will deny that the growing problem of corruption is 
the legacy of the old order. A series of features associated with that old order include the 
severe level of poverty among Blacks, the psychological destruction that apartheid 
imposed and the sense of moral disintegration that accompanied it, the very high level of 
crime and the corruption in the police force itself. 
 
Comparative experience indicates that during the apartheid era official corruption at all 
levels was high, both in homeland administrations and in central departments of State. For 
many officials a mind-set of opportunism and a “get-rich—quick syndrome” became a 
feature of South African political life. Despite stringent controls in the civil service that 
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prevented bureaucrats from using their positions for financial benefits and self-
enrichment, there was in the 1980s more evidence of political corruption within central 
government and homeland administrations as well.  "In the last few years of apartheid”, 
wrote Tom Lodge, “it was very easy for officials to behave dishonestly; millions of rands 
were spent on secret projects and skilled labour shortages led to a breakdown of control 
procedures, particularly in the homelands"  (The Star, September 3, 1996). 
 
The problem with apartheid was that it was a political system based on the predominance 
of one race over other races that constituted the South African social, economic and 
political landscape. Absolute power was in the hands of a white minority that led to an 
exclusive, authoritarian, secretive and dictatorial society. As such, it was susceptible to 
bureaucratic venality as the case with most authoritarian and secretive governments. At 
that time, a lack of transparency and the opacity of the regime may explain the high level 
of dishonesty encountered within state departments where, as noted by Lodge, “secret 
budgets allowed senior security officials to misuse funds for private gain and by removing 
procurement from public scrutiny they created ample opportunities for bribery”. More, 
“strategic” kinds of government expenditure did not have to be defended in public, 
whether they involved defense projects, propaganda exercises, or sanctions evasions and 
all these featured large-scale misappropriation of public resources” (1998:171. 
 
In short, the incidence of all these corrupt practices in the old regime is a sign of a corrupt 
society where corruption was pervasive and although many cases came to court, only a 
few had been prosecuted. And when came the new dispensation in 1994, apartheid South 
Africa’s lack of morals also infected the new administration. The political legacy was the 
continuation of this trend towards corruption. “It would be surprising if there was no 
significant political corruption in contemporary South Africa ... Given that much of the 
administration, is still run by the same people, it would be reasonable to expect the 
continuation of a certain amount of corruption” (Lodge, 1998:171). 
 
1. Nowadays, a series of scandals - ranging from property scams to the alleged 
diversion of food parcels intended for the poor - have marked the political history 
of South Africa. The multiplication of political scandals produced an increased 
sensitivity to the issue of corruption. The frequency and extent of these scandals 
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brought corruption to light culminating in the 1997-1998 political upheavals 
caused by prominent people including Jessie Duarte and Dan Mofokeng cases.  
 
6.3. Typology of Corruption in South Africa  
 
Before 1994, most instances of corruption or misuse of public resources by public servants 
included both routine and grand corruption.  Examples of corruption in most case studies 
included private enrichment such as nepotism, favouritism, ghosting, phonies’ contracts, 
bribery, fraud, kickbacks and greed. The following typology of corruption practices in 
South Africa highlights the magnitude of the phenomenon and therefore reflects the past 
and the present in terms of officials’ misbehaving.     
 
6.3.1. Before 1994  
 
 Dishonest practices were located in a number of departments considered as strategic in 
the defence of apartheid ideals and its survival. The most documented included: the 
Department of Information that was hit in 1978 by a scandal involving senior officials 
who were using public funds to pay for holidays for their families, tax-free supplementary 
allowances, and properties registered in their own names.  The Defence Department was 
described as “the mysterious world of covert operations”, in Lodge’s terms, where official 
secrecy and loose accounting employed in the funding of arms procurement and front 
companies led to excessive venality. Given the huge sums and the evidently rather trial 
exercises in which they were supposedly deployed it seems reasonable to argue that 
private enrichment constituted a fairly significant aspect of “covert operations”, notes 
Lodge (1998:165). 
 
1. State Departments: 
 
According to a government report (the Pickard Commission) in the Department of 
Development Aid in 1991, it seems that official corruption at all levels during the last 
decades of apartheid contributed to the development of a culture of corruption whereby: 
“Public officials have developed a syndrome of a lack of enthusiasm to the extent 
sometimes of apathy and the huge amounts of money made available to the department 
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became too tempting to resist for some officials. Self-preservation and self-protection 
against criticism have become matters of primary importance even to the detriment of the 
very cause itself”, as a 1991 government report revealed (Republic of South Africa, 
1991:113, 147).  
 
The Inquiry found dishonesty and abuse to be rife in the Department and cases of tender-
fraud, favouritism, lack of accountability and an “all pervasive culture of corruption” as a 
result of the apartheid regime (Bauer, 2000:219). The report showed that the spreading out 
of the “culture of corruption” in the Department consisted of collusion between a number 
of public officials and a number of contractors, producers and developers in the private 
sector, resulting in abuse of power for personal gain to the detriment of the people they 
were supposed to serve.  
 
After the release of the Pickard Report on 7 May 1992, despite the loss over the years of 
several of millions of rands through various forms of nepotism and fraud in a Department 
which administered about 11 percent of the government budget; despite all these 
wrongdoings and irregularities discovered in the Department, there was not enough action 
taken against the culprits. As a result, the Department of Development Aid was disbanded 
with its officials being redeployed to other state departments. And the decision taken by 
then President De Klerk for the disbanding of the department had nothing to do with 
irregularities and wrongdoings, but with a change of strategy on the part of the 
government of the day. 
 
Another comparable case of irregularities and dishonesty was that of the Department of 
Education and Training (DET). This case suggests that corruption and incompetence were 
quite common. The Department was responsible for Black education in the townships. A 
Commission of Inquiry headed by Mrs. Justice E. van den Heever (also known as the Van 
den Heever Commission) was established in 1988 after numerous reports in the press of 
irregularities within the Department. As reported, “the Commission carried out a lengthy 
investigation into irregularities around book contracts, the sale of video equipment, and 
the arrangement of sending youths to youth camps run by friends and family of employees 
and found cases of fraud, bribery, kickbacks, nepotism, ghosting and a general lack of 
accountability” (Bauer, 2000:219). 
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The findings of the Commission of Inquiry were published in four reports, of which the 
second, third, and fourth report contained examples of cases of corruption. Regarding the 
issue of ultimate political responsibility, as in the case of the Department of Development 
Aid, government reaction was poor. The only reaction came from the Democratic Party, 
which complained about the fact that while “the revelations of illegality, corruption and 
incompetence were alarming, but equally disturbing was the unwillingness of the 
government and the Department to take tough and decisive action against those 
responsible…” (The Cape Times, 21 September 1990:5). 
  
It emerges from these inquiries, as Bauer has found out that, “such action was possible 
because in South Africa the system functioned in such a way that people who are accused 
are allowed to continue at their posts, move to another department, or merely slide into 
retirement” (Bauer, 2000:227).  The persistence of this culture of impunity is a matter of 
public concern nowadays as the Gauteng case will demonstrate. These facts show that the 
legacy of the past – as far as poverty and unemployment are concerned – still haunts the 
country as a whole, opening windows and doors for venality. The public sector 
perspective is justified by the fact that the abuse by the incumbent of his public office or 
position for private gain relates corruption to the abuse.  
 
Besides location of corruption in several national departments, individuals also perpetrated 
acts of corruption, in their capacity as public representatives and were removed from 
public life due to corruption. They include: 
 
• Hennie Van Der Walt: Schweizer-Reneke MP, he was sentenced in January 1988 to 10 
years in prison (five years suspended) for 15 counts of theft of R800 000 in trust 
money. He perpetrated the crimes while deputy minister of co-operation and 
development. 
 
• Leon De Beer: Hillbrow MP, he was jailed in 1989 for two years for 70 counts of 
electoral fraud. He served eight months. The charges arose from false change-of-
address cards, and 12 special votes resulting in him leading Progressive Federal Party 
MP Alf Widman by 89 votes. 
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• Peet De Pontes: East London City MP. Resigned in 1989 and fined R35 000 in 1991 for 
fraud, theft, bribery, forgery and uttering. He defrauded a residence permit for 
controversial financier Vito Palazzolo, bribed a public servant and stole a government 
file. 
 
• Pietie Du Plessis: a former cabinet minister received a nine-year jail sentence in 1993 
for 17 counts of fraud involving R30 million. Served two years and eight months. 
Freed early because he was over 60, and ill. The judge cited his greed and the losses he 
inflicted on others. 
 
2. Homeland Administrations: 
 
Other well-documented cases were found in the homeland administrations, both 
“independent” and “self-governing” where political corruption on a major scale was rife, 
especially in Transkei, Kwandebele, Lebowa and Qwaqwa, among others. Almost 
everywhere, official inquiries discovered the same pattern of behaviour: sale of farms, 
firms and houses at very low prices to cabinet ministers and their friends and associates in 
the Transkei. Kickback amounting to a R1 million to officials from contractors for 
building work that had never been undertaken and Cabinet ministers appropriated 
discounts from the government’s purchases of luxury cars in Kwandebele. And in 
Qwaqwa, a press report (Sowetan, 25 November 1993) showed there was a deal involving 
purchases of chemicals that had been authorized by Dr. G.L.Becker, Secretary for the 
Qwaqwa Department of Health, at a cost of about 60 percent of his Department’s annual 
budget.  
 
However, Bophutatswana offers a best example of corruption where the Skweyiya 
Commission in 1996 uncovered what Lodge has called “a carnival of misconduct” dating 
from 1978, beginning with former Bophutatswana President Mangope’s issue of irregular 
tenders, his appropriation of state owned houses and farms, and his establishment of 
private businesses with public funds” (Lodge, 1998:169). 
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The Skweyiya Commission, which investigated mismanagement and corruption, 
recommended that Mangope be prosecuted for fraud, theft and contravening ex-change 
control regulations. As reported by the Sunday Times (March 21, 1999:13), Mangope, 
seen as one of the worst of the homeland leaders was convicted in 1998 on 90 counts of 
theft totaling R2.8 million in his 17 years rule. Most of the money was stolen from his 
own tribe, the Bahurutshe-Bo-Manyane. Judge Tom Mullins said Mangope had abused his 
tribe’s trust and had used the money to fund his own “domestic and family expenditure, 
holidays and overseas trips”. He was also convicted of fraudulently transferring R1.3 
million to a covert bank account in Jersey in the Channel Islands. In another trial, he and 
others were accused of siphoning off R10.4 million of public funds to set up his political 
party, the Christian Democratic Party in 1995.  
 
All these examples convey to instances of elite or grand corruption, carried out by senior 
officials resulting in large-scale abuse of power.  But, petty or routine corruption was 
common too in both state departments and homeland administrations. It is significant to 
note that in the Bantustans, the power was mainly based on the old patrimonial features 
where the family, the clan or the tribe was still playing a prominent role. The demise of 
the apartheid state brought to an end the Bantustan regime in South Africa.  Nevertheless 
the way these acts of corruption were carried out by the homeland leaders led Tom Lodge 
to argue: “these occurrences in the final years of apartheid may have represented 
behaviour motivated by the realization among officials that their powers and privileges 
were shortly to be curtailed, but there are other reports dating from earlier periods which 
suggest, as in the Transkei case, that graft was entrenched and routine in the highest 
echelons of homeland administrations through much of their history” (1998:169). 
 
 In short, the incidence of all these corrupt practices in the old regime is a sign of a corrupt 
society where corruption was pervasive and although many cases have come to court, only 
a few had been prosecuted. When came the new dispensation in 1994, apartheid South 
Africa’s lack of morals infected the new administration. The political legacy was the 
continuation of this trend towards corruption. “It would be surprising if there was no 
significant political corruption in contemporary South Africa”, wrote Tom Lodge, who 
added: “Given that much of the administration, is still run by the same people, it would be 
reasonable to expect the continuation of a certain amount of corruption” (1998:171). 
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6.3.2. Incidences in Post-1994 South Africa 
 
Today’s apparent increase of corruption in South Africa is a matter of public concern. 
There is no doubt, on the one hand that, this is the result of both democratization and 
transparency, while, on the other hand, the problem is the legacy of the old order, as seen. 
In contrast to the extremely coercive apartheid state, democratization has made 
government less secret, more open to public scrutiny and strong criticism from both 
opposition parties and media.  
 
“Today corruption is the mark of South Africa”, said one observer who describes with full 
details what constitute corrupt activities in the new South Africa: “From the officials at 
local levels who demand to be paid for what it is their duty to do, or for not doing it; e.g., 
in housing allocations, awarding of pensions and maintenance grants, access to water and 
other essential resources, issues of fake IDs and birth certificates, turning a blind eye to 
criminal activities; to the larger tax evasions, financial scams, gifts and entertainment to 
win political favours, contracts and licenses; the dishonesties that take place on a daily 
basis like playing for hours on the internet at your employer’s expense, cheating on 
working time, customs, tax returns, television licenses; taking early retirement and going 
back to the same job on a consultancy or temporary basis, earning the same salary as 
before for a job, or a position as public representative, which one has relinquished; the 
price in trade or military agreements for “aid” (Duncan: 1995).  
 
What Sheena Duncan said in her book and what she confirmed during an interview with 
her has been echoed by President Nelson Mandela who oncecomplained that corruption 
became prevalent in government administrations after 1994:  
 
“Corruption is also unacceptably high, and what is ever more demoralizing is that we 
came into government with the intention of cleaning the civil service of corruption, but our 
own freedom fighters, some of them very top activists, also steal taxpayers’ money” 
(Saturday Star, April 17, 1999). 
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More importantly, corruption today has crossed the racial lines. A significant number of 
whites in South Africa in the late 1990s still believe that Black is synonymous with 
incapacity.  White perceptions are that before 1994 there was good government under the 
white minority rule and that after 1994, the government is bad because it is associated 
with Blacks. According to Afrobarometer, “The perception that corruption is an important 
problem has been increasing steadily since 1994, when it was not even reported as an 
issue. It was first mentioned in 1995 by 2% (of respondents) and has now climbed to 13%. 
Whites are more concerned about this issue than other races, with 31% mentioning it, 
compared to 22% of Indians, 11% of Coloureds, and just 8% of Blacks” (Briefing Paper 
No.5, July 2003) 
 
The reasoning is that, “it is quite normal for a white person to get wealthy. When the same 
applies to a black person, a lot of questions are raised concerning his background and the 
origin of his sudden wealth”. They associate blackness with “non-merit” and corruption.  
 
The intention, of course, reckons Kaizer Nyatsumba, is to create the impression that 
corruption is part and parcel of blackness: there is more corruption now in the public 
service, so the shop-logic goes, because the country is now black-ruled (The Star, 1 
September, 1999:8). Those who hold this view have forgotten that since 1994, 
transparency, especially on the part of the government, has become one of the basic tenets 
on which our democracy is founded and is a good thing for the country as a whole. 
Openness means citizens now know much more about the exercise of power in the public 
service, and in the country generally, than was the case in the past.  
 
Advocate Tim McNally goes on to say that “corruption depends on opportunity. 
Opportunity in turn, depends on power. Apartheid tended to limit the power base to white 
people. This tended to confine the problem of corruption to a relatively small percentage 
of the total population. Full democracy, with its accompanying aspects of affirmative 
action and black empowerment; has widened the opportunity pool to include, potentially, 
the entire population. It is inevitable that the number of people taking negative advantage 
of the new opportunities has grown proportionately”  (2001:2). 
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As a result, in today’s South Africa allegations of corrupt practices in the public sector are 
made almost everyday in the local press and many people believe that none of the 
government institutions escape the widespread corruption that “seeps into every nook and 
cranny of their lives”. Accordingly, the question that may rise is that of the incidence of 
corruption in South Africa as well as the strategies to curb it. Hostages of the historical 
legacy of apartheid as South Africans are today; can one pretend that South Africans are 
living in a society free of corruption? Obviously the answer is no. In this case, what can be 
done to control it?  
 
As far as these questions are concerning, one has to concede, as shown by my 
investigations in Gauteng that there are no reliable data of the level of corruption in any 
one society as there are no statistics on corruption. Therefore, analysts have cautioned 
about taking for granted all statements on corruption facts: “statements about its incidence 
are necessarily impressionistic, heavily influenced by its public profile … to the extent to 
which it is discussed in the press and is also a topic of everyday conversation. This raises 
the problem that more open societies – societies where there is a free press and political 
opposition is tolerated – may appear to be more corrupt than more authoritarian regimes” 
(Theobald, 1990:79).  In South Africa, the openness of the society, which lies in a 
democratic constitution after the demise of apartheid, has sometimes given the impression 
that there is more corruption now than before.   
 
So far, the current occurrence of corruption in government administration seems to be on 
the increase in all three tiers of government – central, provincial and local. Despite claims 
that since 1994 there has been little evidence of corruption at national government level 
certain notorious incidents have proved those claims wrong. For the sake of this study, this 
section will succinctly review some heavyweight cases in central government featuring 
senior officials using public funds for private gain or elite or grand corruption. Among 
those who took advantage of the new opportunities by making corruption work for them 
are some individuals from departments such as Welfare, Home Affairs, Correctional 
Service or Parliament. These departments seem to have been particularly affected by high 
level of corruption.  
 
1. The Department Of Welfare and Population Development:    
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In June 2000, former National Party Welfare Minister Abe Williams was found guilty on 
36 charges of theft and four of corruption; all dating back to his time as Welfare minister 
in the late apartheid-era House of Representatives. He kept the same position after the 
1994 elections at the time of the Government of National Unity.  
 
A three-year investigation by the Office of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) into a 
pensions scam in which Williams was allegedly implicated led to his resignation as 
Minister in 1996 when irregularities were found in the award of a R149 million contract to 
a company called NISEC to administer pension pay-outs.  It was established that “he 
(Williams) has received money that he should not have received”. ANC Western Cape 
Welfare MEC Ebrahim Rasool initiated the investigation. 
 
The investigation, followed a forensic probe, conducted as part of the Rasool inquiry, 
which found serious fraud and corruption in social security units in the province involving 
junior clerks and senior management. “The probe also exposed weaknesses in the contract 
between the Welfare Department and NISEC, which was allowed to hold R100 million a 
month for 17 days before paying out old-age pensions and disability grants. As one should 
note, the company was allowed access to the interest accumulated before payments were 
made” (The Star, May 10, 1999). 
 
After his trial, Williams was convicted and sentenced to an effective three years’ 
imprisonment in June 2000 after being found guilty of corruption involving R240 112 and 
theft of R383 000 in donor funds. These charges related to bribes he took as Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development to ensure the purchase of computer software solely 
from a company known as UNIDATA, for a welfare literacy programme.  He was also 
found guilty of accepting bribes from an Eastern Cape company, NISEC, to influence the 
extension of the Western Cape pension payout contract to the Eastern Cape. 
 
The theft charges involved donations he had received for the upliftment of impoverished 
West Coast communities. 
 
2. The Department Of Home Affairs: 
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After apartheid demise in 1994, the Department of Home Affairs became an attractive 
center for corrupt individuals due to its exclusive role in the handling of immigration 
matters. Immigration services all over the world have always been the target of asylum 
seekers and those in search of a better life in wealthier countries. The desire to find work 
in these countries makes documents such as birth certificates, work or study permits and 
identity documents very valuable. The obtainment of immigration documents invites 
attempts to manipulate the system, at all costs, for profit. The opportunity leads to all kind 
of operators trying to obtain, falsify and sell such papers to would-be immigration 
candidates.  
 
Research in South Africa gives a detailed account of wealthy illegal migrants bribing 
officials in the Department of Home Affairs to “create a background” by entering 
fictitious names of parents, dates of birth and other details into the computer database for 
population registration. The illegal migrant then uses this same information on an 
application form for a late birth registration. Once their births have been registered they 
can legitimately apply for South African identity documents and eventually for a passport 
(Mail & Guardian, October 8 to 14, 1999:31). 
 
But without the involvement and the connivance of government officials, public sector 
corruption would not take place. These officials are issuing fraudulent documents 
frequently by using false names and signatures to mislead police trying to track them 
down.  A typical case was that of Home Affairs Director General Albert Sepatake 
Mokoena who found himself in the center of controversy following his involvement in 
corrupt practices in the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
A summary account of the case is needed. On 7 March 1999, the Sunday Times revealed 
that corruption is rife at the Department’s Gauteng headquarters in Harrison Street, 
Johannesburg, with officials loitering outside the building brazenly peddling false ID 
documents. Confronted with evidence of this, Mokoena instead found the Sunday Times 
investigation “malicious, untruthful and irresponsible” (March 14 1999:18). However, one 
should recall the promises Mokoena made when he took up office in 1997. During a Press 
conference in Johannesburg he disclosed his plans to transform this discredited department 
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into an institution that all South Africans could cherish: “We’ll have to put a lot of 
emphasis on human resources and ensure that we employ world-class customer care. 
People should remember that we have the collective responsibility of ensuring that we 
break with the past. This means that where we go wrong, people must come forward and 
demand attention”. 
 
During the Public Sector Anti-corruption Conference held on 10-11 November 1998 in 
Parliament, Cape Town, Mokoena in his address as Director General of the Department of 
Home Affairs – and at the time as champion of an anti-corruption drive, emphasized the 
need for moral regeneration in South Africa and how corruption had to be rooted out of 
public office. As he pointed out, transparency, accountability and fairness are the 
cornerstones of government ethics and, when translated into operating norms, become 
decisive tools in the onslaught against corruption. “This is the point of departure in our 
sustained promotion of ethically induced conduct and a merciless onslaught against all 
manifestations of corruption temptations and practices throughout the department” 
(1999:51), he said. 
 
But this strong statement seems to be just fine words, nothing else. Few months later after 
this statement, it was discovered that Mr. Mokoena was part of organized crime syndicates 
operating within the Department with “international underground connections”, in his own 
words. A Sunday Times investigation (March 28, 1999:5) revealed that Mokoena was 
running a private basket ball team, Mecer Soweto Panthers, from his Pretoria office in 
contravention of the Public Service Act and that:  
 
a) He was linked to the fake ID scandal in the Department. As Home Affairs 
Director-General he dealt with final work permits applications. It was in this capacity 
he recruited and registered three foreign players in his team who were using illegal 
identity books to claim they were South Africans.  
 
b) He sought a R543 000 sponsorship for the Panthers from Cenit, a computer 
company, while they had a three-year contract with Home Affairs. Cenit rejected his 
request. He secured a R250 000 sponsorship from Mecer, another computer company.  
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c) He stood accused of using state vehicles for personal reasons while he was not 
entitled to do so. Senior officials at Home Affairs claimed that for two years, Mokoena 
used Home Affairs vehicles to transport his basketball team in Gauteng. and to travel 
from his home at taxpayers’ expenses.  
 
Faced with all these accusations, it was not surprising for Mokoena, after only three weeks 
of Sunday Times exposé, that a full investigation was launched against him. In fact two 
investigations had been ordered into Mokoena’s activities: one by the Public Service and 
Administration Department and another one by the Public Protector, who launched an 
investigation into the Home Affairs office in Harrison Street, Johannesburg and to probe 
Mokoena’s basketball activities.  
 
On 11 May 1999, a report by the Public Service and Administration recommended that 
Mokoena be suspended and face at least six criminal charges for alleged misconduct and 
misusing state property. According to the report, he was to be charged for allegedly 
performing remunerative work outside the Public Service without permission and for 
allegedly misusing state property and government facilities, and alleged misconduct 
regarding a sponsorship for his basketball team 
 
Mokoena was later suspended as Director General in May 1999 on the instruction of 
former President Nelson Mandela after being charged with eight counts of misconduct. 
Despite what analysts call “newspaper stories”, one realizes that Mokoena’s suspension 
was a confirmation that allegations made by the Sunday Times against him proved to be 
true. Though Mokoena tried to dismiss these reports to be without foundation and saw 
himself as a victim of a smear campaign. 
 
The findings were damning for Mokoena though he pleaded not guilty to all charges at an 
internal disciplinary hearing. The departmental inquiry found him guilty of abusing 
departmental facilities to benefit his private basketball team. The four charges, involving a 
conflict of interest in soliciting sponsorship from a computer company for his basketball 
team, abusing work facilities for private interests by posting the department’s phone and 
fax numbers on his basketball team’s Internet site, and improperly using government 
vehicles. The charges against Mokoena were found to be serious, as the presiding officer, 
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Puke Maserumule, pointed out: “Mokoena’s conduct in this regard demonstrates a lack of 
responsibility and a gross abuse of his position and of state assets and resources”; and 
amounted to a “breach of the relationship of trust and confidence which underpins his 
employment relationship with the minister” (Sowetan, 10 September, 1999; The Star, 10 
September, 1999).  
 
As a result, Mokoena finally resigned on September 1999, before he could be fired by the 
Home Affairs Minister, citing the report’s findings and recommendations as the reasons 
for his resignation he described it as a “constructive dismissal”.  
 
Mokoena’s naïveté and lack of responsibility as Director General were displayed when he 
stated that he did not believe he needed to ask permission, as required by the Public 
Service Act, from the Minister to own the Panthers, because he had put this detail in his 
CV. Moreover, he did not believe that using the telephone and fax at taxpayers’ expense to 
run his privately owned basketball team was a problem. Mokoena admitted that his office 
telephone and fax numbers were used to conduct the team’s business. But he said he did 
not think this conflicted with his job as Director General (Sunday Times, March 21, 
1999:1). 
 
Such evasive statements contribute to the growing public perception that the Department 
of Home Affairs and, obviously, many other government and civil institutions are corrupt. 
Those in charge of these departments generally do not comply with the Public Service Act 
and other regulations and abuse the public trust and confidence. The abuse of power at 
Home Affairs is an ongoing business with the Department today embroiled in false 
passports and fictitious marriage scams and other corrupt practices, prompting the new 
Minister, Mapisa-Nqakula to launch a plan to review all home affairs policies and 
efficiency. Everyone believes that bad service characterized by long queues and 
corruption could soon be a thing of the past if the planned shake-up is successful.  
 
After his dismissal, his former boss, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, rehired Mokoena this time as 
a special consultant for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In January 2002, Mokoena, 
despite his dodgy past was appointed the new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for the 
South African Football Association (SAFA), a top managerial soccer post. Obviously, his 
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appointment sparked off fresh controversy, given that in 1999, he stepped down after 
being found guilty on charges of corruption and misconduct. SAFA, his new home, itself 
is no stranger to controversies and scandals. The last one features the match-fixing saga 
and corruption involving top referees, assistant referees and club leaders who were 
arrested and appeared in court on the charges during July 2004. The arrests were made in 
accordance with the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2003, section 15, 
which addresses offences in respect of corrupt activities related to sport events. At SAFA, 
Mokoena immediately got entangled in another controversy after he announced the 
payment of bonuses amounting to R22, 5 million to three 2010 Soccer World Cup Bid 
bosses for bringing the World Cup home. What was interesting in this new account was 
that Mokoena himself admited that SAFA coffers were empty.  
 
3. The Department Of Correctional Services: 
 
The Correctional Services Department is another example of blatant corruption and 
maladministration where graft and fraudulent behaviour are so rife. Irregularities and 
dishonesty had been the order of the day with financial control being so lax that 
departmental senior officials could do what they wanted, and had also developed their 
own rules. There are a lot of stories in the Correctional Department but the story of 
Prison’s boss Khulekani Sitole, who took over as Commissioner of Prisons in December 
1996, seems to confirm the seriousness of all these allegations.  
 
Khulekani Sitole was being investigated in 1998 for maladministration and 
mismanagement of funds and other irregularities within the Department. The Auditor 
General’s report found that Comm. Sitole received two irregular “merit awards” of R54 
646 each during March and December 1997 both authorized by former Minister Dr Sipo 
Mzimela. It was discovered that both awards should have been regarded as unauthorized. 
 
Other allegations included that the Department used voluntary severance packages as a 
“tool to get rid of unwanted staff”, and that Comm. Sitole spent 123 official and eight 
private days overseas at a total cost of R528 889 between May 1997 and December 1998. 
 
A Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee report effectively found Sitole:  
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a) to have used the state’s money in a “wasteful and ill-advised manner”;  
b) had awarded himself and his senior management team generous merit awards 
with little justification;  
c) displayed poor judgment that favoured himself at the expense of the public 
interest; and  
d) showed a lack of understanding of his accountability to Parliament.  
e) In addition, Sitole had misled it and Correctional Services Minister Ben 
Skosana over his involvement in a professional soccer team he was running 
from his office and had been involved in situations where there had been 
conflict of interests between his public position and his private interests.  
 
It can be suggested that to measure the extent of corruption in the Department of 
Correctional Services, one should question the management practices that took place 
under Sitole’s leadership. “The whole Department was in a rotten state”, said one observer 
(Sowetan, March 6, 2000). 
 
A Sunday Times investigation, as well as a massive government probe into the prison 
service implicated prisons boss Khulekani Sitole. At the heart of this investigation was a 
secret “jobs for pals” society called CORE – set up by Sitole just after his nomination as 
Commissioner of Prisons. According to Sunday Times (March 5, 2000:13), members of 
this powerful Broederbond-like group held secret meetings to ensure their family and 
friends, some with only a Grade 11 (Std 9) education, landed up getting plum jobs with 
whopping salaries. The group held meetings at Correctional Services headquarters in the 
Poyntons Building, Pretoria.  
 
People earmarked as being “loyal” were regularly promoted and given merit awards for 
outstanding work. As unearthed by a government probe into prison services led by the 
Department of Public Service and Administration, the Public Service Commission and 
two experts from the United Kingdom on criminal justice matters, there were many 
dedicated prison staff who deplored the behaviour of their corrupt colleagues but were too 
intimidated to speak out. The role of the Public Service Commission was to review all 
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staff movements and merit awards over the Sitole’s years to find out if some staff were 
victimized. 
 
Members of CORE occupied positions where they were capable of “influencing” the 
awarding of Correctional Services tenders worth millions of rands for meat, chickens, 
prisoners and staff uniforms, the building of prisons and computer contracts. Thus CORE 
was a state within a state. 
 
Meanwhile, the Parliament’s Public Account Committee in its report, after a year-long 
investigation, found that Sitole had abused state assets, “should never hold high office and 
was unfit to hold high office in the Public Service”. It recommended that Sitole be fired. 
Sitole offered to resign in a letter to President Thabo Mbeki on November 2, 1999, ahead 
of a decision by the Cabinet, which endorsed the recommendation of the Public Accounts 
Committee for him to be dismissed. Public Service and Administration Minister Geraldine 
Fraser-Moleketi announced his resignation without a golden handshake on November 3, 
1999. 
 
In its damning report, the Public Accounts Committee established that Sitole had: 
 
a) Misled former Correctional Services Minister Dr Sipo Mzimela into giving 
him permission to run an amateur soccer team, Spartak FC, when the club was 
registered as a professional team;  
b) Employed 24 players of the team in the Correctional Services Department;  
c) Used his office to recruit players for the team before he had permission to run 
the club;  
d) Contravened Public Service regulations by not getting permission for 
Correctional Services staff to receive additional income from the club;  
e) Spent 131 days out of the country over a 20-month period, at a cost of more 
than R500, 000. This had detracted from his role and function as head of 
Department;  
f) Overspent the Department’s travel allowance by R150, 000 during 1997-1998;  
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g) Made it impossible for the Committee to assess whether the state had received 
value for money from the trips because he failed to provide detailed 
motivations and schedules;  
h) Gave himself an irregular merit award of more than R100, 000. (He 
subsequently repaid the money); and  
i) Approved several voluntary severance packages considered to be 
“inappropriate”. 
 
Sitole’s general behaviour and attitude were found to be inconsistent with aspects of the 
Constitution, Public Service regulations, the Public Service Code of conduct and treasury 
instructions (Sowetan, November 4, 1999:2). 
 
After Sitole’s resignation for misconduct and corruption, a task force that had been joined 
by the elite Scorpions Police then launched a massive probe. Rampant corruption in the 
Department of Correctional Services was found to be rife leading to the dismissal of 35 
prison officials, the conviction of 20 others in 1999 alone and disciplinary measures were 
taken against more than 160 officials following an investigation into 202 cases of 
corruption received by the Department. Earlier in 2000, an official was sentenced to 15 
years’ imprisonment for using the state computer system to enrich himself with a basic 
salary and service bonuses totaling R103 633,75, for which he did not qualify (The Star, 
June 1, 2000). 
 
The Department’s Anti-corruption Unit was established in 1997 with the objective of 
identifying malpractices and, advising top management on strategies to prevent 
corruption. The Unit had identified as major problems the assistance prison officials give 
to prisoners to help them escape; the irregular recruitment of officials; and theft of judicial 
files, prisoners’ money and medical supplies. Other malpractices identified included the 
use of fraudulent qualifications, false claims, the misuse of medical aid benefits, money-
lending schemes between officials and prisoners, and officials paying themselves 
backdated salaries. 
 
 Sitole’s legacy is disturbing. The Jali Commission, which started in August 2002, was 
appointed by President Mbeki to investigate alleged corruption and maladministration, 
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violence and intimidation in the country’s prisons. Not only did it come across the same 
practices, but also encountered actions such as drug-trafficking, crime syndicates, rape, 
criminal activities committed with the help of prison officials and the inability of 
managers to run the Department and prisons effectively. 
 
Extraordinary evidence to the commission included videotape filmed by inmates of the 
Grootvlei prison, with the permission of the prison head, showing warders supplying 
prisoners with weapon, alcohol, drugs and a minor for sex. As put by analysts, “the picture 
that emerged was of a system riddled with murder, gangster networks reaching into the 
townships, fraud involving more than R40-million, jobs for pals and staff corruption 
including condoned escapes and recruitment scams. Judge Thabani Jali told Parliament 
that members of the prisons union Popcru conspired to make the Pietermaritzburg prison 
ungovernable in order to grab the jobs of white managers” (Mail & Guardian, 20 
December 2002). The Jali Commission has already produced six interim reports with 
recommendations for the department to implement. 
 
 4. The Department of Defence: 
 
The last five years in South African politics bear the marks of one of the most 
controversial deal known as “the arms deal” or the “yengenigate”. This is a notorious case 
of misconduct and corruption originating from Parliament but with its ramifications 
deeply embedded in the Defence Department and involves prominent figures in the ruling 
party. This includes one who was regarded as South Africa’s most powerful politicians, 
the former ANC’s Chief Whip Tony Sithembiso Yengeni. He is the man who looked after 
the disciplinary matters of ANC MPs in Parliament and was the immediate past chairman 
of Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence. He was arrested on October 3, 2001, 
charged and released on bail following his appearance in the Cape Town Regional Court. 
The charge sheet linked the case directly to the controversial arms deal.  
 
Yengeni was chairman of Parliament’s Defence Portfolio Committee for the period 
September 1994 to January 1999, at the time the arms deal was being negotiated dating 
back to October 1996. It is thus important that the complexity of this case requires an 
explanation on the arms deal issue from the onset. 
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6.3.4.1. The Arms Deal: 
 
The arms deal is a massive package, which initially involved the spending of billions of 
rands on purchasing defence equipment. The objective of the deal was to create 65 000 
jobs, and to inject billions into the South Africa economy. Approved by Parliament in 
April 1998, the review led, after a process of selecting preferred bidders, to a government 
announcement in September 1999 to proceed with the purchase of a strategic arms 
package. The decision by the Cabinet came with the promise that R110 billion would be 
injected into the economy as a result of the arms procurement and more jobs would be 
created. The acquisition included different force design options as follows: 
 
Table 11: The Arm Deals Package: 
SANDF FORCE DESIGN 
SA AIR FORCE  
Fighters:  
Light Fighters 16 
Medium Fighters 32 
Helicopters:  
Combat Support Helicopters 12 
Maritime Helicopters 5 
Transport Helicopters 96 
SA NAVY  
Submarines 4 
Corvettes 4 
Source: Joint Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages, 14 November 2001:5. 
                  
Soon after the government announcement, South Africa, the region’s economic 
powerhouse was plunged into a long running controversy over a R43 billion arms deal 
involving contractors from Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK. According to observers, 
the deal was controversial from the outset, largely because of doubts over whether South 
Africa should be spending billions of rand on military hardware instead of on poverty 
alleviation and social upliftment. There were concurrent concerns about its cost and a 
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Department of Finance briefing to the Cabinet warned of possible adverse implications for 
the budget deficit. The concerns were about the deal being contaminated by corruption 
(2001/2002 Survey: 71).   
 
Today, almost a decade after the deal was signed, the multibillion-rand reequipping 
programme for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is nevertheless 
beginning to deliver benefits for the country. But still, the programme is plagued by 
controversy, confusion, ignorance, ineptitude and downright misinformation and has 
become an embarrassment to the ruling party. Hitherto, all authority and responsibility for 
defence acquisition had been vested solely in ARMSCOR, whereas the present 
programme implies four separate Departments namely, Defence, Trade and Industry, 
Finance and Public Enterprises. Thus showing the scope of the oversight to which the 
programme had been subjected. 
 
To make things worse, a political scandal erupted and overshadowed Government “utmost 
integrity” on what was seen as a seemingly transparent and scrupulously negotiated 
package and consequently its rejection of any wrongdoing in the arms deal when close 
links between foreign contractors and high-ranking government officials were exposed. 
Non-compliance with tender regulations, nepotism, conflict of interest, internal 
manipulation and lack of transparency came to the surface.  
 
As far back as November 1999, the arms deal became the centre of controversy over the 
propriety of various aspects of the procurement. Allegations were dispatched to Judge 
Willem Heath, then head of the Special Investigating Unit by Patricia de Lille, then Pan 
Africanist Congress MP. De Lille blew the whistle in her efforts to enforce transparency 
and accountability on the part of government for its handling of the arms deal dossier. She 
compelled the government, which had earlier defended the deal as completely legitimate 
and flawless, to agree to high-level investigation. But her claim and pressure for the 
appointment of a commission of inquiry made no progress until a year later. 
 
The issue took on another twist with the report of the Auditor-General in September 2000, 
which did not confirm corruption but stopped short of approving it as open and honest. 
The Auditor-General discovered “material deviations from generally accepted 
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procurement practice”. But earlier in November 1998, the Defence Audit Center of the 
Office of the Auditor-General identified the procurement of the Strategic Defence 
Packages as a high-risk area from an audit point of view and decided on the need to 
perform a special review of the procurement process (Joint Report, 2001:5).  
 
According to the Auditor-General in the 2001 Joint Report, the Special Review was the 
subject of hearings and deliberations of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA), which culminated in the fourteenth report of the committee. On 2 
November 2000 the National Assembly adopted the SCOPA report which suggested that a 
meeting be convened with the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions and the Heath Special Investigation Unit (SIU) to discuss the broad 
framework of an independent and expert forensic investigation into a number of issues, 
which were referred to in the Special Review, as well as other information in the 
possession of SCOPA (2001:6). On 13 November 2000, it was decided that the four 
agencies would conduct a joint investigation in order to combine skills, resources and 
legal mandates. 
 
However, a powerful government reaction against the inclusion of the SIU led 
subsequently to the exclusion of the Unit from the inquiry by President Mbeki on the 19th 
January 2001 in his address to the nation. Consequently the SIU did not form part of the 
joint investigation. The exclusion of the SIU raised the question of why the government 
ignored the recommendation of its own Parliament’s insistence to get the SIU involved in 
the probe? This exclusion was viewed by observers as a cover up operation aimed to 
protecting certain well-known senior officials allegedly involved in the deal. However, 
whatever the outcome of the investigations the arms deal scandal is seen as a public 
relations exercise for the ANC government’s commitment to accountability. What IDASA 
has called “litmus test” of democratic accountability in South Africa (2001:1). 
 
The problem now is the increasing uncertainty and anxiety about the final cost of the deal 
for the country. Initially it was estimated at R30 billion, then R43 billion, and 2001 
projections have put the price at R66 billion. However, answering questions from the 
Portfolio Committee on Finance, Ramos, the Director-General of the Treasury and 
Andrew Donaldson, the Deputy Director-General of the Budget Office in the Treasury 
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explained how it works. They underlined the fact that the Cabinet had been kept fully 
briefed on the full costs of the deal but no one could have predicted the extent to which 
this would be affected by the rapid depreciation of the rand since then (Business Report, 
December 4, 2001:1).  
 
As they stated during the meeting, the Cabinet approved the deal at a R30 billion, or $4,8 
billion, contract price (1999 prices at an exchange rate of R6,25 to the dollar), of which 
R22,1 billion consisted of foreign supplies and R3,2 billion of local supplies. In the 
February 2001 Budget, the total cash flow cost of the programme was put at R30,3 billion 
because of the depreciation of the rand and inflation-related cost increases. Expenditure on 
the deal was expected to peak at R5, 8 billion in 2003/04, or about 2 percent of the overall 
budget. By this time the full cost of the programme was expected to be R43,8 billion over 
12 years. They added that "a clear decision had been made from the beginning that the 
deals would be financed from within the Budget, so they could not affect deficit 
projections".  
 
This is perhaps good news, but the handling of the arms deal by the government leaves the 
impression that it wants forcefully to hide something. The second Yengeni's trial - there 
had been one in the late 80s when he and 14 others ANC members were arrested, charged 
with terrorism and tried - could maybe be the occasion to spill out the beans. 
 
6.3.4.2. The Yengeni Scandal: 
 
The Yengeni affair began with his alleged non-compliance with Parliament’s code of 
conduct requiring members to disclose in writing (in the parliamentary register) all 
financial interests beyond their parliamentary salaries, including gifts valued at more than 
R350 and benefits of a material nature and their value. The allegation referred to the ethics 
committee for investigation by the Democratic Alliance (DA) was a follow-up to a Sunday 
Times news report that Mr. Yengeni had received a luxury 4x4 Mercedes-Benz from 
Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace.  
 
The report showed that the car was registered and licensed in his name in October1998, 
but he started paying for it only in May 1999 after questions began to be asked about its 
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acquisition. At the time of the acquisition, Mr. Yengeni was the chairman of the Standing 
Committee on Defence. His purported benefactor Michel Woerfel was the managing 
director of EADS. At this stage, it is obvious that Mr. Yengeni was embedded in the 
controversy over the arms deal and this was not an isolated incident but the beginning of 
an ongoing probe that will become a full programme of events. The “Yengenigate” - as 
the case was known - began in fact in November 1999 when PAC MP Patricia de Lille 
forwarded allegations and documentation regarding government corruption in the arms 
deal to former Judge Willem Heath, then head of the so-called Heath Special Investigating 
Unit (SIU). The acquisition of a luxury car led to the whole swoop. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace was incorporated into the 
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), a company that, in turn, was 
a partner in a consortium that won a contract to supply missile and radar technology for 
four corvettes as ordered by the Cabinet.  In short the Yengeni's case is linked to 
allegations of widespread corruption in South Africa's R43 billion arms deal to buy navy 
corvettes, submarines, warplanes and helicopters. The controversy surrounding the deal 
has been damaging for the government, leaving irreparably the public with a negative 
impression on the whole deal. And the ANC's image, already dented at the time by other 
scandals such as the Sarafina debacle, Alan Boesak's case, the HIV/AIDS debate, Heath's 
forced removal from the probe on the arms deal, will be further tarnished. 
 
On 3 October 2001, Yengeni was arrested, charged and appeared in Court. The charges 
against him, as well as European Aerospace Defence Systems official Michel Woerfel, as 
issued on the warrant of arrest that was echoed in full details in the local press, were 
corruption, alternatively fraud, forgery, and perjury (lying under oath). According to the 
National Directorate of Public Prosecution that issued the charges sheet: 
 
i. The Corruption charges related to a R167 386 discount on a luxury 4x4 Mercedes 
Benz Yengeni allegedly obtained through an employee of European Aeronautic 
Defence and Space company (EADS), a company linked to the controversial arms 
deal. According to the Code of Conduct, all members of the National Assembly 
must record particulars of their registerable interests in the register of members’ 
interests. Yengeni never declared any sponsorship, gift, hospitality or benefit 
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received from Daimler Chrysler Aerospace South Africa (DASA) or from its 
managing director Michael Woerfel. The only sponsorship or gift declared by 
Yengeni was a visit to an air show in Chile and a visit to the Daimler Benz plant in 
Brazil during March 1998, sponsored by Daimler Benz. The company had interests 
in the arms acquisition deal.  
 
ii. The forgery charges related to an agreement for the sale drafted in respect of the 
transaction. According to the charge sheet, Yengeni received the vehicle with the 
intention “to use his power or exercise his influence to influence the arms 
acquisition process in favour of Daimler Benz Aerospace AG or Daimler Chrysler 
Aerospace AG”. He was also expected to facilitate introductions between his co-
accused Michael Woerfel, now president of EADS, and other role-players in the 
arms deal. Daimler Chrysler is now part of EADS, which has a 33% share in 
REUTECH Radar Systems, the company that was awarded a R220 million 
contract to provide radars for the corvettes that form part of the arms acquisitions.  
 
iii. Fraud charges: he faced charges of defrauding the company, as he was alleged to 
have pretended he would use his influence “when he had no intention to use his 
power or exercise his influence in that way”.  
 
iv. Statutory Perjury: was related to false evidence he gave to the Investigating 
Directorate of Special Operations when he was summoned to appear before it on 
June 29, 2001. According to The Star (October 4, 2001:19), a file memorandum 
signed by Woerfel and filed on the records of DASA indicated that the vehicle was 
damaged while being transported to Pretoria, that the vehicle would be sold off at 
residual value after rectification, and that there was no warranty. The sales price 
was R230 052, and payment was due on May 1 1999. He claimed to have paid a 
R50 000 deposit. The vehicle was registered in the name of Yengeni on October 22 
1998. The agreement of sale was backdated to October 18 1998. The Prosecution, 
however, claimed that Yengeni paid R182 563, that the vehicle was not damaged, 
no deposit was paid and there was a warranty. 
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In terms of credibility, the investigators believed that the man then entrusted to whip all 
majority party MPs into line, "did wrongfully, unlawfully and corruptly" receive a benefit 
that was not legally due. "He is lying" (Business Day, October 4, 2001:3). However, while 
the ANC expressed its indignation on this matter, it recognized that the law, therefore, 
must take its course.  
  
On October 4, 2001, Yengeni, who stood accused of fraud, corruption, forgery and 
statutory perjury, stepped down as Chief Whip of the ANC in Parliament. He became the 
second ANC parliamentary casualty of the arms deal. The other MP to have lost his 
position because of the arms deal was Andrew Feinstein who resigned at the end of 
August 2001 over the ANC's handling of the arms probe. Feinstein who was senior ANC 
member of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), together with SCOPA 
IFP chairman, Dr Gavin Woods, led a campaign for a full investigation. Mr. Feinstein was 
removed by the ANC from his SCOPA post and replaced by Geoff Doidge. 
 
While the outcome of this case which involves prominent ANC politicians remains 
uncertain until October 2005 (Tony Yengeni’s appeal had yet to be heard, two years after 
sentencing), comparative experience has shown that in similar cases, the ANC stands 
accused of covering up, and being soft on corruption, particularly in instances whereby 
culprit officials are its own members. Observers are now wondering if the Presidency is 
starting to regret its hand-off approach to government. As underlined by Andrew 
Davidson (Business Report, October 5, 2001:2), “President Thabo Mbeki has managed to 
avoid angering whatever political alliances, deals and pals that he had accumulated in the 
journey to the top. South Africans are entitled to expect and demand more from the 
Presidency, especially when they are living in an environment littered with high-profile 
examples of corruption and crime with few illustrations that an effective plan exists to 
deal with it”. 
 
Further, there is too much speculations on the arms deal suggesting that Tony Yengeni 
may be a strategic sacrifice to shield more prominent figures and to protect the arms deal. 
The Mail & Guardian (October 5 to 11, 2001) reports that the late Defence minister Joe 
Modise and Army Procurement Chief Shamin “Chippy” Shaik top the list of key players. 
Shaik’s brother, Shabir, a bidding contractor in the multi-billion rand arms procurement 
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deal was arrested in Durban for possession of classified government documents. He has 
since been granted bail while prosecution is still ongoing. Shabir was allegedly in 
possession of cabinet minutes in which the arms procurement was discussed, and also 
correspondence between the Departments of Public Enterprises and Defence. He was due 
to explain in court how as a bidding contractor competing with other contenders, he had 
acquired inside information. It was not difficult to find out that his brother “Chippy” was 
the head of acquisitions in the Department of Defence. 
 
So far, Yengeni claimed his innocence to charges of corruption, fraud, forgery and perjury 
and firmly believing that his arrest, along with German businessman Michael Woerfel of 
European Aeronautic Defence Systems, and all charges as well, were related to the 
investigation on the arms procurement. European Aeronautic Defence Systems is the 
company that gave Yengeni the 4x4 vehicle discount and which also benefited from the 
arms deal. Yengeni protested his innocence with full-page advertisement in Sunday 
newspapers denying any wrongdoing.  
 
Nevertheless, on 13 February 2003 he agreed to plead guilty to fraud in exchange for the 
corruption charges being dropped in terms of a plea bargain agreement with the state. He 
was convicted of failing to disclose to parliament, a 47% discount he negotiated on a 
Mercedes Benz 4x4, which he bought in 1998 and which became the cause of his troubles. 
On March 6 2003, he resigned from parliament under pressure from the ANC leadership, 
but not before the party suffered embarrassing publicity over his refusal to quit. 
 
On 19 March 2003, Yengeni became the first MP in South African history to be charged 
with defrauding parliament. His responsibilities as an MP obliged him to adhere to a code 
of conduct. But he chose to give to parliament a wrong account about his 4x4 vehicle 
causing prejudice to that institution regarded by many as the symbol of democracy. He 
betrayed the trust placed in him as chairman of Parliament’s joint standing committee on 
defence. By so doing he demeaned the parliament in the eyes of the public. As he said in 
court: “ the above misrepresentations were made with the intent to defraud parliament”. 
He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for defrauding parliament. He is out on bail 
of R10 000 that has been extended pending an appeal. All charges against Michael 
Woerfel of European Aeronautic Defence Systems had been withdrawn.  
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However, the arms deal controversy did not end with Yengeni’s prison term, as he was not 
the only ANC official to be investigated. So far, as the probe progressed, there were new 
names coming to the surface. The “Arms Deal Dossier” saga, seen by many as a “trial by 
media”, due to the constant media coverage of the matter, is now in the hands of the court 
and a judicial process has commenced and what the country is witnessing now is the 
restoration of the culture of justice. This was unthinkable during apartheid days. The only 
similitude is that this is happening in the Defence Department, once again. Yengeni was 
punished because he forgot or feigned to ignore that when he was sworn in as an MP he 
was asked to take an oath that he would uphold and respect the law. By lying he put 
himself above the law hoping to get away with it, damaged the reputation of parliament 
and hurt the core of South Africa’s young democracy. 
To sum up, one can argue that corruption persists despite new efforts to end it and the 
arms deal dossier undermines trust in government and its credibility. After the last 
development of the “spy allegations”15, it is understood that the Scorpions’ probe of 
Schabir Shaik could be extended to include Jacob Zuma who is also accused of accepting 
bribes solicited on his behalf by Shaik, currently on trial for fraud and corruption. Shaik 
was found guilty and convicted (2 June 2005) on two charges of corruption and one of 
fraud. He has been sentenced (8 June 2005) to an effective 15-year jail term and has 
applied for leave to appeal. In the meantime, Jacob Zuma lost his position as the country 
deputy president and has been charged (29 June 2005) by the Scorpions on two counts of 
corruption. The charges followed a finding by the Durban High Court of a "generally 
corrupt" relationship between Zuma and his financial adviser Schabir Shaik, during 
Shaik's fraud and corruption trial. President Thabo Mbeki then relieved Zuma of his 
position as deputy president in a special sitting of Parliament on 14 June 2005. 
The most recent case is the multimillion-rand travel voucher scam known as “travelgate” 
that involves a significant number of MPs. Twenty-three lawmakers - most of them 
members of the governing African National Congress party - were accused of using 
vouchers intended for official travel to pay for luxury hotels, meals and car rentals. Five of 
 
15 Inquiry set up by President Thabo Mbebki to probe claims that Ngcuka was an apartheid spy and abused 
his position as National Director of Public Prosecutions. Also known as the “Hefer Commission" (Sept. 03-
Jan.04) 
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them were convicted and fined in March 2005. They eventually resigned from Parliament 
(23 June 2005). They are Ruth Bhengu, Mildred Mpaka, Rhoda Joemat, Pamela Mnandi 
and Mavis Magazi. Altogether another 21 MPs or former MPs are facing fraud charges in 
connection with Travelgate, pending their trial on July 28 2005. 
 
Finally, various scandals at the Department of Home Affairs ranging from officials taking 
bribes, to foreigners marrying South African women without their knowledge (Mahlangu: 
2004) has tainted the idealism with which anti-apartheid heroes took power over a decade 
ago. 
 
6.4. Chapter Synopsis 
 
Many lessons emerge from this conceptual apparatus - the typology of South African 
corruption - that requires an assessment of the extent, forms, causes, and effects of 
corruption for the country as a whole.  Such an assessment entails the need for a strategy 
that should fit the particular circumstances of the country, taking into account the nature of 
the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.  
 
What this thesis reveals is that corruption in South Africa can be understood as an 
extension of corrupt practices from the past into the present dispensation.. The extent of 
corruption provides the first step of the assessment. Its extent can range from sporadic, 
occurring in isolated intervals with no apparent order, to pervasive, permeating most 
government institutions or affecting most activities within a specific institution, as 
witnessed in some departments in Gauteng. Sporadic corruption occurs irregularly and 
therefore does not threaten the mechanisms of control nor the economy as such, and does 
not have the same corrosive effect on political and economic systems as pervasive 
corruption. 
 
Though the incidence of sporadic corruption seems serious, it is not pervasive and not 
crippling, but it can seriously undermine morale and sap the economy of resources. In 
addition, corruption is more personalistic than institutional in the sense that personal or 
individual level analysis of corruption clearly shows that corruption is simply a 
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consequence of human nature, that is, human beings are generally subject to greed and can 
behave corruptly to rationally maximize their gain.  
 
Determining the form of corruption is the second step of the assessment. In South Africa, 
corruption is both petty and grand. When it is petty, it involves lower-level officials and 
smaller resources while grand corruption operates at the highest levels of government with 
huge sums of money. As I found out in departments such as the Licencing Department or 
the regional office of the Department of Home Affairs in Gauteng, it can be organized and 
linked to organized crime (driving licences, certificate of registration for cars) or 
entrenched in patterns of patronage, or embedded in elite networks to make the system 
works. As a result, corruption entails unilateral abuses by government officials (e.g., 
embezzlement and nepotism) or links public and private actors (e.g., through bribery, 
extortion, and fraud). 
 
From what I have observed in Gauteng, the types of administrative corruption that occurs 
simultaneously are “corruption according to the rule” and “corruption against the rule”. In 
the first situation, an official is privately and illegally receiving gains for doing something, 
which he or she is ordinarily required doing by law, as was the case with Mokoena, Sitole 
and Yengeni.  In the second situation, the bribe is paid to obtain services which the offcial 
is prohibited from providing, like going on an official trip with a friend at the taxepayers’ 
expenses, as did Duarte.These two categories can occur at all levels of the government 
hierarchy and range in scale and impact from grand corruption to more ordinary, routine 
corruption.  
 
Examining the causes of the different forms of corruption is the next analytical cut of the 
assessment, which generally raises a number of questions about institutional problems or 
societal attitudes that contribute to corruption in South Africa. Responding to these 
challenges posed by corruption provides an understanding of its causes.  From an 
institutional perspective, corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little 
accountability, and perverse incentives. This means the more activities public officials 
control or regulate, the more opportunities exist for corruption. Furthermore, the lower the 
probability of detection and punishment, the greater the risk that corruption will take 
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place. In addition, the lower the salaries, the rewards for performance, the security of 
employment, and the professionalism in public service, the greater the incentives for 
public officials to pursue self-serving rather than public-serving ends.  
 
Moreover, it emerges from fieldwork that nepotism; erosion of ethics, non-meritocratic 
appointments and poverty came of as the most important factors that propel corruption in 
the public service in the country. Regarding poverty, no one can deny that this 
phenomenon has produced some of the most extreme cases of inequality in South Africa. 
As shown by studies, there were 18 million people in South Africa living below the 
poverty line in 1999; the MLL (Minimum Living Level) for an individual was R164, 20 
per month, amounting to approximately R5, 30 per day, while the poverty line for a 
household was R353 per month in the same year (Graaff: 2003:7). Under such 
circumstances, individuals become vulnerable and easily subjected to exploitation and all 
kind of abuses including corruption, as this thesis has argued.  
 
Finally, the last level of review deals with the costs of corruption. The detriment caused by 
unchecked corruption merit spending resources that could be invested in other 
development objectives, making corruption a serious development challenge.  As it will be 
demonstrated later, societal damages inflicted by the phenomenon embrace every nook 
and cranny of the community.  
  
Therefore, politically, corruption undermines democracy and good governance by 
subverting formal processes; in elections and in legislative bodies it reduces accountability 
and representation in policymaking. Economically, it undermines economic development 
by generating considerable distortions and inefficiency. In the private sector, it increases 
the cost of business through the price of illicit payments, the management cost of 
negotiating with officials, and the risk of breached agreements or detection. Corruption 
also generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment 
away from education and into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more 
plentiful. These distortions deter investment and reduce economic growth. 
 
  
150
The effects of this unchecked corruption in South Africa suggest that those involved are 
embarking on the destruction of values and resources. Fundamentally, it undermines 
sustainable development and exacerbates inequality by affecting the poor 
disproportionately. Whatever reason, generally corruption kills the development spirit. By 
diverting scarce resources to less or non-priorities, corruption is on the larger part 
responsible for neglect of fundamental needs, particularly basic needs such as food, health 
and education. 
 
Table 12: How does South Africa measure up in Africa in 2004? 
   
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 
 
According to David Nussbaum16, "Corruption permeates the lives of Africa's poor and 
vulnerable, making it impossible for millions to earn an honest living". 
  
 The corruption situation in developing countries is grave, but there are measures that can 
be taken to reverse this trend. Thus, a strategy to fight corruption proves to be central to 
                                                 
16 Chief Executive of Transparency International. 
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any anti-corruption measure. At the same time, strategy formulation requires taking a 
close look at the political will for anti-corruption reform in government and civil society. 
 
The institutional perspective suggests that possible responses to the underlying causes of 
corruption include institutional reforms to: 
(1) reducing the role of government in economic activities (to limit 
authority); 
(2) strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanctions (to improve 
accountability); 
 
(3) redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve 
incentives), as well as societal reforms.  
 
But this is not enough. These considerations suggest anti-corruption efforts should also 
address attitudes toward corruption by changing people’s attitudes and mobilizing political 
will for sustained anti-corruption interventions. Most generally, such efforts need to raise 
awareness about the costs of corruption for the country's political and economic 
development.  This implies convincing the public that corruption is an extremely 
damaging pattern of interaction for society as a whole, and that the collective damages 
over time outweigh any possible short-term personal benefits. 
 
The vital lesson to draw from this assessment is that in South Africa, corruption practices 
seem to be increasing, as shown in Table 12, which contains the TI Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2004 of Africa. In the coming chapters we will see in what government 
institutions corruption is concentrated and why.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In this first part, the thesis has explored the concept of political corruption by 
contextualizing the phenomenon into domestic, regional and international dimensions. The 
subject emerges to be quite old and must be dealt with in its particular context. The 
contextualization of this multidisciplinary concept prompted the study to open definitional 
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doors as corruption manifests itself in different facets, different forms and consists of a 
variety of definitions ranging from legal to public opinion. For instance, what is perceived 
as corrupt in South Africa is venerated in Botswana. There is a general consensus among 
analysts that “corruption” is a contested concept due to variations in definitions among 
nations. The thesis has therefore defined corruption as “the abuse of public power by 
public officials for personal advantage”. Otherwise, corruption is a privatization of state 
assets by a political clique.   
 
Finally, we have seen the implications of the political and the historical legacy of 
corruption on democratic governance. The manifestation of all these cases is an indication 
that political corruption must be taken seriously. While the apartheid system was 
conducive to corruption due to its secretive nature, no one can understand how these 
incidences still occur in a democratic society where transparency and openness should be 
the order of the day. But if we look at the political legacy of the country, some issues such 
as corruption become more understandable, as I found out that there is a culture of 
corruption in South Africa, as discovered by the Pickard Commission when probing the 
Department of Development Aid in 1991.  
 
It appears that once again, prominent people in power are using unscrupulous businesses 
to enrich themselves and the arms deal is an example of this in South Africa of today. 
However, Peter Honey observes that: “it also spotlights a clear case where public officials 
– of both the old and new regimes – made money out of private schemes while serving in 
government” (2002:36). And Albert Mokoena, Sitole and Tony Yengeni are such a 
prototype of this new generation of leaders, without mentioning Duarte and Mofokeng. 
These few cases, and not the least, show that the perceived corruption in public 
administration by bureaucrats and elected politicians has thus found significant 
confirmation.  
 
In this particular context, corruption in Gauteng can be explained through historically 
entrenched institutional and personal features. After reviewing its underlying causes and 
effects, are the strategies put in place to combat it adequate? In the chapters that follow we 
begin to investigate in more details the Gauteng corruption experience. The second part of 
this study undertakes our empirical case, while the third part  - with its subsequent 
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chapters - essentially deals with justification of corruption determinants and the extent of 
its effects in Gauteng, before probing in the fourth and last part of the study the provincial 
anti-corruption strategies and checking out how effective they are.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TWO 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GAUTENG CASE 
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GAUTENG’S MAP 
 
 
 
  
155
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
7.1. 1ntroduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to draw the research design and methodology adopted in this 
study. Research design and methodology are important tools as they are central to any 
research project. This is the planning of scientific enquiry, which provides the glue that 
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• 
• 
holds the research project together. A design is used to structure the research, to show how 
all of the major parts of the research project - the samples, measures, treatments and 
methods of assignment - work together to try to address the central research questions. 
 
The chapter provides the objectives of the survey, which outlines the intention of the 
researcher. It also outlines the following aspects: the organization of the survey, the 
study’s sampling procedures and data collection methods and location of research subjects 
before presenting the results of the survey.  
 
7.2. Objectives of the Survey 
 
The objectives of the survey were to:  
 
Identify eventual causes and effects of corruption in the Gauteng government by 
drawing new data from public officials, notably those who are dealing on a daily basis 
with cases of corruption and misconduct in the public sector, including members of the 
Gauteng Legislature.  
Have Gauteng public officials, the civil society, black business people, as new comers, 
and scholars from a range of academic institutions in the province indicate what they 
believe was the extent of corruption in provincial departments and to detect potential 
corruption resistance mechanisms.  
 
However, it was not the intention of the survey to conduct a comprehensive measurement 
of the phenomenon. Instead, it focuses on identifying causes and effects of corruption, as 
the first step in drawing effective strategies to increase corruption resistance in the 
province. 
 
7.3. Organization of the Survey 
 
The questionnaire was based on existing standards (see Kpundeh, 1995) for similar 
surveys. Detailed information was requested under the main heading regarding corruption 
perceptions including its sources and incidence; its extent, causes, effects and how the 
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government is dealing with it. Therefore, extensive pretesting was not required as the 
questionnaire was based on existing standards used in corruption literature.  
 
A systematic random probability sample of more than 100 officials, academics, business 
and civil society was drawn from provincial government officials, selected academics 
institutions, black business and non-government organizations in the field of corruption. 
Screening questions were asked by means of a telephone to determine whether the 
personnel from choosen organizations qualified as a sample element: “Can I send you a 
questionnaire on corruption in the public sector”? If the answer was “yes”, thereafter, the 
questionnaire with instruction was sent to the appropriate organization, firstly by fax or e-
mail and secondly by hand. 
  
The decision to do the survey by hand was due to the fact that, it was easy for me to go to 
the sample element, not only for the interview, but also to directly observe the 
environment. The first two approaches (fax and e-mail) did not yield good results since 
only 30 sample subjects returned their completed questions after one year, nine of which 
were not acceptable due to errors. At a late stage we continued with questionnaires 
between April and July 2003 mostly with sample subjects who had not responded. The 
meeting with them was to find out whether they were willing to be interviewed for the 
completion of their questionnaires or not. 
 
Therefore, more than 100 people were approached for interviews between May 2001 and 
June 2003 as part of our survey on the causes and consequences of corruption and on the 
possible strategies that could be adopted for the prevention of corruption in Gauteng. The 
survey targeted people dealing with cases of corruption in the Public Service and those 
involved in preventing or combating it such as the watchdog bodies including the 
parliament, or Transparency South Africa (TSA). But first of all, request letters were 
addressed to the members of the Executive Council (MECs) requesting access to the 
departmental database of cases involving public sector corruption investigated and/or 
under investigation. Seven departments (64%) responded to the request and four (36%) 
did not respond. This exercise was meant to identify the way that actual and potential 
corruption is managed within a department. Unfortunately, such data did not exist, 
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according to the responding departments. And this gave me insight into what to expect and 
presented the main obstacle I had to encounter during my investigation.  
 
In this survey, we established that factors such as weak checks and balances, 
mismanagement, greed and self-enrichment, general decline in morals and ethics, legacy 
of apartheid, and socio-economic conditions were the most common reasons given as the 
main causes of corruption in the provincial government. All these factors entail the three 
clusters of corruption causes, namely the combination of economic, political and social 
variables, or personal, institutional and systemic.  
 
7.4. Response Rates 
   
At the second stage, an original sample comprised 102 individuals representing a diverse 
range of activities including the public sector (Gauteng Anti-Corruption Unit within the 
Department of Finance and Economic Affairs, the provincial Public Service Commission, 
Housing Department: the only Department that accepted to participate in the survey), 
Gauteng Legislature (Chairpersons of Standing Committees and provincial leaders of 
political parties), civil society (Black Sash, Idasa, Transparency South Africa (TSA), 
CASE and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), academic institutions (University of the 
Witwatersrand, Rand Afrikaans University, Pretoria University) and the private sector 
particularly business people from the black economic empowerment companies doing 
business with the Gauteng government; having in mind the opacity of the procurement 
system in the public service. Procurement is an area in which corruption is always a threat 
because contracting is “where the money is”, to quote Klitgaard et al. (2000:117).  
    
Regarding academic institutions, we decided to survey senior lecturers from four 
departments within each university: the departments of Political Studies, History, 
Anthropology and Sociology, due to the way corruption has been seen as a particular 
state-society relationship and its “multi-disciplinary” character. Department of 
Anthropology at the Rand Afrikaans University pulled out at the eleventh-hour. An 
average of 4 academics were randomly selected from each department to respond to the 
survey. The reason behind this is that corruption is viewed as a complex and multifaceted 
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phenomenon with multiple causes and effects as it takes on various forms and functions in 
different contexts.  
 
Table 13: Types of Organizations and Response Rates  
Organizations No. Sent  No. Returned Response Rate 
(%) 
Provincial Departments: 
• Finance & Economic Affairs 
• Housing & Land Affairs 
• Public Service Commission 
Gauteng Legislature: 
• Committees 
• Political Parties 
Academic Institutions: 
• Wits University 
• RAU University 
• Pretoria University 
Civil Society: 
• ISS 
• IDASA 
• BLACK SASH 
• TSA 
Black Business: 
 
TOTAL: 
 
6 
20 
2 
 
11 
6 
 
14 
12 
15 
 
1 
2 
1 
1 
 
11 
 
102 
 
5 
18 
1 
 
5 
4 
 
12 
9 
13 
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
2 
 
72 
 
83 
90 
50 
 
45 
67 
 
86 
75 
87 
 
100 
50 
100 
00 
 
18 
             
70,5 
 
According to researchers, corruption has been studied as a problem of politic, economic, 
cultural or moral underdevelopment, and mostly as something in between, ranging from 
universal theoretical modeling to detailed descriptions of single corruption scandals. The 
complex nature of corruption has made most observers agree that it pervades many 
societies and that there are no quick-fix solutions to it (Andvig et al., 2000:9).  
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In view of the variety of organizations I approached, the basis of my sampling resulted in 
130 surveys being sent. Of these, 102 were accepted and 72 completed surveys were 
returned, giving an overall response rate of 70,5%.  This is a relatively workable sample as 
it is more representative in terms of the variety of organizations and the range of 
legislation under which they operate.  However, we cannot know how those who did not 
respond would have differed from those who did respond. Nonetheless, perceptions are 
subjective given the fact that different groups, for example academics and political parties, 
will have different, but equally valid perceptions on particular issues. Despite this 
limitation, the quality of the data collected was quite impressive. 
  
This reality brings to mind Lala Camerer’s Expert Panel Survey in which she made 3 789 
contacts only to obtain 154 successful contacts. Globally, I made 130 contacts, 102 were 
successful and obtained 72 completed reports. Fieldwork was a real challenge, as I was 
often required to track down respondents. The main problem was to get an appointment 
with senior public officials or managers of black empowerment companies without 
enduring hostile behaviour on the part of switchboard or reception employees. Sometimes, 
it was a very frustrating experience. Despite these shortcomings, it is the view of the study 
that this survey was crucial for future evaluations on corruption, its causes, effects and 
control in Gauteng.  Nonetheless, a systemic exploration of the root causes of corruption 
in Gauteng is not available and therefore, the results from this study must be seen as 
tentative and subject to further scrutiny. In the following sections this study tries to 
contribute through this survey to the still underdeveloped field of South African corruption 
studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5. Presentation of the Results  
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The study does not quantify existing corruption. Instead it explores perceptions of 
potential opportunities for corruption and highlights corruption-related issues facing 
Gauteng Administration. The findings emphasize the need for all departments to have in 
place corruption prevention strategies and to identify the types of high-risk functions they 
are performing, monitoring and effectively dealing with.  
 
The survey asked a variety of questions about perceptions for what respondents thought 
was the source, the instance and the extent of corruption in Gauteng, what was the most 
important cause of corruption and the ranking for the root causes of corruption in Gauteng, 
what they thought about bribes, nepotism, dishonesty and corrupt officials, what could be 
the consequences and if the government was doing enough in combating corruption and 
how they rated the Gauteng administration.  
 
7.5.1. Sources: 
The majority of respondents (50%) assumed they had heard of the corruption in 
government in Gauteng from Media: print, radio, TV and newspapers reports, and several 
other sources (24%) including: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Whistleblowers (government officials or members of the public) 
The Anti-Corruption hotline within the Department of Finance and     
Economic Affairs 
Commissions of Inquiry set up by various departments/councils 
Land and Housing Department (see RDP houses) 
Auditor-General Reports 
13% were uncertain of their sources and 10% had never heard of government corruption 
in Gauteng, while 11% had no clue. 
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Table 14: Sources of Corruption 
Sources  Media Public officials Uncertain None Total  
Academic Inst. 23 5 4 1 33 
Business - 1 1 - 2 
NGOs 2 1 - - 3 
Legislature  3 5 - - 8 
Public servants 8 4 4 7 23 
Total  36 16 9 8 69 
% 50 22 13 11 100 
Q.: From which sources did you hear about government corruption in Gauteng? 
 
7.5.2. Instances: 
About cases of instance of corruption, 49% of respondents referred to some specific 
infamous corruption cases related to political scandals including: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Jessie Duarte’s case 
Ekurhuleni’s former mayor, Bavumile Vilakazi who spent R400 000 on 
his inauguration party and R560 000 on a fancy car, all at the expense of 
poor taxpayers. 
Housing Department: Housing Board regarding subsidies and contracts; 
irregularities in the allocation of RDP houses and queue jumping in the 
provincial Housing Department waiting list. 
Department of Welfare: social grants fraud. 
Gauteng Tourism Agency: appointment of senior officials. Concerning this 
allegation, we tried to get an appointment with some senior officials but our 
efforts were not successful. 
Arms deal 
Selling of dockets by members of the Police and traffic officers taking 
bribes in order not to issue tickets. 
Misuse of vehicles and fraud (overtime). 
Nepotism and ghost workers. 
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Meanwhile 50% of respondents had no opinion with one respondent fearing that the 
disclosure of confidential information could lead to a breach of privilege with their clients 
or a violation of human rights for the public servant. 
 
Table 15: Instances of Corruption 
Instances  Housing Traffic Dockets Tender Nepotism Loc.Gov.  Fraud  None  Total 
Academic Inst 6 
3 2 1 1 1 4 16 34 
Business - - - 1 - - - 1 2 
NGOs 1 - - - - 1 - 1 3 
Legislature  4 - - - 1 1 2 1 9 
Pub. Servants 6 - - - - - - 17 23 
Total  17 3 2 2 2 3 6 36 71 
Average  % 24 4 3 3 3 4 8 50 100 
Q.: Can you refer to any specific instance of corruption in the provincial government?  
 
7.5.3. Extent: 
10% of the respondents thought it was very serious, 54% believed that the extent of 
corruption in Gauteng was serious, while 24% thought it was not very serious, 7% found it 
to be definitely not serious against 4% who had no opinion. What is interesting here is the 
fact that while organizations differed in their descriptions, their approach to corruption 
was apparent. While the vast majority of organizations expressed their concern about the 
extent of corruption in the Gauteng government, the breakdown of the matter sector by 
sector presents quite exciting patterns: 
 
While businesses and non governmental organizations (NGOs) almost share the same 
opinion (serious (60%) and not very serious (40%), it is quite a different versions of 
events for the other sectors. In the Legislature, while the opposition parties (NNP, DA, 
ACDP and UDM) found the extent of corruption to be serious (57%), the ANC thought 
that it was not very serious (43%). Respondents (72%) from the Housing Department that 
was shaken by corruption and mismanagement for decades believed that the extent of 
corruption was serious in the province. For the Anti-Corruption Unit in the Department of 
Finance, corruption was definitely not very serious (60%) while 32% of academics 
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thought that it was not very serious, but 50% of them viewed the extent of corruption as 
serious.   
 
On the question regarding the extent of corruption before and after apartheid, the majority 
of NGOs’ respondents argued that the level remained the same before and after. Those 
from the legislature are divided between very much and not very much but overall, 29% of 
respondents believed that there is not less or more corruption now than during the old 
apartheid system with a tendency to remain the same. 24% thought that there was not very 
much corruption now than yesteryear; 11% found that it is very much now; 10% believed 
it is less; not at all for 7% and the same level for 6%.  This question was not asked to 
business people, as most of them were not in business before 1994. 
 
Asked whether corruption was increasing, decreasing or remained at the same level, 
academics and legislators came together to express their concerns about the question, 
which implied two different systems: one closed (apartheid) and one open (democracy). 
First of all, there is no measure of corruption because of the unavailability of documented 
cases and lack of “historical exposure”, as put by a Wits sociology lecturer. Secondly, the 
level is difficult to determine because the exposure of corruption goes with democracy and 
this may be the reason for hearing about more cases. Moreover, legislators - and especially 
the ANC caucus - believed that as the new South Africa inherited a rotten system, it will 
take time to put in place any ethics and institutions to detect and deal with corruption and 
to defeat the evil practice of corruption. Its level is fluctuating but being dealt with better 
than in the past. Corruption is being exposed due to the general transparency, which forms 
part of the new system introduced since 1994. Finally, with the current situation (post 
1994), it would be difficult for anyone to affirm or refute either way. In terms of public 
perception it may appear that corruption is now on the increase and this may negate the 
open society versus the closed one prior to 1994.  
 
Nonetheless, our survey shows that 41% of respondents thought the level was the same for 
both systems; for 24% it is increasing; 22% do not know; 12% assumed that it was 
decreasing (12%). This question was not asked to business people, as most of them were 
newcomers in the business. The same question was dropped for housing respondents as 
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they felt that the lack of database before and after 1994 made it difficult to measure 
corruption. 
 
Table 16: Extent of Corruption 
Extent Very serious Serious Not very serious Definitely not serious None Total 
Legislature  5 4  1 10 
Pub. Servants 6 14 - 3 - 23 
Academic Inst.  1 17 11 2 2 33 
Business  - 1 1 - - 2 
NGOs - 2 1 - - 3 
Total  7 39 17 5 3 71 
Average  % 10 54 24 7 4 100 
Q.: what is the actual extent of corruption in Gauteng? 
 
7.5.4. Causes: 
Poor and lax management have been singled out as the principal causes of corruption in 
the Gauteng public sector with 32% of respondents “strongly agreeing” and 53% 
“agreeing” that this created an environment in which corruption can fester. This gives us 
85% agreeing, while 10% (7% “disagreed”, 3% “strongly disagreed”) disagreed and 3% 
did not have an opinion.  
 
Table 17: Causes of Corruption 
Causes Strongly agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
know Total 
Business  - 2 - - - 2 
NGOs 3 - - - - 3 
Legislature  3 6 - - - 9 
Anti-Cor. U. 1 2 1 1 - 5 
Housing  5 12 1 - - 18 
Academics  11 16 3 1 2 33 
Total  23 38 5 2 2 70 
% 32 53 7 3 3 100 
Question: “The extent of corruption in Gauteng is largely the result of poor and lax management and a 
lack of control within the administrative system that create an environment in which corruption can fester.” 
Do you agree or disagree? ( Strongly Agree – Agree – Disagree – Strongly disagree – Don’t know). 
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7.5.5. Root causes: 
Public servants from Legislature, Public Service Commission, Anti-Corruption Unit and 
Housing Department were asked to rank from the most important factor they think to be a 
root cause of corruption in the public service in Gauteng to the least most important. A 
significant proportion of respondents felt that nepotism was the most important root cause 
that propels corruption in Gauteng, followed by poverty, apartheid, low levels of 
education, clientelism and affirmative action among government officials. 
 
Academics, business people and NGOs were asked to state what could be the root causes 
of corruption in the public service in Gauteng. All categories of respondents emphasized 
the importance of human determinants and were unanimous about greed as the top cause 
of corruption. Greed was followed by poor systems, the lack of control and poor checks 
and balances, lack of accountability, absence of ethics, maladministration, apartheid, 
incompetence and institutional capacity, privatization and the nature of politics. In 
addition, historians from both Pretoria University and RAU pointed out the history of 
dispossession, inadequate culture of service, officials insufficiently trained, lack of 
commitment to a corrupt-free environment and bad example set by public figures such as 
Alan Boesak, Winnie Mandela, Tony Yengeni and in Gauteng’s Jessie Duarte and Dan 
Mofokeng. 
 
Table 18: Roots Causes of Corruption 
Roots Causes Education Poverty A. Action Clientelism Apartheid Nepotism 
Total   34 34 34 34 34 34 
Business 2 0 0 2 1 2 
Legislature 8 8 7 8 8 7 
Anti-Corr. Unit 3 3 3 4 3 3 
Housing 4 7 6 3 5 8 
Total  17 18 16 17 17 20 
Rank  4 2 6 5 3 1 
 
Question: “What are the roots causes of corruption in Gauteng? Choose among the following factors and 
rank from the most important to the last important causes that you think propel corruption in the public 
sector”. 
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7.5.6. Attitude toward corruption: 
This section refers only to public servants (Legislature, Housing and Finance Departments 
and PSC); those who might have been experiencing alleged acts of corruption on a daily 
basis. Therefore, concerning feelings about Gauteng officials accepting bribes from 
members of public, a reassuring 91% felt it was very harmful against 9% who felt the act 
was somewhat harmful. About officials providing job for unqualified family members 
(nepotism), 94% of respondents felt it was very harmful and 3% thought it was somewhat 
harmful and other 3% judged the act not harmful at all. About dishonesty in both public 
and private sectors, 56% believed that it was about the same in both sectors; 38% found 
that it was more widespread in politics than in private sector; against 9% who had no 
opinion. 
 
Table 19: Attitude Towards Corruption 
      Bribes       Nepotism 
Bribes & Nepotism Very Harm Some Harm Not Harm. Very Harm Some Harm Not Har
Legislature 9 - - 9 - - 
Public Servants 20 3 - 21 1 1 
Total  29 3 - 30 1 1 
% 91 9 - 94 3 3 
Q.: How do you feel about Gauteng government officials accepting bribes from public members?/ How do 
you feel about someone who provides a job for an unqualified family member? 
 
7.5.7. Proportion: 
Asked about the proportion of government officials being perceived to be corrupt, the 
majority of all respondents (29%) believed that only a few who hold important positions 
are corrupt, 28% thought that it was quite a significant number at all levels, followed by 
8% who believed that it was only a tiny insignificant minority; 4% argued that it was 
mainly senior officials with most junior provincial positions; 4% claimed that was mainly 
junior officials with senior provincial positions and finally, it came as surprise that 21% 
expressed no opinion. 
 
However, the margin between those who believed there were “few top positions” involved 
and those who thought “all levels” were involved in corruption was too close to call. Thus, 
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while the majority (67%) of those respondents “inside” the government (Housing, Anti-
Corruption Unit, Legislators) believed there were only “few top positions” involved, the 
majority (50%) of those respondents “outside” the government (Academics, NGOs, 
Business) thought this was happening at “all levels”. Nevertheless, 45% of “insiders” felt 
this was happening at “all levels” against 33% of “outsiders” who believed this involved 
only “few top positions”. 
 
Table 20: Proportion of Officials Involved 
Proportion Tiny insignificant  minority 
Few top 
positions 
All 
levels 
Junior 
officials 
Senior 
officials 
Don’t 
know 
Total 
Business  - 1 - - - 1 2 
NGOs - - 1 1 - 1 3 
Legislature  2 5 2 - - - 9 
AntiCor.Unit 2 1 - - - 2 5 
Housing  1 8 7 1 1 - 18 
Academics  1 6 10 1 2 11 33 
Total  6 21 20 3 3 15 68 
% 8 29 28 4 4 21 100 
Q.: How many officials in Gauteng government do you think are involved in corruption?/ Only a tiny 
insignificant minority/Only a few but – they hold important positions/Quite a significant number at all 
levels/Mainly junior officials with senior provincial positions /Mainly senior officials with most junior 
provincial positions.  
 
7.5.8.  Fighting Corruption: 
In terms of commitment to combat corruption, there is a mixed message for government 
with most respondents 48% (33% agreed, 15% strongly agreed) agreeing that the Gauteng 
government was doing enough, 36% disagreed, 10% strongly disagreed and 4% were 
uncertain. Opposition parties and academics thought the government is not doing enough 
in combating corruption, they are trying their outmost best yet it is going to take time to 
reach the target. As emphasized by a RAU political science lecturer: “We do hear of 
people being identified and arrested, but very little of convictions and dismissals. Instead 
people get suspensions with pay and benefits”. 
 
The disclosure of assets by people running for public office got almost an unanimous 
decision with 57% strongly agreeing, 26% agreeing, 4% strongly disagreeing, 7% 
disagreeing and 1,3% without opinion. Trust and confidence in commissions of inquiry 
were seen as a great deal by 22%, a fair amount (40%), not very much (24%) and none at 
all (10%). 
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Table 21: Controlling Corruption 
Combating  Strongly agree Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree Uncertain  Total  
Business  - 1 1 - - 2 
NGOs - 1 2 - - 3 
Legislature  4 1 2 2 - 9 
Anti. Cor.Unit 2 2 - - 1 5 
Housing  5 9 2 2 - 18 
Academics  - 10 19 3 2 34 
Total  11 24 26 7 3 71 
% 15 33 36 10 4 100 
Q.: Do you think the government is doing enough in combating corruption by maintaining transparency and 
accountability?/Strongly agree /Agree /Disagree/ Strongly disagree /Uncertain. 
 
Table 22: Disclosing of Assets 
Assets   Strongly agree Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree Uncertain  Total  
Business  2 - - - - 2 
NGOs 2 1 - - - 3 
Legislature  8 - - 1 - 9 
Anti. Cor.Unit 2 2 1 - - 5 
Housing  8 5 4 - 1 18 
Academics  19 11 - 2 2 34 
Total  41 19 5 3 3 71 
% 57 26 7 4 4 100 
Q.: How do you feel about the Gauteng Legislature passing a law that people running for public office 
should publicly disclose their entire assets?/Strongly agree/ Agree/ Disagree/ Strongly disagree/ Uncertain. 
 
Table 23: Confidence in Commissions of Inquiry 
Commissions   A great deal A fair amount Not very much  None at all Total 
Business  - - 2 - 2 
NGOs 1 2 - - 3 
Legislature  4 3 2 - 9 
Anti. Cor.Unit 4 - - 1 5 
Housing  4 8 5 1 18 
Academics  3 16 8 5 34 
Total  16 29 17 7 71 
% 22 40 24 10 100 
Q.: How much trust and confidence do you have in commissions of inquiry that investigate politicians after 
major corruption scandals?/A great deal/A fair amount/Not very much/None at all. 
 
In addition, most respondents from civil society and academic institutions thought that due 
to the global dimension of corruption, regional and international cooperation is essential to 
counter corruption. There is a tendency for more action because different strategies and 
measures from different countries can be implemented to combat the phenomenon. 
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Though international cooperation is central, however it cannot be restricted to cooperation 
between state institutions. In South Africa in general, government has to clean its own 
house before looking at the international picture. Corruption here is not yet of 
international proportion. It is highly domestic.  
 
These two categories of respondents (civil society and academics) believed that there was 
a need for ethical standards, leadership and especially political will for the adoption of 
appropriate policies and allocation of resources. These exist already. What is needed is the 
will by politicians to confront corruption when and where it manifests itself. While all 
these factors are a crucial component, accounting standards and audits, strongly enforced, 
are critical. More, direct accountability of leadership in government and the involvement 
of civil society is the issue.  
 
Regarding the whistle blowing issue, they thought that whistleblowers should be protected 
with regard to their important role, as often, they are the only way corruption is 
uncovered. However, while whistleblowers are extremely useful at present, they are 
fundamentally insufficient as a permanent solution. The role of whistleblowers could be 
enhanced if the mechanisms ensuring their safety are effective and reliable. In terms of 
democracy, they saw democracy and the role of the law as an impediment to the incidence 
of corruption. While democracy is a good thing to happen in this country, it seems that 
even criminals are being protected in terms of “ human rights” paving the way for more 
incidences of corruption to take place. Action needs to be taken to strengthen and develop 
capacity and to punish offenders. But this issue is more to do with cultural standards 
coupled with political will and vision. 
 
7.5.9. Rating: 
Asked to rate the Gauteng provincial management, a small minority of respondents felt 
that it was excellent (3%); but for the majority of respondents it was fair (43%) and good 
(36%), while poor  (10%) and 4% did not have any opinion.  
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Table 24: Ratings 
Ratings    Excellent Good  Fair   Poor  Total  
Business  - - 2 - 2 
NGOs - - 2 1 3 
Legislature  - 5 4 - 9 
Anti. Cor.Unit - 4 1 - 5 
Housing  1 7 8 2 18 
Academics  1 11 15 5 34 
Total  2 27 32 8 71 
% 3 38 44 11 100 
Q.: How do you rate the Gauteng management in terms of fighting corruption?/Excellent /Good /Fair/ 
Poor. 
 
7.6. Key Findings 
This research provides a framework of corruption-related issues facing Gauteng 
government and highlights the diversity of respondents in terms of occupational area.  The 
findings include corruption causality issues as well as the way the Gauteng administration 
has managed to control it. The findings present a broad picture of the current 
administration and how they have succeeded to manage corruption risks. However, one of 
the key findings for the survey is that 85% of respondents agreed that institutional 
determinants are the principal and the most important causes that propel corruption in the 
public sector, while its roots lie in nepotism, which is understood as favouritism shown to 
relatives or close friends by those in power (as by giving them jobs); followed by poverty 
and clientelism far before levels of education, apartheid and affirmative action. 
 
Although respondents generally believed that the province is well administered, they also 
indicated that the government must remain vigilant in monitoring and continue to review 
all sensitive functions they believe are posing a risk to management practices. 
Respondents referred to some specific infamous corruption cases related to political 
scandals including: Jessie Duarte’s case, which will be dealt with in due course. The case 
of Ekurhuleni’s former mayor, Bavumile Vilakazi, the Housing Department scandal 
regarding subsidies and contracts; irregularities in the allocation of RDP houses and queue 
jumping in the provincial Housing Department waiting list, as this is one of our case 
studies. In the Department of Welfare, there were incidences of social grants fraud. The 
Arms deal scandal. The selling of dockets by members of the Police and traffic officers 
taking bribes to not issue tickets. The misuse of vehicles and fraud (overtime) in the 
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department of Transport and finally nepotism and the presence of ghost workers in almost 
all departments are among prominent cases of corruption in Gauteng. 
 
Table 25: Key Findings:  
Findings Legislature 
Public 
Servants 
Academic 
Instit. 
Business 
 NGOs 
Total 
% 
Sources  
Media  
Public officials 
Uncertain  
None  
 
3 
5 
- 
- 
 
8 
4 
4 
7 
 
23 
5 
4 
1 
 
- 
1 
1 
- 
 
2 
1 
- 
- 
 
50 
22 
13 
11 
Instances  
Housing  
Traffic 
Dockets   
Tender  
Nepotism  
Local gov. 
Fraud  
None  
 
4 
- 
- 
- 
1 
1 
2 
1 
 
6 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
17 
 
6 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
16 
 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1 
 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
1 
 
24 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
8 
50 
 
Extent  
Very serious 
Serious  
Not very serious 
Definitely not ser.  
None  
 
- 
5 
4 
- 
1 
 
6 
14 
- 
3 
- 
 
1 
17 
11 
2 
2 
 
- 
1 
1 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
2 
1 
- 
- 
 
10 
54 
24 
7 
4 
Causes  
Strongly agree  
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly disagree  
Don’t know 
 
3 
6 
- 
- 
- 
 
6 
14 
2 
1 
- 
 
11 
16 
3 
1 
2 
 
- 
2 
- 
- 
- 
 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
32 
53 
7 
3 
3 
Root causes  
Education  
Poverty  
Affirmative Action  
Clientelism  
Apartheid  
Nepotism  
 
8 
8 
7 
8 
8 
7 
 
7 
10 
9 
7 
8 
11 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
2 
0 
0 
2 
1 
2 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
(Rank) 
4 
2 
6 
5 
3 
1 
Bribes  
Very harmful 
Somewhat harm. 
Not harmful  
 
9 
- 
- 
 
 
20 
3 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
91 
9 
0 
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Nepotism  
Very harmful 
Somewhat harm. 
Not harmful 
 
9 
- 
- 
 
21 
1 
1 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
94 
3 
3 
Proportion  
Tiny ins. minority 
Few top positions 
All levels 
Junior officials 
Senior officials 
Don’t know  
 
2 
5 
2 
- 
- 
- 
 
3 
9 
7 
1 
1 
2 
 
1 
6 
10 
1 
2 
11 
 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1 
 
- 
- 
1 
1 
- 
1 
 
8 
29 
28 
4 
4 
21 
 
 
Assets  
Strongly agree 
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly disagree  
Uncertain 
 
 
8 
- 
- 
1 
- 
 
 
10 
7 
5 
- 
1 
 
 
19 
11 
- 
2 
2 
 
 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
2 
1 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
57 
26 
7 
4 
4 
Commissions  
A great deal  
A fair amount 
Not very much  
None at all  
 
4 
3 
2 
- 
 
8 
8 
5 
2 
 
3 
16 
8 
5 
 
- 
- 
2 
- 
 
1 
2 
- 
- 
 
22 
40 
24 
10 
 
Controlling  
Strongly agree 
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly disagree 
Uncertain  
 
4 
1 
2 
2 
- 
 
 
7 
11 
2 
2 
1 
 
- 
10 
19 
3 
2 
 
 
- 
1 
1 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
1 
2 
- 
- 
 
15 
33 
36 
7 
4 
Ratings 
Excellent  
Good  
Fair  
Poor  
 
 
- 
5 
4 
- 
 
1 
11 
9 
2 
 
1 
11 
15 
5 
 
- 
- 
2 
- 
 
- 
- 
2 
1 
 
3 
38 
44 
11 
 
The continuous corruption scandals in government spheres are merely strengthening my 
resolve to assume that this is the duty of any responsible government to build sustainable 
strategies in concerned departments such as Housing, Transport and Public Works, not to 
mention Education or Safety and Security. This study has detected potential corruption 
resistance mechanisms within the Gauteng administration, though there is still room for 
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improvement, as those departments not referred to in our strategic section have still much 
to do to improve their anti-corruption measures.  
 
7.7. Reliability of the Results: 
 
Properly conducted sample surveys yield useful estimates but not exact values. Errors may 
arise from sampling, non-response, reporting and processing. However, secondary sources 
such as archival information help to validate our data. The purpose of this chapter was to 
present and analyse the empirical data that were acquired through interview and 
questionnaires. 
 
The next part undertakes to empirically explain the study outcomes. 
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PART THREE 
DETERMINANTS AND OUTCOMES OF CORRUPTION IN 
GAUTENG: 1994-2004 
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Chapter Eight 
EXPLAINING CAUSALITY: THE INTERPLAY OF THE THREE 
CLUSTERS OF CORRUPTION 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
While the analysis in the previous chapter may help in identifying the domestic sources of 
corruption, it does not address the role of international key contributors to the corruption 
phenomenon such as foreign business bribery, the role of the State sovereignty and the 
granting of asylum to corrupt leaders. Based on the results of this study, this chapter 
presents an empirical analysis about the politico-economic and socio-cultural factors that 
determine the perceived level of corruption on a micro-level basis. It is a common belief 
that incentives and opportunities of generating corruption are strongly linked with political 
institutions; therefore, the empirical analysis on determinants of corruption includes many 
institutional factors among the potential causes of corruption. By focussing on the micro 
level this study clearly shows that the level of research analysis is globally shifting away 
from comparing countries to the study of regions or groups within a country. The micro-
level approach help to build a more comprehensive picture of how corruption operates in a 
province endowed with opportunities. Therefore, to remain within the scope of this 
research, the assessment focuses only on the causes of corruption from the domestic front.  
 
For instance, what institutional problems or societal attitudes contribute to corruption in 
South Africa? How do these institutional and attitudinal problems vary across institutions 
and provinces within the country? For example, is the issue of wide government authority 
problematic in all areas or just in certain activities?   
 
While the conclusions of this study are preliminary, they, nevertheless, suggest an 
understanding of causes and effects that can provide guidance to the policies, procedures, 
and codes of conduct needed to prevent breaches in ethics. The need to understand and 
deal effectively with varying levels of both the practice and acceptance of corruption will 
become increasingly important, as such understanding can also help government, national 
agencies and non-governmental organizations in developing their own strategies for 
moving toward an environment that is freer of corruption at the organizational as well as 
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the national level. This provides a robust set of data on which to build strong strategies. 
Such knowledge can also help reduce levels of corruption in the province in designing the 
best approach to communicate and enforce ethical standards in ways that recognize local 
norms and customs.   
 
8.2. The Interplay of the Clusters 
 
Clearly, there is a common concern with a dependent variable such as corruption, which is 
a broad concept that covers an assortment of phenomena ranging from petty to grand 
corruption. At times corruption indicators can be inconsistent or unreliable or affected by 
our own biases. Their reliability relies therefore on the diversity of the sources of our data 
that reflect this heterogeneity. Thus conclusions about causes arising from the survey 
represent hypotheses that we can study with tests. 
 
Accordingly, the causes of corruption may be explained by a combination of three 
clusters: economic, political, cultural and social variables. Otherwise, the two major sets 
of variables we identified as opportunities for corruption and controlling powers of 
institutions. From respondents’ responses the relevant factors causing corruption in 
Gauteng have been grouped in three categories: intervention of the state in the economy 
that generates opportunities for corruption, controlling powers of institutions or 
institutions of accountability and finally the social and bureaucratic culture of the society.  
In terms of government corruption, literature on corruption distinguishes between direct 
and indirect causes of corruption that appropriately explain the scenario in Gauteng. On 
the one hand, direct factors that promote corruption are: regulations and authorizations, 
taxation system and spending decisions or procurement, including the financing of 
political parties, which is not part of our discussion. On the other hand lie indirect factors 
identified as the quality of bureaucracy or administrative capacity, institutional controls, 
recruitment and “affirmative action” policy, level of public sector wages and the penalty 
system. Both direct and indirect factors have been summarized as follows: 
 
As this study establishes, the analysis of the interaction of the cluster shows that as the 
level of perceived corruption increases, the level of development of a country decreases 
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and the cultural characteristics tend to be more significant. The awareness of the dramatic 
effects of corruption on a country’s development leads to investigate why corruption 
exists and what makes it so differently widespread among societies. 
 
Table 26: Factors impacting on administrative corruption 
 
1. Payment: 
 Salary 
 Fringe  benefits, pensions, allowances, other financial incentives 
2. Monitoring: 
a. Internal: when internal, the control deals with: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Supervision and control systems 
Standards of performance for employees 
Recruitment and selection procedures for personnel 
Rules and procedures for tax collection and reporting 
 
a. External: control deals with: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
General auditor’s independence and capacity 
Law and order tradition, checks and balances 
Information made available to the public (e.g. newspapers, media) 
The judiciary system (proving cases in court). 
3. Statutory penalty: 
 The size of penalty (amount of fine, confiscation of wealth, prison sentence). 
 Administrative sanctions. 
4. Public sector regulations: 
 Governmental regulations (e.g. Licences, fees, etc.) 
 The tax laws and regulations (including tax bases, collection procedures and 
transparency). 
 Statutory tax rates. 
5. Other factors: 
 The bureaucratic structure 
 Education of civil servants 
 Political and administrative leadership 
 Cultural determinants 
 Development aid organizations.  
 
Source: Andvig, et al. (2000:108). 
 
When looking at the study’s results as well as relevant empirical contributions on 
corruption determinants, one should note that the abuse of power thrives in Gauteng for a 
number of reasons that I believe contribute to its incidence: 
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8.3. The Role of the State in the Economy  
 
These are administrative or institutional factors as corruption arises from the activities of 
the State that lead to monopoly and discretionary power. Good administration brings about 
bureaucracy quality. Bad administration leads to mismanagement, maladministration and 
corruption, thus paving the way to poor services and delaying tactics in terms of delivery. 
But prior to the analysis of these factors, it is significant to underline the weight of state 
intervention in the economy. Evidence from empirical research (Gurgur and Shah, 2000) 
suggests that a country characterized by large government involvement is likely to 
encounter corruption. Since government has the authority to redistribute resources and 
rents in the economy, the authority can be used for personal gains. Government officials 
may refuse the authorizations for new investments, delay the paperwork for import 
permits, use safety standards as an excuse to close down businesses, give different 
meanings to economic regulations to turn down foreign exchange or bank credit requests, 
and so on. Otherwise the more government intervenes in the operation of markets, the 
more opportunities for corruption appears through discretion on regulations and allocation 
of resources. Therefore an open economy reduces the level of available rents, which in 
turn leads to a reduction in the amount of corruption in the economy.  Accordingly it is 
usually the scope of government activities, not the size of government that affects the 
incidence of corruption. 
 
8.3.1.  Regulations and Authorizations: 
Do public sector regulations impact on the incidence of corruption? As argued before, 
corruption is closely associated with the activities of the State and especially with 
monopoly and discretionary power. The bottom line is that the more government 
intervenes in the economy, the more there is likely to be room for discretionary 
interpretation of regulations and distribution of resources by public servants. Therefore, 
should we abolish the State to abolish corruption, asked Gary Becker, a Nobel Laureate in 
Economics?  The response is no, of course! We cannot function without a State, thanks to 
the many functions it must perform.  It has been documented that the least corrupt 
countries such as Finland, Denmark, Sweden or Canada, possess an extensive public 
service. In the meantime, corruption seems to have increased in countries like China, 
Russia, Uganda or Tanzania, which have gone through economic liberalization and 
  
180
privatization. Empirical evidence indicates that it is not the size of the public sector, but 
the way the public sector works that are of importance for the level of corruption (Tanzi, 
1998; Andvig, et al., 2000). So the problem cannot simply be addressed by just reducing 
the size of the State.  
 
The role of the State is so important than even the World Bank, which is not known for 
advocating state intervention took the role of the state as its theme in the 1997 Report. 
Regarding that role, the 1997 World Bank Development Report argues that States need 
strong institutions to meet people’s needs effectively. In that Report, notes Madeleine 
Wackernagel (1997:5), emphasis was put on a two-pronged strategy: matching the state’s 
role to its capability and improving those capabilities by reinvigorating public institutions. 
Therefore, when governments try to do too much with too little, they can end up doing 
more harm than good. Thus the state must refocus its role on what it does best: performing 
the public tasks not provided by markets and voluntary groups. And public institutions 
must be strengthened to enhance the state’s capabilities.  
 
The Report points to a survey of local entrepreneurs in 69 countries that illustrates the link 
between credibility and investment and firms were asked to rank indicators on a scale 
from one (extreme problems) to six (no problem). The results show sub-Saharan Africa 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States faring worst because states were failing in 
their core functions of ensuring law and order, protecting property, and applying rules and 
policies predictably. Finally, concludes Wackernagel, for the State to play its full role and 
to enhance its capability, the Report suggests that three mechanisms would apply: 
effective rules and restraints; greater competitive pressure; and increased citizen voice and 
partnership. Therefore, there is a need for improving the state’s effectiveness and avoiding 
by doing so to plummet into corruption trap, as each country’s institutional and political 
framework demands different strategies.  
 
In a provincial administration such as Gauteng the way the government operates and 
carries out its functions is very important. It can exercise its role through various 
instruments. Some of these lend themselves more easily to acts of corruption because 
particular aspects of government activities create fertile ground for corruption. The 
government does it through the use of many rules or regulations. For instance, licences, 
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permits and authorizations of various sorts are required to engage, or to continue to be 
engaged, in many activities. Opening a shop and keeping it open, borrowing money, 
investing, driving or owning a car, building a house, getting birth, marriage or death 
certificates, getting a passport and so on require specific documents or authorizations. 
 
The existence of these regulations and authorizations gives a kind of monopoly power to 
the officials who must authorize or inspect the activities. This also leads to frequent 
contacts between members of the public and civil servants and requires enormous amounts 
of time to be spent by citizens in acquiring these permits. These officials may refuse to 
effect the authorizations or may simply sit on a decision for months. Subsequently, they 
can use their public power to extract bribes from those who need the authorizations or 
permits. The question one is compelled to ask is whether corruption is caused by extensive 
regulations or is the regulations caused by corruption. In response, some scholars argue 
that extensive public sector regulations are the result of a deliberate strategy by civil 
servants to increase their clients’ willingness to pay bribes (Myrdal, 1968; Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Tanzi, 1998). By assuming that bureaucrats are driven by rational, self-
serving motives, the logical presumption is that they will seek even more ways to create 
bribe-producing delays. In South Africa, a recent study has shown that state and local 
government institutions are weak and often under the control of rent-seeking politicians 
(Rubinfeld, 1997). 
 
In Gauteng, some individuals in the Licence Department become middlemen or 
facilitators for obtaining these permits. In most of the cases, the regulations are non 
transparent or are even publicly available and that an authorization can be made only from 
a specific office or individual. Thus the lack of competition in the granting of these 
authorizations gives the bureaucrats a great amount of power and a good opportunity to 
extract bribes. Government officials can use tactics to benefit from their monopoly power 
and administrative discretion by extracting bribes from those that need the authorizations 
or permits to engage in activities.  
 
Likewise, Lambsdorff positively associated corruption with government regulations. He 
also measures the degree to which the government regulations are vague and lax, on the 
other hand. In both cases, it seems that policy intervention causes corruption. Other 
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studies that have focused on corruption see it as a cause for policy distortions. But it is 
quite often the case that policy distortions and corruption are just two sides of the same 
coin. Lambsdorff ended up concluding that disregarding this problem a correlation 
between political distortions and corruption is an important result, clearly giving direction 
to policy reform (1999:3).  
 
A report on the provincial Administration of Gauteng (1997:4-5) highlights the confusion 
that was created by vague and lax regulations. For instance, there was a lack of clarity in 
the respective roles of the politicians and Heads of Department (HODs). Prior to the 
formal appointment of HODs when the province was established, the MEC’s initially 
performed the dual functions of political and administrative leadership. As a result, there 
was administrative interference by the MEC’s in managerial activities. The MEC’s were 
unable to assert their policy priorities on the departments leaving the staff being unclear 
about the role of the MEC in setting the policy direction for the activities of his/her 
department. More, there was a lack of clarity about who HODs were accountable to 
between the DG and the respective MEC. The province was lacking a clear policy, which 
defined these relationships, and enabled the DG [and the MEC] to hold the HODs 
accountable.  
 
From this, it is easy to understand in which environment public servants were working in 
between 1994 and 1999. However, while systems of monitoring and coordinating cabinet 
decision-making are in the process of being developed, these systems are still inadequate 
to enable effective implementation of decisions. For example, on 26 July 2001 an Auditor-
General 2001 Report on the financial statements in the Office of the Premier of Gauteng 
for the year ended 31 March 2001, points to the internal audit and audit committee. The 
Report underlines the fact that no internal audit work had been done during the 2000-2001 
financial year. Furthermore, no effective audit committee had functioned during the 2000-
2001 financial year. This is contrary to section 38 (1) (a) (ii) of the Public Service Act, 
which requires that the department should institute and maintain a system of internal audit 
under the control and direction of an audit committee. Despite claims by management of 
the Gauteng Provincial Government to have established five audit committees for the 
departments, the Report shows that during the audit it was found that no checking was 
done to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. 
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The weakness in this area was of serious concern prompting the Auditor-General on 5 
October 2001 to observe that: 
 
“During the audit process various issues were raised related to a lack of proper 
internal control systems. This involved mainly issues such as non-compliance with 
control procedures, lack of timeous and adequate management information, 
ineffective internal audit, limited risk management processes and a lack of early 
warning systems. As a result:  
 It provides an environment conducive to fraud and corruption 
 It has a significant impact on effective and efficient service delivery  
 It has an impact on the extent, nature and time frame of the audit and 
ultimately on the cost of the audit” (2001:2).  
 
Thus, the need for improvements in this area that can be achieved over time should result 
in a positive impact on financial management in the Province. 
 
8.3.2.  Recruitment and Affirmative Action 
 
Another contentious variable in terms of causality is the hiring of personnel. The quality 
of the bureaucracy can be found in what many years ago Max Weber (1947) had described 
as an “ideal bureaucracy”, known as “Western bureaucratic administration”. This system 
is based on: “a regular system of appointment and promotion on the basis of free contract; 
clearly defined spheres of competence, subject to impersonal rules; a rational ordering of 
relations of superiority and inferiority; technical training as a regular requirement; and 
fixed salaries, typically paid in money” (Richard Joseph, 1987:64). 
 
Given the fact that nowadays most bureaucracies have sinned and lost their “genuine 
ideal” through corrupt acts, Weber’s “ideal bureaucracy” is now a pious vow, for most 
bureaucracies are no longer ideal. The “myth of absolute efficiency and incorruptibility” 
enjoyed by the administration of the Prussian state is today only wishful thinking. In any 
case modern approaches to public administration show that accountability, 
decentralization and business style operations, in various ways challenge Weberian 
precepts. 
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Other analysts such as Andvig and Fjeldstad support de Sardan’s view that Weberian 
informed definition of corruption is “too narrow and excessively concerned with the 
illegality of such practices, defined from a modern, Western point of view”. They are 
militating in favour of what de Sardan calls “corruption complex” to include practices 
beyond corruption in the strict sense of the word. This includes some broader political 
debates on legitimacy, representation and participation that entail the role of the civil 
society but also models from social anthropology and sociology on reciprocity and 
networks, and on clientelism and nepotism, and other embezzlement and misappropriation 
to explain the causes of corruption (Andvig and Fjeldstad: 2000: 52, 66). 
 
A recent study by Rauch and Evans (1997) on the degree to which civil servants’ 
recruitment and promotions are merit-based for 35 developing countries indicates that the 
less are recruitment and promotion based on merit, the higher is the extent of corruption. 
Further, absence of politically motivated hiring, patronage, and nepotism, and clear rules 
on promotions and hiring all contribute to the quality of a bureaucracy (Tanzi, 1998:16). 
In other words, applications of employment and advancement along meritocratic 
principles have a strong negative impact on corruption levels.  
 
In South Africa in general, and in Gauteng in particular, recruitment and promotions are 
based on the values and principles contained in the Constitution regarding values and 
principles of public administration. The core of this new policy is entrenched in the Public 
Service Act, 1994 (PSA) and the Public Service Regulations that set out the mandatory 
requirements and guidance on the steps to be taken by national and provincial 
administrations in implementing it. The new policy provides the new framework that 
addresses inequalities and historical imbalances of the past that ravaged the country as a 
whole. This led to the marginalization of millions of people as they were overpowered by 
legislation and regulations. This new policy has been called “affirmative action” through 
which past injustices should be improved by transforming the public service and 
empowering those who have been historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
31% of respondents believed that affirmative action was one of the root causes of 
corruption in the province. Therefore, political history is an indicator of the impact of 
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Affirmation Action policy on South African politics in the past and today and it will be 
unfair not to discuss it in-depth. 
 
Affirmative Action is an anti-discrimination measure that is reinforced by legislation for 
the removal of all forms of discrimination, formal and informal, and all obstacles to 
equality of opportunity. It finds it roots in the American discourse of the early 1960s and 
was first introduced by President JF Kennedy in 1961 and legislated for the first time in 
the US by president LB Johnson in 1965. In South Africa, its roots could be found in the 
aftermath of the Union in 1910 when Afrikaners came to power. As Franklin Sonn has 
written, “the Afrikaner’s history proves that there is a direct link between the possession 
of political power and socio-economic upliftment” (Charl Adams, 1993:7). 
 
Deborah Posel described how the Civil Service was “afrikanerized” during the 1950s: 
“The expansion of the civil service was closely associated with efforts to change its ethnic 
composition and political leanings. With the energetic help of the Afrikaner Broederbond, 
the National Party introduced what amounted to a tacit policy of affirmative action for 
white Afrikaners. Afrikaners were actively recruited for positions of influence in as many 
social, political and economic organizations as possible. This included – perhaps most 
importantly - colonizing the state. English-speakers who were already civil servants were 
discouraged, or more forcibly prevented, from holding office – particularly those in 
powerful or prominent positions. And Afrikaans-speaking people formed a growing 
proportion of new appointees” (1999:104). 
 
Once in power the Afrikaners used the State apparatus to edict a bulk of discriminatory 
legislation in order to uplift the living of the “poor whites”. In reality as many studies have 
shown, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 was passed as Affirmative Action for 
whites against cheaper black labour, followed by legislation providing for Job Reservation 
or “job colour bars”, the Apprenticeship Act of 1994 which gave control of entry to the 
trades to the whites unions. The Native Building Workers Act of 1951 prohibited blacks 
from doing skilled construction in white urban areas. This is Affirmative Action that 
contributed to the rise of Afrikaner business. For instance, the first act of the 
Reddingsdaadbond of the 1940s was to pressurize government to promote Afrikaner 
business ownership. As a result, Franklin Sonn contends, “the plain nepotism based on 
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Afrikaner chauvinism, which represents the most extreme form of Affirmative Action, 
was strongly propagated throughout. Economic nepotism and the taking over of power 
changed matters for the Afrikaners” (1993:7). A look at the following figures, as presented 
by Sonn, gives us an illustration of the Afrikaners use of the State apparatus: 
 
1.  In 1952 about 80% of the employees of the South African Railways and Harbours and 
68% of the employees of the Post Office were Afrikaners. At the same time there were no 
fewer than twenty-two public corporations with the government deliberately appointing 
National Party Afrikaners to key positions to ensure the advancement of apartheid. The 
interest of the public sector grew by 50% in the period 1946 to 1976.  
 
2.  By 1968 there were twice as many Afrikaners in the public sector than in 1948. In 1979 
35% of economically active Afrikaners were in the public service and in 1978 about 90% 
of the approximately 150 key positions in the public sector were held by Afrikaners 
(1993:7). 
 
In terms of wages, scholars have compared the size of income between blacks and whites. 
In 1975, O’Meara calculated approximately that “if the real income of whites against 
blacks in industry in 1947-48 was taken at 100, the index of real white salaries rose by 
more than 10% in the first five years of NP rule. During the same period the income of 
blacks decreased by 50%. By 1960 the real income of whites stood at 130” (1975:71).  
 
The result of these inequalities was the marginalization of blacks not only from political 
power but also from economic participation that impacted on stability and long term 
development. Subsequently, as observed by Eli Louw (see Adams, 1993:153), inequality 
engendered other problems such as:  
 
a) A very unequal distribution of and wealth between white and black communities.  
b) Massive unemployment and poverty among blacks.  
c) An over-reliance on white males in skilled occupations.  
d) Shortcomings regarding the educational system, which reduces equality of 
opportunity for blacks.  
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The exclusion and incapacitation of blacks from mainstream economic life was not only 
maintained but encouraged as well. Wiseman Nkulu (1993) for example, stressed that 
“successive governments used legislation to inhibit the economic advancement of blacks 
and state budgetary allocations to promote the development of whites through better 
education, health facilities and housing. Blacks access to jobs and to economic resources – 
land, capital and technology – was severely restricted through a plethora of laws and 
regulations” (see Adams, 1993:11). 
 
The white Affirmative Action was characterized by nepotism or “bond”. As pointed out 
by Sonn, “in this significant shift the Broederbond played a very important role leading 
some observers to declare “the growth of State capitalism in South Africa since 1948 has 
also been the growth of Afrikaner capitalism” (Adams, 1993:7). However, instead of 
crying vengeance in reverse or retribution and recrimination, Mandela in a statement in 
1991, rose to the occasion and promised that Affirmative Action will be introduced to 
redress “imbalances created by apartheid” and that there will be no abuse or shameless 
nepotism. “ Nor are we saying that just as the white skin was a passport to privilege in the 
past, so a black skin should be the basis of privilege in the future. Affirmative Action must 
be rooted in principles of justice and equity” (Mandela, 1991).  
 
In the New South Africa, according to the White Paper (1998:8) on Affirmative Action, 
one of the post-1994 Government’s foremost tasks has been to transform the Public 
Service into an efficient and effective instrument capable of delivering equitable services 
to all citizens and of driving the country’s economic and social development. This comes 
after a long period of unfair discrimination and division on the basis of race and gender 
and the exclusion of people with disabilities. As a result, the Public Service lacked 
legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the majority of South Africans. Therefore, the 
restoration of legitimacy and credibility became one of the keys to the transformation 
process through the development of a broadly representative Public Service. 
Consequently, Affirmative Action policies were introduced for the first time in 1994 to 
bring into the administrative heart of government, people from those groups who had been 
marginalized and systematically discriminated against by the apartheid state. Thus the 
focus was on the field of human resource management and the “target group” comprised 
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black people that refers to Africans, Coloured and Indians; women, and people with 
disabilities.   
 
Nowadays, Affirmative Action has focused solely on the employment, development and 
promotion of the disadvantaged group. As anticipated by Thea Wingrove, “it redresses 
imbalances. It identifies positions that have previously been inaccessible to the 
disadvantaged group and launches special recruitment drives for these groups as well as 
engaging in training and development” (1993:5). For that purpose, the White Paper 
defined Affirmative Action: 
 
 “ as the additional corrective steps which must be taken in order that those who have 
been historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination are able to derive full benefit 
from an equitable employment environment” (1998:9). 
 
However, as a non-meritocratic system of recruitment or promotion, the implementation 
of the AA policies was of great concern among all communities and was hampered by 
shortcomings and subjective allegations over its credibility. This concern could be 
justified on two grounds. Firstly, to white people it has been seen as a form of 
discrimination and an economic threat. Whites perceived themselves as being vulnerable 
in the face of the impending restructuring of political power relationships. As argued by 
Hugo (1998), “white South Africans associate the demise of white supremacy with a sense 
of threat and vulnerability” and these fears of change were more pronounced among 
Afrikaners, the occupational group than among other white groups. Secondly, to others, 
the disadvantaged camp, it represents hope for real socio-economic change and economic 
opportunity and a better future.  
 
Indeed, for many whites, AA is nothing else than a form of discrimination. Where blacks 
were previously discriminated against on racial lines, is the discrimination not now in their 
backyard? Is black empowerment not simply apartheid in reverse? In answering these 
questions there is general consensus among writers that “most affirmative action 
programmes in fact aim to achieve equality among people of different races, gender, or 
other groups; their aim is to overcome discrimination and to achieve equality” (see Pierre 
Hugo (1992), Duncan Innes (1993), Adèle Thomas (1996), Blade Nzimande and 
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Mpumelelo Sikhosana (1996). A report on AA in South Africa states, “avoidance of 
tokenism should be the rule because AA does not undermine merit-based recruitment or 
promotion. More, it is a fundamental error to equate AA with the preferential treatment of 
underserved persons, and such an approach is offensive towards people from relevant 
target groups” (Price Waterhouse, 1996:4).  
 
This point of view underlines Innes’ explanation of what he thinks about “tokenism” 
1993:15), especially when a black person is appointed to a senior position without 
preparation and lacking requisite skills to take responsibility:  
 
“tokenism is another serious drawback which sometimes accompanies affirmative 
action programmes. It usually occurs when a company or organization is very 
keen to promote blacks into prominent positions within the organization in order 
to achieve a “window-dressing” – to look good in the eyes of either the 
international community or black consumers, for example… But in reality, while 
the post still carries a grand-sounding title, it has been stripped of all its decision-
making powers, to ensure that the new incumbent cannot inflict too much damage 
on the organization.”   
 
This led Innes to warn against this form of affirmative action that he found to be 
“particularly pernicious because it degrades the black incumbent in the eyes of his/her 
colleagues and subordinates, who quickly become aware of the changes the post has 
undergone. Furthermore, this experience is eventually humiliating for the incumbent as 
well, since he or she becomes a symbol of ridicule within the organization” (1993:15). 
Thus, for affirmative action to have any chance of succeeding, tokenism must be avoided 
at all costs. 
 
Secondly, to those who have hope of a real change, notably the target group, the 
implementation of AA did not come without some knocks. The White Paper (1998:25) 
reports on some distorted ways of applying AA whose effect was to boost some groups of 
the target group at the expense of others, thereby perpetuating their disadvantaged status. 
For instance, within some National Departments and Provincial Administrations there was 
a tendency to recruit one group of women at the expense of others as the requirement to 
affirm women was used to affirm white women only at the expense of African, Indian and 
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Coloured women. There too was a practice that has evolved in some instances to promote 
one group among the broad group, “black people”, while ignoring the others. In such 
situation “black” is wrongfully interpreted as Coloured only, or African only or Indian 
only when it is an inclusive term for African, Indian and Coloured people. Persons with 
disabilities suffer in similar ways.  
 
Another illustration comes from Adèle Thomas (1996:56) who calls these distorted ways 
“some South Africanisms” consisting of events that are particular to South African 
landscape. She explains how affirmative action programmes, in many cases, are 
perpetuating an ethnic conflict and subsequently historically so-called Coloured and 
Asians in the country were the more favoured groups among the disadvantaged. 
Consequently, some organizations have introduced affirmative action programmes, which 
specifically exclude these groups in favour of the majority “black” or “African group”. 
Furthermore, discrimination against women, both by black and white males, still widely 
exists and this issue has not yet, received the attention, which it warrants, as Thomas 
argues. In this regard, it is arguable that such policies are not only unwise but are a 
misrepresentation of government policy and need to be stopped where they occur and 
strongly monitored and the target group as a whole needs to benefit directly from 
affirmative action according to their disadvantaged status.  
 
As reactions to this situation, individuals from the target group have to face hostility on 
the job where they are often stigmatized as “token appointees” and are seen to be 
unworthy of their jobs. Such hostility, notes the White Paper, has cast a slur on many if 
not all members of these groups despite their levels of competence, capacity, and 
qualifications and even when they are better at their jobs than anyone else. As a result, 
many individuals from this group prefer not to be associated with Affirmative Action. 
Therefore, the implementation of Affirmative Action in both the old and new system 
moves us far away from Weber’s “ideal bureaucracy”. An absolute contradiction to 
Weber’s principle when one thinks of the “economic nepotism” of the apartheid era and 
today’s “comradeship” within the ruling party.    
 
In Gauteng new political classes that ascended to power in the aftermath of the 1994 
elections tended to move away from what was the apartheid system. It is the rise and 
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triumph of those new groups or individuals – in opposition to the oppressive old regime – 
that opened the door to yet another context for the mushrooming of political corruption. 
Transformation was the name of the game for the newcomers. The “new men” are coming 
from the African National Congress (ANC), now the ruling party, which won the 1994 
elections and took power from White rulers. The change in the leadership of this liberation 
movement was comprehensive.  
 
The new elite comprise of three types of people: first, there was the group coming from 
Roben Island’s prisoners, such as the likes of Tokyo Sexwale, former premier who quit in 
1997 and was replaced by Dr Mathole Motshekga. Secondly, there was the growing 
number of those coming from exile the likes of Jabu Moleketi, the capable Gauteng MEC 
for Finance and Economic Affairs. And the last group was that of trade unionists and other 
freedom fighters who resisted from inside South Africa such as the premier of Gauteng 
Mbhazima Shilowa, Khabisi Mosunkutu, MEC Transports and Public Works and former 
MP (1994-1999) or the Johannesburg executive mayor, Amos Masondo; activists such as 
Mary Metcalfe, MEC Agriculture, Environment and Land Affairs, Ignatius Jacobs, MEC 
Education and former MEC Welfare and Population, Angelina Motshekga, MEC Social 
Services and Population Development, to mention but a few.  
  
As elaborated in early studies on political systems, the period of bureaucratic transition 
generally brings about structural fragmentation or conflict in the public service between 
the “new men” in power and the older public servants. After the demise of apartheid and 
the takeover by the ANC in Gauteng, it became obvious that the conservatism of the 
apartheid bureaucracy stood in sharp contrast to the dynamism of the “new men” in office 
bent on rapid transformation of the South African polity in general through “Affirmative 
Action” according to the vision of the ANC leadership. Affirmative Action commenced in 
the public service in 1994, under special provisions contained in the Public Service Staff 
Code. This was intended as an interim measure until the introduction of the White Paper 
on Affirmative Action in May 1998.  
 
The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service supported by the White 
Paper on Affirmative Action in the public service provides guidelines to departments in 
terms of race, gender and disability for achievement by the end of 1999. The requirement 
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for the attainment of representativeness in the public service is that within four years from 
1995 all departments’ establishments must endeavour to be at least 50% black at 
management level; at least 30% of new recruits to the middle and senior management 
echelons should be women and within ten years, people with disabilities should comprise 
at least 2% of public service personnel. 
As a result, older public servants, whites especially, trained and experienced, became both 
unenthusiastic and recalcitrant about putting the new program into effect. But it was 
inevitable that when the rule of the white minority ended, and when positions became 
available in new structures of administration, the posts were rapidly filled by 
representatives of the new ruling party. Accordingly, the brain drain mainly on the part of 
white bureaucrats began, despite the obstructive tactics of the old bureaucracy in an 
attempt to hold onto top positions. In the growing administrative structures, the politically 
faithful rather than the technocrats or professional bureaucrats increasingly filled these 
positions. As put by Charlotte Bauer, “[White emigrants are] fed-up ... with the 
insecurities of no longer holding the trump card in the new order" (Cape Times, 19 April 
1999).  
Excerpts from a recent study on the brain drain phenomenon in South Africa provide 
evidence on the extent of the problem. Johann van Rooyen analyses in his new book 
entitled “The New Great Trek” (2001) all the trends related to South African emigration 
and especially the scope of South Africa’s exodus and its costs to the economy.  
Regarding the scope, van Rooyen argues that thousands of predominantly white, young, 
skilled South Africans of all persuasions, regions and professions are leaving the country 
each year to settle in mainly Australia, New Zealand, Britain, the USA and Canada. 
Official statistics suggest that just more than 8 200 people had emigrated from South 
Africa during 1998, but due to an under-reporting of between one-half and two-thirds, the 
unofficial total will have been between 16 000 and 25 000. These latest emigrants joined 
the 550 000 emigrants who have officially left since 1995, in addition to the 500 000 to 
one million emigrants who may have left the country unofficially during this period.  
Affirmative Action is one of the reasons those people are leaving, but there are other 
reasons that may be singled out as emphasized by van Rooyen:  
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 “...South African emigrants are motivated by a number of typical `push` factors 
and these are countered by many `pull` factors. The typical emigrant will list 
various `push` factors in order of importance, among which will be uncertainty 
about the future, falling standards, the economy, affirmative action and bleak job 
prospects, and loss of faith in the ANC-led government, but most importantly, … , 
he or she will list violent crime as the real reason for wanting to emigrate. 
Surveys indicate that 60% of emigrants regard crime as the major reason for 
leaving South Africa, while 19% cite concern for their children’s education. A 
total of 15% of emigrants said that they were looking for a better quality of life, 
14% wanted better prospects in general, 20% were concerned about healthcare, 
and 10% cited the government, the economy and affirmative action as reasons for 
emigrating...” 
 
In terms of loss, van Rooyen found out that “the real significance of this exodus can be 
found primarily not so much in the sheer size of the exodus, even though it is large by any 
standard, but in the fact that these emigrants represent a huge loss of human capital - they 
are mostly professionals and their skills and ability to create wealth and jobs cannot be 
replaced overnight, if at all”. Professor Haroon Bhorat from the University of Cape 
Town’s school of economics believes this trend has a negative effect on our national 
development. He said that “the country faces a severe skills shortage and that in this 
context; the outflow of that scarce resource - skilled workers - is a cause for concern”   
(www.mnet.co.za/CarteBlanche/default.asp). Furthermore, the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC) traced the movements of graduates and found that close on 20 percent of 
South African graduates are living abroad - a fact that costs the South African Receiver of 
Revenue R20-billion per year. 
In conclusion, it should be argued that even though the brain drain is not a recent 
phenomenon, it has caused much concern in South Africa over the last few years. South 
Africa is losing more skilled people every year, even much more than the Central 
Statistical Services data indicates.  It may be coincidental but during the period between 
1994 and 1998 in Gauteng, I witnessed unprofessional behaviour such as uncontrolled 
expenditures, free wheeling state enterprises, and an entrepreneurial ethic that permitted 
wholesale trade in public resources. These trends are common in Africa during transitional 
periods such as a change of government from dictatorship to democracy. In addition these 
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new opportunities gave easy entry to a variety of outside promoters, salesmen, and brokers 
who offered a dazzling array of “supplier credits”, equipment, projects, and benefits to 
enhance the status of an agency or line the pockets of its managers, as observed by Le 
Vine in Ghana’s case (1975:96).   
 
In such circumstances, opportunities for political corruption are rife: office holders 
became individual political entrepreneurs, each at his own level, operating according to 
whatever personal techniques he could develop and whatever political resources he could 
control. This was - and still is - the case within the Gauteng Licence Department, the 
Housing Department, the Department of Education, the traffic Police, the Department of 
Safety and Security and particularly the Hillbrow police station, not to mention the 
Department of Local Government, as some cases of misconduct raised in this study 
suggest. 
 
The Public Service Regulations require the development and implementation of an 
affirmative action programme that contains the following: 
 
• Numeric and time-bound targets for achieving representativeness, 
 
• Annual statistics on the appointment, training and promotion within each grade of each 
occupational category of persons historically disadvantaged (PSR, III, D.2). 
 
 
In line with the Affirmative Action policy, the following table describes changes in the 
composition of employees represented in terms of race, gender and persons with 
disabilities in the Gauteng government as follows in July 2000: 
 
Table 27: Distribution of persons employed in the Gauteng Government: 
African Coloured Indian White Total 
M F D M F D M F D M F D M F D 
26529 51124 64 1480 3198 4 987 1627 - 7637 21277 49 36633 77226 117
Source: The State of Representativeness in the Public Service, July 2000:18 
    Key: M = Male; F = Female; D = Persons with Disabilities  
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This means the overall total of persons employed in the Gauteng Administration in 2000 
was 113 976 representing 68% of Africans (M=23,2% and F=44,8%); 25,3% of Whites 
(M=6,7% and F=18,6%); 4% of Coloured (M=1,29% and F=2,80%), 2,28% of Indians 
(M=0,86 and F=1,42%) and 0,1% of disabled people. Despite this broad 
representativeness, transformation of the public sector has only been partly achieved with 
regard to the three target groups in terms of current regulations. As pointed out by the 
Public Service Commission (PSC), transforming a scattered and disparate public service 
based on racist values and organized around self-interest has been a profound challenge 
since the democratization process started in the early 1990s and became formalized after 
the first democratic election in 1994 (Report on the State of the Public Service 2001:9). 
 
However, despite the controversy surrounding the AA policy which is seen as  a blatant 
favour shaped for the upliftment of blacks in the workplace, a number of analysts believe 
there is room for improvement. As Professor Tom Lodge argues: 
 
 “affirmative action criteria can undoubtedly be combined with meritocratic 
considerations in making appointments, but this does not seem to be happening 
consistently. The exodus of skilled personnel from the public service as well as 
the appointment of under-qualified people to middle-management positions at a 
time when public service tasks have become increasingly complicated, has 
increased bureaucratic inefficiency and hence increased the incentives to 
bypass official procedures illegally. This may be a short-term problem, though. 
The proliferation of public-sector professional training institutions suggests that 
the supply of adequately trained job-seekers should soon outstrip demand”, 
(2002:150). 
 
 
To conclude, it is worth to point out that after ten years in power, the “Affirmative Action 
products” or the newcomers are relatively doing well, although there are poor performers 
among them. The country in general and Gauteng in particular, is well-run, despite the 
high level of crime and poverty; the economy is strong compared to other African 
countries and it is difficult to draw a demarcation between the new black management and 
the old white management. The “tokenism” noted at the beginning of affirmative action 
during the first term of the present government at all levels had given the impression that 
affirmative action - due to the lack of training and requisite skills on the part of black 
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incumbent - and corruption were the two faces of the same coin. Corruption is still there in 
the province – see the Housing case study - but AA cannot be pointed at as its only root 
cause. The lack of a database regarding AA cases is of great concern, rendering difficult 
any diagnosis of these cases. This constitutes the weakness of this factor in explaining 
causality. I cannot consider AA policy as the origin of all dismissals of corrupt public 
servants in Gauteng Administration. The institutional set-up of the bureaucracy also 
impacts on the incidence of corruption. And the lack of meritocratic recruitment and 
promotion as well as the absence of professional training has been found to be associated 
with corruption. 
 
8.3.3. Tax and Procurement Regulations 
 
The burden of high taxes and procurement regulations are major problem areas. Regarding 
taxation, scholars such as Tanzi (1998) have emphasized the fact that taxes based on clear 
laws and not requiring contact between taxpayers and tax inspectors are much less likely 
to lead to acts of corruption. However, when the laws are difficult to understand and can 
be interpreted differently so that taxpayers need assistance in complying with them, when 
the payment of taxes requires frequent contacts between taxpayers and tax administrators 
or when the administration procedures (for example, the criteria for the selection of 
taxpayers for audits) lack transparency and are not closely monitored within the tax or 
customs administrations, then corruption is likely to be a major problem in tax and 
customs administrations, as we shall see in the next chapter.  
 
Focusing on procurement, my investigations found that the majority of business people 
claimed that procurement spending, that is the purchase of goods and services on the part 
of the government is another area affected by corruption. Indeed, this may be related to 
electricity, water, public housing, access to educational and health facilities, access to 
public land, and so on, as expressed by observers. Even access to some forms of pension, 
such as for disability, fall into this category because individuals who get them have paid 
less in contributions to the pension funds over time than the pension they get once their 
disability status is approved. Evidence in some countries has shown that disability 
pensions have been a fertile ground for corruption. In some countries, some individuals 
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benefited enormously when they were able to get access to large amounts of credit or 
foreign exchange at below market prices (Tanzi, 1998:13).  
 
In Gauteng, because of the limited supply of goods and services, rationing or queuing 
becomes unavoidable, as it is the case in the Department of Welfare where excess demand 
is created and decisions have to be made to apportion the limited supply. These decisions 
are often made by public employees who find themselves in positions where they have 
discretion over important decisions. In these situations corruption and often high-level or 
political corruption can play a major role. A net of tender boards has been set up at 
provincial and national level and a procedure for inviting and evaluating tenders. 
 
However, an audit conducted by the Ncholo task team (1997) in the old Department of 
Corporate Services - now the Premier’s Office – revealed that the tendering system did not 
allow solutions to be requested, but products only. The Department’s view was that the 
tendering system was faulty and this meant that the best practice was often ignored. 
Similarly in the implementation of projects there was poor definition of the costs, time and 
resource requirements in tenders. In the meantime, the Auditor-General noted that there 
was non-compliance with tender procedures in the Department of Finance and Economic 
Affairs for the year ended 31 March 1997. For instance, contract numbers in respect of 
certain expenses could not be furnished to the Office. The Department was unable to 
justify two monthly payments of R20 452 it said was connected to cleaning services. This 
amounted to approximately R400 000 for the 1996-97 financial year. Only proposals, 
indicating the date of tender submissions, were supplied as evidence. In the absence of 
evidence substantiating that tender procedures have been complied with and that the 
respective contracts have been signed, these payment were considered by the Auditor-
General’s Office as possible unauthorized expenditure.  
 
In its 2000/2001 Annual Report, the department of Finance acknowledged that the 
management of the tenders had been quite a challenge which needed to be addressed so as 
to improve the quality of service it provided to other departments. To this end, the Tender 
Board’s focus that year was to deal with companies with a clear message that government 
will not tolerate the abuse of its policies for the benefit of the few unintended 
beneficiaries. From this perspective, let us have a look at the administration of 
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procurement in Gauteng, in accordance with the official procurement policy as provided 
by the Provincial Tender Board Act, 1994 (Act No2, of 1994) and Finance Department’s 
regulations.  
 
8.3.3.1. Procurement Administration in Gauteng:  
 
8.3.3.1.1. Objectives:  
 
The objectives of Procurement Administration are to:  
• Manage and support the provincial procurement process and provide a 
procurement administration service to government;  
• Ensure compliance to the provincial procurement policy;   
• Create a policy environment conducive to maintaining a high standard of quality 
and efficiency, whilst ensuring value for money and the promotion of sustainable 
employment generation;  
• Empower disadvantaged communities, women and the disabled through the 
promotion of small, medium and micro-enterprises and those controlled by 
persons from previously disadvantaged backgrounds. In 2001, of the R658 
million tenders approved by the Tender Board, 53% was awarded to Small and 
Medium and Micro Enterprises/Previously Disadvantaged Individuals.  
• Simplify the procurement system and ensuring that access to, and knowledge of, 
the tendering process and opportunities is enhanced.  
 
Procurement Administration has offered the following services to the public:  
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Advertising, dissemination, receiving and closing of tenders;  
Processing of tenders that fall outside the departmental delegations;  
Arranging for and servicing Tender Board meetings;  
Coordinating and administering term contracts for all line departments;  
Conducting public workshops, and giving advise on the tender process; 
Conducting training for line departments on amendments to procurement policy;  
Conducting ad hoc investigations on compliance issues; and  
Preparing reports on specific tender investigations, an aspect of the tendering 
 process and general reports as and when they are required.  
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General tenders invited by the Office of the Provincial Tender Board and provincial 
Departments are subject to the Provincial Tender Board’s General Conditions and 
Procedures. It is of vital importance that prospective tenders study this document 
thoroughly in order to be fully acquainted with all the terms and conditions contained 
therein. Tender procedures are as follows: 
 
8.3.3.1.2. Tender Procedures: 
 
a) Procedure for calling tenders using the revised delegated authority: 
Section 5(1)(b) of the Tender Board Act (Act no.2 of 1994) empowers the Gauteng Tender 
Board to call for tenders. Therefore it follows that the responsibility for drawing up tender 
documents also rests with the Provincial Tender Board. However the physical action has 
been delegated to various bodies, namely, Line Departments in respect of tenders that they 
invite in terms of delegated powers. The Office of the  Tender Board (Procurement 
Administration), in all other cases including    tenders for general period contracts, 
specific period contracts. The financial limits for the delegated powers have been 
increased from R12 500 to R100 000 and from R120 000 to R1 million.  
 
b) Departmental Tenders (from R101 000 to R1 million): 
The financial limits for departmental tenders has been increased from R120 000 to R1 
million, Line Departments are required to follow the procedure as per GT 37 (User 
Manual) specifications. The specifications should be written in an open manner without 
mentioning brand names, to ensure maximum participation by any person/entity, without 
barrier of brand names or around a particular company. Thereafter the specifications must 
be submitted to the ICT (Internal Tender Committees) for approval. If approved the tender 
is advertised. 
 
c) Advertising Tenders: 
All tenders for the Gauteng Province must be advertised in the Government Tender 
Bulletin, and the three local newspapers, namely Sowetan, The Star and Beeld. Tenders 
should be advertised for 28 days. If a shortened period is required, Line departments 
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should approach Procurement Administration (Office of the Tender Board). The adverts 
should be done through the Government Printer in Pretoria. 
 
d) Issuing of Tender Documents: 
The approved tender documents begin with the prefix “GT” and these documents are 
available in an electronic format from Procurement Administration. Whenever, issuing 
tender documents include the specifications, declaration affidavit and special conditions. 
A record of those who collect tenders is maintained, i.e. name of company, contact person, 
address and telephone or cellular or e-mail. With regard to documents, it should be noted 
that specific standard forms are used to compile a tender document. These forms vary 
depending on whether the requirement is to supply goods/services to the Government or to 
purchase goods from the Government. A tender document will usually consists of the 
following: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Covering page of the official tender document that must be signed in ink by the 
tenderer. 
GT 6: Important conditions. These conditions are supplementary to the GT 36 
conditions and contain important information, which must be scrutinized 
thoroughly. Any substantial deviation from these conditions may invalidate a 
tender.  
GT 7: Description and quantity of requirement. Price and delivery period to be 
indicated by tenderer. A variety of GT 7 are used, depending on the type of 
commodity required.  
GT 8: Provision is made on this form for the tenderer to indicate the name and 
address of his business and to sign the document in ink. By signing this form the 
tenderer confirms that he/she is familiar with the contents of GT 36 and fully 
acquainted with all the terms and conditions contained therein. It also contains 
several undertakings, which form the basis of a valid offer that, if accepted by the 
province, will result in abiding State contract. Failure to sign this document in ink 
may invalidate the tender.  
GT 10: Questionnaire. A reply must be given for every question whether it is 
relevant or not. The questionnaire serves as an instrument used by the province to 
evaluate offers and tenders, i.e. it can be assessed whether the tender is the agent 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
for the product offered, what levels of stock are carried, where the stock is carried, 
etc…  
GT 11: Preference certificate.  Preference is awarded in order to promote local 
manufacture and for this reason a preference certificate is included in the tender 
document. 
GT 12: Declaration of interest. In order to ensure that all tenderers receive fair and 
equal treatment, it is necessary that this form be completed. All tenders received 
must be evaluated and adjudicated objectively without favouritism and without 
acting to the detriment of any person. 
Specification: All offers made are evaluated for compliance against information 
furnished on the specification. Should a tender document make reference to a 
specification, then tenderers must ensure that the relevant specification is attached 
to the tender document. The specification will contain all the information and 
requirements to which the product must comply. 
Special conditions: will inter alia be applicable on requirements such as perishable 
provisions, fresh and processed meat, kitchen refuse, lead and tin products, electric 
and telephone cable, building and auctioneering services, etc… Special conditions 
provided for in the tender document must be studied with care as any deviation 
there from may result in the disqualification of a tender. Should any of the special 
conditions be in conflict with the conditions contained in GT 36, the special 
conditions will then take precedence. 
Enterprise Declaration Affidavit: To enable the provincial Tender Board to know 
the owners/directors of company or joint venture partners. To determine as to 
whether a company is constituted by individuals with previously disadvantaged 
status or not. To verify as to whether a company is an SMME or not and 
shareholding equity for two companies to form a joint venue.  
 
e) Tender Closing Time: 
In the interests of good order and in order to maintain confidence in the system, it is 
essential that a definite cut-off time is set and it should be strictly observed. Paragraph 
16.2 of GT 36 sets the cut-off as 11:00 on the day indicated in the tender document. Late 
tenders are not accepted. 
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f) Opening of Tenders: 
Tenders should be opened in public as soon as practicable after the closing time. Usually 
only names are read out, if so requested at the time of opening of tenders. There are 
specific provisions that deal with reading out of prices for building, civil, mechanical and 
electrical categories. However, Departments can read out prices for other categories as 
well if capacity is available to do so. 
 
g) Considerations of Tenders: 
All tenders duly admitted are taken into consideration by the ITC (Internal Tender 
Committees). The manner in which tenders must be submitted is prescribed in paragraph 
20 and 21 of GT 36. It should be stated clearly that price is not the only determining 
factor, as there are other socio-economic objectives to be considered, e.g. preferences, 
transfer of skills, etc… 
 
h) Acceptance of Tenders: 
Successful tenderers are advised of the acceptance of their tenders by registered mail of 
the original copy, and by electronic format, to minimize delays. This is a line department 
function for both delegated and the successful tenderer. Departments are required to enter 
into a contract with the successful tenderer, as per the attached model contract document, 
which is guideline to line departments. 
 
i) Publishing of Tender Results: 
The results of the successful tenderer should be published in the Government Tender 
Bulletin, and the following information should be published: 1. Name. 2. Price and 
delivery basis. 3. Brand name of the product or manufacturer’s name. 4. Where applicable, 
preference percentage claimed. 
 
j)  Additional Information: 
Tender documents are not available for perusal by the public, but at the written request of 
a tenderer or interested party, the particulars as listed above can be provided. It must be 
borne in mind that the tender documents should be filed properly, and departments can use 
their abbreviated names like FEA100GP (Finance and Economic Affairs) for their tender 
numbers. 
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However, it should be noted that the Gauteng Tender Board Act came to an end at the end 
of March 2002. In accordance with the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) the 
decision regarding procurement now lies with the Accounting Officer. The driving force 
behind this decision is the implementation of the Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA) that forces provincial departments to submit timeously their quarterly reports. As 
a result, in preparing for the implementation of procurement reform, the Provincial Tender 
Board Act was abolished with effect from 26 March 2002. With effect from April 2002 
the Gauteng Shared Services Centre (GSSC) will play the role in driving strategic 
procurement initiatives of the Province and managing the full supply chain to optimize 
Gauteng’s purchasing power. Treasury is in the process of accrediting departmental 
acquisitions councils and procurement units. The Provincial Treasury took over temporary 
responsibility for Corporate IT (Informatics) from the Office of the Premier; this unit is 
destined for the GSSC (see Annual Report 2001/2002:13, 26). 
 
Quality service delivery and good governance justify the motive behind the GPG's 
innovative Shared Service Centre ("SCC"). The first initiative of its kind in South Africa, 
the SSC combines the provincial administration's internal support functions, namely 
Finance, Human Resources, Procurement and Information Technology, into a single 
organizational unit providing these as core functions. This means that scarce resources are 
optimally utilized and departments can concentrate on delivering core services to the 
people of Gauteng. Finally, the Directorate recommended, and the Board approved, the 
centralization of the administration of the security tenders and contracts as a separate 
project, and a full time senior staff member was seconded to manage this function.  
 
8.3.3.1.3. Lack of Transparency: 
 
Nevertheless, a close look at procurement processes raises some important questions 
concerning its effectiveness and affordability. Are the procurement processes adequately 
implemented? Are they themselves a source of corruption? Are they being well adhered 
to? Are they too difficult and complex to maintain?  While the public procurement process 
looks effective in law, the same cannot be said in practice, especially at the provincial 
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level where conflicts of interests are rarely declared. No one can exclude the possibility of 
corrupt influences given the way procurement is organized in practice, and particularly 
when procurement to larger public projects is concerned. 
A study on fiscal transparency and participation in the budget process in South Africa 
(Folscher, 1999: 24) shows that: 
(1) Current procurement processes are unnecessarily complex and non-transparent, 
rendering them inefficient and creating opportunity for corruption.  
(2) Current regulations are not always observed in practice, leading towards 
inconsistent application and corruption. The Auditor General’s report covering the 
1997/98 financial year noted several instances of non-adherence to procurement 
procedures across all votes and provinces. The reasons ranged from ignorance of, 
to deliberately ignoring the rules and regulations.  
(3) Current procedures are costly; adding unnecessary cost to the price of the resource 
purchased, and should be streamlined.  
(4) While calling for national legislation to ensure fair, equitable and cost-effective 
procurement systems across the public sector, the Constitution does not, however, 
say which agency should take responsibility. Given the complexity and 
inflexibility of the current rules and regulations, some provinces, including 
Gauteng, have in the meantime proceeded to draft their own regulations. For 
instance at provincial level, with regard to the early warning systems, provinces 
have instituted different systems to control over-expenditure. The measures range 
from ceilings on certain types of expenditure, to regular provision of cash flow 
statements and projections; regular review meetings; treasury approval for all 
spending commitments and even a virtual banking system in the case of Gauteng. 
But many of these measures were only implemented in the recent past and their 
effectiveness remains untested. 
 
Subsequently, shortcomings of this policy lead to its reformulation that ended up with it 
being amended. This comes with new regulations in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act of 1999 known as the “Framework for Supply Chain Management”. 
According to new regulations, the Supply Chain Management applies to all national and 
provincial departments and trading entities, constitutional institutions and public entities 
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as listed in Schedules 3A and 3C of the PFMA. This Framework took effect on 5 
December 2003 and serves as a formal requirement to accounting officers/authorities to 
ensure the implementation of the “Supply Chain Management” process as an integral part 
of their financial systems (see National Treasury, December 2003). 
 
As other organs of state replicated the procurement reform measures in the national sphere 
of government, very divergent interpretations of government’s procurement objectives and 
strategies became prevalent. Hence the need to issue a single legislative framework to 
guide uniformity in procurement reform initiatives at all levels of government. There was 
also the need to replace the outdated and inefficient procurement and provisioning 
practices in government with a supply chain management function and a systematic 
competitive procedure for the appointment of consultants. Therefore, the repealing of the 
tender board legislation is an affirmative answer to questions raised at the beginning of 
this section.   
 
In terms of public procurement in Gauteng, half the respondents in the survey from the 
business sector thought that there was sometimes some form of collusion between the 
buying side (tenderers or contractors) and the selling side (responsible officials). They said 
there was a lot of corruption involved. In order to get a tender one should at least know 
someone in the Provincial Tender Board or make payments to officials. Concerning 
affirmative procurement, respondents felt they were not satisfied with it. The reason for 
dissatisfaction was that affirmative procurement was only in writing and not in practice. 
Tender requirements are too high for small businesses to meet. As a result, small 
businesses lacked interest in applying as they knew they would not meet all the 
requirements. This in turn resulted in so-called white companies being awarded tenders. 
 
An investigation into this matter by a task team found that the Provincial Tender Board 
changed specifications set by the departments without reference to the originators. 
Departments experiencing problems with tender procedures included the Department of 
Agriculture; the Department of Health where poor specifications were written for a tender 
for helicopter ambulances resulting in specifications being adjusted after the tender had 
been published. This caused problems with a number of tenderers who contested the 
award of the tender. For instance, the lack of transparency and incompetence in the 
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awarding of tenders emerged when the Provincial Tender Board awarded a helicopter 
ambulance service to Ndinzani Aviation Services. Vuyo Mvoko reported in Business Day 
(14 May 1997) that Europ Assistance, a medical services company had instituted court 
action applying for the award of the tender to Ndinzani to be set aside because it had 
offered a low price and that Ndinzani never existed before applications closed for the 
tender. Furthermore, Europ Assistance accused a tender board official of tempering with 
its prices and also pointed out that Ndinzani chairman Peter Malungani was a member of 
the Board. Complaints about the handling of the tender led to an investigation by the 
Auditor-General who asked the Board to suspend the implementation of the tender 
pending the outcome of the investigation. The Health Department had recommended to 
the Board that Europ Assistance be given the tender. 
 
However, the Gauteng Finance and Economic Affairs MEC Jabu Moleketi stated that, “in 
his final report, the Auditor-General exonerated the Tender Board’s recommendation and 
adjudication of the tender”. This opened the way for the Board to award the tender to 
Ndinzani despite a visible conflict of interests on the part of Malungani, even if he had 
declared his interest in the tender and despite the fact that Ndinzani did not exist at the 
time of the first closing date of October 1996. Moleketi said: “the date was extended to 
February 1997 due to the Board’s own internal administration problems”. For many 
observers, this was blatant incompetence on the part of the Board. 
 
As a result, the Pretoria High Court on 10 June 1997 threw out this Tender Board contract, 
which the Board had recently awarded, to one of its own members in violation of the 
provisions of the Tender Board Act. His bid was R7 m higher than a competitor’s. 
Melanie Ann Feris of The Star (11 June   1997) remarks that: “the urgent interdict sought 
by Europ Assistance medical services company, which offered the service for R7, 9 m, 
was not opposed by Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale and Gauteng MEC for Health Amos 
Masondo. The court ordered that Europ Assistance retain the contract for a further three 
months … and the Board to review its procedures”. 
 
In the Department of Housing, the tender process created problems because of the time 
taken to obtain approval as well as the awarding of tenders to emerging contractors. The 
tenders were more expansive and impacted on the department’s budget. In the Department 
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• 
of Transport, Roads and Public Works, there were delays caused by tender procedures, 
especially since tender delegations were withdrawn (The Provincial Administration of 
Gauteng, 1997 Report). 
 
In the old Department of Corporate Services that had been absorbed by the Office of the 
Premier in 1999, the task team discovered that the tendering system did not allow 
solutions to be requested but only products. For the Department, it was the tendering 
system that was at fault and this meant that the best practice was often ignored. Similarly 
in the implementation of projects there was poor definition of the costs, time and resources 
required in tenders. Despite a good relationship between the Provincial Tender Board and 
Corporate Informatics, there were problems around this. The problem was that of 
accessing training for Information Technology (IT): by the time the tender was approved 
the training has become outdated and no longer useful.   
 
In all these cases, concerns were that the procurement policy was not clear, inconsistently 
applied and ignored. Poor procurement control was noted as a serious concern, as 
observed by Alta Folscher (1999:26). 
 
Another example of promoting unfair and nontransparent dealings in terms of provincial 
contracts came to light when the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) – 
exercising its oversight role – tabled on 21 June 2002 the Report of the Auditor-General 
on the performance Audit of the Acquisition and Utilization of Consultants at the 
Departments of Housing and Land Affairs, Education, Finance and Economic Affairs, as 
well as Health at the Gauteng Provincial Administration. The Report focused also on the 
control and monitoring of the execution of functions and the outcome of consultancy 
services. In assessing the overall state of affairs, the Auditor-General’s key findings 
contained in the Report, identified and documented certain examples of “deficient 
management measures” and notably: 
 
Proper planning – which includes, inter alia, a sufficient needs analysis, the 
identification of milestones, the determination of tasks to be performed by the 
consultant and finalizing the responsibilities of departments prior to tenders being 
awarded – did not always take place. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Contracts were not always drawn up between the parties concerned, contract 
periods were extended without the necessary prior approval and consultants were 
appointed without the approval of the Provincial Tender Board. 
Consultants were appointed despite there being vacancies on the establishment. 
This had a negative impact on the affirmative action appointments as well as on 
the budgetary process. 
Although the establishment of a department made provision for project 
management directorates to manage housing delivery projects, the department had 
appointed consultants as project managers of 4 projects since 1997. The 
consultants earned an amount of R10 million over a period of 3 years without the 
necessary capacity being built at the department. 
Contracts of consultants who had been appointed as far back as 1995 and 1997 to 
the amount of R22 million were extended by a department until 2000 without 
tenders being invited and thus not always complying with the requirements of 
competitiveness and transparency. 
The payment of consultants for work performed was not controlled and monitored 
for reasonableness resulting in overpayments with regard to traveling claims. 
 
Most of SCOPA’s recommendations were based on the Auditor-General’s findings with a 
specific proposal – among others – that all consultants should be appointed through a 
tendering process to: 
- identify the best consultant for the job; 
- promote cost-effectiveness through competitive pricing; 
- promote equity and fairness in the procurement of services;  
- preserve the highest standards of integrity; and  
- promote transparency and prevent corruption. 
 
But can corruption be prevented in the procurement system?  The lack of transparency in 
the process as we have seen in the above examples means that corruption will always be in 
the system for a long time. Past experience showed that in the context of public 
procurement (see Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa, 
1997:103), corruption usually comprises fraudulent behaviour by persons concerned with 
the procurement process leading to losses for an organ of State. Usually, there is some 
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form of collusion between the buying and the selling side: responsible officials on the 
public procurement side request or are induced to accept favours from tenderers or 
contractors. Such practices are often, but not always, criminal; they are always immoral 
and improper in terms of good procurement practice. Fraudulent actions are sometimes 
confined to one side of the procurement transaction, such as when tenderers collude to 
“rig” tenders or when officials misappropriate public property, or assets. 
 
There are many types of procurement corruption that have been identified and that are 
affecting tender process: 
a. Corrupt actions within organs of State may include: 
- preparing slanted specifications 
- approving inappropriate tenders 
- tampering with tenders 
- breaching confidentiality 
- taking bribes 
- lax control administration 
- use of position to obtain a private benefit. 
b. Corrupt actions by suppliers/service providers/contractors may include: 
- collusion 
- influencing the choice of procurement method and technical standards 
- inciting breaks of confidentiality 
- influencing the work of evaluators 
- offering bribes 
-  over or under invoicing 
- “fast pay” action 
-  inaccurate disclosures 
 
To sum up, it can be underlined that corruption in tender acquisition turns up to be part of 
the game as highlighted by Transparency International in its Bribes Payer Index (BPI) of 
2002. The BPI is a deliberate manifestation of corruption by global corporations from 
industrialized nations that bribe government officials in developing countries to win 
tenders or to buy business permits. The BPI is a survey, as seen earlier, to find which 
corporations were most likely to bribe their way into markets of developing countries. 
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South Africa featured high on these surveys as likely to accept bribes, as evidence from 
the arms deal procurement shows. In July 1999, the new Premier of Gauteng Mbhazima 
Shilowa made a public admission that bribes were being paid for tenders. He was 
addressing black businessmen and was quoted as saying: “White business people lobby. 
They hustle for tenders. That’s what you must do. Yes, sometimes some of them do pay 
bribes – but the point is they hustle for business” (Sunday Times, July 18 1999). 
 
Therefore, as one can note, the size of government spending, transfer payments and 
subsidies, the procedure used in allocating the expenditure or selecting investment projects 
constitute sources of rents and corruption. Further, corrupt tax officials may use high tax 
rates and complex tax regulations to collect bribes, in exchange for alleviating tax burdens 
of taxpayers. The repealing of the tender board and its replacement by a single framework 
at all government spheres is an indication of the inevitability of corruption in Gauteng 
procurement policy due to shortcomings as those displayed in this section that needed to 
be addressed. The “Framework for Supply Chain Management” came at the right moment. 
It remains to be seen how it will cope to achieve the ideals of good governance and to 
address eventual deficiencies in supply chain management.   
 
The Gauteng arrangement supplies some food for thought to an empirical research that 
suggests that, “participation of government to the economy through state-owned 
enterprises, active industrial policies, restrictive trade and exchange regimes, price and 
interest rate controls, excessive regulations, and complex tax systems are all associated 
with higher corruption” (Gurgur and Shah, 2000:7). Thus it appears that competition and 
transparency serve to combat corruption to some extent, but are not enough. Other 
measures however – such as those suggested in the strategies’ section of this thesis - need 
to be instituted to minimize corruption.  
  
8.4.   Institutions of  Democracy or Accountability  
 
In the political field in democratic societies, the parliament, and most importantly 
parliament committees, monitor government operations. However partisan preferences 
and the lack of resources prevent an adequate oversight of government that may lead to 
tension between the executive and the legislature. Besides parliament oversight, there are 
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rules of conduct and administration laws designing the operations of the government, such 
as procedures on public procurement and selecting private firms for contracting. These 
constraints may be more difficult even for democratic officials who may resist reforms 
that expose them to public scrutiny and criticism. These limits include the balance of 
power between the legislative and executive branches. From this perspective, this section 
will deal with two elements that have been singled out in our attempt to explain causality: 
monitoring and punishment.  
 
8.4.1.  Internal Controls Mechanisms: 
 
Most respondents in the survey felt that poor systems and weak checks and balances 
create an environment conducive to corruption. This is characterized by a lack of 
transparency, extensive regulations, impunity and poor/lack of monitoring. It should be 
stressed that public accountability is necessary for the control of corruption, especially 
with a dominant party like the ANC that is sure to win the vote.  
 
What impacts do controls and monitoring have on the agent’s performance? There is the 
probability of being detected and punished. The implementation of monitoring policies is 
sensitive to strategic behaviour from the parties involved. Tanzi argues that this is really 
the first line of defense. Honest and efficient supervisors, good auditing offices and clear 
rules on ethical behaviour should be able to discourage or discover corrupt activities. 
Good and transparent procedures should make it easier for these offices to exercise their 
controls (1998:19).  
 
In the struggle against corruption, various institutional control mechanisms have been 
evaluated, like parliamentary control, executive control, internal bureaucratic control and 
audit and watchdog bodies. In South Africa and Gauteng in particular, special agencies 
and anti-corruption commissions have been created expressly charged with the 
responsibility of following reports on corruption. But patron-client relationships in 
bureaucracy undermine the effectiveness of internal controls especially the lack of 
independence from the political establishment. One has in mind the gloomy history of the 
Heath Special Investigating Unit. Wha is more when senior officials and politicians trigger 
the corruption, internal monitoring bodies to lose their organizational purpose and become 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
lame ducks. Once the process becomes politicized their effectiveness is reduced and 
generally they do not have the power to impose penalties and their reports may not have 
any following by other institutions. Thus the existence of these controls reflects to a large 
extent the attitude of the political body toward corruption. Otherwise, lack of effective 
controls facilitates corruption and monitoring systems may also be part of the corruption 
structures within public institutions.  
 
Monitoring can be internal or external as shown in the Table 25. When internal, the 
control deals with: 
Supervision and control systems 
Standards of performance for employees 
Recruitment and selection procedures for personnel 
Rules and procedures for tax collection and reporting 
And when external, it deals with:   
General auditor’s independence and capacity 
Law and order tradition, checks and balances 
Information made available to the public (e.g. newspapers, media) 
The judiciary system (proving cases in court). 
Generally the most effective controls are those that exist inside institutions. 
 
In Gauteng, obviously, the best instrument of control remains the Legislature in its role of 
providing, sustaining and overseeing the executive. In short, it must be emphasized that 
the provincial legislature provides and sustains the Gauteng executive through the 
operation of accountable or responsible government. As reported by Christina Murray and 
Lia Nijzink (2002:5-6), the Legislature creates the executive by choosing the provincial 
Premier. He is chosen by a majority of the Legislature for a five year term of office and, at 
least in theory, remains in office only so long as they maintain this confidence. The source 
of executive power lies with the Legislature. 
 
As a result, this system of representative government allows those who are elected to 
represent the people that put them in power. Those elected are expected to oversee the 
way government implements policy and spends tax revenue, rendering by the fact the 
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executive accountable to them. Accordingly, “oversight” and “accountability” as stated by 
Murray and Nijzink, are two sides of the same coin – the accountability of the executive to 
the Legislature is enforced when the Legislature exercises oversight over it and scrutinizes 
executive action (2002:87). 
 
In South Africa, the role and responsibilities of the Legislature are organized by the 
Constitution. It obliges legislatures to establish systems that enable them both to ensure 
that government is accountable to them and to maintain oversight of government action: 
 
Constitution Section 114 (2):  
A provincial legislature must provide for mechanisms: (a) to ensure that all provincial 
executive organs of State in the province are accountable to it; and (b) to maintain 
oversight of (i) the exercise of provincial executive authority in the province including the 
implementation of legislation, and (ii) provincial organs of State. 
 
Constitution Section 133 (2): 
Members of the Executive Council (MECs) of a province are accountable collectively and 
individually to the legislature for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their 
functions.   
 
To be accountable, note Murray and Nijzink (2002:88), means an obligation to answer, to 
give an account of action taken by the executive of one’s assigned responsibilities. 
Political accountability is required by the Constitution. Four elements are necessary for 
accountability to work: 
a) Persons who have the power to make decisions and to put them into effect  
b) Objectives or standards that are to be attained by those persons  
c) An authority to whom the decision maker is answerable  
d) Some means of calling those responsible for decisions to account. 
 
As defined by the Auditor-General, accountability is a relationship based on the obligation 
to demonstrate and take responsibility for performance in the light of agreed expectations 
(2001:7).  
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Therefore, it is the duty of the MPLs, as provincial democratically elected representatives, 
to make sure that people who work for the provincial Cabinet explain their actions. This 
includes the MECs, the Premier and the Heads of Departments. It emerges from this setup 
that the power to call the Premier and other people who work for the government to 
account for their actions is very important. It is one way that the provincial Legislature can 
keep a check on what the provincial government is doing, and make sure that it is in line 
with what the people need and want. But the relationship is not always good between the 
executive and the legislature and this can give rise to serious problems. The stumbling 
block remains the lack of available information to identify the problem adequately. In 
most instances, the executive does not provide enough information of its plans for 
legislation for the Legislature to establish a reliable timetable.  
 
However, the Premier of Gauteng has been on record claiming that the relationship is as 
strong as ever and that the Legislature’s role of oversight over the Executive is cherished 
by all and is fully complied with by all departments (2000/2001 Annual Report:2). Despite 
this claim, evidence shows that there is relatively little interaction between provincial 
executive and Legislature. For instance, I witnessed that during the “sitting of the House”, 
verbal exchanges between MECs and MPLs tend often to turn stormy when the Premier or 
the MEC is questioned before the House. Also, while some MECs are not attending the 
“sitting”, those attending leave the House just after being questioned without waiting for 
the end of the proceedings. At the end the Legislature is almost an empty House when the 
Speaker announces the closing of the ongoing session. As observed by Murray and 
Nijzink, the Legislature would simply not be doing its job properly if the two institutions 
always agreed (2002:81). 
 
The Auditor-General in his 2001 Report acknowledged this state of affairs when he 
observed that “until now, the executive has been submitting responses to the legislature 
within a short period, and these have been referred to the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts. However, the quality of the responses is often poor in terms of completeness 
and appropriateness. This could be due to a lack of criteria, in terms of which the 
responses can be standardized”(2001:8).  
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In addition the Auditor-General identified the factors that significantly hamper the 
accountability processes at different levels of government: 
a) Constraints in financial management capacity at the auditee had material effects on 
the audit.  
b) Late submission/finalization of financial reports (including prior year).  
c) Financials records incomplete or not supportive of financial statements. Audit 
committees did not work effectively in processing audit reports or plans.  
d) Auditees had difficulties interpreting requirements of recent legislation.  
e) Other factors including non-existence of audit committees, and the availability of 
senior management during critical stages of the audit process (2001:16-17).  
 
As reported by Murray and Nijzink (2002:109), oversight often requires the analysis of 
complicated and inaccessible information as South Africa is still struggling with its huge 
transformation agenda and relatively poor information systems. Members simply could 
not carry this workload alone. Hence the need for properly qualified and skilled 
researchers. In Gauteng, researchers are developing a framework that will allow members 
to hold government to account for outcomes as opposed to outputs. Gauteng’s goal is to 
establish dedicated databases in every policy area so that members can see immediately 
what is happening in terms of policy development, financial inputs, service outputs and 
social outcomes. The framework, conclude these two authors, will set out reporting cycles 
and will use data and criteria from sources other than the department itself to measure 
outcomes properly. 
 
It should be emphasized that in an effort to strengthen accountability within the 
Legislature, an important policy of the Gauteng Legislature is based on the impartiality of 
its personnel. All staff employed by the Legislature must be non-partisan in their approach 
to the MPLs from the various political parties. For instance, even though a staff member 
may support a party, he or she may not give special treatment to an MPL belonging to that 
party or express political views at his /her place of work. This is crucial to ensure, not only 
a smooth running of the Legislature, but also that all parties are treated equally by the staff 
of the Legislature 
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Finally, the oversight function is to ensure that there are adequate alternative mechanisms 
in place so that problems are recognized and brought to the attention of the legislature in a 
speedy manner. Therefore, a number of institutions have been established with the single 
goal of aiding Legislature in its oversight role, notably the Auditor-General, the Public 
Protector, the Human Rights Commission and the Special Investigating Unit.   
 
For effective government, the executive needs to be able to drive the legislature. This 
implies the leading role of the government as an indispensable instrument for economic 
development, resource redistribution and welfare. One notes that in conventional political 
science; the causes of corruption are believed to be deficiencies in the political system, 
and in particular in the “democratic deficit”. In this perspective, corruption is understood 
to be caused by political systems that are deficient in democratic power-sharing formulas, 
checks and balances, accountable and transparent institutions and procedures of the formal 
and ideal system of democratic governance (Doig and Theobald: 2000).  
 
The goal of the monitoring policy is to identify and report fraud in the institution. 
Supervisors should be able to monitor the activities of their subordinates. If corrupt agents 
are caught they are fired. But what if the size of the penalty is insignificant given the fact 
that its characteristics vary from country to country? Unfortunately, I found that in many 
departments these checks are almost non-existent so that outsiders, including the media, 
mostly discover corruption by chance or through the reporting. 
 
In the Office of the Premier in Gauteng, mechanisms of accountability and monitoring are 
in place, as stated in its 2001/2002 Annual Report. According to the Report (p.7-8), there 
are a number of processes in the Office of the Premier that ensure effective delivery. The 
following mechanisms are in place to monitor effective performance and delivery: 
 
a) Performance agreements signed by all senior staff from the level of director 
upwards  
b)  Regular management committee meetings to discuss strategic issues and to 
monitor operations   
c)  Internal Audit conducted by the Gauteng Audit Services  
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d)  Periodic risk management assessments to ensure that all the required checks and 
balances are in place  
e) Annual audit by the Auditor General  
f)  Monthly and quarterly financial reports to Treasury  
g)  Regular presentations to Standing Committees in the Legislature. 
 
However, during the same period, a Report of the Auditor-General (2001:2) on Auditing 
and Financial Management Matters in the Public Sector at all levels of government put an 
emphasis on governmental areas that require improvement. Concerning the control 
environment, the Auditor-General found out during the audit process that various issues 
were raised which related to lack of proper internal control systems. This involved mainly 
issues such as non-compliance with control procedures, lack of timeous and adequate 
management information, ineffective internal auditing, limited risk management processes 
and a lack of early warning systems. This weakness is of serious concern for the following 
reasons: 
 
a) It provides an environment conductive to fraud and corruption. 
b) It has a significant impact on effective and efficient service delivery. 
c) It has an impact on the extent, nature and time frame of the audit and ultimately on 
the cost of the audit. 
 
If only improvements in this area could be achieved over time, it would result in a positive 
impact on financial management in the public service.  
 
Time is what the Gauteng Government needs in its search for a better life for all, as 
implicitly acknowledged by the Premier in his 2001/2002 Report when he said:   
  
“The implementation of internal controls and the establishment of a Risk 
Management Committee is an ongoing process that was implemented throughout 
the Office of the Premier. All managers entrusted with state assets and resources 
are required to manage them efficiently and effectively. The appointed risk 
management team, which consists of members of all programmes within the Office 
of the Premier, will focus on identification of all areas of risk management within 
the Office of the Premier and will be fully implemented in the next financial year. 
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The risk management team will also ensure the implementation of fraud 
prevention measures and will work with all major role players including the Audit 
Committee, Auditor General and Internal Auditors to achieve its objectives” 
(p.18). 
 
Thus it appears that in Gauteng, corruption in government may be the result of 
dysfunctional public institutions that lead to weak internal controls and systems and 
mismanagement. 
 
8.4.2. Statutory Penalty 
 
Penalty also plays a significant role in terms of causality. As seen above, the agent’s 
decision whether to behave honestly or corruptly depends on the anticipated costs of the 
decision with two variables mattering: first the probability of being detected and second, 
the size of the penalty. A credible judiciary proves to be of great meaning, given the 
probability that the perpetrator of a crime would be caught and punished. In this case, the 
penalty imposed will determine the probability that criminal or illegal acts would take 
place.  
 
A well-known analyst of crime prevention, Gary Becker (1968), demonstrates that 
theoretically, increasing the penalties on those who get caught can reduce corruption. This 
analysis implies that the penalty structure existing in the country is an important factor in 
determining the extent of corruption: higher penalties may reduce the number of acts of 
corruption, but they may lead to demands for higher bribes on the corrupt acts that still 
take place. For instance, in China the death penalty is applied in certain incidences of 
corruption, while in South Africa, the main risk is loss of the job for the culprit, as in 
Jessie Duarte’s case. 
 
The fact is that in the real world relatively few people are punished for acts of corruption, 
despite the extent of the phenomenon. Thus, there seems to be a wide gap between the 
penalties specified in the laws and regulations and the penalties that are effectively 
imposed. Commonly, effective penalties tend to be more lenient than the statutory ones. 
The administrative procedures followed before a public employee is punished for acts of 
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corruption are slow and cumbersome. The probability that those who commit crimes 
would be caught leads to the role of institutional controls. What does matter, as empirical 
evidence has revealed elsewhere, is the existence of an independent, impartial and 
informed judiciary that has a central role in reviewing actions taken by the government 
and public officials because enforcing the rule of law requires a strong independent and 
responsible judiciary, investigative and auditing bodies, and legitimate access to the 
society. An effective judiciary is a significant element of anti-corruption efforts (Gurgur 
and Shah, 2000:10). 
 
In Gauteng, as is the case elsewhere in the country, existing legislation on corruption 
matters is poor and complex and in many instances corrupt acts are classified as fraud or 
theft in order to proceed with prosecution. It was difficult during investigations to find any 
database or consolidated statistics on corruption practices in any department. Absence of 
statistics, poor information and lack of a clear legislation on corruption seriously hamper 
anti-corruption measures. This lack of information management in terms of corruption has 
been highlighted by a recent study on corruption in South Africa when it noted:  
 
“information from law enforcement and criminal justice agencies about 
corruption cases is difficult to collect. Many of the problems emanate from the 
corruption offence as defined by the Corruption Act of 1992 which, most of the 
experts agree, was inadequate to provide for effective investigation and 
prosecution cases” (Country Corruption Assessment (CCA) Report: 2003:4).  
 
However, a study by the Public Service Commission on dismissals from the Public 
Service resulting from misconduct between 1996-1998 is an indication of attempts made 
by some agencies to keep valuable database available. This study reveals that, of 2247 
disciplinary cases in the Public Service, 1077 were finalized. Almost 90% of those 
officials were found guilty and 238 were dismissed. Of the finalized cases, 281 were 
corruption-related. Some 43% (102) of the individuals dismissed, were dismissed for 
corruption related offences. Only 9 individuals were dismissed for bribery, demonstrating 
the difficulty of proving that bribery took place (CCA Report, 2003:72). 
 
  
220
In order to consolidate the legislative framework, the focus is now on the Prevention of 
Corruption Bill, which contains clear definitions and wider range of corruption offences to 
be enacted and enforced for  better management of the phenomenon. 
 
To sum up, it is quite arguable that all those factors that have been analyzed, notably 
checks and balances including control and punishment have an impact on the incidence of 
corruption and the majority of the respondents in this study confirmed this. These factors 
hamper the role that penalties actually play in Gauteng, especially when corruption is 
partly politically motivated, as were Jessie Duarte and Dan Mofokeng cases, as we will 
see when exploring provincial case studies.  
 
Table 28:  Misconduct and discipline (2001-2002 and 2002-2003): 
 
 
Outcome of disciplinary 
hearings 2001/02 
 
Number 
 
% of 
total 
 
Outcome of disciplinary 
hearings 2002/03 
 
Number 
 
% of 
total 
Verbal warning 4 100 Verbal warning 0 0 
Written warning 0 0 Written warning 2 100 
Final written warning 0 0 Final written warning 0 0 
Not guilty 0 0 Not guilty 0 0 
Case withdrawn 0 0 Case withdrawn 0 0 
Dismissal  
 
1 100 Dismissal  
 
0 0 
TOTAL  5 2,66% TOTAL  2 100 
 
Source: Premier Annual Report 2001/02:46; 2002/03:16. 
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The table 28 summarizes the outcome of disciplinary hearings conducted within the Office 
of the Premier for the financial years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003. Some lessons can be 
learnt from these tables. Firstly, this is an indication that misconduct in this department 
may be under control as far as these figures are concerned. In this case it is clear that 
Gauteng government has subscribed to internal best practice principles of equitable and 
fair labour practices. In the office of the Premier, 5 civil servants were disciplined in 
2001/02 and there was one dismissal.  There were no disciplinary hearings in 2002/03 
when 2 officials were disciplined. Secondly, some acts of corruption may still go 
unpunished so that uncertainty prevails on the treatment of individuals accused of 
corruption that may lead to the perception that penalties are applied selectively or 
arbitrary. This attitude may lead to tolerance of small acts of corruption that can in time 
encourage bigger acts. It is therefore incumbent upon provincial managers to ensure that 
all public servants comply with all provisions of the Public Service Act and adhere to the 
Public Service Code of Conduct.  
 
8.4.3. The quality of bureaucracy or institutional capacity: 
 
The majority of NGOs and academics respondents think that the lack or absence of a civil 
service work ethic in the province leads to institutional incapacity that provides 
opportunities for corruption to thrive. According to S.A. Fakie, the Auditor-General, “one 
of the burning issues in government is the lack of capacity. Capacity refers to the 
availability of human resources at operational and managerial levels to implement 
legislation and the policies of government and to manage the implementation process in 
an economic, efficient and effective manner” (Report 2001:3). This observation has been 
confirmed by many performance, regularity and forensic audit reports issued by his office. 
Furthermore, any constraints on capacity, which hamper service delivery, should be 
discussed in the annual reports of departments, agencies and municipalities, as he said. 
 
It should be emphasized here that, every administration is run according to a set of rules 
that tell agents what they should do, what they must do, and what they have the right to 
do. As demonstrated by the “constructivist theory of rules” (Michael W. Collier, 1999:9), 
“when agents fail to follow rules, other supporting rules bring consequences. In light of 
their material circumstances, agents follow or disregard rules in order to achieve their 
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goals. Therefore, institutions are simply patterns of stable rules and structure a stable 
pattern of rules, institutions, and their unintended consequences”.  
 
As a complex institution, political corruption consists of a constantly changing mix of 
three different types of rules that perform distinct functions identified by Collier (1999:9) 
as: 
 
1. general instruction rules that delineate the principles, beliefs, or norms that inform 
agents of the purpose of the particular institution, telling them what they should do. 
2. directives rules that repeat and elaborate what the instruction rule principles have 
to say. They tell agents what they must do. For their effectiveness, directives rules 
must be supported by other rules (i.e., sanctions) that stipulate the consequence if 
an agent does not follow a particular directive rule. 
3. commitment rules that create roles for agents – the unintended consequences of 
supporting the instruction rule principles, beliefs, or norms. They tell agents what 
they have a right or duty to do and give some of them well defined powers, while 
assuring other agents that those powers will not be abused. 
 
These types of rules result in distinct forms of rule or methods that govern society. And a 
rule’s strength is determined by how frequently agents follow the rule. One of these rules 
is ‘the boundaries between public and private spheres” in Johnston’s terms (1994:17) that 
had been described by Noonan as follows:  
 
“the notion of fidelity in office, as old as Cicero [106-43 BC], is inextricably bound to the 
concept of public interest distinct from the private advantage. It is beyond debate that 
officials of the government are relied upon to act for the public interest distinct from 
private advantage” (1984:704). 
 
Shumer (1979) has found out while analyzing Machiavelli that:  
 
“one dimension of [Machiavelli’s] political corruption is the privatization both of the 
average citizen and those in office. In the corrupt state, men locate their values wholly 
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within the private sphere and they use the public sphere to promote private interests” 
(Shumer, 1979:9). 
 
In short, agents must carry out their duties in a manner transcending personal interests. 
“To not separate private from public spheres, argues Collier, presents government officials 
with almost unlimited opportunities for corruption” (1999:11). 
 
This has been emphasized by number of respondents from the Gauteng Legislature who 
stressed that ignorance of Public Service by the new comers and the creation of “comfort 
zones” by the old class are among other things cause of corruption. Public servants lack a 
sense of purpose and commitment to their responsibilities and believe they should exploit 
their positions for personal gain. 
 
According to the PSC, despite political commitment to opening up the public service to 
greater scrutiny, it remains uncommunicative and opaque. The capacity of the public 
sector urgently needs its capacity built in a number of levels: this will require a real 
commitment to improvement rather than mere formalism (PSC Half Yearly Report, 
October 2000:3-4). 
 
In this section emphasis will be put on the key role played by the media in ensuring that 
the ruling elite is accountabile as most of our cases come to the fore through the media 
(newspaper clippings). Therefore, an independent investigative media is often the primary 
conduit for information regarding elite misconduct. “In this context”, notes Bettina Peters, 
“the contribution made by journalists is clear: by providing the public with timely and 
accurate information on the affairs of government, business and special interests, the 
media can shape the climate of democratic debate and help the establishment and 
maintenance of good government” (2003:44).  
 
8.4.3. The Gauteng Bureaucracy  
 
In Gauteng, this study established that cases of corruption were prevalent in some 
departments where public servants exploited state structures to extract benefits for their 
own enjoyment. 
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8.4.3.1. The Office Of The Premier: 
While Tokyo Sexwale managed to leave office on a clean slate, despite the “matric 
scandal”, the same cannot be said of his successor, Dr Mathole Motshekga. His 
premiership was overshadowed by tensions and infighting along with maladministration 
and corruption that almost paralyzed the provincial government. The majority of the big 
political scandals occurred after his take over: the Jesse Duarte scandal and Dan 
Mofokeng mismanagement that caused the ongoing scandal in the granting of low-cost 
housing subsidies in the Housing department, both of which are case studies. Other 
features of this administration included the chaotic financial situation in some departments 
due to lack of fiscal discipline and poor financial management exemplified by 
unauthorized expenditure that has been uncovered by the Auditor-General’s office. 
 
In May 1998, irregularities, including mismanagement, nepotism and dishonesty, were 
reported in the office of the Premier. Allegations included claims by the Democratic Party 
(DP) of two employees frequently drunk on duty, misappropriation of public funds by a 
former director of legal services and the appointment of senior staff. The then provincial 
director-general Lulamile Mbete, who, however, dismissed allegations of widespread 
wrongdoing as “cheap politicking and gossip mongering”, acknowledged these 
irregularities. In fact, Mbete confirmed the drunkenness case and said there were two 
employees with “drinking problems” and they had been “assisted in accordance with the 
department statutory responsibility”.  
 
The misappropriation case involved Joseph Sedumedi, who misused R30 000 only and not 
R200 000 as claimed. Eventually he was suspended and then fired and the case was sent to 
courts for criminal charges. Another employee, Noel Ndlovu was accused of spending R2 
000 on an unauthorized liquor bill but resigned before disciplinary action could be taken 
against him. To the Director-General, who was reacting to “sensitive information” on 
irregularities that was handed to the Heath Unit in the early January 1999 by Peter Leon, 
the DP leader in Gauteng, “the irregularities in the Premier’s Office were distorted” 
(Business Day, 12 January 1999). However, his own evidence proved that there was no 
distortion. 
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The appointment of senior staff was, what Corruption Barometer has called “hair-raising” 
(1998:110-11). For instance, the appointment of Fikile Magubane as chief director after a 
senior interviewing panel had rejected her for “lacking in analytical and strategic thinking 
about issues”. The most striking case was that of the appointment by the Premier of his 
driver, Derrick Mangadi, as his assistant private secretary with a salary of about R110 000 
a year. This while the advertised position called for a three-year university degree and 
relevant work experience – of which Mr Mangadi apparently had none. Another 
appointment was that of a friend of the Premier’s wife, Ms Phuma Shabalala, as acting 
director of protocol and intergovernmental relations, over the heads of two serving deputy 
directors in his office. 
 
Further claims of corruption in Gauteng in the Office of the Premier were brought to light 
by the DP in March 1999 in a letter claiming the need for the eradication of irregularities 
to avoid transforming the hope for efficient and effective delivery into a mere myth. The 
letter namely denounced 13 officials in the Premier’s Office who were being employed 
without the relevant qualifications. Another eight officials at senior management level had 
“questionable qualifications” because of their levels of incompetence and poor 
management skills. Many of them, including the secretaries of senior officials, were 
serving in responsible positions. The matter was of such gravity and sensitivity that it led 
the Heath Unit to launch a probe. But after a meeting between the Unit, the Premier 
Motshekga and MECs to discuss 26 allegations of fraud and corruption involving State 
assets, it had been decided that while the Unit was still looking at some of the original 26 
cases, most of the allegations involving the Premier’s Office fell outside the ambit of the 
Unit and were matters for “internal discipline”.  
 
As a result of this meeting, an anti-corruption committee chaired by Motshekga was 
created. Later, a “wrap-up report” on the reported number of cases materialized. Some 
reports were “fallacious, some were interesting but not specific, and others were specific 
and right”, as pointed out by Roland Hunter, a senior official in the Finance Department 
(The Star, 2 February 1999). I tried to get these reports from the Office of the Premier, but 
the Deputy Director in charge of Labour and Human Resources Management, told me 
there was no way we could get “confidential information”.  Speaking at a Masakhane 
award function in Pretoria on 9 February 1999, Premier Motshekga admitted that “we are 
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not saying there is no corruption, but we are not saying that the whole government is 
corrupt. There are just some rotten individuals”. Later in February 1999, the Gauteng 
Anti-fraud hotline set up on 18 March 1998 at the provincial department of Finance and 
Economic Affairs was moved to the Premier’s Office. 
 
There is general consensus that Gauteng is unquestionably in better hands now than under 
Motshekga who was blamed for administrative weakness and factionalism. Nevertheless, 
one of his allies, former Local Government MEC Sicelo Shiceka who failed to make 
Shilowa’s cabinet found himself appointed as Chairperson of the Safety and Community 
Liaison Standing Committee in the Legislature. Despite being accused of grossly 
mismanagement of his department and failing to honour the Code of Ethics he signed. 
These allegations were investigated only after the DP requested that former Gauteng 
Premier Mathole Motshekga conduct a full investigation into Shiceka’s activities 
following the resignation of the Head of Department, Silas Mbedzi. Irregularities were 
found within the department and opposition parties saw his new appointment as 
“compensation”. Shilowa also took the blame when he failed to react and turned a blind 
eye to the case of the Housing MEC, Paul Mashatile who obtained in June 1997 an 
advance of some R34 000 on his salary for an alleged study trip to Australia, while he was 
still MEC for Public Transport and Roads. He never took the trip, but started repaying the 
money only in 1999 at a minimal rate of R2 883 per month – enjoying in effect a two-year 
interest free loan from Gauteng’s taxpayers, noted Peter Leon, DP leader in Gauteng (The 
Star, 10 November 1999).  
 
Subsequently, “transformation can only begin when the Gauteng government is prepared 
to take concrete steps towards the total eradication of corruption within its various 
departments. Unfortunately, inept officials and politicians seem to be rewarded rather than 
punished for their incompetence”, suggested Peter Leon. The above cases are illustrations 
of people who are supposed to clamp down on corruption perpetuating it while preaching 
about it. 
 
8.4.3.2. The Department Of Education (GDE): 
The Department of Education is hampered by the lack of capacity, as often expressed by 
Kader Asmal, the then Minister of Education. Contrary to appearances, the following 
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instances confirm that there are cracks in the department’s structures as highlighted by 
continuing problems encountered that have to be solved. These include: 
 
a) The 1997 investigation in the “capacity” of the Provincial Administration of Gauteng to 
deliver services conducted by the Dr Ncholo team came out with an alarming report on the 
Department of Education in Gauteng. According to this Report that made the front page of 
leading Gauteng newspapers, an investigation undertaken by Douglas and Velcich 
indicated that there were major problems with the financial control systems used in the 
central region. This may well be the case for the entire department that did not have 
adequately qualified and skilled financial managers, yet they have to administer a budget 
of more than R5 billion.  
 
The complexity and lack of clarity of policies was another problem revealed by the 
Report. Indeed, “a number of policies which were determined nationally had to be 
implemented by the department. Many of these policies did not emanate from the 
department. The National Department set stringent time frames for the implementation of 
policies and the department felt overwhelmed, because once they implemented the 
policies they became unworkable for the department and many policies had financial 
implications which the national department apparently, does not take into account in their 
policy formulation” (1997:21). As a result, it was not sure whether teacher education was 
a provincial or a national competency. Consequently, the absence of national norms and 
standards has sometimes left the department to function in a vacuum. The department had 
to backtrack because there was no guidance from the national department.  
 
A Report of the Auditor-General for the year ended 31 March 1997 draw a gloomy picture 
on financial matters. An audit revealed that there were no proper management systems to 
either monitor accounts or maintain adequate internal checking and control measures. For 
instance, permanent as well as temporary employees with no banking details resulted in 
hand payments, which were necessarily more exposed to possible irregularities and 
incorrect payments. It was found that there was a serious lack of internal checking and 
control at the North Regional Office during the financial period under review: the batch 
register was not checked and signed by the responsible officials which could result in 
unauthorized or incorrect information in the systems. Payments made were copies of 
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invoices that had not been certified as not previously paid and invoices did not always 
clearly indicate whether or when stock had been received. Unauthorized purchases due to 
stock obtained outside of the State Tender Board directives did exist. The following 
documentation was not available on files: itinerary forms, summary of log sheets and 
claim forms, printouts of calculations in respect of capital cost, cash payments, 
installments and allowances and fuel claims. 
 
Therefore, due to incomplete information on files it could not be determined whether 
journeys had in fact been approved prior to departure, that those official trips were in fact 
more than ten working days and that a minimum of 1550 kilometers had been traveled. 
Furthermore, it could not be established that private kilometers did not exceed 30%. This 
list is not exhaustive. 
 
Because of the significance of the matters discussed above, the Auditor-General did not 
express an opinion on the financial statements of the GDE for the year ended 31 March 
1997 (September 1999:87-90). 
 
b)   Another scandal, seen by observers as one of the most striking problems of 1996 took 
place during the matriculation examinations. 1996 will be remembered as “the year of the 
cheats” for those 112 200 candidates who wrote their Matric exams that year. The 
following is a general survey of the whole saga. 
 
Reports of chaos were received after the first day of Matric examinations in Gauteng from 
all sources (GDE, media, political parties). A number of irregularities including 
allegations of a lack of security, teachers collecting papers without showing the proper 
identification, the wrong papers being delivered to schools, people making photocopies of 
papers and mainly the leak of Matric exam papers, had been discovered, leaving students 
and parents in total disbelief and heartache. During the whole week, there were reports of 
widespread sale of matriculation exam papers.  
 
This led the GDE to appoint an independent commission of inquiry into a number of 
irregularities discovered during the Matric examinations. According to Education MEC 
Mary Metcalfe, “the theft of matriculation papers from the GDE was a matter of enormous 
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public concern”. ESKOM Human Resources Chief Executive Bongani Khumalo led the 
investigating team and its mission was to: 
 
a) Inquire into the preparation of the examinations with special focus on security 
arrangements;  
b) Inquire into the adequacy of the steps taken to protect the integrity of the 
examination; and  
c) Make recommendations on the necessary actions to ensure such a situation does 
not arise again. 
 
Opinions varied from one group to another with regard to the causes of the scandal. For 
students and parents the whole messy business was the result of weak security and 
controls. For Education officials, it was a “transitional problem” resulting from structural 
changes from the old system to the new. While there was cheating in previous years, this 
was the first year in which the Department conducted the examination as a whole in a 
unified way and all pupils wrote the same Matric, as stated by Mr Maseko, Gauteng 
Education Superintendent-general. The message was clear: because of this, the chances of 
cheating and irregularities were more pronounced.  
 
The disclosure of the findings came from the GDE which revealed that 16 percent of the 
province’s examination centers were suspected of irregularities with a total of 1413 
candidates suspected of being involved in cheating during the examination of (The 
Citizen; The Star, 24 December 1996). 1144 pupils were found guilty of cheating in 
Matric exams and 110 schools were implicated in irregularities. Offences identified by the 
Department included the buying of stolen exam papers and model-answer memoranda by 
some 336 candidates, and copying from smuggled crib notes by 1077 others.  But, in the 
meantime, Education officials were trying to minimize the debacle with Maseko 
maintaining that “reports of widespread leakage had not been confirmed by the findings of 
a special investigating team. Only a very small percentage (3,6%) of candidates has been 
involved in any form of examination irregularity”. Of 1585 pupils called to appear before 
hearings into exams irregularities, 1144 were found guilty and 441 were cleared of 
wrongdoing, he said.  
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In addition, the Khumalo Commission found seven senior education officials guilty of 
gross incompetence in the organization of the examinations and slammed the security and 
computer systems in place at the time. Only a Pretoria teacher was sentenced to a year in 
jail after being found guilty of selling some leaked papers: math, biology and accounting 
(The Star, 4 November 1997). As the GDE announced the implementation of the 
recommendations by the Khumalo Commission on how to improve examinations, the 
findings have been withheld from the public. Meanwhile, the Public Protector Selby 
Baqwa found in a separate investigation that seven of the papers leaked nationally were 
from Gauteng. These were biblical studies, both English first and second language, 
computer studies, accounting, biology and geography. Finally 5 280 out of a total of 518 
000 matrics across the country were found guilty of cheating. 
 
The 1996 Matric debacle can be seen today as a conspiracy of silence for corrupt 
exchanges between officials, teachers and pupils that created what an observer called “a 
roaring trade buying and selling of papers and answer memoranda” (Jacqui Reeves, 1997). 
This is an indicator of the extent of the moral decay and corruption that is sneaking into 
the society. Collusion between government employees and the public in corrupt acts does 
not improve good governance, but weakens state credibility. As a result, such acts 
inevitably, if unchecked, can have serious implications such as the decline in standards 
and credibility that could make South African academic qualifications worthless. But in all 
fairness, it does seem that the 1996 matric cheating was checked. 
 
c) Another problem was that of fraud. It was revealed that during the same period, fraud 
amounting to millions of rands was discovered and 96 officials of the Gauteng Department 
of Education had been reported for fraud and other forms of corruption and practices 
(Corruption Barometer, 1994-98:112). As a result, a “fulltime internal fraud unit” was 
formed to investigate fraudulent activities in the department and especially to root out 
“ghost workers” that cost millions (Mail & Guardian, 28 August 1997; The Sunday 
Independent, 31 August 1997). However, in 2001, a massive scandal on the awarding of 
fraudulent tenders amounting to more than R10 million to bogus companies was 
uncovered involving senior departmental officials with interests in those bogus companies 
(City Press, 16 September 2001).  
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However, the origins of fraud could be dated back to the old regime. As noted by Dr 
Ncholo report:  
“the department has inherited a lot of problems in terms of fraud at a regional 
office level as well as at head office level. They had uncovered that some fraud 
dated back to about 6-7 years. A independent auditing firm, discovered, while 
investigating the department, a fraudulent network in the Personnel and Finance 
sections working in conjunction with teachers. Fraudulent claims were detected in 
the Provisioning section as well” (1997:23). 
 
In addition, a report showed there was a case of ex-employees who owed the province 
more than R16 million, an amount that would cover all capital works planned by the 
Department for the 1998/99 budget. One of the identified causes of debts often arise from 
broken contractual agreements, as explained by the Director of administration, finance and 
buildings at the GDE: “when the contract is broken some form of compensation has to be 
paid to the department which is often a large source of the debts. Incomplete, faulty or late 
information passed on to the GDE’s salaries section could result in an employee being 
overpaid” (The Star, 31 August 1998). These excess payments had to be reclaimed from 
the staff and could take some time to secure. It is important to note that these type of debts 
exist in many other departments. But there are no records to provide details of debts owed 
by individual departments.  
 
This had been confirmed by an Auditor-General Report (1996/97) that underlined amongst 
other problems that of:  
- personnel members who received salary from two departments, 
- personnel members who received salary from two different provinces, and 
- those with outstanding debts that have not been accounted for.  
 
d) The long-lasting problem of lack of capacity was also evident in a 2002 report released 
by the Minister for Education, Kader Asmal, when the GDE underspent in the 2001/02 
financial year at least R248 million. Gauteng was part of under-achieving 3 provincial 
education departments with underspending in the previous financial year being even worse 
than in 2000/01 where the amount was estimated at R127 million. The provinces that have 
shown a level of expenditure outside the permissible 2% are Eastern Cape (3.1%), Free 
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State (3.3%) and Gauteng (3.3%). What is more striking is the fact that in the three 
provinces the level of under-expenditure could be as high as 20% of the non-personnel 
expenditure (2002 Report, Department of Education).   
 
According to the Report, some of the reasons that may have led to this poor performance 
could derive from the lack of capacity to manage and administer the budget, delays 
associated with the process of procuring goods and services, and positions that remain 
vacant over long periods in the provincial departments where about 40% of posts remain 
vacant. To improve the situation, departments were recommended to ensure the 
appointment of Chief Financial Officers who would monitor and advise them on the 
utilization of their allocations. The delay, points out the Report, on the part of provincial 
departments in appointing these officials may have been one reason for the under 
expenditure, which would be indicative of lack of capacity in skilled officials to manage 
and administer the budgets. However, suggests the Report, the slow response of some of 
the provincial departments of education has indicated one of two possibilities, either there 
is a lack of capacity to develop the required plans or the provincial departments do not 
regard the request as government’s priority (see Report 2002:10-11; 51-54).  
 
What is more striking is the fact that, in May 1997, the Ncholo team recommended to the 
GDE to put into place adequate financial controls as a matter of urgency. Consideration 
should be given to the appointment of a Financial Manager. More, the Department needed 
to pay special attention to putting administrative systems in place, which would facilitate 
its timeous and smooth functioning. Nevertheless, the problems of lack of capacity along 
with that of technical skill in the GDE were so serious that they were raised as issues in 
the Department of Finance and Economic Affairs. Aspects such as the overspending by 
R454 million, and the failure of closure of books on time for 1996 by the GDE were 
indicated as some of the problems. 
 
Introducing his budget speech on 5 June 2001, Ignatius Jacobs, Education MEC, revealed 
the commitment of his department to taking disciplinary actions against educators and 
officials who failed learners and the entire education fraternity by taking strong steps and 
action in the name of effective governance. Therefore, more than 102 teachers were 
dismissed from Gauteng schools for misconduct in 2000. In May 2001, a school principal 
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was fired for sexually harassing a colleague at a Johannesburg school. A Thokoza teacher 
was suspended at the same time for allegedly threatening to fail a pupil when she refused 
to continue with their sexual relationship. Other strong actions included: charges against 
256 teachers for misconduct and 231 being finalized. Of the finalized cases, 83 teachers 
were dismissed, 57 were fined between R1 000 and R6 000, 42 were warned, five were 
suspended, 23 were acquitted and charges against 17 were withdrawn. An additional 22 
were fired for absconding from work. Concerning officials in the administration section of 
the department other than teachers, 127 were charged with misconduct and 39 were 
dismissed. 14 were demoted in the same period. With regard to past irregularities, 
education authorities may have set the correct tone by ensuring that the culprits 
responsible for unethical behaviour were prosecuted and flushed out of the system. The 
integrity of the whole process depends on it. 
     
On the other hand, delivering the Department’s progress report on November 15 2001 in 
the Gauteng Legislature, the Gauteng Education MEC announced that his department had 
developed a fraud prevention plan to bring about change in employees’ attitudes towards 
corruption. Thus, a fraud prevention operational committee was established from June 30 
2001 with the aim to steer and take responsibility for the Fraud Prevention Project (FPP) 
as well as to ensure effective project implementation, management and maintenance.  
 
On 21 June 2002, a statement from the GDE confirmed its commissioning of an audit of 
the Independent Schools to probe claims that the department was inconsistent in 
subsidizing them. Consequently the department instituted a forensic investigation into 
matters raised and in order to take appropriate action in instances that include professional 
negligence that caused overpayments, fraud and probable systemic faults. 
 
This declaration of good will shortly would be followed by the suspension on 28 January 
2003, of a senior manager and two senior officials of the Gauteng West District in the 
wake of allegations of fraud and corruption against them. The three officials were 
suspended with immediate effect, pending the outcome of the investigation. In a statement 
the Department said this formed part of the Department’s strategy to rid itself of fraud and 
corrupt practices in the Public Service. Besides internal disciplinary processes, the case 
was handed over to the SAPS to investigate criminal charges. In the meantime, the 
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department would immediately appoint an acting senior manager for the Gauteng West 
District. Finally, as acknowledged by Minister Kader Asmal: 
 
“the management and administration of financial resources has improved and 
should continue to improve as weaknesses discussed above are addressed. All the 
challenges referred to can be addressed if provincial departments ensure that the 
necessary human resource capacity and skills are improved” (Report 2002:55).  
 
8.4.3.3. The Department Of Health: 
Answering questions in the Provincial Legislature on 5 October 1995 from JB Bloom of 
DP who had wondered about instances of corruption or misdirection of funds that had 
been uncovered, Health MEC Amos Masondo – later Johannesburg Executive Mayor17 - 
replied that “to date no single allegation of fraud was picked up”. And at the question of 
what monitoring and review mechanisms were in place? His response was: “monitoring is 
done by functionaries and members of civil society, where possible on a monthly basis. 
Project committees monitor stock levels and submit complaints to the provincial office”, 
(Hansard no 113, 1995:323). 
 
Unfortunately, the 1997 Report of the Auditor-General on the province’s financial 
statement for the 1996/97 financial year revealed that with regard to personnel expenditure 
an audit at various hospitals showed a lack of evidence to ensure the existence of 
employees and the proper amounts paid. Unauthorized expenditure amounted to R382 172 
118,32 followed by excess in grant-in-aid to an institution of R165 500,68. Furthermore, 
as previously reported, audits conducted at various hospitals and institutions again 
revealed deficiencies and shortcomings in the system of internal checking and control. In 
general a large percentage of errors due to the non-compliance with Provincial Treasury 
Instructions, regulations and legislation could be ascribed to the lack of internal checking 
and control (see pp. 71-73). 
  
 
17 Councillor Masondo was appointed the city's first executive mayor on December 5, 2000, when 
Johannesburg became a unity. He leads a 10-person mayoral committee - essentially a city-level "cabinet".  
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According to the report the total amount involved in unauthorized expenditure was close 
to half a billion: R431 496 950. The report shows that the department of Health toped the 
list with R328 337 619 of unauthorized expenditure. In addition, an amount of R42 337 
936 disappeared as a result of thefts and other losses from the provincial administration 
that included unrecovered hospital fees and claims of alleged negligent treatment of 
patients. 
 
On the other hand, property worth more than R216 000 was stolen from the Gauteng 
Department of Health’s office in 1998. Details of the thefts released by the Health MEC 
showed goods worth R79 000, mainly computers, were stolen from the head office in 
Johannesburg. Items worth R53 000, including a R10 000 photocopying machine, a printer 
and three computers, were stolen from the Hilbrow offices. A bar fridge, a microwave 
oven, a TV set, clocks and electric kettles were stolen from the West Rand offices, and a 
switchboard machine, microwave oven and fax machine from the central Wits Region 
offices (The Star, December 7, 1998). 
 
In its 1998 Annual Report, the department singled out numerous challenges, many not 
unique to the health services. These included (1998:21):  
a) Legacy of little training and development, particularly in response to a dynamic 
service   organization,  
b) Problems with discipline and mechanism to deal with transgressions speedily,  
c) Lack of career management,  
d) Lack of personnel delegated functions to enable managers to manage effectively 
and efficiently,  
e) Lack of mechanism to retain skilled staff,  
f) Lack of literacy skills for lesser skilled employees,  
g) Procedures and processes not geared towards efficiency, poor morale of staff, 
particularly in period of massive transformation. 
 
All these problems led to the appointment of the commission of inquiry by Premier 
Mathole Motshekga in May 1999 into practices in provincial hospitals following his visit 
to the Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital after a spate of thefts and attacks were reported. 
The commission was to investigate (Provincial Gazette Extraordinary, 5 May 1999:2). 
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1. Whether any officials of the Provincial Department of Health contravened the 
provisions of any Act, regulation or relevant policy in the performance of their duties 
and functions with regard to the provision of health care to patients and handling of 
other persons at provincial hospitals. 
2. Whether any official/person employed at any provincial hospital contravened any 
provisions of any Act, regulation or relevant policy with regard to the performance 
of their duties in the handling of patients at any provincial hospital. 
3. Whether patients at any provincial hospital are treated with the required standard of 
service in line with the applicable legislation, regulations or relevant policies. 
4. The causes and extent of the poor treatment of patients and customers at provincial 
hospitals. 
5. Whether any official or persons employed at hospitals have been negligent or 
indolent in the treatment and handling of patients and/or have committed any act or 
acts of misconduct in terms of the applicable legislation. 
6. Determine managerial responsibility and accountability for the findings. 
 
Released on 19 October 1999 by Gauteng Health MEC Dr Gwen Ramokgopa, the 71-page 
report dealt comprehensively with issues identified following investigation by the 
commission. The commission’s key recommendations focused on the strengthening and 
review of management structures, efficient budget management and health-care ethics, as 
well as the “hospitality side of patient care”.  Management of hospitals’ budgets, 
unreasonable waiting times, shortages of linen, conduct of professional and support staff, 
catering, forced reliance on family care, security and being turned away at pharmacies and 
some casualty sections were some of the problems that were highlighted. With regard to 
management, the report addressed some salient issues such as: managers’ and supervisors’ 
responsibilities, access to policy and regulation, filling of vacant posts, working hours and 
staff morale.  
 
The commission appealed to hospital management to use patient complaints as a tool to 
measure perceptions of service quality and identified a complex web of factors which led 
to poor standards of health care in hospitals that included: a lack of equipment, 
inappropriate facilities, lack of medical officers, lack of nursing staff, low staff morale, 
  
237
lack of managerial training, budgetary constraints, lack of decentralization, lack of 
incentives, poor information systems and inadequate support services. The commission 
had described other factors such as absenteeism and corruption as having an impact on the 
department’s financial viability. 
 
Besides administrative and inadequate financial management capacity in the Department 
of Health, the Ncholo team highlighted the problem of tender. Thus, poor specifications 
were written for the tender on helicopter ambulances. This resulted in specifications being 
adjusted after the tender had been published, therefore causing problems with a number of 
tenderers who contested the award of the tender (1997:16).  
 
Another critical issue brought to light by the MEC was that of pending claims and out-of-
court settlements. Responding to a question by the DA in the Legislature, Ramokgopa 
revealed that between 1998 and 2000, 71 malpractice claims totaling R42 million were 
lodged against the Department and Gauteng provincial hospitals had to fork out this 
amount. Only 10 cases were so far settled for R220 000 (Hugo Hagen, 2000:8; Mawande 
Jubasi, 2000:6).  
 
While most of these problems continue, there is room for improvement to redress the 
remaining backlogs such as misconduct cases. As stated by the MEC on 31 May 2001 in 
her Budget Speech for the 2001/2002 financial year, “systems are being strengthened to 
send a very strong message of zero tolerance to those few with deviant, negligent and ill-
disciplined behaviour”. Figures given by the MEC show that contrary to past years habits 
due to poor regulations and lack of law enforcement, now penalties have been imposed on 
those found guilty of wrong-doing: as a result, in the year 2000, 21 public servants have 
been dismissed, 43 charged with fraud, 77 charged with theft, 13 suspended and 6 
professional negligence cases have been dealt with (2001:2).  
 
In January 2003, the Gauteng Health department dismissed Edith Zambo, head of the 
Yusuf Dadoo hospital in Krugersdorp. The dismissal followed the discovery of financial 
irregularities at the hospital (Sabcnews.com, February 01, 2003). This was followed by the 
announcement by the Department that “steps had been taken to help eliminate fraud from 
the health care system. And in collaboration with the Gauteng Shared Service Centre, 
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almost 20 forensic investigations have been conducted. The message is clear that fraud 
and corruption will not be tolerated. 54 employees have been dismissed during 2002 as 
proof of the department endeavours to wipe out fraud, corruption and professional 
negligence from the system” (Budget Speech, 5 June 2003).  
 
In another development, a statement released June 19, 2003 by the MEC showed that 33 
employees had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of between two months and 
three years since 2000. Many of the convicted employees, all from Johannesburg Hospital, 
had stolen medicine, linen, food and surgical instruments. The value of the stolen goods 
had “substantially plummeted” from more than R1, 6 million in 2001 to R264 258 in 
2002. The MEC said the convictions were an indication that the department’s zero 
tolerance approach to fighting thefts was working. “More suspects are being apprehended 
now following the implementation of the Fraud Prevention Plan, and the improvement of 
the disciplinary system”. In the most recent court case, in March 2002, she added, an 
employee was sentenced to a fine of R300 or 60 days imprisonment, suspended for five 
years. Nine employees were then suspended, with pay, pending investigations into 
allegations of theft.    
 
8.4.3.4. Department of Safety and Security: 
The Police Service in the Province is more accountable to the National Department than to 
the provincial one. At the creation of the Province, this situation generated a lot of 
problems that impacted negatively on good governance within the provincial department. 
The significance of acts of corruption within the Police Service indicates gross abuse of 
power and seems to be the result of poor management, as shown by the Jesse Duarte case. 
As revealed by a recent study, South Africans in general still believe there is a lot of 
corruption, and that it is a common occurrence, with the Police toping the list in 
malfeasance (TI Global Barometer Survey, July 2003). But explaining Police corruption, 
Tom Lodge (2002:133) believes that “the situation may have worsened since 1994 as a 
consequence, perhaps, of demoralization and disloyalty to the new government”. He gave 
some figures showing that in 1998, 10 000 policemen (out of a national force of 140 000) 
were under investigation for charges of bribery, theft, fraud and involvement in crime 
syndicates.   
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Those acts that occur within a body entitled to create a safe and secure environment for all 
led to the creation of an Anti-Corruption Unit on 1 January 1996. As stated by its Director 
and the Commanding Officer of the Unit, SF Globler, “the Anti-Corruption Unit of the 
South African Service was formed to deal with corruption within the ranks of the Service 
itself, as the prevention of corruption was then neglected – may be due to the fact that 
prevention was not seen as important as the arrest of the offenders…. And from 1996, 
corruption has been defined as a National Priority within the South African Police 
Service” (SAPS Report on Anti-Corruption Unit 1996-1998).  
 
The Unit came into being with only offices in Pretoria and Johannesburg. It then consisted 
of the National Head Office (referred to as NACU) and nine Provincial Anti-Corruption 
Units (referred to as PACU). Only the commanders in each of the Provinces were 
appointed, each being responsible for his own development. Globler described the current 
level of corruption within the overall criminal justice system as the factor most negatively 
influencing efforts to substantially improve safety and security in South Africa. 
Corruption in all its forms, he said, seriously undermines not only public confidence in the 
Government and the Public Service, but also in government-driven crime prevention 
strategies (SAPS Report on Anti-Corruption Unit 1996-1998).  
 
In Gauteng, this task became more difficult with the transformation of the Department into 
a new component. The Ncholo Report (1997:29) shows that the lack of communication 
and understanding by the rank and file police members about the role and function of the 
Department incapacitated and hampered its performance. The MEC and the HOD had no 
power over the operational arm of the Police Service in the Province. The HOD 
experienced a lack of defined lines of accountability, that is to say the National 
Secretariat, the provincial Director-General and the MEC. The department experienced a 
problem with the low ranks of its officials as compared to the police with whom they 
should interact. The police was refusing to interact with officials on levels lower than 
themselves. The lack of staff impacted negatively on the functioning of the Department 
and the lack of skills was manifested in various areas – Human Resources Management, 
Finance, Finance Management System, Personnel and computer literacy. The lack of 
financial control by the Director of Support Services created some tensions within the 
Department. Consequently, there was a lack of discipline in the Department as a result of 
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the weak decision-making by the HOD. For instance, there was a general abuse of 
vehicles: unauthorized passengers; unauthorized trips; unauthorized use of vehicles 
between home and workstation. The Report concluded that the monitoring of decisions 
taken at the MEC meeting was weak because the responsibility for issues was not directed 
via the HOD, but was fragmented. As recommendations, the Department was asked to 
develop an effective communication strategy to inform the police and the civil society of 
its role and function and that the MEC Committee should be more structured to ensure that 
staff are held accountable for their performance.   
 
This kind of atmosphere creates an environment that is always fertile and conducive to 
mismanagement, maladministration and corruption. This is perhaps what explains the 
general behaviour of former MEC Jesse Duarte that should be put into this context. 
 
It is arguable that, apart from mismanagement and maladministration, one of the key 
issues experienced by the Department is that of missing dockets involving Justice officials 
and members of the SAPS. Collusion between these two bodies is a sign of moral decay 
that highlights the corruption, which is wreaking havoc in South Africa’s criminal system 
in general, and in Gauteng in particular.  Every month hundred of dockets go missing from 
courts all over the country. There are many examples to illustrate this case. 
 
On 10 May 1997, Sasha Jensen reported in the Saturday Star, how hundred of courts 
dockets and crucial court exhibits were stolen in one fell swoop while on their way from 
the Gauteng Attorney-General’s Office to a Johannesburg court – effectively halting the 
criminal procedures they were to be used in. It was difficult   for the Police to ascertain 
whether the heist was purely for the vehicle, or a syndicate after the dockets. After a long 
investigation she found out that there were serious levels of corruption within the justice 
system and the Police as confirmed by the Attorney-General of Pretoria, the Deputy 
Attorney-General of Johannesburg, the SAPS Anti-Corruption Unit, the National Task 
Team, the Transvaal Lawyers Association and individual lawyers. What was striking to 
note was the fact that there were no official statistics available from the Ministry of 
Justice, the SAPS and the legal bodies in the Transvaal, on how many dockets were stolen, 
unaccounted for or missing. In Cape Town, 600 dockets were declared missing while in 
transit between courts and police stations. 
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According to Jensen, in Johannesburg it is cheaper to buy a docket which can be stolen 
and go missing for R1 000. Accountability and monitoring become difficult because 
“there are too many people, too many courts, too many lawyers, police and prosecutors” 
dealing with dockets. No docket, no hearing. The prosecutor will ask for postponement so 
that the docket can be found. After several postponements, a case is struck from the court 
register, costing the State millions of rands in fees.  This is the main reason why syndicate 
members and gangsters are not arrested because there are elements in the criminal justice 
system who manipulate cases to achieve results.  
 
Jensen concluded the investigation by some figures provided by the former head of the 
Anti-Corruption Unit Steff Grobbelaar that showed that the problem was serious and the 
situation extremely worrying: 1 250 police members were involved in illegal practices 
reported in some 1 412 dockets opened against certain officers. The lack of statistics made 
it difficult to know how many of these were docket-theft (or tampering) related cases. 
Other figures came from the Transvaal Lawyers Association with 33 attorneys barred 
during 1996, 5 in 1997 with 14 cases under investigation for crimes of corruption, 
bringing an official figure of 0,6% of corrupt attorneys, compared to the Police, of whom 
1,30% were corrupt. 
 
To corroborate this investigation, I did single out the case of John Vorster Square 
constable, Mutle Mogale, who found himself in much trouble in early July 1997 when he 
tried to get out of the burglary charges he thought he was facing. Jensen described how he 
was caught red-handed by SAPS Anti-Corruption Unit officers along with a corrupt fellow 
policeman from whom he had just allegedly bought his case docket for R2 000. Mogale 
had been charged earlier in 1997 for housebreaking and theft. Unfortunately, what he did 
not know was that the burglary case against him had been dropped and the docket closed 
((Saturday Star, 12 July 1997).    
 
Another hotbed was the Hillbrow police station in Johannesburg that was the theater of all 
kinds of activities between 1994 and 1999, where up to five dockets containing vital court 
evidence went missing each day. On one weekend, 85 dockets went missing. A docket 
was sold for R500 or more depending on the importance of the case. However, as reported 
  
242
by newspapers (Saturday Star, October 16, 1999:7), the arrival of a new superintendent 
Vincent Mtengo sensitively reduced the docket theft just by keeping the original 
documents under lock and key. As seen above, the hard copies are vital for court cases. 
When dockets disappear, suspects cannot be prosecuted. But this did not stop the theft of 
dockets for criminal elements will always find a way to get what they want. 
 
In the same vein, several other reports highlighted the bad state of policing in the Gauteng 
Department of Safety and Security making the public wonder if the terms of “law” and 
“enforcement” still existed in the vocabulary of SAPS in Gauteng. Among them was an 
interim report compiled by the Mackenzie group and former MEC Duarte’s own 
secretariat in June 1997 that showed serious shortcomings in policing in the province. For 
instance, the tendency by Johannesburg police not to give consideration to corruption in 
the crime intelligence services, to organized crime syndicates or to violence against 
children was of great concern.  
 
Another report called “threat analysis” on the state of policing in Gauteng presented by 
provincial police commissioner Sharma Maharaj during Deputy President Thabo Mbeki’s 
visit to the province highlighted the trend of Police involvement in criminal activities. 
Compiled by the provincial organized crime unit between January and April 1997, the 
audited report revealed that the investigation of 327 dockets by the SAPS Anticorruption 
Unit, resulted in the arrest of 73 government officials, 67 of whom were police officers. 
Furthermore, a total of 6 132 cases involving police officials were being adjudicated. Out 
of 432 cases finalized, only 53 police members were convicted of offences. 456 members 
were found not guilty or not prosecuted at all. More than 400 other police officials were 
suspended between January and April 1997 (Business Day, 21 July 1997).  
 
 The regular exposure of criminal activities among police officers both by the media and 
senior police officials proved to be beneficial to the whole community thanks to the anti-
corruption drive initiated by the ACU since its creation within the police services. More 
and more arrests were made between 1996 and 1998 as shown in the table below that 
provides an overview of dockets received, members involved, arrested, convicted and 
acquitted in Gauteng during the same period. 
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Table 29: Dockets received and members involved: July 1996-June 1998: 
 
YEAR 
DOCKETS 
RECEIVED 
MEMBERS 
INVOLVED 
MEMBERS 
ARRESTED 
MEMBERS 
CONVICTED 
MEMBERS 
ACQUITTED 
1996 TO 1998 559 561 359 64 141 
Source: SAPS Anti-Corruption Unit 1998/1999. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that at John Vorster Square only in Johannesburg, 50 
policemen were convicted of serious crimes during the first ten months of 1997 and more 
than 380 were under investigation for crimes ranging from reckless driving and assault to 
rape, armed robbery, murder and corruption. At the end of 1997, a statement by the MEC 
Duarte disclosed that more than 700 Gauteng policemen were awaiting trial for a range of 
crimes including arms dealing with gangsters, aiding in prison escapes, theft and 
corruption. To justify this trend, the MEC put the blame on “chronically high” rate of 
absenteeism at the province’s police station due to overwork, the lack of enthusiasm and 
management controls, as well as “endemic racism” (Business Day, 11 December 1997). At 
Cleveland, Sergeant M. Koto, who had 14 years’ service with the police, was suspended 
early in February 1998, fined R5 000 or eighteen months’ imprisonment, with a further 18 
months conditionally suspended for tearing up a shoplifting docket and throwing it in a 
public municipal refuse. 
 
The never-ending vanishing dockets saga continued to make the first page of Gauteng 
newspapers during the entire first term of the ANC-led government. There were 
documented stories of complaints over both corrupt policemen and court officials on 
bribes taken to lose dockets or plan to burn crime dockets after receiving a pay-off of R10 
000. But in most cases the culprits ended up either in jail or being suspended from the 
courts or SAPS ranks. The Sowetan reported the story of more than 350 case files 
destroyed or lost in 1999. Police attributed the theft of dockets from police offices or from 
the directorate of public prosecutions offices to an element of corruption among its 
members (Sowetan, 27 Mach 2000).  
 
In March 2001, the arrest and prosecution of seven policemen on various charges of theft 
and corruption made the headlines and had been seen by observers as the police 
management’s zero tolerance approach and total commitment to root out corruption in the 
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service. According to Sapa (March 23, 2001), bail of R5 000 each was granted to police 
spokesperson Superintendent Richard Luhvengo, Captain DJ Graggs from the Hercules 
visible policing unit in Pretoria, and Inspector Tefo from the Johannesburg vehicle 
safeguard unit. The other four, Inspector Janjie, Inspector FS Mahlanga and Sergeant MP 
Mashalale – all from the Soweto public order policing unit, and Sergeant MD Makae from 
the Johannesburg vehicle safeguarding unit were not granted bail. In a public statement, 
the then acting Provincial Commissioner, Mpumelelo Landu said the arrests of the seven 
members had been a breakthrough in police efforts to end police involvement in crime and 
collaboration with criminals. Landu added that the fact that their colleagues arrested the 
members was encouraging and proved the SAPS had the capacity to deal effectively with 
criminal elements within its own ranks. This case came as a shock to the new Gauteng 
Safety and Liaison MEC Nomvula Mokonyane, who, in an interview with Kaya FM Radio 
on Tuesday the night of 27 March 2001, found it distressing that police had played a role 
in contributing to criminal activities in the province. “The scenario where junior 
policemen arrested their senior colleagues has brought shame and embarrassment to the 
police”, she said. This brought the figures of criminal elements within SAPS to 16 in the 
same week that followed these arrests.  
 
But, it is observable that amid this sea of corruption and malaise, there were incentives for 
swift action being taken against policemen accused of neglecting their duties. As many as 
238 crooked Gauteng police officials were exposed in 2001. It was reassuring to see that 
there were mechanisms, in the form of Anti-Corruption unit, in place to weed out the 
rotten apples. It is an indication that the Police is committed and determined to sweep out 
corruption within its ranks. Another example of this commitment was given, when an 
officer was arrested by his fellow officers and then handed over to the Gauteng SA Police 
Services following his involvement in an armed robbery, together with other suspects, of a 
Taiwanese tourist on July 5, 2002. In a public statement on 18 July 2002, Gauteng Safety 
and Liaison MEC, congratulated the Johannesburg Metro police and the SAPS for their 
swift action in arresting the officer. She went ahead to warn “all those members who are 
involved in crime and corruption to know that they will be dealt with without any favours” 
(www.gpg.gov.za). 
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 Nationwide, the following table shows clearly that there has been a dramatic increase in 
the reporting of corruption. This, observes the SAPS Annual Report 2001-2002, is mainly 
attributable to greater success in the investigative process owing to improved training and 
investigative techniques. The table offers the big pictures of enquiries received nationally 
and members convicted for the period 1996 to 2001. 
  
In addition and according to the SAPS Annual Report 2002-2003, over the period 1 April 
2002 to 31 March 2003, altogether 872 police members were suspended as a result of their 
alleged involvement in corruption. Of these members, 833 were suspended without pay 
and 39 were suspended with pay. Between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2002, a total 
of 2 370 corruption-related cases were investigated, of which 1 332 resulted in criminal 
prosecution and 641 in internal disciplinary hearings. 
 
Table 30: Enquiries received and members convicted: 1996 –2001 
 
YEAR 
NUMBER OF 
ENQUIRIES 
RECEIVED 
NUMBER OF 
ARRESTS OR 
CHARGES 
NUMBER OF 
CONVICTIONS 
1996 2 300 249 30 
1997 3 100 429 78 
1998 3 779 475 128 
1999 4 618 844 147 
2000 6 974 1 048 193 
2001 4 275 592 138 
Source: SAPS Annual Report 2001-2002 
 
This good performance can be attributed to good results obtained by the SAPS Anti-
Corruption Unit since its inception in 1996. In its seven-year existence, the unit dealt with 
investigations of all allegations of corruption and related aspects in the SAPS; 
identification and report on dysfunctions, and mainly co-ordination of all anti-corruption 
investigations in the SAPS. For instance, between 1997 and 1998, many projects took 
place all over the country and notably “Operation Clean Deal” during which police 
officers involved in an Organized Crime syndicate along with syndicate members 
operating in stolen vehicles in the Gauteng province were arrested. The syndicate 
concentrated on theft of motor vehicles, corruption, fraud, defeating the ends of justice 
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and receiving stolen property. During the period of 8 months, 16 persons were arrested, 85 
dockets were registered and R6m worth of exhibits were confiscated (SAPS Anti-
Corruption Unit, 1998/1999). 
 
The success of the Unit was evident in the increase of the number of allegations reported. 
This has been illustrated in Table 29 that shows that from 1996 to the end of 2001, the 
Unit had received a total of 20 779 allegations of police corruption, 3 045 police members 
were arrested and 576 were convicted. As suggested by a recent study the large 
discrepancy between the numbers of allegations received and the conviction rate can be 
explained away by a number of factors including: 
 
a) capacity constraints of the unit to respond adequately to all the allegations 
received;  
b) the large number of witnesses who remained anonymous and provided insufficient 
information; and  
c) the flawed Anti-Corruption Act of 1992 which repealed the common law offence 
of bribery and provided inordinately difficult legal requirements to prove corruption 
(Newham and Gomomo, 2003:3). 
 
Despite its performance, the ACU which investigated about 1000 cases a year in  its 
seven-years existence was officially closed down in October 2002.  Its members were 
transferred to organized crime units or detective branches. The closure had been finalized 
at the end of December 2002 although with criticism from its members who did not 
understand, as most South Africans, why the Unit had to be closed? The reasons given by 
the SAPS left everyone stunned: the bottom line of the move was “a reorganization 
intended to pool resources and make the SAPS more efficient”. To the distressed members 
the message was clear: “the investigation of corruption is the duty of each and every 
member of the service and not a certain sector of the South African Police Service” 
(Sunday Times, October 20, 2002). 
 
Observers expressed their concerns by pointing out that “many years of international 
experience in tackling police corruption would suggest that a better decision would have 
been to identify the shortcomings of the ACU, and ensure the necessary changes to make 
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it a stronger and more effective unit than it had been before” (Newham and Gomomo, 
2003:8). But it is still too early to draw hasty conclusions and to say whether the 
restructuring of the ACU will improve the fight against corruption in the police forces. 
Given the amazing number of complaints received by the ACU, to argue that “police 
corruption had reached endemic proportions in South Africa” cannot be seen as an 
overstatement, but a reflection of dishonesty and disloyalty on the part of members of the 
police force, not only in Gauteng, but countrywide as well.  
 
Meanwhile, as confirmed by recent reports (see SA Corruption Briefing, September 2003), 
the Gauteng Safety and Liaison Department is investigating more than 736 cases of 
corruption involving members of the SA Police Service. The now disbanded anti-
corruption unit previously handled the investigations. The organized crime unit through an 
integrated and holistic approach is now dealing them with. The skills of the anti-
corruption unit members are preserved within the organized crime units. Crime 
intelligence members are also involved in the activities of the organized crime unit. For 
the period April to June 2003, 66 suspects had been arrested for alleged corruption. This 
included both members of the SAPS and civilians who allegedly bribed them. The 
Department through its monitoring and evaluation directorate had prioritized cases of 
corruption received from members of the public and were sending them to the provincial 
commissioner for quick intervention and further investigation. 
  
8.4.3.5. The Department Of Transport: 
The Department of Public Transport, Roads and Public Works was among those in turmoil 
due to the ongoing process of transformation, from the onset shortly after the 
establishment of the new government. During its investigation, the Ncholo team came 
across serious shortcomings in the Department and notably:  
 
a) excessive centralization of the administrative system resulting in service 
components to have a tendency to regulate instead of delivering service to line 
departments;  
b) existence of fears and lack of trust between old and new people in the Department;  
c) shortage of trained technical and professional staff that affected service delivery, 
with large number of vacancies, especially at a supervisory level;  
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d) existence of a serious backlog regarding road maintenance, due to lack of funding 
and delays caused by tender procedures since the withdrawal of tender delegations.  
 
But, it was the issuing of licences and roadworthy certificates along with reports of bribery 
and corruption involving Johannesburg traffic officials that put the whole department in 
the spotlight.. The licence department made headlines in the media and there were 
concordant reports from independent sources pointing at the lack of supervision that 
turned vehicle and licence testing stations into cesspools of corruption. This followed 
reports of widespread corruption in the Johannesburg licence department where forgeries 
were used to “launder” vehicles and bogus documents allowed stolen and hijacked cars to 
be licensed. Duplication of registrations was a common problem not limited to Gauteng 
only. Everywhere in the country licensing authorities and police were struggling to control 
car thieves fraudulently obtaining genuine registration papers for stolen cars.  
 
While it was easy to blame licensing authorities for the poor handling of the matter, it can 
be assumed that the lack of equipment and other means to check every application was an 
impediment on clamping down on culprits. But despite the implementation of far-reaching 
methods to get rid of this rampant fraud, as noted by observers, licensing officers would 
detect up to 80 forged documents every month giving the impression to be under siege or 
under the “control” of crime syndicates. Such was the extent of the phenomenon that 
Gauteng legislators debated the possibility of army intervention with a view to untie the 
“Gordian knot” (Corruption Barometer, 1994-1998:111). 
 
Another type of corruption was the collusion between corrupt driving-school owners and 
licensing department officials. A two-week investigation by Jacqui Reeves of the Saturday 
Star, revealed that even the most inexperienced drivers could buy both learners’ and 
drivers’ licences – within a week – for a total of R1 420. And at no stage would there be 
written or oral tests. The existence of this type of corruption had been confirmed by 
licensing authorities who, in the aftermath of the investigation, decided to suspend oral 
tests with immediate effect, until the extent of the corruption was ascertained (Saturday 
Star, 15 March 1997). As we have seen, this case revealed serious structural flaws in the 
system, characterized by poorly trained staff, a lack of sufficient control and time-saving 
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practices that made the system works. The Department of Home Affairs in Pretoria 
confirmed the issuing of fake licences to over 1000 people in Gauteng in 1996.  
 
As a result, to combat licence fraud, Johannesburg’s traffic authority scrapped oral tests 
for learner drivers and replaced them with a new computer-based testing system. 
Furthermore, in May 1997, 517 people, including officials of Home Affairs, were arrested 
in connection with the fraudulent issuing of drivers’ licences. 445 ended up in convictions 
and sentenced to six months in prison or fined R1 500. Besides, 5000 illegal licences were 
under investigation and more arrests were expected. Nationwide, it had been discovered 
that a complex web of corrupt officials in licensing departments had issued more than 1,3 
million licence numbers that proved to be duplicates of legally registered vehicles.  
 
But in December 1997, the person behind the successful anti-corruption campaign in the 
department, acting head of licensing Gerrie Gerneke found himself suspended on 
allegations of racism. An internal investigation, which cleared him of the charges, was 
rejected by the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu). Consequently, “labour 
disputes, racial tensions and widespread corruption plunged once again the Johannesburg 
vehicle licensing department into near-anarchy – destroying the successes the department 
achieved during 1997 in stamping out corruption” (Saturday Star, 31 January 1998).  
 
However, observers believe that the labour strife was nothing but the determination of 
corrupt officials to continue their fraudulent transactions. Indeed, the minute he left, things 
became worse than ever with the return of anarchy. For insurance, reports of hijacking 
syndicates registering stolen vehicles for resale, mass thefts of blank vehicle registration 
forms and the registration of “ghost vehicles” scams all resurfaced. Gerneke was 
reinstated in May 1998 after his suspension was declared unfounded by the Independent 
Mediation Service. This came “just on time to prevent the department to be turned into a 
‘permanent happy hour’ for car thieves, conmen and crooked employees”, as Deborah 
Fino wrote in Business Day (18 June 1998). 
 
Furthermore, what happened in this department during Gerneke’s suspension was not very 
different from what many people had seen and heard of the “route of Africa” or “banana 
republic”, synonymous with erratic power supply, coups d’état, rebellions, clientelism and 
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malfunctioning bureaucracies in general resulting in crippling disorder, followed by public 
administration decline and collapse. The Johannesburg licensing department became a 
case with its image of mafia-like administration, corruption and indiscipline. And the 
senior management from the Transport Department were nowhere to be seen.  It emerged 
from that worrying situation that what was needed was reforms to root out corrupt 
officials. While Gerneke’s return did not stop corruption, nevertheless, it succeeded in 
reducing its incidence and in restoring a sense of dignity and discipline that were missing 
for a while and the tracking of culprit officials went ahead with the new proceeding.  
 
In March 1999, the Johannesburg licensing department confirmed that more than 30 fake 
ID books had been found on people trying to obtain duplicate documentation for stolen or 
hijacked vehicles. This was the result of collusion between the public and agents from 
Home Affairs and Licence Department in Johannesburg operating outside these 
government offices. Between November 1998 and March 1999, two staff members from 
the Licence Department were suspended for corruption and fraud, while eight others were 
dismissed on similar charges since 1997 (Sunday Times, March 14 1999:6). Besides, 
during an interview with Sowetan on 6 July 1999, Mr Gerneke revealed that the 
Johannesburg traffic department confiscated about 10 fraudulent car registration forms 
weekly from syndicates involving departmental employees and the public. As a result, he 
said, three staff members, including a top official were suspended (Sowetan, 7 July 1999). 
 
In order to assess the situation after a lot of allegations involving several employees in 
corruption, the new MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works Mr Khabisi Mosunkutu 
and the one for Planning and Local Government, Mr. Trevor Fowler decided to embark on 
an extensive tour of all local traffic departments and to throw their weight into the fight 
and send a clear message that corruption will not be tolerated by the government. I will 
come back to the outcome of that tour and other strategies to stop corruption in the 
Department in the appropriate section.  
 
Subsequently, the ensuing collusion between the Johannesburg licensing department and 
the Department of Transport brought about the discovery through the National Traffic 
Information System (Natis) of huge scams which involved the issuing of illegal 
roadworthy certificates, implicating staff of licensing department. There were arrests in 
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Sandton, Roodepoort and Johannesburg licensing departments where more than 30 people 
got arrested (Sandton: 16, Roodepoort: 4, Johannesburg: 12). Numerous cases of bribery 
and corruption in the traffic department got exposed in local media along with the list of 
names of those found guilty of fraud and corruption (The Star, 3 August 2000).  
 
Another massive driver’s licence scam that cut across three provinces (North West, 
Mpumalanga and Gauteng) had been uncovered and more than 1 200 fake former 
Bophuthatswana documents had been identified as having been acquired fraudulently (The 
Citizen.9 November 2000).  Finally, a report released earlier in March 2001 by the 
Automobile Association (AA) showed that 75% of traffic officers nationally accept bribes. 
The establishment of the Metro Police was seen as the solution to clean governance and 
zero tolerance of corruption within the new force, but has it delivered? It seems no, as 
several complaints already were pouring in, after only 3 weeks of the launching of the new 
Metro Police in April 2001.  In his budget speech delivered in the Legislature on 22 May 
2001, MEC Mosunkutu promised that his department would crack the whip on fraud and 
corruption and all efforts would be made to ensure clean governance in the future. This 
would be done in partnership with Business Against Crime (BAC), the Department of 
Safety and Liaison and the Department of Justice, as we shall see later. 
 
The 2001 Annual Report showed that the Department of Transport was committed to 
certain priorities for the next five years of government, including “fraud awareness and 
anti-corruption drive”. To achieve this goal, the Department would continue to focus on 
rooting out corruption and fraud within the departmental processes such as motor vehicle 
registration, licensing, roadworthy certificates, GG vehicle misuse, and financial related 
areas (14 November 2001:120). Besides, between 2001 and 2002, 18 arrests were made 
and 45 people apprehended during inspections at various driving schools, as revealed by a 
departmental public statement on 11 September 2002. 
 
Finally, under the leadership of MEC Khabisi Mosunkutu, the Department of Transport 
was transformed from one bending under widespread allegations of fraud and corruption 
and lacking supervision between 1996 and 1998 to one that became a role model in 
combating corruption. It sensitively succeeded in reducing corrupt behaviour by restoring 
discipline within the department and instilling a sense of dignity to all staff members, 
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resulting in the department winning numerous awards including the prestigious Premier’s 
Awards for delivering on government commitments in 2002, and to have its strategies in 
the fight against corruption and fraud approved and adopted by the central government 
with the aim to implement it throughout the country  (Budget Speech, 3 June 2003).  
 
8.4.3.6. The Department Of Local Government: 
From 1994 to 1999, this Department made regular headlines in the media and was the talk 
of the City, especially in Johannesburg, where scandals and allegations of fraud, theft and 
corruption were very frequent, costing ratepayers millions of rands a year. It was reported 
in January 1995 that fraud and theft relating to the disappearance of computer equipment 
purchased for the city council along with allegations of widespread corruption and theft 
amounting to an estimated R400 million at the Johannesburg fresh produce market in City 
Deep and other illegal activities that were threatening and affecting service delivery. 
 
 All these irregularities were exposed by various reports conducted not only by the 
Auditor General’s office but also by independent investigators as well. At the produce 
market, there was a general consensus about serious flaws in the market that had been 
corroborated by the Auditor General’s report dated February 9, 1996 that revealed that 
fraud and corruption at the market was the result of a lack of controls and systems. The 
report further pointed to security weaknesses regarding bar coding and access to the 
market’s computer system. And the Council was accused of covering up the vast extent of 
fraud and corruption at the market. In another report regarding the functioning of local 
government structures and public sector entities, the Auditor General disclosed the lack of 
financial discipline in most substructures, especially the Johannesburg Western 
metropolitan substructure where irregular payments of more than R800 000 to suppliers 
had been made between June and August 1995. 
 
The Ncholo Report highlighted these practices by pointing out that the tender process 
created problems for the Department because of the time taken to obtain approval as well 
as the awarding of tenders to emerging contractors. The tenders were more expensive and 
impacted on the Department’s budget. One of the challenges that was faced by the 
Department was that of the decentralization and development of  Human Resources as 
revealed by this report. The department lacked expertise in the areas of labour relations 
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and other human resources matters. There was a serious lack of human resource 
development that needed urgent attention, as there were no funds available for training 
bursaries. As a result, the shortage of trained technical and professional staff as well as the 
fact that qualified people could not register with professional bodies affected recruitment 
and service delivery. 
 
Under such circumstances, corruption continued unabated as shown by several internal or 
external commissions of inquiry. In April 1997, a legal commission of inquiry was 
appointed to investigate alleged embezzlement of funds and the illegal sale of land – 
amounting to millions of rands – by four Gauteng municipalities, notably Kruisfontein, 
Orange Farm, Benoni and Krugersdorp councils. For instance, in Orange Farm, the 
Auditor General’s report showed that the accumulated deficit from July 1989 to December 
1994 was R8, 2 million. Many irregularities had been found in funds for Orange Farm 
which included receipt books with omissions; no proper control of staff appointments and 
resignations and salary increases effected without authorization.  
 
In the Greater Johannesburg Metro Council, four senior officials, including two 
department heads were suspended with immediate effect when the Council had uncovered 
a fraud scam involving R17 million in its vehicle workshops. The scam was uncovered 
following a full forensic audit ordered by the council after the release of an auditor’s 
report in December 1998. The fraud allegedly, as reported by Anna Cox of The Star (1 
February 1999), happened in the department that runs the council’s fleet of emergency 
vehicles, including safety, ambulance, traffic and fire vehicles. Between 1996 and 1998, 
the officials fraudulently ordered vehicle parts that were never put on the vehicles sent in 
for repairs. The forensic auditor discovered that five tyres were ordered for the same 
vehicle three times in one day with different job cards. Another vehicle had three 
gearboxes ordered for it in three months. Vehicles were written off while they were still in 
working condition as unserviceable and beyond repair, and then sold; there was the 
sending of vehicles to gearbox and engine repair companies where the work was not done 
but the council was still charged and there was the staff’s disregard of the council’s tender 
process to favour friends or family. A forensic auditor who went undercover at the 
department as a computer programmer spent six months downloading the evidence.  
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In the meantime, a damning Auditor-General’s Report on the 1997-1998 financial year 
shows that the accounting systems of at least 10 municipalities was in such a shambles 
that the Auditor-General was not able to express an audit opinion. The Auditor-General 
identified ineffective billing systems and inefficient credit-control mechanisms as major 
weaknesses of Gauteng Local Government structures, according to the Provincial 
Legislature Public Accounts Committee in its address to the Legislature on the above-
mentioned Report. The Public Accounts Committee also expressed its concerns about the 
lack of financial management capacity and the political will to tackle the problem. The 
truth was that councils were losing millions to fraud, large-scale corruption and theft by 
officials in various council departments. 
 
The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) uncovered another scandal 
of rampant fraud and corruption in municipal pension funds (The Star, August 30, 1999). 
SALGA launched an investigation into 30 pension funds for employees of municipalities 
after allegations of irregularities in the management of the funds, with an estimated asset 
base of R30 billion, came to the fore. Clearly, corruption had contributed to the financial 
mess, which most municipalities faced. Moreover, municipal employees raised 
irregularities and loopholes in the retirement funds for many years, but attempts and calls 
to create a national fund fell on deaf ears. 
 
However, a comprehensive departmental Annual Report for the year 2000/2001 played 
down the seriousness of the situation and tried to explain it in an historical perspective. 
According to the Annual Report, the financial year 2000/2001 represented a paradigm 
shift in the democratic system, particularly in the sphere of local government. The 2000 
local government elections saw the demise of the Local Government Transitional Act of 
1993, which included the establishment of new Gauteng municipalities with brand new 
boundaries. The department had to define and tighten the meaning of its mission and 
vision. Then in line with its constitutional responsibility and the program of government it 
sought to define programs and projects to achieve its contributions, which were defined by 
the government.  This meant changing focus from the old TPA type of work where the 
department was seen as the broad custodian of local government and administration and 
“big brother”, when it came to issues of planning where the provincial departments were 
supposed to plan for the municipality and also enforce what was acceptable in terms of 
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planning and broad local government management. This meant that the department had to 
learn a new role and adapt as a matter of urgency to make sure that it made its mark within 
the province, so that its role of leading the municipal transformation and broad change 
could not be lost in the process. 
 
The new phase of local government ushered in a new era and presented historic 
opportunity for participatory democracy.  Yet, as acknowledged by the MEC, there were 
still a lot of challenges with regard to transformation and consolidation of local 
government structures, systems and developmental mandates. Furthermore, any 
organization that finds itself in the middle of transformation and is also experiencing a 
change in leadership is bound to encounter major ructions and instability. It is however, 
interesting that this Department was able to experience profound changes with very 
minimum disruptions albeit facing internal and external challenges. Concerning the 
question of the high staff turn over, the 2000/2001 report found that it had always been a 
source of concern although in most cases staff would migrate to other departments 
provincially and nationally due to promotional opportunities or municipalities given their 
much needed skills and knowledge. As a result, there were too many vacancies at all 
levels including the management echelon. It should be pointed out that the vacant post of 
the head of department was only filled in January 2000, which paved way for the 
subsequent appointment of the post of Chief Director and other important positions. The 
result of this state of affairs implied that staff morale was subsequently affected due to the 
fact that most managers had to act in other capacities. 
 
Finally, the report claimed that, despite these changes and challenges there had been a 
dramatic turnaround and positive tangible results both within the departmental operations 
and in managing its constitutional responsibilities with regard to monitoring and 
supporting municipalities in Gauteng. 
 
Despite assurance from the MEC on the improvement of service delivery, revenue 
collection and the financial sustainability, shortcomings still persisted as revealed by the 
Auditor General with regard to internal audit and audit committee, for instance. His report 
for the year ended 31 March 2001 gave an idea about the lack of respect of the Public 
Finance Management Act, 1999, Section 38 (1)(a)(ii) that required that the department 
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should have and maintain a system of internal audit under the control and direction of an 
audit committee. Due to lack of internal audit work done during the 2000-2001 financial 
year, no reliance could be placed on their work. Furthermore, no effective audit committee 
had functioned during the 2000-2001 financial year rendering it impossible for the Auditor 
General to place reliance on the internal audit. 
 
In addition, the situation was even worse for Johannesburg where the billing system and 
its call centre were still in a shambles four years after the publication of that Auditor 
General’s damning report (The Star, January 24, 2002). In the appropriate section we will 
see which improvements have been undertaken with respect to its programs and projects. 
 
8.4.3.7. The Department Of Housing: 
Among all Gauteng departments, the most challenging appears to be the   Department of 
Housing. For instance, it emerged from the Ncholo Report of 1997 that there was a lack of 
guidance from the central provincial administration regarding matters of 
discipline/misconduct. To improve service delivery and good governance, it had been 
recommended that the province should address the handling of discipline/misconduct 
matters to enable departments to finalize these matters expeditiously. Considering the 
seriousness of mismanagement and the ensuing corruption that plagued this department, it 
may be remarked that this is a best case scenario for a study of corruption. That is why it 
was listed as our second case study along with Jessie Duarte’s case. 
 
From our investigation, it emerged that a multitude of complaints regarding alleged 
irregularities in the affairs of the Gauteng Department of Housing were received from 
various individuals, various civic associations, political parties and concerned resident 
groups and employees of the Department. Therefore, a multi-disciplinary investigating 
team comprising the Office of the Public Protector, the Auditor General, the then Heath 
Special Investigating Unit and the Director of Public Prosecutions was established. The 
multi-disciplinary approach of the investigation and the establishment of the crack team of 
senior investigators was to ensure that fraudulent activities involving millions of tax 
payers monies had to be brought to an end. The investigation kicked off in May 1999. 
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For the Public Protector (28 September 2000), all the allegations were found to be without 
substance, but when one looks at his findings and recommendations, one is bound to ask 
questions. This led opposition parties, including the New National Party (NNP) and 
especially the Democratic Alliance (DA) to question the Public Protector’s loyalty. 
Despite the fact that the Public Protector has an exhaustive portfolio, his office seems to 
be geared towards mere investigation and lacks any real power to implement corrective 
measures, but tends to issue a standard report declaring government offices fraud free, 
wrote Hermène Koorts, MPL, DA spokesperson on Finance in Gauteng (Sowetan, 
February 6 2002). In Mofokeng’s case, it seems there was enough evidence to support 
cases of misconduct and corruption, as shown by a 10-month investigation headed by 
former police commissioner George Fivaz.  
 
According to the Office of the Public Protector, from investigations into irregularities 
pertaining to the Protea South Project Linked Housing Subsidy Scheme, and the 
Vlakfontein/Hammanskraal Project Linked Housing Subsidy, the Public Protector came to 
the conclusion that:  
 
a. There was a lack of proper control measures in the Department regarding control 
and safeguarding of vital documentation, such as contracts.  
b. The participation of members of a Provincial Housing Development Board in the 
lodging of an application and/or claims for payments by a developer to the Board 
can create a perception of impropriety, even though the interest of such a member 
may have been declared and he/she excused him/herself from meetings of the 
Board when the development concerned was discussed.  
c. There appeared to be a lack of proper liaison between the Gauteng Housing Board 
and the Department regarding proposed housing projects and compliance with the 
legislative and other prescripts pertaining to the approval, implementation and 
administration of such projects.  
d. There appeared to be a lack of training of the officials of the Department and the 
members of the Gauteng Housing Board regarding the provisions of the legislation 
and other prescripts relevant to housing matters.  
e. In the case of the projects referred to in this Report, there had been substantial non-
compliance with the provisions of the Implementation Manual, to the detriment of 
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the interests of the State and the communities affected by these projects. There had 
also been an alarming lack of control by the Department of these projects, which 
resulted in substantial overpayments being made to developers. 
 
The Public Protector’s recommendations included the following: 
 
a. That the Head of Department, in consultation with the Auditor-General and / or the 
Heath Special Investigating Unit, take urgent steps to recover money that was 
unduly paid to developers involved in the two housing subsidy projects mentioned 
above.  
b. That the Head of the Department, in consultation with the Gauteng MEC 
responsible for housing, the Office of the Auditor-General and the Heath Special 
Investigating Unit, establish a departmental investigating body to investigate the 
housing development projects administered by the Department since 1995, with a 
view to determining whether or not there was proper compliance with the 
provisions of the relevant legislation and other prescripts, and if not, that 
appropriate remedial steps be taken and the Head of Department advised on what to 
do to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents. 
 
To understand better what happened in the Housing Department from 1997 to the events 
of 2002, our second case study focuses on investigations in the Housing Department.  
 
To sum up, it can be argued that the occurrence of corruption in the Gauteng 
Administration is an indication of the tendency of many civil servants to promote their 
self-interest at the expense of carrying out their duties in an efficient and professional 
manner. This is the case of civil servants in the province, attempting to maximize their 
budgets and their compensation levels at the expense of performing their duties. Thus, 
instead of performing their duties, public employees became opportunistic and involved 
primarily in rent seeking activities to improve their wealth position, maintain their 
privileges and continue to control the allocation of resources.     
 
A 2001 Report on the state of the Public Service in South Africa discloses that corruption, 
at national or provincial levels, is one of the problems the government should deal with. 
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Moreover, deficiencies in the provincial government were revealed at the African 
Renaissance Conference organized in Pretoria (12 May 1999), jointly by the Office of the 
then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and the Department of Public Service and 
Administration to enhance regional training.  
 
A provincial government director general in presenting the role of leadership in public 
service transformation in general described a big picture of the provincial administration. 
He decried the “over-concentration of experienced senior managers at the central 
government office level while provincial departments had weak executive support systems 
and lacked a sense of direction. A cursory glance at provincial departments reveals 
overworked top management, with middle management having weak and inadequate 
management and administrative skills with low levels of motivation” (Sowetan, May 13, 
1999).   
 
This set-up leads to inefficiency and bureaucratic incompetence, another factor likely to 
cause corruption. In order to promote sustainable growth and development in the province, 
the government needs a competent, efficient and professional civil service. The 
bureaucracy, in general, and those who serve in it, in particular, must be responsive to the 
needs and demands of the business class in order to encourage and enhance investment 
and productivity in the economy. Thus, to improve macro-economic performance, the 
bureaucracy is expected to be able to deliver public goods and services to the population 
equitably and efficiently. 
 
Unfortunately, cases of corruption in Gauteng during the period under study, witnessed a 
severely bloated and inefficient bureaucracy marred by all forms of corruption in many 
departments, especially during the premiership of Motshekga. The problem of a lack of 
capacity and technical skill is a general problem in all departments. But, for instance, it 
has been acute in the Department of Education and was raised as an issue in the 
Department of Finance and Economic Affairs. Aspects such as the overspending by R454 
million, and the failure to close books of accounts on time for 1996 by the Department of 
Education were indicated as some of the problems. 
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In addition, the need to ensure that a high standard of professional ethics is promoted in 
the workplace is highlighted in the Constitution. This represents an important drive to 
create a non-sectarian approach to public service based on professionalism that needs 
more efforts to drive out the rot. As emphasized by the PSC 2001 Report, while these 
efforts are important and positive, claims of a poor success rate and long turnaround times 
are hard to discount. Experience has shown that the internal processes and projects 
instituted by public service organization and agencies vulnerable to corruption are 
generally weak and ineffective and that a greater momentum is often needed. In this 
perspective, it is important to develop a more sophisticated approach to understanding the 
economic, social and political context in which corruption takes place, so that more 
effective intervention can be undertaken (2001:9). 
 
8.5. Socio-Cultural Determinants of Corruption  
 
According to Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR)18, “South Africa is an upper-middle-
income country, but despite this relative wealth, the experience of most South African 
households is of outright poverty or of continuing vulnerability to being poor. In addition, 
the distribution of income and wealth in South Africa is among the most unequal in the 
world, and many households still have unsatisfactory access to education, health care, 
energy and clean water. This situation is likely to affect not only the country’s social and 
political stability, but also the development path it follows: countries with less equal 
distributions of income and wealth tend not to grow as rapidly as those with more 
equitable distributions”. Such an environment is also conducive to corruption. 
 
8.5.1. Social Dimensions 
 
One of the main features of the South African society resides in the inequalities that make 
up the social fabric of the nation. Poverty and inequality pose the greatest threat to the 
success of South Africa's young democracy, prompting Archbishop Desmond Tutu to call 
for action by stressing: 
 
18 Report prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Poverty and Inequality (13 May, 1998). 
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"At the moment, many, too many, of our people live in gruelling, demeaning, 
dehumanising poverty. We are sitting on a powder keg. ... We should discuss as a 
nation whether a basic income grant is not really a viable way forward. We 
should not be browbeaten by pontificating decrees from on high. We cannot, 
glibly, on full stomachs, speak about handouts to those who often go to bed 
hungry. It is cynical in the extreme to speak about handouts when people can 
become very rich at the stroke of a pen" (Nelson Mandela Foundation Lecture, 
November 23, 2004). 
 
But before this call, president Thabo Mbeki’s often referred to the “existence of two 
nations: one rich and white and the other one poor and black” (Business Day, 11 
November 1998). The latter is characterized by harsh poverty, seen as imbalances from 
the past and a legacy of apartheid. In 2003, a major study by the government19 noted: 
"One of the major consequences of the change in the structure of the (South African) 
economy is that 'two economies' persist in one country. The first is an advanced, 
sophisticated economy, based on skilled labour, which is becoming more globally 
competitive. The second is a mainly informal, marginalised, unskilled economy, populated 
by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector. Despite the impressive 
gains made in the first economy, the benefits of growth have yet to reach the second 
economy, and with the enormity of the challenges arising from the social transition, the 
second economy risks falling further behind, if there is no decisive government 
intervention." 
 
A majority of those surveyed has singled out poverty as the most important root cause that 
has spread corruption in the provincial government. In the first place, one is attempted to 
answer that poverty may cause corruption. But after a meticulous analysis of facts, it is of 
the utmost importance to point out that it is a complex situation dictated more by culture- 
bound conceptions than mere personalistic variables. It emerges from our investigation 
that while numbers of public officials believe that poverty causes corruption, 
anthropological and sociological respondents from our three academic institutions have 
argued that as corruption is associated with power, poverty has nothing to do with it. 
 
19 'Towards a Ten Year Review' (2003). 
  
262
There are many countries far poorer then South Africa where corruption is less frequent. 
Very poor people are rarely corrupt. It is always the relatively well off who get greedy. 
The corrupt officials who are stealing are not poor; they are the ones with jobs and 
opportunities to get corrupt. They may believe they are, but this is a cultural problem, not 
an objective reality. Those who are benefiting from state institutions for themselves, are 
doing so not because of the legacy of the past or because they are poor, but for pure and 
insatiable greed. Greed is the cause of corruption, which in turn leads to poverty. 
Therefore, as they (academics) have stressed, poverty is generally the result of corruption 
and a lack of patriotic and nationalistic culture.       
 
When one looks around Gauteng, one finds that poverty is a reality and when corruption 
thrives in an environment where individual members of society have no access to financial 
resources, to people in power or to public services vital to the poor such as education, 
health and sanitary facilities, they become more vulnerable to extortion and cannot use 
corruption in their favour. They are the first victims of corruption. Empirical evidence 
elsewhere in developing countries had shown that in poor countries corruption lowers 
economic growth, thereby breeding poverty over time. At the same time, poverty itself 
might cause corruption, perhaps because poor countries cannot devote sufficient resources 
to setting up and enforcing an effective legal framework, or because people in need are 
more likely to abandon their moral principles (Paolo Mauro, 1998:13). 
 
New estimates of poverty from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) show that 
the proportion of people living in poverty in South Africa has not changed significantly 
between 1996 and 2001. However, those households living in poverty have sunk deeper 
into poverty and the gap between rich and poor has widened. Approximately 57% of 
individuals in South Africa were living below the poverty income line in 2001, unchanged 
from 1996. Limpopo and the Eastern Cape had the highest proportion of poor with 77% 
and 72% of their populations living below the poverty income line, respectively. The 
Western Cape had the lowest proportion in poverty (32%), followed by Gauteng (42%).  
 
The HSRC has estimated poverty rates for each municipality. The majority of 
municipalities with the lowest poverty rates are found in the Western Cape. These include 
Stellenbosch (23%) and Saldanha Bay (25%). The major city with the lowest poverty rate 
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is Cape Town (30%). Pretoria and Johannesburg have somewhat higher rates of 35% and 
38%, respectively, while Durban has a rate of 44%. The poorest municipality is 
Ntabankulu in the Eastern Cape, where 85% of its residents live below the poverty line. 
The figure below shows that seven of the 10 poorest municipalities are located in the 
Eastern Cape while two are located in Limpopo and one in the Free State. 
 
With its large, poor population KwaZulu-Natal has the biggest “poverty gap”20 (R18 
billion). The aggregate poverty gap is calculated by summing the poverty gaps of each 
poor household. Therefore, it is equivalent to the total amount by which the incomes of 
poor households need to be raised each year to bring all households up to the poverty line 
and, hence, out of poverty. The Eastern Cape (R14.8 billion) and Gauteng (R12 billion) 
follow KwaZulu-Natal. The Gauteng's poverty gap has grown faster between 1996 and 
2001 than all other provinces. This is probably a result of its population growth rapidly 
exceeding economic growth. Among municipalities, Durban has the largest poverty gap, 
followed by Johannesburg and East Rand. The poverty gap has grown faster than the 
economy indicating that poor households have not shared in the benefits of economic 
growth. In 1996 the total poverty gap was equivalent to 6.7% of gross domestic product 
(GDP); by 2001 it had risen to 8.3%. The HSRC study has shown that the poverty gap has 
grown from R56-billion in 1996 to R81-billion in 2001 indicating that poor households 
have sunk deeper into poverty over this period.  
 
The fact that poorer households have not shared in the proceeds of economic growth is 
reflected in the rise in inequality between rich and poor. Poverty rates also are much lower 
for whites than for other historical racial groupings in South Africa. The degree in which 
poverty is concentrated in South Africa is astounding - of all poor individuals, 95 percent 
are African. Poverty rates in South Africa - meant to measure the extent of absolute 
poverty - are extremely high and tend to increase in rural regions, in provinces containing 
one of the former homelands, and in areas whose economies have been underdeveloped by 
apartheid-era policies. In most provinces the level of poverty is shockingly high, with 
 
20 The poverty gap measures the required annual income transfer to all poor households to bring them out of 
poverty. 
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poverty rates for individuals near or exceeding 50 percent. Table 30 gives the estimated 
poverty rates by province in South Africa. 
 
Table 31: Poverty head count and ratio per province 
Province Number of poor 
household 
% household living in 
poverty 
Number of poor 
individuals 
% individuals living in 
poverty 
Western Cape 125 208 14.1% 635 557 17.9% 
Northern Cape 51 466 38.2% 267 992 48.0% 
Eastern Cape 710 257 56.8% 4 115 332 64.0% 
KwaZulu Natal 626 889 40.4% 4 216 184 50.0% 
Free State 263 112 36.1% 1 331 649 47.1% 
Mpumalanga 208 419 33.8% 1 275 517 45.1% 
Northern Province 608 528 61.9% 3 565 492 69.3% 
North West 232 947 29.7% 1 248 724 41.3% 
Gauteng  299 821 15.4% 1 443 204 21.1% 
Total  3 126 647 35.2% 18 099 651 45.7 
(Source: HSRC, 1995: A Profile of poverty, inequality and human development in South Africa).  
 
In Gauteng, as everywhere in South Africa, one finds that poverty is entrenched in the 
fabric of the South African society and is a feature of each province. With an estimated 
25% of the population living on less than a dollar a day, government needs a strategy to 
reduce poverty, a national anti-poverty plan. As Frank Meintjies asked, “is it possible that 
many key players forget we are on the lower rungs of the ladder of middle-income 
countries? That our society is highly unequal? That countries in our league, apart from the 
large number of ultra-poor, have millions who are sent sliding into poverty by the slightest 
economic shock?” (1999:16). 
 
In a highly unequal society such as South Africa, indications are that general social 
upliftment initiatives, with a few exceptions such as low-income housing programmes and 
special health services in urban areas, do not benefit the ultra-poor. Their very position in 
society – marginalized, and lacking access to resources and information – puts them at a 
serious disadvantage, as observed by Meintjies. Under such circumstances, the 
manifestation of corruption may strengthen the social divide and the erosion of social 
services may exert heavy pressure on what little is left to go round. 
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 Recent studies (Lambsdorff, 1999) have shown that the benefits from corruption are 
likely to accrue to the well-connected at the expense of the poor and that corruption 
increases income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. A significant positive 
impact of corruption on inequality was found in a cross-section of 37 countries, while 
taking into account various other exogenous variables. Other studies have demonstrated 
that inequality also contributes to high levels of corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999:4). 
Therefore, corruption may increase the probability of growing poverty all around the 
country.  
 
This situation can be explained by what scholars have called the lack of economic 
development with the creation of a bi-polar type of income distribution between the 
“haves” and the “have-nots”. One consequence of this situation, as described by Hope, is 
that civil servants, who strive for high social status so that they can be counted among the 
“haves”, resort to the instrument of “demonstration effects” – a conspicuous consumption 
of luxury goods which they cannot afford given their low salaries (1985:3). 
 
In the South African perspective and as a reminder, one recalls that in pre-1994 South 
Africa, the system of apartheid severely impeded development in African areas through 
state sanctioned programs, and used state structures effectively to enrich the white 
minority and oppress the black majority. History tells us that the apartheid-era government 
enacted several laws that impoverished blacks especially and created several privileges for 
the white minority. The system of apartheid effectively sentenced blacks to a life of 
poverty and deprivation while creating and sustaining artificial privileges for whites. The 
Natives Land Act of 1913, the Bantu Trust and the Land Act of 1936 limited ownership of 
land by blacks to a mere 13 percent of the total land area of the country. Meanwhile, 
whites that made up 15 percent of the population were granted the right to control as much 
as 85% of the land. In addition, the Industrial Color Bar made it virtually impossible for 
blacks to occupy skilled positions in the country’s industrial sector. As a result of these 
pieces of legislation, most of the income and wealth generated in South Africa accrued 
primarily to the nation’s white population (Mbaku, 2000:49).  
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Despite its reputation of not being a “typical developing country”, South Africa still bears 
the burden of poverty on the part of the black community. The very high level of poverty 
and inequality in this country leads to the establishment of a link with corruption. A recent 
study funded by the British international development department reveals in its Poverty 
and Inequality report that behind South Africa’s First World façade lurked one of the 
largest income differentials in the world. ”The poorest 20 percent receive 3.3 percent of 
national income, while the richest 10 percent receive 47.3 percent”, reveals the study. The 
report found that half of South Africans lived in poverty, using a poverty line equivalent to 
about $2.40 a person a day. The British department aims to reduce by half the number of 
South Africans living in extreme poverty by 2015. It shows that 23.7 percent of the local 
population lived on less than $1 (then about R3) a day in 1993 (Business Report, 11 
January 1999:6).    
 
As poor countries bear the burden of corruption, one can understand now why allegations 
of rampant corruption are so prevalent in South Africa, in general, and in Gauteng, in 
particular. Can corruption levels in South Africa be linked to Mbeki’s existence of two 
nations? Nonetheless, evidence has revealed that “when debilitating problems trouble the 
economy, poverty propels people not only to tolerate corruption, but forces them to 
eagerly participate in it” (Kpundeh, 1995:10).  
 
In Gauteng, places like Soweto, Alexandra, Freedom Park, Ivory Park or Thokoza, as well 
as hundreds of all so-called “informal settlements” or “squatter camps” that are 
mushrooming around Johannesburg and other big cities in the province, still remain 
paradises of poverty. In these places, most school-age children cannot afford to go to 
school. These uneducated children of today are the most likely to become poor adults in 
the years ahead resulting in the creation of a large pool of uneducated and unemployed 
people.  
 
Despite there is a new and democratic dispensation in South Africa, the suffering 
continues for most blacks who remain poor, as during the apartheid era, unable to get 
access to opportunities and other key services that accompany democracy. This come as a 
challenge to the ANC-led government which is currently engaged in efforts to transform 
the society and provide the black majority and other historically deprived and 
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marginalized South Africans the way to participate more effectively in political and 
economic markets. Tom Lodge points out: 
 
 “the government’s policy, which favours black business ‘empowerment’, surely 
makes it vulnerable to charges of favouritism. However, there is a professed 
commitment to an ethic of ‘transparency’ and, certainly, much more official 
information about the ways in which the government spends its money is available 
than before” (2002:130).  
 
As a result of these acute inequalities in the South African society, the majority of the 
historically deprived and marginalized people have chosen the “exit option” by engaging 
themselves in underground activities or informal economy. A walk on the streets of 
Johannesburg or Pretoria that have been invaded by thousand of hawkers from all social 
strata tells the story and give us a big picture of the existence of the informal economy in 
the province. By participating in several types of underground activities, people are trying 
to earn some income that can generally support them and their relatively large families. 
Meanwhile, individuals at the top of the political system continue to enjoy relatively high 
standards of living thanks to the control they have over goods and services and other 
opportunistic behaviours.  
 
Most Gauteng leaders come from this deprived background and are thus vulnerable to 
corruption. Evidence elsewhere has shown that individuals faced with these types of 
hardship conditions are quite susceptible to actively engage in corrupt activities in order to 
secure necessary resources to maintain the high life. The almost chaotic situation 
experienced by certain Gauteng departments between 1994 and 1999 featuring 
mismanagement, political scandals and allegations of corruption followed by numerous 
commissions of enquiry, was a bitter pill to swallow and left people with the impression 
that the new men in power were incompetent and corrupt.  
 
Fingers were pointed at their poor background seen as the catalyst cause of 
mismanagement and corruption. But it is wise not to jump to generalizations. If there are 
few rotten fruits this does not mean all fruits on the tree are rotten. Dan Mofokeng and 
Jessie Duarte’s exit from government was clouded by investigations and commission of 
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inquiry into mismanagement and corruption in their respective departments. Both were 
outrageously cleared of charges of corruption, but irregularities and mismanagement were 
singled out and further investigations in the Housing department delivered plenty of 
evidence of corruption involving bribes, kickbacks, misappropriation and fraud. There was 
nothing to justify that poverty was the prime cause of this kind of behaviour.  
 
A statement made on 3 November 2003 by Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki who urged - at 
a Nairobi conference hosted by the African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption 
(APNAC) – Africans as partners in the common struggle, “to bring an end to the culture 
of corruption across Africa, as this culture has brought poverty to our people and shame 
to us as leaders (Reuters, 2003-11-03); indicates that African leaders are concerned about 
the damaging effects of corruption.  
 
Since1994, the ANC-led government has worked effectively to improve the lives of the 
poor, according to findings of research collected as part of the government's ten-year 
review process. But much work still needs to be done and bold initiatives are urgently 
needed to confront this challenge 
 
8.5.2. Cultural Dimensions: 
 
Culture is said to be a contributing factor to corruption in Africa generally. But, to what 
extent does culture within a country influence the behavior of its political leaders? Is 
corruption culturally determined? Does loyalty to family, ethnic, or socioeconomic 
identity outweigh allegiance to objective rules? Do patronage systems secure advantage 
through personal rather than formalized channels? Is the cultural relativist explanation for 
corruption correct? Response to these questions will cement the core of our discussion. 
  
According to scholars, corruption arises from the existence of defective cultural norms as 
a result of the conflict between Africa’s traditional cultural values and the imported 
Western norms that accompany political, economic, and industrial development or 
modernization. Culture has been highlighted by Huntington as a cause of political 
corruption and is higher in states where “the interests of the individual, the family, the 
clique, or the clan predominate” (Huntington, 1968:71).  Many other corruption scholars 
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such as Scott (1972:11); Johnston (1983); Klitgaard (1988:62-64) have considered culture 
in terms of kinship, traditional societies, sense of community, etc., and assumed that it is a 
strong and significant variable in explaining corruption and cannot be ignored in 
corruption analysis. 
 
From this view, corruption is a cost that each African society anticipating political and 
economic modernization must bear (Mbaku, 2000:50). Thus, notes Paolo Mauro, 
sociological factors may contribute to creating an environment in which the availability of 
rents is more likely to result in rent-seeking behaviour (2001: 342). 
 
Another common and popular explanation of differential corruption is that social norms 
are very different in different countries. What is regarded in one culture as corrupt may be 
considered a part of routine transaction in another. Some societies are characterized by a 
high level of trust among its people, while others may lack this and trust can be helpful in 
fighting corruption, since it helps bureaucrats to better co-operate with each other and with 
ordinary citizens. Culturally speaking, corruption may result from diverse interpretations 
of the public or national interest. What signifies a patriotic act in one context constitutes 
corrupt practices in another. 
 
For instance, in traditional African society, the rights of the individual are usually 
considered subordinate to those of the ethnic group or extended family. The family and 
loyalty to it are considered more important than individual rights. These particularistic 
attachments are very strong in many African societies and are said by researchers to have 
a significant impact on corruption. Grief (1994:913) provides insights of how culture 
works as a causal mechanism by studying trade among organized societies of the medieval 
Mediterranean littoral. He found two distinct types of societal organization: one 
collectivist and another one individualist.  
 
1. In collectivist societies the social structure is ‘segregated” in the sense that each 
individual socially and economically interacts mainly with members of a specific 
religious, ethnic, or familial group in which contract enforcement is achieved 
through “informal” economic and social institutions, and members of collectivist 
societies feel involved in the lives of other members of their group. At the same 
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time, non-cooperation characterizes the relations between members of different 
groups.  
 
2. In individualist societies the social structure is “integrated” in the sense that 
economic transactions are conducted among people from different groups and 
individuals shift frequently from one group to another. Contract enforcement is 
achieved mainly through specialized organizations such as the court, and self-
reliance is highly valued. 
 
As observed by Collier, “in general, collectivist societies have more traditionalistic 
political cultures that are ambivalent about open markets, display paternalistic attitudes, 
prefer hierarchically organized societies, and place real political power in the hands of a 
small and self-perpetuating elite who often inherit the right to govern through family ties 
or social position” (1999:1). 
 
In South Africa, these two kinds of societal organization do interact where traditional 
networks are still strong and important but are straddling over western individualistic 
cultures based on commitment rules that enable them to construct citizen coordination 
mechanisms that are self-enforcing on the ruling elite, thus lowering political corruption 
levels.  
 
Thus, what is seen as corruption varies from one society to another. Given such variations, 
explorations of how actors themselves evaluate social practices are required. Whereas 
economic corruption takes place in a market-like situation and entails an exchange of cash 
or material goods, which is basic to corruption, in traditional African society, the 
exchange is not only in cash and other tangibles, but it takes place in a social setting with a 
number of cultural and moral meanings. This is what scholars have called “social 
exchange” or “social corruption”. According to Médard, “social corruption is 
conventionally understood as an integrated element of clientelism. Clientelism often 
implies an exchange of material benefits but cannot be reduced to this, because clientelism 
has a wider cultural and social implication. Clientelism, nepotism, ethnic and other 
favouritism are all variants of corruption, in social terms” (1998:308).  
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This led Chabal and Daloz (1999) to point at the significance of these paternalistic 
attitudes by asserting that “this is a system that enables the political elites to fulfill their 
duties, to meet the expectations of their clients and, hence to enhance their status. In their 
view corruption is a key aspect of the African functional disorder; it is legitimate, practical 
and “a habitual part of everyday life, an expected element of every social transaction” 
(1999:99). This is a system of obligations of mutual support, imperatives of reciprocity, 
and importance of gift exchange, which for these authors constitute the “key ingredients” 
of the continent’s “modernity” (ibid, 101). 
But my investigations did not link the manifestation of corruption in Gauteng to cultural 
determinants. The account of the Gauteng leadership is a mere illustration in order to 
single out the significance of “Gauteng uniqueness”. Contrary to Chabal and Daloz’s view 
regarding the “failure of the modern state to supersede the informal compacts” (1999:100), 
the Gauteng experience claims the transformation from the racist administration to a 
public service characterized by professionalism and ethical standards. Obviously, 
transforming a society as complex, sundry and imbalanced, as South Africa has not been 
an easy job, as the implementation of these new standards has not been uniform. 
Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape are such an example where the legacy of both 
Bantustan states and apartheid are still more evident. In Gauteng, “the modern state has 
succeeded to supersede that of the informal compacts derived from ethnic, factional, or 
nepotistic ties of solidarity”. Gauteng is a new and modern structure that did not get 
influenced by what Chabal and Daloz call the “moral economy of corruption” … that is 
embedded in the dominant social imperatives. 
 
What remains true in most African countries is the fact that a lot of young people migrate 
to the urban areas in search of opportunities for further education or immediate 
employment. Without any other means of support, they have no choice but to rely on 
relatives who had migrated to urban centers early and who are now well established both 
socially and economically. Those urban relatives then have the obligation to provide 
assistance to the new arrivals. Consequently, a top civil servant is expected to share in the 
modern industrial sector, with members of his extended family and his ethnic group. But, 
interestingly, this does not necessary imply that public servants in this case must be 
involved in corrupt exchanges at all costs. This interaction is viewed as solidarity in action 
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but whatever the nature of the exchange (goods and services), what is evaluated here is 
more the nature of the relationship existing between those involved. 
 
Meanwhile, in terms of family solidarity networks, it has been argued that such culturally 
related pressures can force civil servants into engaging in corrupt activities in an effort to 
generate the additional resources needed to meet obligations to members of the immediate 
and extended family. Thus the motivation to remain honest may be weakened by long 
established patron-client relationships, in which the sharing of bribes and the exchange of 
favours has become entrenched. 
 
The Gauteng leadership is a good example to emphasize the nexus between cultural 
determinants and new standards of public management. This could be the story of any 
member of the Gauteng government living and working in Gauteng. Dr Gwen Ramokgopa 
(Health) was born in Atteridgeville in Pretoria; Nomvula Mokonyane (Security) in 
Kagiso, Krugersdop; Jabu Moleketi (Finance) and Khabisi Mosunkutu (Public Works and 
Transport) in Pimville, Soweto; Ignatius Jacobs (Education) in Riverlea, Johannesburg 
and Paul Mashatile (Housing) in Pretora. 
 
While most MECs are from Gauteng townships and Tokyo Sexwale was from 
Johannesburg, the last two premiers came from Limpopo and fit well into this big picture, 
in terms of family networks solidarity. Both came to Gauteng, and Johannesburg 
especially, in quest of green pastures and better living conditions. They both succeeded in 
making a name for themselves but in different ways: Motshekga, a Pedi, who was born in 
Bolobedu, Duiwelskloof, became a respectable scholar with strong legal credentials, while 
Shilowa who was born on 30 April 1958 at Olifantshoek, turned out to be a respected 
trade unionist. Their successes made them the envy of those left “at home” and a catalyst 
for other communities in the rural area whose members were still dreaming to take the 
Gauteng road. Motshekga became Gauteng Premier to succeed Tokyo Sexwale after 
persistent infighting in the Gauteng African National Congress when he went against the 
wishes of a strong lobby of provincial and national ANC leaders and contested the 
position of provincial ANC chair vacated by Sexwale.  
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However, his leadership was permanently challenged and shadowed by all sorts of 
wrongdoings: from spying claims that he spied for the apartheid government to allegations 
of blatant irregularities in his office, mismanagement and corruption. The Negota 
commission of inquiry was appointed by the ANC national leadership in February 1998 to 
investigate all these allegations including those aimed at him for maladministration of 
donor money at Nipilar and misrepresenting the scale of the organization’s activities to 
donors. But, as noted by an observer, “the ANC has long had a dilemma in dealing with 
allegations of spying against its own members, and has rarely taken action against even 
those about whom strong evidence exists” (S. Brummer, 1998). Therefore, though 
Motshekga has never been a party establishment favourite, the national leadership avoided 
moving decisively against him after his election, fearing that interference would only 
reinforce the perception that the popular will was being subverted. A decision was taken to 
make sure he did not contest the 1999 elections – effectively ending his premiership.  
 
Motshekga’s leadership had never been seen as a strong one when compared to that of his 
predecessor Tokyo Sexwale. Observers have described it as a “fledgling leadership” 
featuring tensions, rivalry between the ANC old guard and party newcomers, factionalism 
and intrigue in the province. But in an interview with Shalo Mbatha of Saturday Star, he 
judged his administration as a success story and argued that none of the accusations ever 
led to legal charges, while conceding that there had been some problems (January 30 
1999). But the weakness of his administration was exposed when provincial Director 
General Vincent Mntambo, regarded as one of his allies, tendered his resignation on 
March 24 1998, accusing Motshekga of “flouting administrative procedures and policy in 
the way he ran his office”.  
 
Socially, Motshekga who is married to Angelina Motshekga (the former Gauteng MEC for 
Social Services & Population Development (2000-2004) and currently Gauteng MEC for 
Education with 9 children) has been described by Mbatha as “some one who knows about 
the hard life, an orphan who once subsisted on R1 a month pocket money at school, and 
who first had the chance to study by electric light when he was in matric. Someone 
uncomfortable to admit he has a swimming pool at home but says the size of his family 
means, “He never has any money and has never been on holiday”. “I can’t afford it”, he 
said. But he has to carry on working and will “die on duty” because he needs the money. 
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Coming himself from poverty, he understood why some people are forced to steal: “they 
have families to feed”. “These cases are different from those of criminals who make 
violence and theft their way of life”, he added (Mbatha, 1999). This is the kind of 
background that may be conducive to acts of corruption. However, his confrontational 
governing style may have put him in trouble by embarrassing the ANC leadership that had 
no choice but to remove him by paving the way for Shilowa to take over. As pointed out 
by Drew Forrest, “Motshekga has the embalmed quality of a politician whose moment has 
passed” (Business Day, 2 September 1999).  
 
The youngest of seven children, Mbhazima Shilowa, a Shangaan, was born in 
Olifantshoek, Gazankulu, attended school at Khamanyani Lower Primary Schools, 
Muhunguti higher Primary School, Kulani Higher Primary School and Akani High 
School. He came to Johannesburg to seek employment in 1979. He worked at John 
Weinberg Hardware in Germiston, Anglo Alpha Cement in Roodepoort and PSG Services 
in Johannesburg. He joined the trade union movement in 1981 and in 1991 he was elected 
as Deputy General Secretary, and in 1993 General Secretary of COSATU, a position he 
held until his nomination and subsequent appointment as Premier of Gauteng.  
 
Shilowa was elected a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC in 1997. 
He has been a Central Committee member of the SACP since 1991 and represented both 
organizations in the National Peace Structures and CODESA negotiations. On 15 June 
1999, the Provincial Legislature elected Shilowa as the Premier of Gauteng. He was 
inaugurated on 18 June 1999. He is married and has two sons. Under his premiership, 
Gauteng is unquestionably in better hands now than under Motshekga. But it is still too 
early to draw up any conclusion and there is still a long way to go.  
 
Dan Mofokeng, the former MEC for Housing, was born in Bethlehem in Free State but 
grew up in Kathlehong in Johannesburg and became a teacher after his high school before 
engaging in civic organizations’ activities. Jessie Duarte was born in Johannesburg and 
was the fifth of nine children. She grew up in Newclare - a coloured township - where 
hard life and poverty went hand in hand before becoming involved in women activities 
during the struggle years. But while solidarity in action may be salient in regional 
governments that had absorbed Bantustan states in their bureaucracies, as was the case in 
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Mpumalanga or the Eastern Cape for instance, Gauteng may be less affected by 
patrimonial cultures of tribute.  
Thus these features alone cannot explain Mofokeng and Duarte cases. As observed by 
Tom Lodge, “what may appear to be an increased incidence of abuse in these domains 
[the two departments] is probably a consequence of more stringent controls and more open 
disclosure. In these cases, the rapid social mobility from situations of material hardship 
which modernization theorists suggest as a prime cause of political corruption may help 
their behaviour” (2001:420). Therefore, the salience of culturally-based explanations of 
corruption in Gauteng seems to be inappropriate. A valid explanation may be found in the 
change in social status for the newcomers who possessed more “struggle” credentials than 
administrative ones before their appointments to the ANC government. In these two cases 
we cannot refer to cultural determinants to explain why they failed. Incompetence has 
nothing to do with culture. 
 
Nevertheless, we have to remember that in South Africa the traditional society does no 
longer exist in its original form. History teaches us that across the different groups, 
marriage customs and taboos differ, but most traditional cultures are based on beliefs in a 
masculine deity, ancestral spirits and supernatural forces. In general, polygamy is 
permitted and a lobola (bride-price) is usually paid. Cattle play an important part in many 
cultures, as symbols of wealth and as sacrificial animals. However, social interactions in 
South Africa's urban areas, along with the suppression of traditional cultures during the 
apartheid years, means that the old ways of life are fading, but traditional black cultures 
are still strong in much of the countryside. Although the country is home to a great 
diversity of cultures, most were suppressed during the apartheid years when day-to-day 
practice of traditional and contemporary cultures was ignored, underestimated or 
destroyed. The new South Africa is being created on the streets of the townships and 
cities.  
 
In corroboration of these historical features, I came to realize the depth of the dilemma 
existing in Gauteng, as demonstrated by some interviews I conducted at random around 
Johannesburg. It emerged from these contacts that, as a metropolitan area, Gauteng does 
not have a specific traditional culture and has been seen as a mosaic of cultures where 
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there is no predominance of one culture over another. The new comers must “adapt or 
vanish”. Because people are no longer exposed to their original culture, as was the case 
with those living in Sophiatown or those living in Soweto, today many people often 
referred to as the “lost generation”, seem to have lost their culture and identity. These 
individuals have become culturally hybrid, having adopted Western-influenced traditions 
and sitting upon them while in the meantime trying to keep their African cultural roots. 
The end result is defective cultural norms: a mixture of “segregated” and “integrated” 
social structures coupled by both informal and commitment rules as outlined above. 
 
Tom Lodge (2001:406), unequivocally, stresses that “South Africa is not a “typical 
developing country” and may not seem to share the structural predisposition towards 
corruption, which many authorities believe makes the condition endemic in other African 
countries. South Africa’s uniqueness is the result of state formation during a long period 
of white political monopolies that made it more difficult than elsewhere in Africa for the 
state to be influenced by the persistence of old pre-industrial cultures of tribute”. This is 
more accurate in Gauteng than in other provinces 
 
South Africa’s uniqueness has been championed by Chabal and Daloz (1999) who, too, 
consider the country as an exception to these rules so far because they believe that the 
Western notion of the strict separation of public and private interests has been so strongly-
rooted in this country.  Thus, how can one explain the incidence of corruption in the 
Gauteng administration in the post-apartheid area? The authors of the Disorder as 
Political Instrument suggest new ways of explaining the problem: if it is so much part of 
the community-based culture elsewhere in Africa, perhaps the motives for corruption in 
South Africa are also rooted in community – in this case, racially defined communities.  
 
Perhaps those members of the new black elite who steal from the state really do feel they 
are merely redistributing the wealth that has been denied them by the government’s 
unfortunate conversion to free market policies – because whites pay most of the taxes. 
Also perhaps whites that steal do so because they feel they must take what they can before 
the black elites take it all (Peter Fabricius in The Star, October 15, 1999).  
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Therefore, once civil servants begin to make distinctions among the people they deal with 
according to the degree of family relationship or friendship, they have abandoned what 
Tanzi calls “the arm’s-length principle” (i.e. the principle of objectivity). This principle 
requires that personal or other relationships should play no role in economic decisions that 
involve more than one party (Tanzi, 1995:161-180). Yet, despite concern about culture as 
a cause of corruption, it emerges from the analysis that a causal mechanism has not come 
up to satisfactorily include culture in political corruption models. Nonetheless, I try to 
show how culture affects political corruption levels through its influence on the human 
behavioral and on the possible forms of state rule a society perceives as its natural limits.  
 
As Caiden has argued, “bureaucratic corruption is shafted and conditioned by cultural 
attitudes and behavioral patterns that are defective” (G. Caiden and N. Caiden, 1977:303). 
In many cultures, particularly in the context of poverty or conflict, allegiance to personal 
loyalties such as one's family or ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic identity outweighs 
allegiance to objective rules. Patronage systems, in fact, represent a common means of 
securing advantage through personal rather than formalized channels. 
 
For instance, in the post-1994 Gauteng, allegations of nepotism were rife in the 
government. This led to a request by the National Party (NP) to the Public Protector to 
investigate the extent of new senior appointments at different levels of government and the 
public service since May 1994, in general and in Gauteng particularly. The short listed 
cases in Gauteng were that of Mr Jabu Moleketi, MEC for Finance and Economic Affairs, 
husband of Ms Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, the then minister for Welfare and Population 
Development and of Ms Patricia Elizabeth Murray, head of the department of Agriculture, 
wife of the then minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture, Mr Derek Hanekom. But all 
cases of nepotism were found to be without substance by the Public Protector. As he said: 
“from the investigation by my office of the complaints of nepotism by the NP, I could not 
find one instance where such an allegation could be justified. My requests to the NP to 
provide me with substance for these allegations were not responded to”  (Adv. Baqua, 
Public Protector, Press Release, 1 May, 1999). 
 
In this regard, this study assumes that the intention of anthropological approaches or 
cultural values of corruption is not to excuse illegal actions by providing an explanation 
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by “culture”, but as emphasised by new research, to show that the borderline for 
acceptable behaviour is not universal. Using these approaches may enable to understand 
what is corruption and what is not corruption (Andvig et. al, 2000:79). Therefore, in the 
same line of thinking, Lambsdorff stresses that “tracing the level of corruption to cultural 
determinants should not suggest that levels of corruption are largely inevitable. Culture 
can only explain a certain fraction of the level of corruption and there remains sufficient 
room for improvements of a country’s integrity” (1999:10). 
 
Moving back to our initial questions at the beginning of this section, one can argue now 
that it is not that simple to answer these questions because cultural norms of “gift-giving”, 
for instance, are distinguishable from truly corrupt practices in any setting. Moreover, the 
cultural relativist principle that claims that an individual human's beliefs and activities 
make sense in terms of his or her own culture, smacks of paternalism and leads to 
complacency as the determinants of corruption are complex and do not lend themselves to 
simple explanations. 
 
Nevertheless, a recent research underlines that the perceived level of corruption on a 
cross-country basis is determined by the economic, political and socio-cultural factors.  
Although this thesis could not establish a link between the manifestation of corruption in 
Gauteng and cultural determinants, however, this link generally exists. This new research 
(Tavares, 2004) finds a significant statistical relationship between cultural variables, 
perceived corruption and political and economic variables, of which development seems 
to be the most important factor. This relationship is the result of the regression between 
the Corruption Perception Index, the culture dimensions, as suggested by Hofstede and by 
Schwartz, and the social-economic variables such as the human development index, gini 
coefficient, openness index and political stability indicator. Also the cluster analysis 
shows that as the level of perceived corruption increases, the level of development and 
openness of countries decreases and the cultural characteristics tend to be more 
significant. 
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Mallinger et al. claim that, “the greater the uncertainty avoidance (as exemplified by 
societies or organizations with specific policies and procedures for conduct), the less 
                                                
Another research on the Culture/Corruption Relationship (Mallinger et al., 2004) which 
used the nine dimensions of the GLOBE study21 and perceptions of corruption (measured 
by the CPI 2003) examined this relationship and the findings are quite interessing. The 
sample consisted of 17,370 middle managers from 62 different societies and cultures 
collected from 951 organizations that were represented in one of three industries: food 
processing, financial services and telecommunication services. These types of 
organizations were selected because they represented industries found in all 62 societies 
and were sufficiently different from one another that they presented an opportunity to 
capture information from disparate types of businesses 
 
Culture within each of these countries was measured along the following nine dimensions: 
Uncertainty avoidance, Power distance, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, 
Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Performance Orientation and 
Humane Orientation. A regression analysis was used using the GLOBE dimensions as the 
independent variables and the CPI as the dependent variable. A second-order linear 
regression with a 95 percent confidence level was run on each of the nine dimensions and 
their subsequent sub-categories. 
 
It emerges from this study that societies/organizations with high power distance; 
individualistic practices or low future orientation would be highly susceptible to 
corruption. This is the current tendency in South Africa where government officials seem 
remote from the public and the ongoing political scandals could be justifiable.  From the 
nine dimensions of measurement, the only significance in the study appeared with respect 
to uncertainty avoidance, defined as “…the extent to which ambiguous situations are 
threatening to individuals, to which rules and order are preferred, and to which uncertainty 
is tolerated in society (House, et al., 2004: 602),” and “…the extent to which members of 
collectives seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formalized procedures, and laws to 
cover situations in their daily lives.” For example, societies that have detailed policies and 
procedures would be described as demonstrating a high degree of uncertainty avoidance.  
  
 
21 Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness, see House, et al., 2004. 
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likely corrupt practices will occur. While it is surprising that only uncertainty avoidance 
emerged in the analysis, it is notable that the relationship is significant for all three 
subscales—what is valued, what is practiced and the difference between the two. 
According to House, et al.  “…countries that are high on uncertainty avoidance tend to 
have governments that support economic activities.” The results of the regression analysis 
in the current study support that hypothesis (2004: 603) and “…in uncertainty-avoiding 
societies, the public sector is able to function without much political interference and there 
is relatively less bribery and corruption.” (2004:630).  
That is what this thesis undertook to achieve while investigating the underlying factors of 
corruption in the Gauteng administration. 
8.4.3. The Human Factor  
One of the human factors at the root of the current public corruption is an insatiable greed, 
which tragically has become the driving force behind political behaviour. Of course greed 
as a human foible is not new. The histories of our communities are replete with examples 
of how greed had in the end destroyed the rich and powerful. But what makes greed in the 
contemporary South Africa different is this perception that it has been institutionalized 
and legitimized. Profligacy and extravagance in the political arena, illustrate this point. 
The institutionalization and legitimization of greed underscores the dichotomy between 
 
 
These conclusions suggest that, an understanding of the relevant aspects of local culture is 
indispensable as culture determinants impact on the behaviour of both individuals and 
organizations. Seen from this angle, this analysis, according to Mallinger et al., provides 
some insight regarding the possible impact of country culture on levels of corruption that 
occur within a given society. Recognition of such effects and the degree of their impact 
can drive cultural variables to act as predictors by anticipating potential ethical issues 
within specific cultural environments, and can also serve as guidelines for developing 
practices and policies to mitigate corruption, and for helping individuals and organizations 
to design strategies for dealing with these corrupt practices.  
 
 
 
  
281
the principles enshrined in the struggle for freedom of the past and the abuse in the 
exercise of power of today. 
Professor Erich Fromm, a noted Jewish writer and thinker, stated: "Greed is a bottomless 
pit which exhausts the person in an endless effort to satisfy the need without ever reaching 
satisfaction". A Chinese proverb says: “greed is insatiable”.  
In South Africa, there is  consensus that the wholesale siphoning off of public funds by 
greedy public servants is nothing less than a national disgrace. Hardly a day goes by that 
we do not hear of some or other municipal or government official being arrested or 
suspended from duty because of misbehaviour. It is furthermore evident that greed seems 
to be the prominent factor in cases of corruption and organised crime in Gauteng. For 
instance farms and smallholding attacks which occurred in the Wierdabrug area, in 
Gauteng, in 1999, were directed against the property of the smallholders and it appeared 
that in all the attacks investigated, the primary motive for the attack was one of greed.  
 
 
 
Further, it has been reported that in the property sector, greed is driving speculators crazy. 
Since mid-1999, land speculation and property boom have made developers instant-
billionaires.  Developers buy farms ahead of the sprawl, rezone them into townships, 
divide them into stands, sell them as quickly as possible and take their money three years 
before they had to pay for them. But the danger is that one day the end buyers will stop 
and the last speculators will lose billions (Sunday Times, 01 June 2003). In the Western 
Cape, it emerges from the corruption trial of former Western Cape premier Peter Marais, 
and his then-minister for environmental affairs, David Malatsi that “golf estates in South 
Africa were not designed to create jobs, but to make huge amounts of money for their 
developers”. Marais and Malatsi are alleged to have corruptly received two donations 
totaling R500 000 for the then-New National Party, to "lubricate" an application for the 
provincial approval of the Roodefontein golf estate at Plettenberg Bay. Malatsi alone also 
faces charges of theft and fraud, unrelated to the Roodefontein controversy.  
 
 In June 2005, Vusi Pikoli of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) announced that he 
would focus increasingly on crimes occasioned by greed rather than those arising out of 
poverty.  
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To keep things in perspective, it is arguable that corruption is perceived as a shortcut and a 
quick way to enrichment. Indeed, as Dlamini asserts, “we live in a world of competition 
and materialism where material possessions are accompanied by a symbol of an elevated 
social status. It is this concern with a person’s own parochial interests which disregards 
broader public interests. Other personality features associated with selfishness are 
prestige, power, honour and temptation” (2001). The lure and prestige associated with 
material possessions is irresistible to many and people are willing to violate rules and 
principles to enrich themselves. Iona Minton argues that the pursuit of money, by means 
devoid of morals and ethics, is the most prevalent malaise of modern times (2002:9).  
 
According to Rose-Ackerman, subtle differences in culture and basic values exist across 
the world. But there is one human motivator that is both universal and central to 
explaining the divergent experiences of different countries. That motivator is self-interest, 
including an interest in the well being of one’s family and peer group. Critics call it greed. 
Economists call it utility maximization. Whatever the label, societies differ in the way they 
channel self-interest. Endemic corruption suggests a pervasive failure to tap self-interest 
or greed for productive purposes (1999:2). 
 
Xolela Mangcu in his analysis of corruption’s roots keeps the same line by recognizing 
that power and greed explain the existence of corruption. Mangcu quotes CB Macpherson, 
the author of The Theory of Possessive Individualism, who has demonstrated how the 
concept of democracy espoused by people such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and 
Jeremy Bentham entrenched in the political culture the idea that we are all self-interested 
individuals whose purpose in life is to maximize our individual pleasures without regard 
to the greater community good. Self-aggrandisement became the basis of how people 
thought about themselves and their relations to each other and to government (Sunday 
Times, 21 September 2003).  
 
By applying this model to South Africa’s politics, Mangcu suggests that we must locate 
our own corruption in the political culture that has evolved over the years, a political 
culture founded on a number of principles that have to do with extracting maximum 
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benefits from the state for both individuals and groups. As seen in another chapter, the 
best-case scenario to be applied to this assumption remains that of the arms deal scandal 
where individuals entrusted with power unduly and improperly influenced the awarding of 
government contract in return for individual kickbacks.   
 
All these attitudinal or human causes are linked to what Victor Le Vine (1975) called the 
“core process” that is related to the individual office-holder. In other words, the functions 
of the individual occupying a given office or political position are defined not only by the 
formal, explicit powers and duties attached to the office, but a special role. The political 
role is determined by expectation as to how the occupant of a given office ought to 
behave. The office is, therefore, a sort of uniform that provides the wearer with explicit 
and implicit cues about his own expected behaviour and also tells others something about 
how he will probably behave as long as he remains in uniform (1975:4). 
The centrality of the individual office-holder is important in this study for many reasons: 
 
1. He is the link between the formal polity and those outside it; 
2. It is he who converts political resources into goods that creates feed and 
maintain politically corrupt relationships;  
3. And finally, it is not after all, as emphasized by Le Vine, institutions or 
organizations that engage in corrupt political practices, but people, acting alone 
or in concert for reasons of political corruption. 
 
Thus, it appears that a major motivating factor in the prevalence of corruption is greed. 
However, it can be argued that greed can flourish when institutional factors and systemic 
factors are favourable to corrupt exchanges. Bureaucratic transition and the conquest of 
political power by the “New Men” are some of many reasons for the incidence of 
corruption. In almost all incidences of corruption in Gauteng, the role played by 
individuals cannot be ignored. Phylicia Oppelt, criticizing the new men in the office 
wrote: “our new democracy offers wonderful opportunities for gifted, energetic black 
people. We should encourage those among us who have the guts and the confidence to 
stick their necks out, take the risks and make a run for it. But ambition unchecked can 
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easily become naked avarice. And upward mobility can easily become a licence for 
downright greed" (Sunday Times, December 7, 2003).   
 
What is devastating is the fact that profligacy and extravagance have begun to characterize 
elite behaviour at all levels of government. Palatial mansions at home and abroad, private 
jobs, luxury cars, expensive clothes and frequent overseas holidays have become the status 
symbols of the rich and famous in the government. What makes their conspicuous 
consumption totally unconscionable is the glaring fact that millions and millions of their 
fellow countrymen are still struggling to make ends meet. If conspicuous consumption has 
weakened the moral fibre of the society and made it vulnerable to venality, corruption and 
cronyism have further sapped its strength. Corruption and cronyism and the acceptance of 
these vices by a segment of society go against the grain of democracy and good 
governance. My investigations in the Department of Safety and Security and the Housing 
Department in the next chapter, clearly show how accurate is the above statement. If not 
checked corruption and its corollaries lead to the concentration of wealth among a few 
individuals; widens economic and social disparities; perpetuates the exploitation of the 
poor; increases the cost of living and accelerates inflation. It is one of the major causes of 
human misery. 
 
8.5.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
It may therefore be worthwhile to conclude this chapter by stressing that through this 
empirical analysis we have identified a full range of potential determinants of official 
corruption in Gauteng. It emerges from this examination that public sector corruption is 
shafted and conditioned by: 
 
(1) State involvement through regulations and authorizations that lead to the lack of 
competition in the granting of important documents such as licences and 
certificates, which give a golden opportunity to bureaucrats to extract bribes. 
Examples from the Licensing Department, Public Works, Housing and Welfare 
Departments provide good illustration of this trend.  
(2) In addition, the Affirmative Action policy seems to be favouring a specific section 
of the society, namely the black community, as recruitment and promotion are no 
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longer based on merit but are politically motivated. This can widely open new 
doors for venality, as rules for promotion and hiring are sometimes contentious.  
(3) Taxation and procurement regulations are major problem areas where different 
ways of interpreting laws require taxpayers to ask for assistance in complying with 
them. In many instances, the payment of taxes implies frequent contacts between 
taxpayers and tax administrators or when the administrative procedures lack 
transparency and is not closely monitored within the tax administration. In all these 
cases corruption is likely to be a major problem. In general limited supply of goods 
and services makes rationing or queuing situations unavoidable that push taxpayers 
to recourse to corrupt practices in order to “speed up” the procedures. Specific 
cases of poor procurement control were emphasized in almost all governmental 
departments. 
 
Therefore, this study has highlighted the frequency of significant official corruption in 
terms of the prominent role the government is playing in the economy through active 
industrial policies, price and interest rate controls, excessive regulations, and complex tax 
systems. With regard to institutional shortcomings, factors such as poor systems and weak 
checks and balances, the laxity of the punishment system and the lack of institutional 
capacity, all hamper the service delivery quality and create an environment conducive to 
corruption. From this perspective, corruption arises where public officials have wide 
authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives. This means the more activities 
public officials control or regulate, the more opportunities exist for corruption. 
Furthermore, the lower the probability of detection and punishment, the greater the risk 
that corruption will take place. Further, the lower the salaries, the rewards for 
performance, the security of employment, and the professionalism in public service, the 
greater the incentives for public officials to pursue self-serving rather than public-serving 
ends. 
 
 Besides these political corruption determinants, emphasis has also been put on socially-
embedded incentives to participate in or withstand corrupt practices. A number of factors 
related to socioeconomic and cultural conditions such as inequality, poverty, patronage 
and unemployment, can predispose groups or societies to disregard formal rules. In other 
cases, dominance of a political party – such as the ANC - or ruling elite over political and 
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economic processes, or exclusion of marginalized or poorly organized groups from the 
process, creates incentives for those disadvantaged by the system to operate outside it.  
 
Finally, the above analysis highlights that the general causal mechanisms that have been 
exhibited in this chapter to explain political corruption are contained within the structures 
of the state – check and balance systems, excessive regulations, penalty structure, 
affirmative action, institutional capacity – surrounding the corruption experience. Specific 
mechanisms such as poverty and inequality, personalistic behaviour, cultural determinants 
– provide further explanations for the extent of corruption a state may display. Thus, we 
have identified, by so doing, the existence and the strength of specific political, economic 
and socio-cultural mechanisms that can help to understand the underlying causes of 
political corruption in Gauteng.  
 
However, before dealing with the impact of corruption in the province, as there is no cause 
without effect, the next chapter will examine the consequences of official misconduct in 
two provincial departments: the Department of Safety and Security on the one hand, and 
that of Housing on the other hand. The aim is to lay out the relationship between the 
behaviour recounted in the two narratives and the various hypothetical causal models 
described earlier. 
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Chapter Nine 
COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY INTO PROVINCIAL CORRUPTION  
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
We elect to use the case study method because it is the most appropriate to this study. 
Scholarly works present case studies as a strong method of testing theories. As explained 
by Stephen Van Evera: 
 
 “contrary to large-n, or statistical analysis that deals with a large number of 
cases – usually several dozen or more – the case-study analysis explores a small 
number of cases (as few as one) in detail, to see whether events unfold in the 
manner predicted and (if the subject involves human behaviour) whether actors 
speak and act as the theory predicts” (1997:29).  
 
Furthermore, Van Evera states that “case studies can be best if we want to infer or test 
explanatory hypotheses, or if cases have been unevenly recorded – a few are recorded in 
great detail, many in scant detail” (1997:55). Given the lack or the rarity of experiments in 
social science, case studies seem to be the best format for capturing evidence for or 
against political theories.  
 
The following cases demonstrate that corruptiuon in Gauteng is costly as it impacts on the 
well being of its citizens. Our case studies, notably the Moerane Commission and the 
Housing Department’s investigations present blatant cases of the abuse of power by those 
entrusted with it. These two cases directly apply themselves to the study’s conceptual 
framework based upon two models: Becker’s “crime and punishment” and Klitgaard’s 
“principal – agent theory”.   
 
The former put emphasis on the individual who compares the expected utilities of legal 
and illegal behaviour. Fundamental propositions of this model are that the incidence of 
illegal behaviour is positively related to the potential gains from illegal activity and 
negatively related to the probability of conviction and the punishment. In Becker’s 
framework gains from legal activities are explicitly defined, on the one hand as the 
government wage, promotion, and public pension. On the other hand, potential gains from 
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corrupt behaviour are assumed to be a function of variables describing the size and scope 
of the public sector. The more government involvement in market operations, the more 
opportunities for corruption become evident through discretion on regulations and 
allocation of resources. 
 
The latter treats corruption as an information problem on behalf of the “principal” who 
fails to control the “agent” properly. In this context the citizens who elect a politician are 
considered as the principals and the politician as the agents. The models primarily rely on 
the information problems in explaining the incidence of corruption. The monopoly power 
of officials and the degree of discretion they enjoy in exercising this power create 
formidable information problems in explaining the incidence of corruption. Hence the role 
of institutions of accountability that have been pictured as mechanism that leads to 
detection and punishment of offenders. The need to prioritize effective anti-corruption 
strategies with a clear identification of the causes and effects of the phenomenon clearly 
prove to be unavoidable. The more aware provincial administration is of the perceived 
risks it faces, the better placed it is to address and manage these risks.  
 
Thus the eradication of corruption implies governance, which is seen by researchers as the 
traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country. 
According to D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton (2000) governance is: 
1. the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and 
replaced; 
2. the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, 
implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; 
3. the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them (2000:1). 
 
In their work, the authors have demonstrated that practical experience in many countries 
suggests that weak governance and slow economic development go hand in hand, while 
improved governance fosters development success. Their demonstration is based on some 
individual countries. For example, the decline of living standards in the Ukraine in the 
1990s has been ascribed to weak governance in the form of ineffective rule of law, 
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inadequate protection of property rights, widespread corruption, and ill-advised 
policymaking serving special interests. In Argentina, corruption in procurement and 
budget allocation was found to be common in the province of Corrientes. In contrast, in 
the City of Buenos Aires, a participatory program to enhance transparency in procurement 
is bringing about major improvements. In Campo Elias, Venezuela, far-reaching 
municipal reforms cut corruption in half and improved efficiency. These examples suggest 
that while governance failures are widespread and costly, good governance provides 
significant benefits. 
 
9. 2. The Moerane Commission 
 
In terms of good governance, corruption is seen as one of the most concrete expressions of 
maladministration. Transparency in public administration, according to Dieter Frisch, is 
not a new fashion. It is a legitimate concern of democracy: the people have the right to 
know how decisions that affect them are arrived at, by whom and under what 
circumstances; how public resources are administered, by whom and why. It is a guarantee 
of good governance (2000:24).   
The lack of transparency and accountability coupled with the lack of leadership and 
discipline displayed by Ms Yasmin “Jessie” Duarte, the MEC In the Gauteng Department 
of Safety and Security, turned the Department into private business and led to the 
appointment of the Moerane Commission of Enquiry into alleged mismanagement and 
corruption within the Department. Jessie Duarte was eventually suspended before losing 
her portfolio in 1998. This case must be understood as that of elite or grand corruption, 
involving dishonest practices by a senior official – though the offences themselves were 
quite trivial - resulting in poor and autocratic management and large-scale 
misappropriation. 
 
The Moerane Commission of Enquiry was appointed in terms of the Provincial 
Commission Act N° 1 of 1997 to enquire into alleged corruption and mismanagement in 
the Department of Safety and Security in the Provincial Government of Gauteng, and was 
given the following terms of reference: “the Commission was specifically directed to 
make findings and recommendations on: 
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(4) Alleged irregularities in the appointment of consultants, and remuneration 
including a Mr. Joseph Banda who was employed as administrative 
assistant to the MEC; 
Administrative irregularities included the findings by the investigation that after many 
denials about the car accident on 18 October 1997, MEC Duarte admitted, at least, that she 
 
(1) Whether MEC Duarte drove an official government vehicle without a 
valid driver’s licence; 
(2) Whether the MEC was involved in a car accident in a government vehicle 
and failed to report the accident to the police on time, as required by law 
and government regulations; 
(3) Whether the Department of Safety and Security paid for the air-fares and 
other related expenses for Mr. B. Bulunga on the MEC’s official trip to 
Portugal; 
(5) The suspension of Mr. Theo Burgers, a Director in the Department. 
Whether this suspension was in accordance with the public service Act 
and regulations;  
(6) Any other relevant allegations of corruption and mismanagement of the 
Department of Safety and Security, which warrant consideration in 
pursuance of good governance in the Province.” 
 
The Commission started its business on 16 February 1998, adjourned on 13 March 1998, 
resumed on 28 April 1998, and adjourned on 17 May 1998 for written and oral 
submissions. The latter were entertained on 8 and 9 June 1998. 
 
In examining the terms of reference above, the Commission of Enquiry exposed mal-
administration, financial improprieties and an attempted cover-up. The cover-up allegation 
was basically that some person or persons in the Department of Safety and Security had 
fraudulently and by means of forgery created or attempted to create a false paper trail in 
an attempt to exonerate MEC Duarte from all liability arising from or connected with the 
accident mentioned above.  The Enquiry produced evidence of systematic corruption by 
government officials who were in positions of trust. 
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was driving an official government vehicle, that is, her official vehicle, without a valid 
driver’s licence. In fact, on 18 October 1997, MEC Duarte was involved in a car accident 
with a government vehicle and failed to report the accident to the police on time as 
required by law and government regulations. There was an attempt on the part of Mr. 
Sibeko, then Head of Department (HOD), acting in concert with Messrs Musi and 
Muyani, and perhaps others, to conceal the fact that MEC Duarte drove her official car on 
18 October 1997 when it was involved in an accident. The attempt encompassed the 
following dishonest, and/or criminal, and/or improper conduct: 
 
1) On 4 February 1998, the forging of Ms Maruping’s signature on a document which 
was backdated to 11 November 1997; 
2) On 4 February 1998, the uttering of the forged document to “The Star” (a local 
newspaper); 
3) On 4 February 1998, the exerting of undue influence on Ms Maruping to obtain her 
signature on a backdated letter, which purported to close the matter of the “accident 
involving the MEC’s car”; 
4) On 5 February 1998, the creation of a letter backdated to 10 November 1997, with 
the intention to deceive. 
 
In the circumstances, therefore, Messrs, Sibeko, Musi and Muyani dishonestly and by 
means of fraud tried to conceal or cover up the fact MEC Duarte had been involved in an 
accident whilst she was driving or was in control of her official motor vehicle. It was 
claimed that this was a rear-guard action to protect Duarte. 
 
Further investigation against Duarte shows clearly that:  
 
1) Her friend allegedly accompanied her on a trip to Portugal at the   taxpayers’ expense. 
The Department paid Lynn’s travel in settlement of an invoice against the airfare of 
Mr. Bulunga when he accompanied Ms Duarte on an official visit to Portugal during 
April 1997. During cross-examination Ms Duarte accepted responsibility for the 
payment of the airfare in respect of Mr. Bulunga. 
2) Irregularities in the appointment of consultants and remuneration including Mr. Joseph 
Banda who was employed as personal assistant to the MEC from December 1995. In 
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this regard, it was found that the appointment Mr. Banda as a consultant was not 
tenable in several respects: 
 
a) As intended as a member of the Strategic Management Team (SMT) in the 
Department of Safety and Security, Mr. Banda was found not  to be “substantially 
qualified and experienced in the area in which he was to make a contribution”. His 
poor qualifications, standard 8 with 2½ years relevant experience, would hardly be 
sufficient motivation for his appointment to the post. 
b) His employment as a member of the SMT was unauthorized, as the right to employ 
SMT members was vested in the Director General and not in the provincial service 
commission that recommended him to the post. The decision was therefore 
irregular and misdirected. 
c) There was no justification and basis for the level of Mr. Banda’s remuneration at 
R112,00 per hour limited to 40 hours a week because this was a rate payable only 
to members of the SMT. Mr. Banda’s rate of remuneration exceeded the salary 
ranges set for members of the personal staff allocated to the MEC who are 
employed as civil servants. When recommended by the Public Service 
Commission (PSC), the appointment to the post was at the rank of chief 
administration clerk and a the salary notch of R50 868 p.a.. The gap between this 
amount and the R288 232,00 he had received over 15 months - from 1996/01 to 
1997/03 – was alarming and highly irregular. The Commission established that, at 
the interview for the post in question, the panel preferred Mr. Banda above three 
candidates who held Bachelor degrees (a requirement of the post according to the 
advertisement). Hence the question: on what basis was Mr. Banda paid the 
enormous amount of money he received over approximately the 18 months period, 
with access to a government car and a cellular phone? No action was taken to 
rectify his status in accordance with the directives from the Human Resources 
Directorate. At last, Mr. Banda who worked from 4 December 1995 to June 19 
1997 was finally fired after it became known that he had defrauded his previous 
employer. 
 
3) Another case of a breach of the directives of the Tender Board as well as the Treasury 
Instructions (TI) was that of Right Entry CC, as a consultant. The Commission heard 
  
293
the evidence of Jackie Motsegoa, Mr. Burgers, Mr. Sibeko and Ms Duarte, and 
considered as well the submissions of the Democratic Party regarding the procurement 
of Right Entry CC’s computer services for literacy training and installation of 
software. From all the evidence it was indisputable that Right Entry CC was engaged 
as a consultant without any contract setting out the services to be provided and the 
rates of remuneration. Similarly, the payments to Right Entry CC were not controlled 
to ensure payment was effected properly. 
 
Therefore, the following irregularities were found to impact on good governance: 
 
1) By utilizing the services of Right Entry CC, the Department was in breach of 
Treasury Instructions S2.1.1, which requires that if a Department needs services, 
provision of which is the functional responsibility of another Department, it must 
obtain services from that Department. Delegations of the Tender Board (para.1.6), 
however, provide for deviation from the requirement where exemption from the 
relevant Treasury Instruction or other financial directives, has been granted. The 
Commission was of the view that at the time that Right Entry CC was employed by 
the Department of Safety and Security, the Gauteng Government’s Central 
Computer Services was responsible for computer training, and Corporate IT was 
responsible for installing software and attending to computer faults. Even if 
justification had existed for procurement of outside services, such as it might have 
on 6 February 1997 when Ms Duarte addressed the Director-General on her 
computer problems, a departure from the requirements of TI S2.1.1 was not secured. 
 
2) The argument that Right Entry CC offered specialized service, which few other 
companies could provide was not entirely valid. Other companies capable of 
providing the service should have been afforded the opportunity through the Tender 
Board process; or at least the department tendering procedures should have been 
used. 
 
3) Ms Duarte, as political head of the Department, and Mr. Sibeko, as Head of 
Department and Accounting Officer, in terms of the provincial Exchequer Act. 
1994, should have been aware that Tender Board’s directives, the Treasury 
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Instructions, and the delegations of the Tender Board, were at all times applicable to 
the department. Although Right Entry CC was employed before Mr. Sibeko became 
HOD early in 1996, he did not take action to rectify the procurement through to 
1997. 
 
4) Ms Duarte, as MEC was accountable for the conduct and expenditure in the 
Department of Safety and Security, and there is sufficient evidence that she 
commissioned Right Entry CC without adhering to the Tender Board Regulations or 
the Delegations of the Tender Board. She therefore bears responsibility for this 
irregularity. 
 
5) The same could be said about Mr. Sibeko, who failed, as the Department’s 
Accounting Officer, to take steps to regularize the procurement of services of Right 
Entry CC within departmental tender procedures. He should also be held responsible 
for unauthorized expenditure incurred on Right Entry CC. 
 
Other irregularities that could be placed on the agenda for investigation as part of the sixth 
term of reference included: 
 
1. The failure by the MEC, over a long period of time, to implement proper 
administrative procedures and, in general organizational structures; 
2. The acquisition by the department of printing materials from Shereno Printers, 
office furniture from Zakhe without following proper tender procedures; 
3. The Department thereto did not properly manage the use and maintenance of 
Government vehicles, and damage as well. According to the Commission, it was 
evident that management of government vehicles at the Department of Safety and 
Security had been very lax. Mr. Burgers sent several letters to staff involved in 
accidents early in 1997, to Messrs Nkutha and Musi, demanding reports on alleged 
accidents, but there was no evidence that such reports were forthcoming. There 
was also no evidence of any decisive action taken by the HOD in this regard. 
4. Regarding the suspension of Mr. Theo Burgers, a Director in the Department, the 
suspension had been lifted before the Commission began hearing oral evidence, 
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thereby rendering it unnecessary to enquire into the legality or otherwise of the 
said suspension (Report [of the] Moerane Commission of Enquiry: 1998). 
Reactions: 
Duarte resigned her position and Gauteng Premier Mathole Motshekga referred the 
findings to the attorney general. However, despite flagrant mismanagement, 
maladministration and corruption on the part of Ms Jessie Duarte, she was cleared in 
January 1999, from all corruption and fraud charges after her acceptance to pay back to 
the Department of Safety and Security any outstanding amounts owed by her to the 
Department. After that, she was rehabilitated in the high ranks of the ANC and nominated 
on the party national executive committee (NEC) for parliament. The outstanding amount 
to be paid was R27 000. Later she became High Commissioner to Mozambique. 
 
9. 3. The Housing Department Investigations 
 
Besides Duarte’s case of engaging in impropriety, complex issues were brought to light in 
February 1998 in Gauteng during the Dan Mofokeng case. As earlier as 1996, allegations 
of widespread mismanagement, corruption and intimidation in the Housing Department 
were rife. This led the leader of the National Party in the Gauteng Legislature, Mr. Johan 
Kilian, to call for the suspension of the MEC for Housing and Land Affairs, Mr. Dan 
Mofokeng and for a judicial probe into the functioning of his department. In January 1998, 
allegations of irregularities were made by the public, the media, concerned staff of the 
Housing Department and political parties to such an extent that the Auditor-General had to 
intervene. The Public Protector in this regard also received various allegations. While the 
Premier’s Office welcomed an investigation by the Auditor-General, however, there was 
no way for Mofokeng to be suspended, pending the outcome of the probe.   
 
It is worth noting that prior to further debate the Auditor-General reports between 1997 
and 1999 in the Housing Department constantly displayed many shortcomings including: 
 
- The asset management programme 
- Lack of supporting documentation for rentals 
- Overstatement of expenditure 
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- Lack of control over farmers settlement programme 
- Deficiencies in the control of debtor’s bursaries to employees. 
 
Afterward, it was agreed at a steering committee meeting comprising the audit team and 
senior staff of the department to urgently investigate these allegations. The investigation 
that had been conducted by the Auditor-General lasted almost six months – from 3 April 
1998 to 30 September 1998. The findings and recommendations of the ensuing report 
were tabled in the Provincial Legislature on November 1998. An initial investigation was 
performed to determine the factual basis of 27 allegations. Only 17 were finalized and 
reported including the following: 
 
(1) Subsidies were paid out by the Department as well as by conveyancers, although 
sites were not serviced and housing were not provided. 
(2) Conveyancers did not comply with the regulations of the Department and the 
stipulations of standard agreements entered into with them. The Department 
allegedly did not ensure compliance with these either. 
(3) Agreements with developers contained several flaws, which adversely affected the 
delivery of houses. 
(4)  Townships were not proclaimed timely. 
(5) Although a firm of registered accountants and auditors (firm) was appointed as 
consultant to the Subsidy Management Section, it failed to impart skills to the 
Department. In addition, all the modules of the Subsidy Management System (SMS) 
were not implemented. 
(6) Contract workers were appointed in the Office of the MEC for Housing and Land 
Affairs in the absence of a recommendation by the Gauteng Provincial Service 
Commission (GPSC) 
(7) Money was paid out to attorneys not registered as conveyancers at the Provincial 
Law Society (Law Society) 
(8) Subsidy applications to obtain subsidies contained false identification numbers and 
personal particulars. 
(9) The Department did not adhere to the tender regulations of the Provincial Tender 
Board (PTB). 
(10) Government vehicles were used for personal purposes by the Office of the MEC 
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(11) Despite the non-existence of sites, R6 million was approved for the Atteridgeville, 
etc. 
 
The purpose of the Report was twofold:  
a. to facilitate public accountability by bringing to the attention of the 
Provincial Legislature the findings arising from an urgent investigation into 
allegations of irregularities at the Department of Housing and Land Affairs 
of the Gauteng Provincial Administration. 
b. To secure and maintain cooperation between all parties involved and the 
management was informed in detail regarding the objectives and modus 
operandi to be followed during the investigation.  
 
This urgent investigation ended with the exoneration of Dan Mofokeng, the MEC for 
Housing and Land Affairs, from any blame with regard to alleged mismanagement in the 
Department. He was cleared of 17 of the 27 allegations, leaving the Gauteng NNP leader 
Johan Kilian disconcerted and only able to say: “it barely scratches the surface” (Citizen, 8 
January 1999).  
 
However, the Auditor-General stated in his Report that while sufficient audit tests were 
performed to provide evidence for the findings contained in the Report, these findings 
should not be regarded as comprehensive since tests were only performed on a sample 
basis to substantiate allegations. He hoped that the Report would give rise to corrective 
steps, which would contribute, constructively to the establishment and implementation of 
proper management measures and financial control which would lead to improved value 
for money.  
 
The remainder of the allegations was referred to the forensic auditing component for 
further investigation. The forensic department is a specialist branch of the audit profession 
specially trained to investigate administrative and financial crime, which literally uncovers 
every stone, follows every voucher and cheque, and tracks down every clue and traces all 
computer data. Otherwise the probe had identified weaknesses in the system, prompting 
further investigations. 
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This is why, despite the exoneration of Mofokeng in early January 1999, a large force 
including the Heath Special Investigating Unit, the Auditor-General, the Public Protector 
and the Director of Public Prosecutions, was called to probe Gauteng Housing 
Department. In a joint statement released after a meeting between the four bodies in 
Pretoria, the need to meet regularly, share information and coordinate investigations was 
expressed. They agreed to coordinate efforts and to look at complaints against developers, 
irregularities with subsidy applications and alleged corruption by officials of the 
Department. Certain of these allegations had been highlighted in the Auditor-General’s 
Report, as seen above, and in investigations conducted by the Public Protector (Offices of 
the Public Protector, Johannesburg, 2 February 1999). The probe by the four agencies was 
concentrated on the remaining ten allegations already raised by the Auditor-General’s 
Report and involved 32 housing development projects. The cost of the projects exceeded 
R100 million. 
 
Moreover, in May 1999, the Heath Investigating Unit was given the go-ahead to scrutinize 
18 alleged irregularities in the Housing and Land Affairs Department. The 18 allegations 
included theft, corruption, mismanagement and other irregularities such as abuse of the 
subsidy scheme by departmental employees and developers, and failure to comply with 
tender procedures as well. Meanwhile, although he was cleared of all allegations of 
corruption, Dan Mofokeng lost his place on the ANC list and the Legislature in connection 
with alleged irregularities within the Housing Department. Consequently the ANC axed 
him from its election list that led to the loss of his post in the government. Critics were 
unanimous that allegations of irregularities committed within the department under 
Mofokeng leadership weighed heavily on a decision by the African National Congress to 
axe him from its election list. Subsequently he lost his MEC position after the June 1999 
elections. 
 
In March 2000, a statement from the Office of the Public Protector exposed certain 
irregularities after various in-depth forensic audits of specific-linked housing schemes had 
been finalized. The investigation revealed a plethora of fraudulent activities, which not 
only entailed a loss to government but also a loss to the poorest of the poor. These 
irregularities included: 
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- A developer submitted claims and was paid for the installation of basic services which 
were never installed, 
- Duplication on claims and payment in respect of a certain engineer, 
- Lack of performance by developers after receiving payments, 
- Non-disclosure of crucial facts to the Department which made its administration task 
extremely difficult, 
- Lack of proper control by certain local authorities. 
 
Finally, the Public Protector put an emphasis on the fact that the multi-disciplinary 
approach of the investigation and the establishment of the crack team of senior 
investigators was to ensure that the fraudulent activities involving millions of tax payers 
monies should be brought to an end (The Public Protector, 16 March 2000). But as strange 
things happen in politics, the Public Protector released on 28 September 2000 another 
report that showed that the former MEC for Housing and Land Affairs Dan Mofokeng was 
cleared of allegations of interference with the selection process and appointment of two 
senior managers of the department and found the allegations without substance. Therefore 
the investigation could not establish evidence to prove alleged irregularities in the 
Department. Among the allegations proved were: 
 
- Those certain companies offering an inferior product at a price higher than that of 
competitors were appointed as consultants. 
- That the Department prematurely considered paying a developer an amount of R935 
980. 
- That criminal charges and the suspension of an employee were withdrawn to obtain 
her silence with regard to her alleged knowledge of incidences of impropriety that had 
occurred within the department. 
- That all members of the Gauteng Housing Board were not objective and impartial in 
their decisions concerning housing projects. 
- That the Department sold state land to large “white owned” corporations at discounted 
prices and far below market value while persons from the community concerned had 
to pay exorbitant prices if they wished to acquire land in the same area. 
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Despite exonerating the former MEC Mofokeng for the second time, the Public Protector 
Selby Baqua was uncompromising in his revelations of large-scale ineptitude, blatant 
misuse of power and influence along with gross irregularities within the Department. In 
other words, he found out among other things that there was a lack of measures in the 
Department regarding control and safeguarding of vital documentation such as contracts 
and that the mechanism established by the Department to attend to complaints by the 
public in connection with matters pertaining to housing was inadequate. Thus the need for 
further investigations, as he recommended.  
 
Amid this controversial exoneration, a parallel investigation by the Special Unit carried on 
with its task culminating in the release of the 1999/2000 Annual Report on 13 October 
2000 that indicated that 142 000 individual subsidy applications, approximately 100 
conveyancers and approximately 170 projects were under investigation. Allegations 
included: 
a. Developers: 
- Not all the houses in the project had been constructed 
- Services were not installed or were not workable 
- Houses were sub-standard 
- No value for money 
- False certificates issued to the Department of Housing 
 
- Individuals not qualifying for subsidies were allocated houses 
b. Conveyancers: 
- They did not adhere to their contract stipulations and particularly: 
payments were made to developers/ sellers without the conveyancer being 
in possession of a “Handover Certificate or Top Structural Certificate”. 
- They did not pay monies received from the Department into a separate 
account. 
 
During the financial year 2000/2001, the Special Investigating Unit noted in its Annual 
Report that the it had investigated 22 housing projects and visited 25 920 sites to establish 
if the houses were erected, if services were installed and if the quality of the houses met 
the required standard. It was found that 21 452 houses had been erected. The team 
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finalized 17 of the 22 projects and these files had been closed. Of theses, two projects 
were referred to the Department of Housing to address administrative issues while five 
projects were still under investigation.  
In addition to this the team needed to investigate the payments made and if they were in 
line with the necessary policies and procedures, if the beneficiaries qualified for subsidies, 
visit the sites to establish if top structures were erected, services installed and contract 
stipulations met. The Unit reported its findings to Gauteng Premier Mbhazima Shilowa 
and new Housing MEC Paul Mashatile in April 2000, that is to say almost 6 months 
before that of the Public Protector who recommended also further investigations 
including: 
 
 
In this report, and also the last one for the Special Unit, emphasis had been put on the 
scope of the investigation. Accordingly, the unit expressed its concern by highlighting 
what could be seen as an immense investigation that necessitated from the investigating 
team the need to look at all the relevant documentation pertaining to the projects that had 
been approved. This included perusing the project and financial files with emphasis on the 
following: 
- Agreements between the Housing Board and the Developer 
- Application by the Developer 
- Correspondence between the Developer and the Housing Board 
- Addendum’s and changes to original agreements 
 
- An investigation by the Head of the Department (HoD) whether disciplinary measures 
should be taken against any official who might have been responsible for lack of 
control and non-compliance. 
- The HoD, in consultation with the three investigating agencies, should establish a 
departmental investigating body to investigate the housing development projects 
administered by the department in 1995.     
Notwithstanding the conclusion of those reports, the Housing Department continued to 
receive numerous complaints of corruption from the general members of the public, 
prompting the new MEC, Paul Mashatile, to commission a probe in order “to dig deeper 
and widen the scope of investigations”. Consequently, he enlisted the services of 
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independent investigative and forensic experts, George Fivas – a former commissioner of 
the SAPS – and CVMP Ramathe in January 2002. The investigation, in its preliminary 
findings, discovered evidence of serious irregularities including bribes paid to speed up a 
place on the housing waiting list, houses sold illegally, and developers who had been paid 
for houses they never built. As a result, the MEC resolved to instruct the investigators to 
conduct thorough investigations focusing particularly on irregularities in 20 projects in the 
low-cost housing sector. The details of a 10- month investigation into fraud and corruption 
involving these 20 projects had been revealed by Paul Mashatile, the MEC, in a media 
statement handed over to me by his office when I requested an interview on 3 March 
2003. 
 
From this document dated 11 December 2002, he pointed out that Gauteng low-cost 
housing initiative has lost R42, 9 million to fraud, corruption and shoddy workmanship. 
This amount is enough to build about 2 150 houses worth R20 000 each. On the 20 
projects uncovered by the investigation, the worst cases had been singled out as follows: 
 Protea Glen Ext 1-4, 11 and 12: 
On 24 August 1994 an agreement to construct 2 400 housing units in Protea Glen, Soweto, 
was entered into between the Department and a developer styled Township Realtors. 
There was evidence indicating that the developer was paid approximately R40.1 million 
despite non-performance and /or breach of contract. There was also evidence of possible 
criminal conduct on the part of a number of role players, prompting the Department to 
bring in the Serious Economic Offences Unit of the SAPS to further enhance the 
department efforts in its fight against corruption and maladministration. A senior official 
who was implicated in the irregularities was suspended. 
 
 Saldo Projects: 
 In 1994 and 1996 South African Land Development Organisation (SALDO) and its 
subsidiaries was awarded contracts to undertake housing development in Vlakfontein, 
Hammanskraad and Protea South. Saldo was liquidated while initially being investigated 
by the then Heath Unit. An out of court settlement was reached between the Department 
and Saldo with the assistance of the Special Investigating Unit following more allegations 
of wrongdoing being reported. The Department started new investigations – still under 
  
303
way - not only into the three projects but also into other projects undertaken by the 
company or its subsidiaries. 
 
 ERF 230 IQ Farm Hospital – Diepkloof, Soweto: 
The department is investigating a deed of sale entered into between the Department of 
Development Planning and Local Government and a company known as Choice Decisions 
18 (Pty) Ltd in November 2000. Evidence uncovered shows that there was flagrant 
disregard of stipulated rules and procedures as well as acts of collusion between the 
company and certain officials within the Department of Development Planning and Local 
Government. 
 
 Lakeside (southern Johannesburg): 
Various irregularities allegedly committed by individuals and organizations in the 
allocation of low cost houses (commonly known as RDP) to non-qualifying beneficiaries 
have been investigated in the Lakeside project. The irregularities range from illegal sale of 
RDP houses to acts of bribery. As a result of the investigations, sixteen cases of fraud 
and/or theft had been reported to the SAPS and arrests are pending. 
 
 Diepsloot West Extension 1 and 2 (northern Johannesburg):  
Evidence uncovered show possible collusion between Local Council officials and 
members of the public. This matter in particular pertains to the manipulation of the 
“waiting list” by the officials. As a result, many deserving poor people are being deprived 
of the housing benefits resulting in government’s work being projected in poor light. The 
prejudice that has been suffered by both the Department and the City Council of 
Johannesburg is tremendous. 
 
 Braamfischerville and Tshepisong (West Rand): 
The projects consist of about 18 000 housing units. The investigation has identified 
various persons including Council officials who are facilitating the illegal tenure of 
properties. A number of cases pertaining to fraud/or corruption have been reported to the 
SAPS for further investigations. Arrests are pending. 
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 Slovoville (West Rand): 
Investigation in this project has identified members of a local steering committee who 
have acted illegally in obtaining ownership of subsidized houses for themselves. The 
investigation is still proceeding and the Department has in the meantime confiscated over 
33 title deeds pending the outcome of the investigation. 
 
 Kagiso (West Rand): 
It has been found out that officials in the employ of Roodepoort Local Council have been 
accepting bribes of between R240-R260 in exchange for manipulation of ones position on 
the “waiting list”. Furthermore, the officials have been also receiving bribes of between 
R3000-R6000 to issue a fictitious letter of site allocation to non-qualifying beneficiaries. 
As a result of the investigations, numerous charges of theft and corruption against 
employees of the Roodepoort City Council have been laid with the SAPS. A further 30 
instances of theft and/or corruption are still under investigations. 
 
After the disclosure of these corruption cases, it emerged that the Department started to 
take action to root out corruption. In the Protea Glen case, the department acted swiftly by 
canceling the contract as well as instituting a civil suit for the recovery of the over-paid 
funds. The same measure was taken in the Diepkloof case when the Department cancelled 
the deed of sale and requested the Department of Development Planning and Local 
Government to take appropriate action against the implicated officials. 
 
Besides, a lot of arrests and suspensions had already been made and more prosecutions 
seem likely as the investigation continued. The alleged transgressions by the suspects, 
according to the Housing Department, ranged from fraud, corruption, irregularities in 
housing provision by councilors, selling of title deeds and RDP houses, officials who 
tampered with the provincial waiting list and developers who claimed money from the 
department for houses that were never built (Housing2Day, April 2003).  
 
To date, available figures show that subsequent to months of investigations: 
 20 projects are under investigation 
 117 criminal cases have been registered with the police totaling 2 430 counts of fraud 
and or corruption 
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 9 arrests have been effected, including 6 for allegedly defrauding the Department of 
close to R120 million and one Gauteng Housing Department employee, Daniel Bila of 
Soshanguve, sentenced to two years’ jail for corruption in July 2003. He admitted 
asking for and receiving R1 420 from an elderly woman who was thinking the “fee” 
she had paid him would secure her a better position on the housing list. She never got 
the house.  
 More arrests are imminent, as the department has applied for 34 warrants of arrest. 
 
Measures instituted to root out corruption within the Department will be dealt with in the 
next section that includes a review of all contracts, a review of policies and procedures in 
the awarding and administration of contracts; a customer support centre; the establishment 
of an investigating unit; scrapping provincial advisory boards and the formation of a fraud 
prevention committee. 
 
9.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
These two cases are not isolated cases as allegations of corruption from other departments 
continue to be reported. However, corruption poses a serious development challenge. The 
bigger the government is, the more it allows corrupt officials to discover and auction more 
profitable parts of the government. The impact on service delivery is costly as poor people 
are the first to pay the price, as they have to struggle against unemployment and poverty, 
unable to access adequate accommodation and subsequently basic health care and social 
services. Most of them live in small and overcrowded shacks with no privacy and without 
any basic services such as water, sewage or refuse removal. According to the Department 
of Housing, it was estimated in 1997 that 2.2 million households in South Africa were 
without adequate housing. It was further estimated that this figure would increase by 204 
000 every year because of population growth, barring any effective intervention (2000:2). 
The Commissions of inquiry show how bad the situation was, especially in the 
Department of Housing and the relationships between these cases and the causal models 
become more obvious.  
Experience in Gauteng and elsewhere in the country has shown that, even in clear-cut 
cases of corruption, where officials have been investigated and found guilty of having 
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abused their office for private purposes, “the most that agencies such as the Special 
Investigating Unit, the Auditor General or the Public Protector’s office can do is force the 
official concerned to repay state monies and recommend disciplinary or criminal 
proceedings. They cannot either enforce these recommendations or monitor their lack of 
enforcement”, Colm Allan has observed (March 2000:2). In Duarte’s case there was 
neither disciplinary action nor criminal proceedings. A few months later, she was 
nominated as the new South African High Commissioner to Mozambique. As she 
continues to be employed in government service, this sets the precedent that misconduct is 
tolerated in the public service.  The Democratic Party was shocked and astonished that the 
ANC decided to appoint Duarte despite the fact that she was forced to resign as a result of 
the findings of the Moerane Commission. As observed by Peter Leon – then DP’s Gauteng 
leader – “the real issue was fraud for attempting a cover up and conspiracy to commit 
fraud, which De Vries (Witwatersrand Attorney-General) had not mentioned”. “Duarte is 
guilty and she is going to be left untouched, without paying the price for what she did”, 
Leon said. To which Duarte replied, “I have paid the unfair price of indulging egos of 
politicians who wanted me out of the way… Moerane did not accuse me of these things, 
only Leon does”. (Independent Online: www.iol.co.za.: 1998/09/12).  
 
In the Mofokeng case, alleged incidents of corruption in his department were under 
investigation for nearly five years without any tangible result while repeated incidents 
strongly suggested irregular practice. As put by the HoD for Housing Department: “part of 
the reason why there was so much corruption was that there were no systems at the time to 
enforce compliance by developers. Money was paid based on claims submitted by 
developers” (The Star, December 11 2002). Otherwise, before the current investigation, 
the Department was almost under control of obscure forces working in the dark, as a 
legacy of Dan Mofokeng leadership. He was unable to see that the ship that he captained 
was about to sink under the burden of corruption. The final report of all investigations 
called by him was “spin doctored”, in opposition parties’ terms. As proof: he had been 
exonerated twice despite the evidence of the cases. In taking action to stop inefficiency 
and corruption in the spending of taxpayers’ money, Paul Mashatile did simply the right 
thing by opening a can of worms in his department.  
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Duarte and Mofokeng escaped punishment for misbehaving in Gauteng, because both 
possessed good political credentials in the ANC circles as freedom fighters. Even the two 
Gauteng government officials, found by a commission of inquiry that cost taxpayers R1,5 
million, to have “dishonestly and by means of fraud tried to hide” Duarte’s involvement in 
an accident, could not be prosecuted. The only casualty of this saga was Safety and 
Security Department head Mkhabela Sibeko, whose services were terminated on June 30 
1999 on the ground of incompetence and maladministration. But in a bizarre twist of 
events, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration ordered the Gauteng 
government in November 2000 to pay R433 000 to Sibeko as compensation for 12 of the 
months he had been without pay and also to reinstate him. Sibeko’s application to the 
Commission was unopposed. This is called a mockery of accountability and transparency.   
 
In many cases, the lack or absence of appropriate penalty amounts to being “punished” by 
being given an interest-free loan. Clearly, an efficient and accountable public service 
cannot emerge under such conditions. This bring me back to the two causal models and 
one can conclude that there is little difference between the crime-and-punishment model 
and the principal-agent model in explaining corruption. In both models corruption is 
viewed as a function of two major sets of variables: opportunities for corruption and 
controlling power of institutions. These institutions should not be limited only to the 
judiciary, it seems now, as these two cases have indicated, they can be extended to 
political institutions and civil society as well.  
 
The analysis of these two cases clearly shows how official misconduct impact on the 
political life of the province. As it will be demonstrated in the next chapter, in the political 
realm, corruption undermines democracy and good governance by subverting formal 
processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and 
representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary affects the rule of law; and 
corruption in public administration results in the unequal provision of services. More 
generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are 
disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and officials are hired or promoted without regard 
to performance. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government 
and such democratic values as trust and tolerance. Duarte and Mofokeng cases confirm 
this reality. After their departure from Gauteng politics, the ruling party tried hard to do 
  
308
 
some damage control to improve its image in the province. But it was the case of too little 
too late as the damage had already been done. Further investigations in the two 
departments proved how bad they were managed under these two leaderships.  
In terms of good governance, I encountered the case of inexperienced managers who 
often, were ignorant of tendering procedures and failed miserably to run their respective 
departments. As a result, they have to leave on the grounds that maladministration and 
corruption have sullied their credibility.  
The next chapter will summon evidence to demonstrate that corruption in Gauteng is 
costly – not perhaps as damaging as in poorer provinces, but nevertheless representing a 
considerable restriction on state capacity and a threat to political stability and 
developmental projects in the province.   
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Chapter Ten 
CORRUPTION CONSEQUENCES IN GAUTENG 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
By striving to draw up a reasonable theoretical understanding of the causes and 
consequences of corruption and to try to get a sense of the extent of these relationships 
through empirical research, the study also looks at the way in which to monitor corruption 
in order to get rid of it in the public domain. While there is increasing evidence that the 
economic costs of corruption are enormous and that the levels of corruption vary widely 
from one country to another, controlling it became a priority. Obviously, strategies to 
address this issue need to pay more attention to its roots causes that include the roles of 
incentives, prevention, and specific economic and institutional reforms. 
 
In the first part of this study, I referred to the vigorous debate between those who argue 
the “toxic” vs. the “tonic’ effects of political corruption that has been brilliantly illustrated 
by Professor Heidenheimer. By so doing, I tried to underline the point of view of those 
who have argued that the economic benefits of corruption outweigh the costs (Leff, 1964; 
Nye, 1967; Huntington, 1968). One notes that in earlier discussions of the problem of 
corruption in developing countries, some scholars brought to light perceptions about 
positive aspects of corruption. For example, their argument ran that corruption overcomes 
bureaucratic indifference and accelerates decision-making, reduces uncertainty about 
deciding whether or not to invest, and thus serves to mitigate the consequences of poor 
government policies (Leff, 1964:8-14).  
 
Meanwhile, Michael Johnston argues that while corruption can sometimes distribute small 
benefits to a large proportion of the population and can break through bureaucratic and 
political stalemates, more often it is a “regressive” form of influence benefiting the 
wealthy and the well connected at the expense of the have-nots (1982:25). 
 
However, our line of thinking is that corruption is socially destructive. Although some 
forms of corruption may have marginal political and economic benefits, it is important to 
point out that corruption has severe negative effects on long-term and sustainable 
  
310
economic growth and development. In addition, analyses of the overall balance of various 
consequences of corruption show that its effects are negative.  
 
Kaufmann and Gray (1998:8-9) underscore this feature by showing that instead of 
corruption being the “grease” that lubricates the “squeaky wheels” of a rigid 
administration, it fuels the growth of excessive and discretionary regulations. Further, 
available empirical evidence refutes the grease and “speed money” arguments by showing 
a positive relationship between the extent of bribery and the amount of time those 
enterprise managers spend with public officials.  Responses from more than 3,000 firms in 
59 countries surveyed in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Survey 
for 1997 indicated that where corruption was perceived to be high, firms managers spend 
more time with government bureaucrats negotiating licenses, permits, signatures, and 
taxes. In this context, the grease argument is particularly troublesome since bribes can 
override such regulations and cause serious social harm, such as illegal logging of tropical 
rain forests or failure to observe building codes designed to ensure public safety. 
 
It has been found that whether corruption occurs on the micro or microeconomic scale, it 
has its prices, both direct and indirect. Moreover, corruption is not a zero-sum game. It is 
obvious that the costs or the price of corruption are better outlined in terms of economic 
growth. From this perspective, a number of studies have explored the possible influence of 
corruption on the growth of GDP. In developing countries, one dollar of corruption is 
estimated to impose a burden of $1.67, which becomes very large when compounded over 
time. For more details, let us take a look at recent attempts in assessing the impact of 
corruption on political development. Tanzi’s analysis of causes and effects of corruption 
around the world provides the necessary scheme that is used in this study which shows 
that the consequences of corruption on the economy are explained through two 
approaches: qualitative effects and quantitative or econometric results (1998:26-28): 
 
10. 2. Qualitative Results or Direct Effects 
 
The nexus between corruption, development and stability shows clearly that the social and 
economic costs of corruption are sometimes unbearable for many developing countries. 
Further, some forms of corruption are more harmful for development than others, but 
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nobody argues anymore that corruption is good for development. What is obvious is the 
fact that corruption affects the poor directly since it increases the price for public services, 
lowers the quality of these services and often restricts poor people’s access to water, 
education, health care and many other key services. It also distorts poor people’s 
relationships with and trust for public officials, the police and people in authority who 
extort bribes from them.  
 
Furthermore, the effects of corruption hit the small people hard, not the bigwigs. Studies 
show that the ones shortchanged by all this are the socially powerless and decent people, 
for they either cannot or will not join in playing the crooked game. Small business and 
poor people lack the resources to prod the decision - making mill to work in their interest; 
they are helplessly at the mercy of capriciousness and corruption. So they try to make a go 
for it in the outlaw zone of the shadow economy. Because of their poverty or uprightness 
they constantly get short shrift in comparison with those who have the wherewithal to 
influence decisions and the way things are handled to their advantage and are not shy 
about doing so.  
 
Nevertheless, new studies show “little research has been conducted in South Africa on the 
costs of corruption, both in terms of actual monetary value and trust in public institutions” 
(Department of Public Service Administration, Jan. 2002). This thesis is an attempt to 
underline the effects of corruption on the domestic environment. 
 
In Gauteng, the least corrupt regional administration in comparison to other provinces, 
there is no doubt that corruption hurts the economic performance of the province through 
public servants’ wrongdoings. A task team appointed to investigate administrative 
/managerial issues affecting the provincial administration of Gauteng from the 5th to 9th 
May 1997 found among other pitfalls that the financial management capacity of many of 
the departments in the province was not commensurate with the tasks that they were 
needed to perform or the budgets managers were required to oversee. The departments of 
the province did not have sufficient numbers of appropriately qualified senior financial 
managers a situation that was conducive to corruption resulting in significant loss/wastage 
of public funds or resources. 
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The National Party Corruption Barometer points at a total amount of between R161,5 
million and R356,6 million that was transacted in corrupt activities in Gauteng between 
July 1994 and June 1998, as shown in this table: 
Table 32: Total Amount of Corruption: 
Province N° of cases Amount involved Fraud/Theft Maladministration 
Gauteng 61 R161,5m – R355,5m R113,5m- R241,5m R43m-R87,5m 
Source: NP Corruption Barometer (1998:13). 
 
This table shows how poorly managed, inefficient, and wasteful departments are able to 
squander resources that could otherwise, be used for genuine development. Various state 
officials may extract “under the table” fees from individual citizens as they approach the 
state as customers, patients or school children. Widespread corruption is seen as a 
symptom of a poorly functioning state, and as a failure of ethical leadership, democracy 
and good governance. Corruption literature in recent years highlights the impoverishment 
of poorly managed states, as corruption emerges as one of the most important contributors 
to high levels of poverty and deprivation in the developing world. 
 
These practices have been underlined in Gauteng where, according to a new study, clients 
of public services (health, police and home affairs) estimated that between 15% and 30% 
of public officials are corrupt, and 10% indicated that public officials expect some form of 
extra payment for services rendered. Public officials themselves perceived clients to be 
corrupt in a sense of constantly seeking “back-door” solutions to their problems. They 
admitted to having been approached by a client wanting to give them a gift in exchange 
for a service provided. Slightly more than one in ten public officials in Gauteng admitted 
to accepting such a gift (Country Corruption Assessment Report, SA, 2003:3). 
 
With regard to the police, it appears that police officers are the most vulnerable to 
corruption, as shown by a TI Global Corruption Barometer (3 July 2003), where 23.8 % 
of respondents in South Africa singled out police, deemed as the most ripe for reform. 
Subsequently, corruption among police members is severely compromising the 
functioning and credibility of the SAPS. In terms of foreign investment, as put by a Senior 
Superintendent of the SAPS Strategic Unit: “corruption compromised the quality of the 
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police services and affected the country’s economy because investors did not trust the 
police” (Business Day, 23 November 2000). Besides, internal corruption is detrimental to 
the morale of police members and causes the public to perceive the police as being unable 
to provide an effective policing service. The following figures show how cases of police 
corruption increased year after year between 1996 and 2000 and alleged offences from 1 
January 2001 to 31 December 2002.  
Table 33: Number of Cases of Police Corruption: 1996-2000 
 1999 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Cases received 2300 3108 3779 4638 3751 
Police allegedly implicated 2197 3106 3586 4374 1466 
Police charged 246 428 475 844 1041 
Police convicted 30 78 128 143 195 
Source: Race Relations Survey 2001/02, p.374. 
 
Table 34: Police Alleged Offences: 2001-2002 
Corruption Fraud/Theft Defeating Ends 
of Justice 
Assisting 
Escapees 
Bribery/Extortion 
1251 696 293 90 40 
Sources: SAPS Annual Report 2002/2003, p.10. 
 
Furthermore, lack of power by poor people makes them vulnerable, as they do not have 
easy access to legal recourse and representation. Property rights are often not well 
established and access to courts depends on the power of the purse. Not having the means 
to bribe the judge often results in losing a case. In a country with a corrupt justice system 
such as South Africa, justice becomes a matter of negotiating a price, much to the 
advantage of the rich and powerful who have virtually no limits imposed on their actions. 
This has been highlighted by serious weaknesses and shortcomings in the capacity and 
will of public sector bodies to implement and to comply with the laws. For example, the 
courts are overloaded and struggle to retain experienced prosecutors, resulting in backlogs, 
delays and withdrawals in corruption cases, and this may contribute to the perception of 
the prevalence of corruption within some organizations.  
 
In terms of corruption effects, a look at Elliott’s table can be useful as she recaps the 
consequences of administrative corruption in Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, 
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Singapore, Thailand, and Hong Kong – all emerging countries like South Africa. This is 
the result of a cross-country study - that analyses the incidence of corruption in three 
government functions: taxation, expenditure, and regulation. The implications of Elliott’s 
study to Gauteng lay in the similarities of her findings with those of Gauteng with regard 
to the three government functions. The study found that the most common forms of 
corruption were bribery, nepotism and theft of government property. As might be 
expected, the study also found that reduction of taxes owed was the primary corrupt 
objective in customs and other revenue collection agencies. Regarding government 
spending, the study found that overpricing, substandard quality, and theft of government 
property for sale on the black market were the most common forms of corruption. In the 
regulatory area, most of the cases look at police departments, where the most common 
outcome of corruption was protection of illegal vice. This study covers almost the same 
areas, hence the application of Elliott’s research on comparative grounds.  
Table 35: Consequences of Corruption:  
Inefficiencies Inequities 
Misallocation of government resources due to award 
of contracts to less efficient bidders 
Redistribution of assets from public sector to 
corrupt individuals 
 
Distortions in allocation of government expenditure 
Redistribution from relatively poorer to relatively 
wealthier individuals who are more likely to have 
access to government officials 
Distortions in allocation of privatized enterprises Undermining of political legitimacy 
Inappropriate or poor quality infrastructure - 
Undersupply of public goods such as clean air or 
water 
- 
Incentives to create additional regulations or delays 
in order to collect bribes 
- 
Lost national savings and lowered investment due to 
flight abroad bribe of “capital”. 
- 
 
Source: Kimberly A. Elliott, in Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, A. Heidenheimer and M. 
Johnson, 2001:929 
 
The two experiences underscore the subsequent burden of government malpractices as 
corruption undermines economic development by generating considerable distortions and 
inefficiency. In the private sector, corruption increases the cost of business through the 
price of illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating with officials, 
and the risk of breached agreements or detection.  In the Gauteng case the whole burden is 
borne by government departments as corruption is: 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
siphoning away a large chunk of public resources which could have been 
productively employed elsewhere in the economy, as was the case of Jessie Duarte 
who took a friend on an overseas visit. There were millions of rands 
misappropriated in the Gauteng Housing and Land Affairs Department headed by 
Dan Mofokeng.  
undermining effectiveness and efficiency of the government; for instance Duarte’s 
department was plagued with factions and was under the control of inept political 
and administrative heads, as found by the Moerane Commision, giving the whole 
Gauteng government a negative image. The same can be said about the appointment 
by the ANC national leadership of the Negota commission of inquiry to probe a 
string of allegations of maladministration and corruption against Premier 
Motshekga. This resulted once again in a negative image of the government and 
ended up undermining its effectiveness and efficiency.      
reducing efficient mobilization of resources and management of development 
activities; as people in top government positions devoted their time to respond 
questions put to them by the investigative officers to help the numerous 
commissions of inquiry. Thus, they lack the necessary time to get committed to 
government development priorities.  
(4) directing gains from investment in the industrial sector to conspicuous consumption; 
as demonstrated by the following two mayoral cases. The first case involves the 
Mayor of Ekurhuleni metro, Bavumile Vilakazi who once was described as someone 
having completely “lost control of spending”. It was reported that he took 
conspicuous consumption to new heights when the mayoral committee approved a 
R3.5 million budget for his office administration. Many staff in his office earned 
salaries that made them the envy of their counterparts ranging from R305 000 a year 
for his policy advisor and his liaison director to R162 000 for his secretary; while 
his personal assistant pocketed R201 000. This followed his inauguration in 
February 2001 when he splashed out R400 000 for a one-day party. Furthermore, his 
council approved the building of new council chamber, including mayoral office, 
estimated to cost R60 million. Vilakazi’s car was a fully armoured Mercedes E430, 
which cost R560 000, had special features such as run-flat tyres, bullet-proof 
polycarbonated windows and a specially reinforced passenger cell. Obviously, this 
was in sharp contrast to what his colleagues in other municipalities were driving.  
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As Sphiwe Mboyane noted, “while the ANC preaches belt tightening and financial 
discipline among civil servants, it seems this does not apply to the mayor of the 
economically depressed Ekurhuleni unicity, which is made up of several towns and 
satellite townships on the East Rand” (City Press, May 20 2001). As a result of this 
wastfeful expenditure, Vilakazi was forced to resign. 
 
The second case involved the mayor of Mogale City, Lentswe Mokgatle. It was 
revealed that, in terms of a proposal, Mokgatle’s basic salary would rocket to R2.5 
with the total costs of his office amounting at more than R4 million. This prompted 
an urgent meeting attended by Gauteng Premier Mbazima Shilowa, government 
spokesman Joel Netshitenzhe, Johannesburg Mayor Amos Masondo and Ekurhuleni 
mayor Bavumile Vilakazi. The emergency meeting and the revelations came in the 
wake of an outcry over Vilakazi’s extravagant expenditure and aimed to devise a 
strategy to respond to the revelations of Mokgatle’s proposal.   
 
(5) generating allocative inefficiency by permitting the least efficient contractor or most 
costly supplier with the highest ability to bribe those who award government 
contracts, as seen in the procurement section with Ndinzani’s case, to win tenders. It 
can be asserted that where the system of bribery is well established, as was the case 
in Johannesburg Licensing Department, income gained from bribes is no longer a 
windfall but becomes a part of expected wages in addition to the award of contracts 
for supplying, designing and construction by the public sector. In August 2000, 
there were numerous arrests in this department where about 80% of staff members 
were implicated in fraud and bribery, with 16 arrests in Sandton offices, 12 in 
Johannesburg and 4 in Roodepoort, thanks to the National Traffic Information 
System (Natis). The arrests followed the uncovering by the Johannesburg Licensing 
Department, in conjunction with the Department of Transport, of a huge scam that 
involved the issuing of illegal roadworthy certificates.  
 
During investigation, I found that clients who spent the whole day in long queues were 
those who could not afford to pay bribes. As a “punishment” for not paying, they were 
“sentenced” to stay in long queues for long hours and were likely to come back the 
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following day. This sort of corruption for the provision of public services is an experience 
of everyday life. The money slipped to the licensing officer for the issuance of a 
roadworthy certificate or a driving licence or the occasional bribe or “cool drink” to the 
traffic cop to avoid an “official” ticket.    
 
In terms of costs, “the beneficiaries of such a system are the few entrepreneurs, 
bureaucrats, and politicians directly involved in it; leaving the economy in limbo by 
stunting wealth creation and limiting the state’s ability to deal effectively with widespread 
poverty and deprivation. As a result, the enormous costs generated are borne by the 
population at large” (Mbaku, 2000:58). 
 
Furthermore, examples from the Gauteng Province show that between 1994 and 1999, one 
of the laws most commonly violated with impunity was the finance law. “Most 
departments were overspending and the Finance Department especially was bloated with 
unproductive public servants who had duplicating functions. The province was not 
attracting investment and businesses were leaving the city center in droves” (City Press, 
June 16, 2002:3).  
 
A Report of the Auditor-General gave details of the whole situation by explaining how 
“key policies, practices and control framework necessary for proper financial management 
had not been established in the province. Weaknesses existed in the budgeting process. 
Budgets did not always make provision for all known expenditure that contributed to the 
over expenditure thereof. Further, budget did not reflect the strategy, goals, needs and 
objectives of the national government and/or the province” (June 1999-October 2000:3).  
 
One notes in terms of current legislation, and especially the Public Finance Management 
Act (PFMA) Act 1 of 1999, that overspending is regarded as illegal and may lead to 
charges of financial misconduct. In 1999, a report showed that unauthorized expenditure 
of close to half a billion rands in the Gauteng provincial administration was uncovered by 
the Auditor-General’s office. At the end of the 2000-01 financial year, GP was among the 
overspending provinces: 
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Table 36: Unauthorized expenditure in Gauteng         
Province Total of Votes in 2000-01 
N° of Votes with 
Excess Spending 
Total Amount 
Overspent 
 
Total Appointed 
for the Year 
R’000 R’000 
Gauteng 12 9 88317 18538798 
Source: Auditor-General, 2001:72-74 
 
It is arguable that corruption eats into an already tight budget and extra expenditures mean 
cuts in other basic needs areas. In October 1999 in Gauteng, the worst scenario came 
under the form of unauthorized expenditure, prompting the Standing Committee of Public 
Accounts (SCOPA) to hold public hearings at the Gauteng Legislature where different 
departments were called to account for the unauthorized spending. “Unauthorized 
expenditure did not refer to stolen money. It was money spent by the different departments 
that “was not part of their budget”, reiterated Mr. Johan Kilian, then SCOPA chairman, 
during one of my visits to his office. This followed damning reports by the Auditor-
General on the financial statements of the various departments for the financial years 
1997/1998 and 1998/1999. 
 
The Committee noted that there were no significant improvements in the audit opinions 
received by provincial departments for the years mentioned above. The Committee also 
noted that the audit opinions reflected a number of common transversal issues that needed 
to be addressed for improved financial management and performance in the various 
departments. According to the Committee’s Report (2001:3), the situation could be due to 
various reasons such as: 
 
- Late or non-submission of supporting documentation for auditing purposes; 
- Lack of effective personnel expenditure control or management resulting from the 
failure to perform regular reconciliations between the Financial Management System 
(FMS) and Persal; 
- Unauthorized expenditure, e.g. exceeding of budget or non-compliance with tender 
regulations; 
- Weak asset management; 
- Inadequate internal controls and failure to comply with Treasury instructions. 
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Therefore, the Committee recommended that, in line with the PMFA, Treasury should 
monitor and assist the departments’ efforts to rectify deficiencies that were identified in 
the Auditor-General’s report. Regular interaction and effective communication between 
departments, Treasury, the Public Accounts and portfolio committees, and the Auditor-
General’s office, should ensure that the obstacles to improved financial management and 
administration are identified and addressed effectively (SCOPA Report, 15 October 2001).  
 
The occurrence of these incidences of corruption can be interpreted as a strong message 
that shows that when corruption takes place, it distorts markets and the allocation of 
resources by: 
 
(a) Reducing the ability of the government to impose necessary regulatory controls and 
inspections to correct for market failures. When the government does not perform well its 
regulatory role on banks, hospitals, food distribution, transportation activities, financial 
markets and so on, it loses part of its basic raison d’être. The regulatory capacity is largely 
a national rather than a provincial responsibility. Tables 37 and 38 show how people 
perceive state ability to enforce the Law at national as well as provincial levels in South 
Africa: 
Table 37: Perceived State Ability to Enforce the Law (2002) 
Not at all 
likely 
Not very 
likely 
Likely  Very 
likely 
Don’t 
know 
Committed a serious crime 6 7 34 44 9 
Did not pay a tax on some income 
they earned 
8 10 35 34 13 
Obtained household services (like 
water and electricity) without 
paying 
10 12 34 32 12 
Source: Afrobarometer Paper No.24: 16. 
 
As explained by Robert Mattes et al., “while these are important bases of respect for the 
state’s capacity to enforce the law, it is quite clearly not widespread enough. This means 
that 13% feel there is a good chance they could get away with committing a crime, 18% 
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feel they could conceal tax and get away with it, and 22% think it is quite possible to get 
their services without paying for them” (2003:15).  
Table 38: Perceptions of State Enforcement Capacity, by Province (2002). 
 Commit a serious 
crime 
Evaded tax Obtained free services Average 
Northern Cape 8 12 13 11 
Free State 3 11 24 13 
Western Cape 8 13 17 13 
Northwest  12 14 12 13 
Gauteng 8 13 17 13 
Mpumalanga 13 20 21 18 
Eastern Cape 16 21 26 21 
K/Zulu Natal 20 24 26 22 
Limpopo  23 34 36 31 
Source: Afrobarometer Paper No.24: 17. %  “Not likely”/ % “Not likely at all”. 
 
Robert Mattes et al. argue that provincial disparities in government capacity reflect the 
legacies of Bantustan government. But these patterns may also reflect a legacy of a limited 
presence of the Pretoria government in these areas. For example, while an average of one 
in ten respondents feel they could get away with a crime or not paying taxes or rates in 
Northern Cape (11%), or Western Cape, Free State, Northwest or Gauteng (13% each), an 
average of one fifth of respondents in KwaZulu Natal (22%) and almost one third of 
Limpopo (31%) respondents felt they could do so (2003:17). 
 
It emerges from this research that interestingly, the sense that the state will enforce the law 
is wider than the perceived moral authority of the state’s enforcement agencies. 
 
(b) Distorting incentives as able individuals allocate their time and energies to rent 
seeking and to corrupt practices and not to productive activities. Generally, the resulting 
activities have a negative value added. This was the case at the Johannesburg Licensing 
Department where an internal investigation during March 1997 revealed serious structural 
flaws in the system. As a result, a huge vehicle licence scam was rampant within the 
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department where hundreds of false and forged clearance certificates were detected 
between March and July 1997 (The Star, 21, 5, 1997; Sowetan, 21, 5, 1997; The Citizen, 
22, 5, 1997; Business Day, 22, 5, 1997). Bribes ranging from R800 to R1600 were being 
paid by thousands of South Africans to syndicates to acquire illegal learner’s and driver’s 
licences. The licence scam works like this: one pays between R800 and R1600 to a 
“runner” who in turn gets in touch with his “crooked connection” at the Department of 
Home Affairs in Johannesburg. In some instances “applicants” have apparently 
approached the corrupt officials directly.  
 
Consequently, ten forged clearance certificates were detected every day at the 
Johannesburg traffic-licensing center. The scope of the fraud was considered to be much 
wider, but the exact extent cannot be determined as other centers in Greater Johannesburg 
lacked equipment to identify forged papers (The Star, 21, 07, 1997). As a result, about 
5000 drivers’ licence cases that were issued fraudulently in Gauteng were investigated. 
Thus, police had investigated 1015 cases of fraudulent licences issued in New Canada 
near Soweto between March and November 1996, resulting in 523 arrests and 470 
convictions. Here the racket began in 1995 when police uncovered 400 incidents of fake 
licence issuing. By 1996 the racket mushroomed to 1200 cases. In Pretoria, there were 
2800 cases investigated in Cullinan (Business Day, 22, 07, 1997). As an irate 
Johannesburg resident claimes, “running this scam is tantamount to committing murder 
and the bribes are blood money” (The Star, 01, 07, 1997).  
 
(c) Reducing or distorting the fundamental role of the government (on enforcement of 
contracts, protection of property rights, etc…). When one can buy one’s way out of a 
commitment or out of a contractual obligation, or when one is prevented from exercising 
one’s property rights because of corruption, one of the fundamental roles of the 
government is distorted and growth may be negatively affected. Corrupt procurement can 
be singled out here as promoting excessive spending.  
 
The awarding of contracts to high-cost bidders without following tender regulations result 
in decreasing state funds since it leads to higher spending on projects of often inferior 
quality. If we look at the tender award case that involved Ndizani Aviation Services and 
Europ Assistance in 1997, it emerges that the court ordered the board to review its 
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procedures after the Gauteng Tender Board had granted the tender to Ndizani despite 
impropriety surrounding the award. During the same year, an Auditor-General’s report 
found the Department of Transport to have spent R557 785 on a vehicle hire contract in 
defiance of tender board rules. In the financial year ending on March 31 2000, a report 
compiled by the Auditor-General revealed among other things that tenders were granted 
without tender documents or board approval in the middle of a scandal involving financial 
irregularities totaling around R90 million in the Gauteng Education Department. 
 
It is clear that the area of public management in which most corruption takes place is that 
of procurement. The purchasing of goods and services for the public service implies that 
certain decisions can only be made at higher levels of government. As Kimberly Ann 
Elliott has argued, “where such projects respond to genuine social needs, corruption may 
increase their costs, lower the quality, or lead to inappropriate choices of technology. 
Worse are ‘white elephant’ projects that enrich officials and suppliers but serve little 
public purpose” (2001:930). For instance, corrupt officials could allow the use of cheap 
materials in the construction of buildings or bridges that would afterward collapse, as was 
the case in two Pretoria incidences in the recent past.  
 
In one incident, a mall collapsed on 20 December 2001 onto customers and more than 50 
people were injured when the ceiling of the ground floor of the Kolonnade shopping 
centre partly collapsed around 16h00. According to the Tshwane city council no 
occupation certificate had been issued for a portion of the Kolonnade shopping centre, 
which partly collapsed. In a statement in Pretoria, the council said it was in the process of 
acting against the centre for non-compliance with building legislation, when the accident 
happened. The certificate had not been issued, as the centre had not met all the necessary 
legal and safety requirements, the council said. Yet the building plans had been approved. 
But the council could not explain why the mall was operating without the required 
documents?  
 
In another incident, the Women's Day (9 August 2004) stage roof collapsed at the Union 
Buildings. The collapse left Gauteng businesswoman Suraya Scott paralysed and narrowly 
missed President Thabo Mbeki and various dignitaries. A report based on an investigation 
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into the incident showed that the collapsed roof was not anchored correctly. It also noted 
that:  
a. the structure did not have the correct ground anchorages installed;  
b. no completion certificate was issued for the structure;  
c. an engineer from the Tshwane Metropolitan Council was not  appointed;  
d. there were no technical drawings presented; and  
e. that there was only a verbal agreement between the contracted company Computer 
Audio Visual Technology (CAVT) and Presentech, the company that erected the 
stage roof.     
These two cases highlight the lack of transparency, the transgression of procurement 
policy and the failure to comply with state tender and procurement procedures that raise 
the inevitable question of accountability. While the projects responded to genuine social 
needs, corrupt exchanges may have played the catalystic role in lowering the quality of the 
material to be used, which led to inappropriate choices of technology. Who will be 
accountable in these two incidences that imply that corrupt exchanges took place 
somewhere in the tender process? To support this claim, the academic literature shows 
that “the possibility of corrupt influences has always been important for the way 
procurement is organised in practice… The separation between the price and technical 
information in the purchasing organisation gives rise to middlemen with fairly high 
technical competences who try to buy technical information from employees and 
thereafter try to sell it to bidders… But in developing countries, the middlemen often need 
more political and less technical expertise” (Andvig et al., 2000:126). 
 
Therefore, when the awarding of a tender becomes questionable and when roofs collapse 
on customers putting their lives at risk, this become a matter of public concern. These 
concerns arose from the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South 
Africa (April 1997) that pointed to corruption as a damaging factor of the procurement 
process by stressing that:  
 
“Corruption is morally and economically damaging. It jeopardizes the 
procurement process, is always unfair, and often criminal. It saps money from 
much needed development projects, and adversely affects their quality. 
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Corruption, apart from permitting wasteful procurement to occur, undermines 
values of society, breeds cynicism and demeans the individuals involved. 
Accordingly there should be continuing vigilance in the procurement system to 
prevent and to react to the blight of corruption”. 
 
However, it seems that in most cases people take irregular executive decisions with no 
powers in matters of procurement. In Pretoria, Tshwane’s executive mayor, Father 
Smangaliso Mkhatshwa and Thoahlane Thoahlane, one of his municipal manager had 
been accused of involvement in matters of procurement over which they had no powers. A 
PricewaterhouseCoopers report on a forensic investigation into the business relationship 
between the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) and Yarona Creative 
Management Services – a new organizational structure appointed to design "an 
appropriate structure" for the municipality – revealed that both Mkhatshwa and Thoalane 
had their powers revoked at a council meeting on April 5, 2001, and vested in a 
procurement committee. This after Yarona was given the job earlier in April 2001. Only 
Tshwane’s procurement committee had the necessary powers to accept, reject or 
disqualify a tender application for the rendering of services to the CTMM.   
 
Nevertheless, both Mkhatshwa and Thoahlane authorized the payment of Yarona’s 
invoices and the signing of an agreement after this date. From an original contract of R350 
000, Tshwane’s taxpayers paid over R7 million for the design and establishment of an 
organizational structure that is still far from complete. It can be pointed out that Dr 
Thoahlane Thoahlane took office as municipal manager in April 2001 with an annual 
salary of R830 000, but was suspended from January 20, 2003. He was informed of his 
suspension in a letter signed by executive mayor Smangaliso Mkhatshwa. Thoahlane's 
suspension was related to financial dealings between the municipality and Yarona 
Creative Management Services as well as his refusal to sign his performance contract. 
During his suspension, he spent most of his time playing golf while, at the same time, 
earning a hefty salary amounting to R 70 000 each month. The issue was referred to the 
Public Protector for further investigation. The Public Protector informed the council later 
that the matter could not be investigated any further and that it should be closed. 
 
After two weeks of negotiations, Thoahlane resigned at last at the end of July 2003 and 
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received an all-inclusive settlement of R3 million in a golden handshake after having 
worked for about two years of his five-year contract, leaving councilors in disarray.  It 
emerges from this example that a lack of transparency and accountability allows 
politicians to take advantage of their powers to channel money into their own pockets. The 
most affected by this conduct are once again the poor who are more dependent upon 
public services compared to the rich.                  
                                                   
(d) Reducing the legitimacy of the state and perhaps of democracy. Thus besides 
corruption that bears most heavily upon the poorest sections of society, who are in the end 
bearing the cost of the distortions and deprivations corruption produces, it is also clear that 
corruption impacts on politics by rendering the state incapacitated and impotent. From this 
perspective, it should be noted that corruption destroys the state’s ability to extract taxes, 
to implement coherent and rational development policies, to redistribute resources among 
groups and regions, and consequently become destructive to its ability to transform the 
society and the economy according to political priorities. 
 
This has been evidenced by research that (Andvig et al (2000:60-61) shows that: 
 
i. The capacity of the state to extract taxes will for instance be eroded when individuals 
and groups are able to pay their way out, and certainly when public officials are 
embezzling revenues collected..  
 
Idasa and Afrobarometer found that corruption was the other key evaluation that may 
shape perceptions of government legitimacy and trustworthiness that allow the public to 
judge as to whether their representatives and government officials govern honestly 
(Afrobarometer no 24, January 2003:9). One realizes that the same study shows how 
corruption has evolved through the years since 1994. Idasa and Afrobarometer surveys 
from 1995 to 2000 have consistently found a widespread sense that significant proportions 
of government officials were involved in corruption. In 2002, however, there were 
changes in public opinion. As of September – October 2002, just over one third (38 %) of 
South Africans said that “most” or “all” government officials were involved in corruption. 
Similarly, 23 percent thought “most” or “all” elected leaders, such as parliamentarians and 
local government councilors were corrupt. Also 13 % thought that a similar proportion of 
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officials in the President’s office are corrupt. These figures represented a significant 
decline in public perceptions of corruption. The proportions that perceived significant 
levels of corruption in Parliament dropped from 45 to 22% in 2002. Similarly, the figures 
for “government officials” declined from 50 to 27%. It is also noteworthy that the stark 
racial differences in these perceptions seen over the past few years have been narrowing 
considerably.  
In another study (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 5, July 2003:3), Idasa conducted a 
survey between 13 September and 13 October 2002 that emphasized the change in 
perceptions by South African of their most pressing problems with corruption listed in 
seventh place. Clearly, the perception that corruption is an important problem has been 
increasing steadily since 1994, when it was not even reported as an issue. It was first 
mentioned in 1995 by 2% of the surveyed population and has now climbed to 13%. 
Whites are more concerned about this issue than others, with 31% mentioning it, 
compared to 22% of Indians, 11% of coloureds, and just 8% of blacks.  
 
ii. When bureaucratic regulations are restructured, manipulated and operated in a 
confusing and impenetrable manner in the implementation end to enable bureaucrats to 
collect bribes and other personal advantages, and public officials are preoccupied with 
other tasks, insecurity will hamper investments, state’s revenue basis will shrink further 
and its ability to render public services will be shattered.  
 
Government’s capacity - as demonstrated in this study - to solve the important problems 
facing the country, to enforce the law, and to serve them as individuals, is another possible 
factor shaping the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the democratic political system, as 
Idasa has pointed out. 
 
The 2002 Afrobarometer revealed that when asked “What proportion of this country’s 
problems do you think government can solve, fully four in ten (40%) of those surveyed 
said that government should be able to solve “most” of the problems facing the country; 
29% expected government to solve at least “some of them”. Only one in ten said that 
government could solve “very few” (11%) or “none” (2%). Differences in racial 
categories and provincial categories appear to be the most important demographic factors 
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that distinguish between perceptions of government capacity, as shown in the following 
table. Nonetheless, in general, government capacity, as manifested in these responses, is 
weakest in provinces incorporating former Bantustan homelands: which means provincial 
governments that include large numbers of poorly trained former Bantustan civil servants.  
Table 39: Ability to Solve National Problems (2002) 
 Total Black White Coloured Indian 
All of them 17 19 11 15 8 
Most of them 40 43 34 38 29 
Some of them 29 27 38 28 30 
Very few of them  11 9 13 14 25 
None of them 2 2 2 3 8 
Don’t know 2 1 3 3 2 
 Source: Afrobarometer Paper No 24, January 2003:12 
       
iii. Corruption effects render political system illegitimate in the sense that in many 
cases, corruption scandals, reports and debates have led to mobilization and political 
action from below.  
 
One saw how Dan Mofokeng and Mathole Motshekga had been toppled in elections at a 
time where corruption issues were high on the agenda. In many cases there is just much 
talk on corruption but little action, making people deem the entire political system 
dishonest and illegitimate, with withdrawal and political apathy as the consequence. 
According to Tom Lodge, the perception that politicians were corrupt or uncaring was 
among the most important issues that restrained people from voting in the general 
elections of June 1999, besides the failure to register and difficulties caused by lack of 
time or opportunity. These issues can be, broadly, conceptualized as issues of 
enfranchisement, disengagement and convenience (2003:110). Furthermore, the 
perception that politicians were corrupt was especially influential among the abstainers 
aged between 35 and 44 (20%) and 45 and 54 (28%). Both very poor people and the 
wealthiest non-voters in the sample were most likely to be unregistered. More affluent 
people were more likely to explain their non-participation with reference to corrupt 
politicians, and a majority of the wealthiest group of abstainers agreed that their failure 
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was caused by the conviction that political parties did not reflect their concerns, states 
Tom Lodge. Finally, the consequence of disinclination to vote due to the perception that 
politicians were corrupt may alternatively lead to low turnouts, as a symptom of political 
satisfaction. The second municipal elections in December 2000 were characterized by 
apathy with 40% of the electorate in Gauteng having decided not to cast their vote.  
 
Generally, the criticisms often voiced in many countries, and especially in transition 
economies such as Gauteng, against democracy and the market economy, are highly 
influenced by the existence of corruption. Thus, corruption may slow down or even block 
the movement toward democracy and a market economy. In Gauteng, the existence of 
corruption is evidenced through departments’ annual reports as well as budget statements. 
It is a “serious problem” in South Africa, according to the last PSC report released on 21 
February 2003. Endemic corruption in the public service in South Africa, has been 
identified by senior national, provincial government and municipal officials as the major 
impediment to transformation and services delivery, during an African Renaissance 
Conference in Pretoria in May 1999: “with the rebirth of a democratic state, the 
government was required to defend the gains already made by “unleashing the greatest 
might” against the wave of corruption”, warned Cabinet ministers (Sowetan, May, 13, 
1999). TI Global Corruption Barometer 2003 survey pointed to South Africa as a 
pessimist country where more people (36.1%) expected corruption to increase rather than 
expected it to fall. Only 19.3% thought corruption would decrease a little during the same 
period. 
 
(e) Increasing poverty because it reduces the income earning potential of the poor. It is 
worthy to point out that more than 30% of Gauteng’s population of 8,8 million are 
destitute, according to the province’s Department of Social Services and Population 
Development whose R3.9 billion budget is the second largest in the province, after 
education. Up to 87% of this budget goes to care dependency, foster care, child support, 
old-age care, disability and grants-in-aid to people who cannot care for themselves. 
Despite Gauteng’s affluence, the province has high levels of poverty with 48% of children 
in the province living in difficulty because of the lack of income in their houses. About 
25% of them are living in poverty and experience serious social problems. For instance, 
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levels of crime and violence are high, with children involved both as victims and 
perpetrators.  
  
At the national level, a study reveals that in excess of R11 billion is spent annually on 
social security benefits paid to some 3 million beneficiaries. This represents 
approximately 2% of GDP and is a major source of income for the poor. Social security, 
argues Lala Camerer, represents a significant proportion of government expenditure and 
as such requires good administration, careful management and strict control. Although 
there are substantial losses due to fraud and corruption, these losses could not be 
quantified. However, it is estimated that fraud, theft and inefficiencies in South Africa’s 
social security is absorbing 10% of the 11 billion budget, i.e. an annual loss of R1 billion 
(1997:23).  
 
At the provincial level, this has been the case in the Gauteng Department of Social 
Services and Population Development where a 1999 Report of the Auditor-General on the 
financial statements of the Gauteng Provincial Administration 1996-1997 reveals 
deficiencies, shortcomings, problems and fraud regarding the control over pension 
payments, advance, suspense and disallowance accounts, budget auditing and grant-in-aid.  
 
Another investigation during May 1999 at the request of the Minister for the Public 
Service and Administration, Dr Zola Skweyiya, found that the area of social security had 
problems with capacity both in terms of the numbers and expertise of staff. There were 
problems with cross-border flows and “ghost pensioners”. The suspension of officials 
suspected of fraud with full salary presents a problem to the Department that has 
uncovered a major syndicate defrauding the government with tentacles in other provinces. 
An official allegedly committed fraud with warrant vouchers amounting to R7, 925,883. 
The official was suspended from office and was sentenced in the Pretoria High Court for 
fraud. Only a minimal amount was recovered. At the end of the 1998-1999 financial year, 
the Department had experienced fraud to the tune of R50 million. 
 
In order to combat fraudulent claims and to stop pension fraud, the national government 
decided in August 1998, on a countrywide suspension of disability and care dependence 
grants by the Department of Social Services and Population Development. This new 
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welfare policy entailed the re-registration of the recipients of grants. In line with this 
policy, Gauteng withdrew pensions from about 14 000 beneficiaries. The Gauteng 
Department of Social Services and Population Development had to re-register 110 000 
pension beneficiaries in Soweto by 30 March 1999 as part of a national strategy to 
eliminate “ghost pensioners”. In Soweto, there were about 350 000 recipients of pensions, 
as noted by the Race Relations Survey (2000/2001:242). The Department hoped to save 
about R5 million as a result of the drive. The campaign followed investigations, which 
uncovered about 530 beneficiaries and members of the public who defrauded the 
department in 1997.  
 
 In a 2000 Report released on 30 March 2001, the Gauteng Auditor General, indicated that 
the Gauteng Department of Social Services and Population Development had failed to 
implement adequate internal control measures and this had in some instances led to losses 
running into millions of rands. Further, the Department had also failed to reconcile the 
Personnel Salaries System (PSS) with the Financial Management System (FMS), and this 
had resulted in a loss of R2,6 million. Inappropriate accounting practices had also resulted 
in the loss of authorized items amounting to R21, 805 million. The social assistance 
programme had shown a loss of more than R11, 662 million, instead of a R10, 143 million 
saving. Finally, in the social pensions area, expenditure could not be sufficiently verified 
because the department had failed to submit files requested for audit. “Since 19 percent of 
audited files did not contain documentation as prescribed by the Social Assistance Act of 
1992, it could not be established whether all statutory requirements had been adhered to 
before pension payments were effected”, the Gauteng Auditor said.  
 
In the meantime, the national department of Social Services and Population Development 
failed to spend 78.5% of its budget, according to the Auditor-General in September 2000. 
A report by the South African Human Rights Commission expressed its concerns by 
indicating that the government had massively failed South Africa’s most needy citizens. 
The report said that poverty alleviation reached only three million of 20 million people 
living below the poverty line. For IDASA, more than five million children in South Africa 
– 30% of those under the age of 17 - regularly went hungry. And six out of ten people in 
South Africa were starving, the government said in May 2002. 
 
  
331
In February 2002, according to the Gauteng Department of Social Services and Population 
Development, the Gauteng Government had had to close down 90% of its poverty 
alleviation projects, after losing R7 million to corruption. This followed a probe by the 
Kagiso Trust - commissioned by the Department of Social Services and Population 
Development - which investigated all provincial poverty-relief projects and found out that 
90% of the 368 projects were enriching individuals and not serving the community. Few 
people channeled up to R7 million of its budget that was meant for the poor into their own 
pockets. Social Services and Population Development MEC Angie Motshekga said her 
department was then consolidating the remaining 10% into more effective programs.  
 
Corruption and mismanagement often go hand in hand. At the end of the 2002/2003 
financial year, despite government’s talk of poverty alleviation and job creation through 
capital expenditure and public works projects, a report released by Parliament’s joint 
budget committee in June 2003, indicated that all provincial governments have under 
spent their budgets at the end of March 2003. The report was based on the preliminary 
figures released by the national Treasury, indicating spending trends in government 
departments. Of the total of R16, 3 billion allocated to provinces for capital expenditure, 
generally associated with job creation, R2, 5 billion remained unspent. Gauteng received 
R3, 7 billion and failed to spend R391 million.  
 
Finally about R15 million in social grant money meant for the poor had been pocketed by 
government officials in 2002 throughout the country, as disclosed by Social Development 
Minister Zola Skweyiya. This led to either suspensions and/or arrest of several officials 
dealing with grants. Three cases of theft of social grant money, amounting to nearly R1 
million had been reported in Gauteng resulting in one dismissal and one resignation 
(Business Day, 10 December 2002). 
 
To sum up, it should be clear that corruption is negatively associated with developmental 
objectives everywhere, as underlined by Daniel Kaufmann (1998) who argues that 
“opportunistic bureaucrats and politicians [who] try to maximize their take without regard 
for the impact of such perdition on the “size of the overall pie”, as highlighted by all these 
cases. Therefore, they may account for the particularly adverse impact corruption has in 
many developing countries. This was evidenced by a survey of high-level officials from 
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emerging economies that showed that public sector corruption was rated as the most 
severe developmental obstacle facing their countries, and no significant differences 
existed across regions.    
 
10. 3. Indirect Effects or Quantitative Results 
 
Data and research showing the deleterious effects of corruption on growth have been 
mounting, as suggested by corruption literature. From this perspective, it has been 
emphasized that: “in the past couple of years, several econometric studies, using cross-
section analysis and utilizing the available corruption indexes, have reported important 
quantitative results on the effects of corruption on economic variables. These results 
suggest that corruption has a negative impact on the rate of growth of countries” (Tanzi: 
1998,28). The experience of countries in transition strongly supports these findings that 
can be applied at both micro and macro levels - thus, allowing a better understanding of 
the negative consequences of corruption on developmental priorities.   
 
In general terms, the costs of corruption seem to be influenced by a range of other factors 
coming through many indirect channels. Therefore, on a macro level, corruption has 
implications on: 
 
- a country/province’s ability to attract investment,  
- income generation through taxation, 
- the effectiveness of its institutions, and  
- economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
 
As found by Gupta et al. (1998), a 1% increase in aggregate growth is associated with a 
1.2% increase of income growth of the poor. Consequently, since corruption negatively 
affects economic growth, higher growth in corruption is associated with lower income 
growth of the poor.  
 
Gauteng as a society in transition presents similar features to those found elsewhere in 
transitional countries where powerful empirical evidence have demonstrated how 
corruption hurts the poor indirectly. For instance, fiscal distortions caused by corruption 
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erode the quality of government services, with particularly serious consequences for the 
poor. Indeed, corruption appears as an impediment to economic growth through a wide 
range of channels by hindering investment (both domestic and foreign), restricting trade, 
distorting the size and composition of government expenditure, weakening the financial 
system, strengthening the underground economy and reinforcing inequality. Therefore, it 
seems that increases in corruption go hand in hand with decreases in economic growth, 
which in turn affect poverty alleviation. These negative effects of corruption on 
investment and growth similarly exacerbate poverty and erode the tax base, further 
undermining the quality of public services vital to the poor such as education, health, 
water and sanitary conditions.  
 
This scenario emerged clearly on 30 March 2001, when Gauteng Auditor Keith Nayager 
released his report showing how the Gauteng Welfare Department has failed to implement 
adequate internal control measures leading to losses running into million of rands. He 
revealed that inappropriate accounting practices had resulted in the loss of authorized 
items amounting to R21, 805 million. Further, the social assistance programme showed a 
loss of more than R11, 662 million, instead of a R10, 143 million saving. The replacement 
cost of assets lost or stolen was R4 582 022 at the end of the 1998-99 financial year, and 
was ultimately written off. Finally, the social pensions expenditure could not be 
sufficiently verified because the department had failed to submit requested files.  
 
The analysis of the above indirect effects establishes that the level of uncertainty in the 
business environment significantly affects investment, as corruption: 
 
(1) Reduces investment and as a consequence, it reduces the rate of growth. 
Mauro (1995:681-712) undertook an influential empirical study on the impact of 
corruption on investment in a cross-section of countries. He aimed to “identify the 
channels through which corruption and other institutional factors affect economic growth, 
and to quantify the magnitude of these effects”. He made use of various indexes provided 
by Business International (BI), a private firm that sold this and related indicators of 
country risks to banks, multinational, companies, and other investors. The author found 
that in a sample of 67 countries, corruption had a negative impact on the ratio of 
investments to GDP, its investment rate. 
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Researchers such as Keefer and Knack (1995) and Brenetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) 
obtained similar results. However, Mauro’s results have been subjected to criticism 
voiced by Wedeman (1996), the World Bank (1997) and Campos, Lien and Pradhan 
(1999). Nevertheless whatever the debate, Mauro’s result show that such reduction in 
investment is assumed to be caused by the lighter costs and by the uncertainty that 
corruption creates. Thus, according to Tanzi, the reduction in the rate of growth is a direct 
consequence of the decline in the investment rate. In other words, the analysis is based on 
a production function that makes growth a function of investment (1998:29).  
 
In South Africa, economic indicators show that the South African economy has continued 
to achieve steady and sustained growth over the past decade, despite the fact that it is 
experiencing difficulties in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and the global 
economic slowdown. However, it should be remembered that the most rapid sustained 
period of growth occurred in the 1960s, the highest annual increase in real GDP having 
been in 1964 – an increase of 7.9%. In 1977 there was for the first time in this period a 
small decrease (of 0.1%), due undoubtedly to the 1976 Soweto uprisings. But in the 
following years, real GDP grew by some 33% between 1980 and 1999, although there 
were periods of contraction over the same time, most notably in the early 1990s when the 
uncertainty about the political future began to take place.  
 
In 1999, the economy grew by 1.9% in real terms, more than double the rate of 0.7% for 
1998, according to Statistics South Africa. Yet, the growth rate in 1999 was significantly 
lower than in the preceding years. Real growth in GDP was 3.2% in 1994, 3.1% in 1995, 
4.2% in 1996, 2.5% in 1997. 2.4% in 2000, 2.8% in 2001 and 3.0 in 2002. This is a great 
deal better than many other economies have experienced. Nonetheless, in comparison with 
other emerging market countries, South Africa's economic growth has become less 
volatile. Since the 1950s, the economy has diversified and is no longer dependent on gold 
mining. Exports have become more diversified and multi-factor productivity has been 
rising since 1992. Private sector investment is now rising and tight fiscal discipline has 
allowed government to start increasing expenditure, while reducing borrowing (with the 
budget deficit expected to be between 2 and 2.5% of GDP).  
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In Gauteng, the volatility of global financial markets and the re-alignment of emerging 
market economies had also had a significant impact on the provincial economy, and 
rendered the reform and restructuring process more difficult. As South Africa continues to 
be heavily impacted by economic realignments among emerging market economies, this 
will translate into major effects on the economy of Gauteng province, given its magnitude, 
sophistication, financial sector orientation and international linkages, as expressed by Jabu 
Moleketi, then MEC for Finance and Economic Affairs in his department’s 2003 annual 
report.  
 
Data from the report showed that between 1995 and 2002, Gauteng province's economy 
grew at an average of 3.3% - in excess of the national average over the same period of 
2.7% and the province's contribution to South Africa's GDP grew from 32.6% in 1995 to 
33.9% in 2002. The strength of the Gauteng economy is seen by its sectoral contributions 
to the gross domestic product. The finance and business services sector contributed 50%. 
This constituted 27.9% of the GGP, followed by community services sector at 19.3%, 
manufacturing at 17.9% and transport at 12.3%. One of the principal concerns however is 
that growth appears to be taking place in capital intensive, rather than labour intensive 
sectors. 
 
Further, StatsSA data, quoted in Gauteng's 2003/2004 budget, suggested that the Gauteng 
province's economy was undergoing transformation. In 1997, primary industries 
accounted for 1.8% of GGP, a figure that later dropped to 1.3%, while secondary 
industries have similarly decreased their contribution from 29.2 % to 23.9%. By contrast, 
the tertiary sector increased from 60% in 1995 to 66% in 2002. While between 2000 and 
2002 national labour absorption fell from 43.8% to 40.4%; Gauteng province witnessed an 
increase from 44.7% to 45.3%, representing one of only three provinces where 
unemployment fell between 2000 and 2002.  
 
While there is no palpable evidence to prove the effects of corruption on growth in 
Gauteng, it is noteworthy to say that, the incidence of corruption at the national level has 
disastrous consequences in the province. Corruption affects growth hence FDI as this 
behaviour causes foreign investors to adopt negative sentiment that affects the whole 
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country as investments become scarce. This has been expressed by Mark Lowe, a DA 
spokesman, who urged that “government should also address the risk perceptions that 
deterred investors, such as crime, corruption and uncertainty of property ownership” 
(Radebe: 2004). Brian Bruce, CE of Murray & Roberts, felt the same and called for a new 
solidarity between business, labour and government to address the negative perceptions 
about South Africa that were scaring off foreign investors. According to him the challenge 
was to close what he called the “interpretation gap” between key players on the damage 
being done by perceptions on issues such as crime, corruption, HIV/AIDS, the skills 
shortage and labour rigidity (Fraser: 2003).  
 
It clearly seems that corruption is one of the factors impacting on foreign investment by 
entertaining negative perceptions in South Africa. 
 
(2) Reduces foreign direct investment (FDI) and undermines a country’s ability to 
attract foreign capital because corruption has the same effects as a tax and in fact it 
operates as a tax. Tanzi draws attention to its inconsistency: “less predictable is the level 
of corruption (the higher is its variance), the greater is the impact on foreign direct 
investment. A higher variance makes corruption behave like an unpredictable and random 
tax. Thus, increases in corruption behave like an unpredictable and random tax” 
(1998:29). 
 
In fact, Gauteng FDI opportunities are limited by the high cost structure of its location 
relative to the country as a whole and to other sub-Saharan and emerging markets, as well 
as the distance of the province from port facilities. The provincial government’s highest 
priority is to create an environment that will attract investment, both local and foreign, in 
order to foster growth and eliminate historical inequalities.  
 
While the fundamentals in the South African economy are good, the question that remains 
is whether there could be delivery on the 5% growth which is desired to boost the 
economy and improve investors’ perceptions. For instance, figures show that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows into South Africa, which had been positive in the first three 
quarters of 2001, turned negative to the value of R1,9 billion in the fourth quarter (South 
Africa Yearbook 2002/03:154).The same happened during the first three quarters of 2002 
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where FDI flows positively into South Africa, before turning negative to the value  of 0,7 
billion in the fourth quarter. The explanation is that “strong capital inflows into the 
economy during the first half of 2002 were curtailed in the second half of the year owing 
to “negative investor sentiment” (South Africa Yearbook 2003/04:167).  But during 2002, 
there was an improvement in services in the balance of the account resulting from a sharp 
decline in dividends declared on foreign direct investment in the economy, which caused a 
contraction in the net investment-income payments to non-residents.  Although South 
Africa’s flows of foreign direct investment have improved, it is estimated that the country 
attracts on average less than 1% of total foreign direct investment to developing countries. 
It is notable that although growth has remained in positive territory since 1998, there is a 
wide acceptance it is not even close to the rates needed to improve social problems.  
 
Regrettably, this relatively positive growth has proved to be insufficient to alleviate 
unemployment, despite a significant increase in government spending on social services in 
real terms. The government has failed to reduce unemployment rates. This led Tito 
Mboweni, governor of the South African Reserve Bank, in his keynote address to Heads 
of Foreign Missions in December 2002 to express his concern: “the accusation is often 
heard that the country grows, but without creating jobs for the huge number of 
unemployed people”, (SA Institute of Race Relations Survey 2002/2003:130). 
 
For real growth to be realized South Africa should have a strategy to attract FDI and 
encourage foreign investment to the country. If one looks at reports published by 
international ratings agencies the declining trend in the economy may be attributable to 
many factors as reported in economic circles, notably (see SA Institute of Race Relations 
Survey 2000/2001:448-51): 
 
(1) Education and a better-trained workforce was a crucial factor in making the 
country an attractive destination for FDI. Problems in education are exacerbating 
the shortage of skills. Skills were also being lost as a result of emigration, 
particularly of whites, owing to fears about crime and the potential lack of 
employment opportunities, given the intense focus on affirmative action and black 
empowerment.  
  
338
 
 
(2) While fiscal and monetary policy was good, there was concern about job creation 
that has been hindered by labour legislation.   
(3) The geographic location of the country very far from Europe, Japan, and North 
America, sensitively reducing the size of its market and Africa is still perceived as 
a high-risk destination for investment.  
(4) Low levels of investment from US or any other country due to a “range of ill-
considered and inconsistent government policies”, such as over-regulation of the 
labour market; the use of tax incentives which were uncertain and inconsistent 
with trade policies; and the remnants of exchange control.  
(5) It was not the task of the state to create employment, but to create the environment 
for this to happen.   
 
Despite difficulties in attracting FDI, the government announced in September 2000 a new 
strategy based on Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) to be established in various areas 
around the country. But there was concern about its feasibility as South Africa was 
offering, “no additional incentives for investments in its IDZs and the country’s labour 
legislation remains fully applicable”, according to Finance Week (see SA Institute of Race 
Relations, Survey 2002/03:131).  
The same mood was notable among thing tank groups worldwide. The 2002 World 
Investment Report published by the UN Conference on Trade and Development found 
that South Africa was an underperforming economy in attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI), along with countries such as Ethiopia, Colombia, Pakistan, and 
Zimbabwe. South Africa had been ranked 113th out of 140 countries in terms of attracting 
FDI, and 77th out of 140 in terms of potential in attracting FDI. The rankings were based 
on various “social, political, institutional, and economic variables”.   
The 2002 Economic Freedom of the World annual report gave South Africa 47th place out 
of 123 countries. The ratings showed that South Africa’s position had deteriorated 
steadily since the first report in 1970. At that time, South Africa occupied 16th place. But 
a deteriorating political and economic situation meant other countries had gradually 
overtaken South Africa. In 1990, it reached a low of 67th in the ranking. Only in the last 
few years had South Africa managed to improve to 50th (in 1995) and then 47th in 2002. 
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The report rated the various countries according to size of government in terms of 
expenditure and taxation, legal system and security of property rights, currency stability, 
trade openness, and regulation of credit, labour and business. The report is published 
every five years by the Fraser Institute of Canada in conjunction with the Free Market 
Foundation of Southern Africa.  
 
But, although there are many factors pulling down investment, corruption and a range of 
new factors have been singled out. The World Economic Forum (WEF) found during its 
summit in Maputo that what was holding Africa back in general and South Africa’s 
growth in particular were “too much government involvement in the economy, relatively 
closed economies, corruption, weak public institutions, political instability and 
geography”. Corruption received much attention at the summit with Finance Minister 
Trevor Manuel suggesting a campaign of “naming and shaming” companies guilty of 
corruption (Seria: 2004). Manuel used the example of the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Scheme where government officials and international companies were convicted of 
corruption and were to be denied contracts in future projects.    
However, government attempts to encourage foreign investment in the country are 
overshadowed by frequent reporting of misconduct and corruption involving high-
ranking politicians, casting a shadow on government activities and priorities. After the 
“Yengeni affair”, just when people thought the government had matured enough to be 
trusted, another scandal surfaced, regarding the non-disclosure of assets by the defence 
minister, Mosiuoa Lekota, before the spotlight turned on the deputy president, Jacob 
Zuma. As argued by David Bullard: “watching a political wriggle on the end of a hook 
makes us feel all warm and fuzzy about our new democracy. Watching the deputy 
president of the country wriggle on a hook is an altogether less pleasant spectacle, partly 
because of his seniority but mainly because the rest of the world’s media are much more 
interested in Zuma than they were in a political minnow like Yengeni” (Business Times, 
September 7, 2003). The cost of this form of behaviour from the highest office holders of 
the country is much too high as its negative effects on investor sentiment soften the 
economy and keep away the much-needed FDI, seen by the government as the magic 
wand for economic revival. 
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Majakathata Mokoena has highlighted the negative effects of corruption on the South 
African society as a whole. In an article in City Press (September 22, 2002), he warned 
about Africa’s endemic corruption that has seeped into the South African socio-political 
system with a vengeance – and promised to destroy whatever economic momentum the 
country inherited from the apartheid era. Besides, Mokoena contends that, like everything 
else, corruption is a drag on economic growth. Like taxation, it has the ability to gouge out 
needed financial resources from countries and bludgeon whatever multiplier effect those 
forfeited investments could have had on the economy. So, for investors to set their eyes on 
a particular industry, they have to have sufficient information with which to make 
decisions. As a result, he concludes, investors normally avoid places known for their 
corrupt practices when making investment decisions.  
 
(3) . Reduces expenditure for education and health because these sectors do not lend 
themselves easily to corrupt practices on the part of those who make budgetary decisions. 
In fact, notes Paolo Mauro, corrupt politicians may be expected to spend more public 
resources on those items on which it is easier to exact large bribes and keep them secret – 
for example, items produced in markets where the degree of competition is low and items 
where value is difficult to monitor. Corrupt politicians may therefore be inclined to spend 
more public resources on fighter aircraft and large-scale investment projects than on 
textbooks and teachers’ salaries (1998:12).  
 
The controversial 43 billion arms deal in South Africa is a good example as well as the 
ambitious Blue IQ programme in Gauteng. Anecdotal evidence however supports the 
assumption that by favouring large and capital intensive projects at the expense of smaller 
social infrastructure projects, those who allocate resources may have better opportunities 
to extract illegal incomes. The success of the Blue IQ programme, for instance, will 
depend on the honesty, fairness and transparency in the management of the project as a 
whole by the Department of Finance and Economic Affairs. The Department must provide 
investors and cross-border inter-bank lenders with a measure of the projects’ safety and 
soundness, while excluding factors related to country risks concerns. One objective is to 
achieve a higher growth rate for the province than the country as a whole.  
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In particular government departments in Gauteng, such as Welfare, Health, Education, 
Transport and Provincial and local government, corrupt elements misdirect the assignment 
of unemployment or disability benefits, delay eligibility of pensions, abuse school feeding 
schemes, weaken the provision of basic public services, making the poor suffer most. 
Such misbehaviour undermines the social safety net and may deter the poor from seeking 
basic entitlements and other public services and adopt the famous “exit option”. On 16 
March 2004, Social Development Minister Zola Skweyiya disclosed at the launch of a 
new national security fraud and corruption prevention facility that government was losing 
about R1, 5bn a year to small time crooks intent on defrauding the social security system. 
Between 2001 and January 2004 a total of 147 government officials were arrested for 
corruption offences, including taking advantage of child support grants intended for the 
poor. For instance, in Eastern Cape, fraudulent schemes were apparently rife with a 
syndicate facing 11 000 charges of laundering R3, 5m in social assistance grants for the 
elderly and disabled. In Gauteng, four family members accused of issuing false medical 
certificates to gain from state disability grants had also been arrested. And about 500 
people fraudulently receiving disability grants of up to R1, 5m had been removed from the 
system, reports Linda Ensor (Business Day, March 17 2004). In another instance, Housing 
Minister Lindiwe Sisulu ordered all provincial housing departments to establish anti-
corruption units in an effort to root out corruption and fraud that has bedeviled 
government’s low-cost housing projects. The units will investigate allegations of 
corruption and fraud in the provinces’ housing projects.  This study has highlighted this 
trend while exploring the Gauteng Housing Department dossier.  
 
Besides, empirical studies on the welfare effects sometimes produce inconsistent results, 
for instance, with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI). Similarly, the proven impact 
of corruption on investment is commonly related to an adverse effect of corruption on 
incentives to invest. This is not without theoretical strings. Indeed, there is strong evidence 
that corruption lowers a country’s or a province’s attractiveness for investments. This 
reduces capital accumulation and lowers capital inflows. Also the productivity of capital 
suffers from corruption. This corroborates the assumption that large welfare losses result 
from corruption. 
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(4) Tends to reduce state revenues as far as taxation is concerned: in fact, “it pushes 
firms underground (outside the formal sector), undercuts the state’s ability to raise 
revenues, and leads to even higher tax rates being levied and fewer taxpayers. This, in 
turn, undermines the state’s ability to provide essential public good, including the rule of 
the law” (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998:8). Evidence shows that one of the main ways in 
which corruption reduces state funds is through its negative effect on tax income by 
opening up loopholes in tax collection and by acting as an arbitrary tax (with high welfare 
costs). Especially when corruption is not centralized, its random nature creates high excess 
burdens because, to the cost of negotiating and paying bribes – as seen in the Licensing 
case – must be added the cost of searching for the person or persons to whom the bribe 
must be paid.  
 
Bribes paid within South Africa and abroad should not be allowed as deductible expenses 
for tax purposes. Thus guidance needs to be provided to tax assessment officers to help 
them to distinguish bribes from legitimate businesses promotion and retention expenses. 
Tax policies in corrupt countries often favour the rich, well connected and powerful to 
begin with. This happened in Gauteng where Mr. Irvin Khoza, a prominent businessman 
“forgot” to pay his taxes for a period of ten years and owed million of rands to the 
Treasury. Thus tax evasion through corruption as well as poor tax administration where 
some of the revenue “disappears” before it reaches government coffers reduces the tax 
base and adds to the progressivity of the tax system. Thus, poor transparency and high 
levels of corruption increase credit risks. Those holding deposits or granting loans will 
stay away from banks. As a consequence, there is a negative impact on capital movements 
caused by corruption.  
 
Although South Africa has been internationally recognized as having a good financial 
system, this has not deterred corrupt employees within its Revenue Services from 
defrauding the government by accepting bribes in exchange for erasing customs’ tax 
arrears. Many incidences of corruption are rife in South African Revenue Services (SARS) 
branches in Gauteng. In October 1997, tax inspector George Wilke of Roodepoort was 
convicted of corruption for offering to erase a customer’s tax arrears in exchange for R50 
000 and was sentenced   in the Johannesburg Regional Court to two years’ jail or a R6 000 
fine. He was arrested in February 1996 shortly after he had received R30 000, R20 000 
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less than the initial request; this after the customer had alerted the police to the taxman’s 
offer. The police had given the amount received by the customer (The Star, 20 October 
1997). This was someone in a position of trust at the Receiver of Revenue’s office and 
was supposed to see to it that the office functioned properly, but who tried to enrich 
himself by taking bribe.  
 
According to SARS website and many Johannesburg newspapers, a raid on 30 January 
2001 by the Scorpions on 25 customs officials suspected of fraud unearthed possible 
incriminating documents and gifts, including cash, given to officials by those dodging 
import duties. 21 of the officials were employed by SARS and one was a senior employee 
of accounting firm KPMG. The “gifts” given to the suspects besides cash, included hi-fis, 
rifles and even baby clothes in exchange for returning confiscated goods to people caught 
circumventing payment of import duties. 
 
The anti-corruption and compliance campaign led by SARS in the first quarter of 2001 
resulted in the arrests of numerous people. As reported by The Star, it emerged during 
these investigations that private companies were suspected of paying corrupt SARS 
officials thousands of rands to misrepresent value added tax journals on their behalf. This 
was confirmed after the arrest of a VAT refund auditor following an investigation that 
lasted several months. André Bierman was arrested at his Vanderbijlpark home on April 
24 2001 on charges of fraud and corruption amounting to about R600 000. The arrest was 
carried out by detectives of the commercial crime branch of the SAPS following the 
conclusion of three trials in the Pietersburg Regional Court in which four former SARS 
employees were convicted of VAT fraud totaling more than R1 million (The Star, April 25 
2001).  
 
In April 2002, four SARS officials from the Johannesburg customs and excise special 
investigations section were charged with fraud and corruption for allegedly accepting gifts 
and money from an attorney acting for certain importers and clients. Karin van Rensburg, 
Roland Human, Roux Chetty and Ian van Niekerk appeared in a commercial crime court  
on charges of corruption and fraud while waiting for trial. The gifts and money allegedly 
given to the four between 1995 and 2000 for “favourable and preferential treatment” 
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Tax evasion through corruption as well as extra expenditures, as seen above, are 
manifestation of lax administration and mismanagement that lead to some revenue 
“vanishing” before reaching government coffers. The consequences are often disastrous 
for the poor who suffer from it most in transition economies and in many developing 
countries, where, according to the World Bank, corruption may reduce revenue collection 
by driving firms (or their most profitable activities) out of the formal sector and by 
providing a moral justification for widespread tax evasion, as businesses in the informal 
sector do not report revenue and therefore do not pay taxes (World Bank, 1997). The end 
result is the reduction of the tax base that has two effects, in Gupta et al terms: first, it 
reduces the distributive function of tax collection and contributes to increasing income 
inequality; second, it reduces the amount of public funds and therefore the amount of 
public spending (Gupta et al, 1998).  
totaling an estimated R155 000 were detailed in an affidavit presented to the Pretoria High 
Court (Business Report, April 17 2002).  
 
  
All these cases are an indication that if not controlled, corruption may contribute to larger 
fiscal deficits, making it more difficult for the government to run a sound fiscal policy. It 
is not surprising nowadays to note that participants in corruption surveys rank tax and 
customs administrations among the most corrupt government agencies in developing 
countries. Excessive taxation, besides excessive regulation encourages ordinary citizens 
and disillusioned businesses to go underground and countries find it hard to get out of 
poverty. A recent World Bank report shows that: “Where the government regulates every 
aspect of businesses activity heavily, businesses operate in the informal economy” 
(Business Day, October 8 2003). 
   
It is important to point out that the size of the underground sector in different economies 
has been explored empirically in numerous studies during the last two decades by scholars 
such as Andvig et al. (2000); De Sotho (1989); Friedman et al. (2000). Different methods 
of exploration have been developed often leading to very different results. Underground 
and unofficial activities constitute the two types of informal sector. The sector is 
characterized by illegality in business and activities not registered by statistical offices. 
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The World Bank website has even portrayed the impact of the underground or unofficial 
sector on the economy of a country as follows: “The informal sector plays an important 
and controversial role. It provides jobs and reduces unemployment and underemployment, 
but in many cases the jobs are low-paid and the job security is poor. It bolsters 
entrepreneurial activity, but at the detriment of state regulations compliance, particularly 
regarding tax and labor regulations. It helps alleviate poverty, but in many cases informal 
sector jobs are low-paid and the job security is poor. The size of the informal labor market 
varies from the estimated 4-6% in the high-income countries to over 50% in the low-
income countries. Its size and role in the economy increases during economic downturns 
and periods of economic adjustment and transition” (
Tax evasion, avoidance of labour regulation and other government or institutional 
regulations, crime and corruption are part of the system. 
http://extsearch.worldbank.org). 
 
According to latest figures available, in 1996 there were an estimated 1 398 000 persons 
or 15% of the country’s workforce occupied in the underground or informal sector 
activities in South Africa.  
 
Obviously, evidence has shown that there are two-ways links between corruption and 
underground economic activities. On the one hand it is clear that any regular illegal 
economic activity of some scale needs bureaucratic and political protection that can only 
be supplied illegally, most often through corruption, as noted by Andvig et al. (2000:101). 
Thus, it may be argued that underground economic activities lead to corruption. This 
demand for illegality may often be derived from the costs involved in legal registration 
and establishment and the behaviour of the bureaucracy in their legal capacity. Otherwise, 
how can one explain the huge number of registered companies at the Receiver of Revenue 
that have been declared “dormant” while doing business? There is only one explanation: 
to avoid paying taxes! 
 
In addition, in an exclusive empirical study of the size of the underground economy 
undertaken in 69 countries, Friedman et al. claim that corruption, rather than tax rates, is 
the main determinant of the size of the underground economic activities. In most of these 
observations the share of the underground economy varied between 10% and 70% of the 
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In 1999 in Johannesburg, the city was estimated to have some 3 000 informal traders, 
resulting in .the implementation by the Metropolitan Council in Gauteng of steps to 
restrict trading in the inner city and to divert it to designated and regulated areas. In 
September 1999, those trading in Braamfontein were evicted and in December 1999, those 
operating in Yeoville were noticed by the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) – a new 
structure established in October 1999 - to move into the newly erected Rockey Street 
Market. The reason given by the Council to justify those moves was that “it could no 
longer cope with the litter generated by the hawkers and the dangers associated with 
restricted pavement space had an impact on the Johannesburg’s rental and office 
occupancy rates”.  In fact, most of formal businesses, including the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange and the Reserve Bank, moved out of the city to the northern or the southern 
suburbs, reducing the city to a mere “ghost city” at night.  
total economy. With the partial exception of the group of transition countries, the 
incidence of perceived corruption appears to increase with the share of the underground 
economy (2000:454-493). In other words, Andvig et al. (2000) stress that the positive 
empirical association between the underground’s share of the economy is well-established, 
and is likely to be one of the major mechanisms through which corruption becomes deeply 
entrenched in the society.  
 
Further research is needed to explain the relationship between corruption and underground 
economic activities in Gauteng where hawkers are mushrooming. Official records of the 
province’s size of the underground workforce are not available. Nevertheless, according to 
SA Institute of Race Relations Survey 2000/2001:404-409, a study conducted by Ntsika 
Enterprise Promotion Agency in 1996 showed that hawkers are classified as a survivalist 
enterprise along with subsistence farmers and vendors. A number of entry barriers keep 
the survivalist out of the micro category, among them a lack of skills and experience, 
shortage of financial resources, social barriers, and lack of access to markets. 
 
 
Hawkers reacted angrily to the decision, refusing to move into the new market. The 
Gauteng Hawkers’ Association said the erection of the R5 m market was a ploy to keep 
“black traders apart from the white traders”. After negotiations they finally agreed to 
move in. The premier of Gauteng, Mr. Mbhazima Shilowa promised to extend the 
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Thus it is our understanding that economic growth in the province that is required for 
development will depend on government policy that is best achieved through the private 
sector taking advantage of investment and job-creating opportunities. Government's role 
therefore in stimulating economic growth is to ensure the creation of a fair and efficient 
environment conducive to business activity. As the 2003/2004 Budget acknowledges, 
attention needs to be paid therefore to political and economic stability (supported by 
macroeconomic stability and policy clarity), rates of economic growth, labour market 
stability, investment incentives, the tariff regime and the protection of property rights. 
These factors need to be underpinned by a clear regulatory framework, increased 
competition, accountability and transparency.  
experience elsewhere around the city by building six other trading markets. He said that 
the regulation of the informal sector would reduce hidden costs and time incurred in 
traveling, storage, and setting up businesses, meaning there will be a fee to be paid.     
 
Corrupt conduct in office in Gauteng means that quite normal services to which all 
citizens are nominally entitled by the constitution and the law are denied to persons from 
the underclass, already under severe social duress, unless they “cough up”. It starts with 
giving someone who needs a certificate of birth or death a hard time, it continues where 
children are enrolled in school, testimonials are required for a job application or positions 
with government are filled. 
 
 
To sum up, the most serious consequences of corruption have been described above and 
what emerges is a clear message that corruption is socially destructive and its deleterious 
impact on development is beyond doubt. In cross-country regression analyses scholars 
such as Treisman have found that by far the most important determinant of corruption is 
economic development, measured by real GDP per capita. Causation runs from economic 
development to lower corruption, and from corruption to lower economic development. 
As a society in transition, the first challenge to be overcome by Gauteng is the uplifting of 
its development programmes in order to alleviate poverty in the province. Therefore, 
corruption, as an impediment to economic development, should be kept under control. 
Accordingly, combating corruption becomes an everyday struggle for each citizen in the 
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province and should not remain the sole responsibility of government. A combined, 
integrated approach is needed to succeed.  
 
In short, it appears now that corruption and the effects of corruption will often feed back 
into the various phenomena that we have labeled “causes”, as discussed above. In other 
words, the “causes” and “effects” of corruption are closely interrelated and can hardly be 
separated. From my investigation and other empirical studies such as Tanzi (1998); 
Andvig et al. (2000); Kaufmann (1998) and Mauro (1998) on the causes and 
consequences of corruption, it can be claimed that corruption commonly goes along with 
policy distortions, inequality of income and lack of competition.  But, as argued by 
Lambsdorff, to derive clear arguments with respect to causality is rather difficult. On the 
one hand cultural determinants may drive corruption and the variables in question at the 
same time. On the other hand corruption may cause these variables but it is at the same 
time likely to be the consequence of them. These empirical results are nonetheless helpful 
in identifying areas which are prone to corruption or which indicate its existence 
(1999:11). 
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Part Four 
APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING 
CORRUPTION 
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Chapter Eleven 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
11.1 Introduction 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Are there effective mechanisms of accountability or proper incentives in some institutions 
or levels of government? How do these operate? Do anti-system attitudes vary across 
government institutions - between public education and tax collection, for example - or 
between national and subnational governments, or between different regional 
governments?  
 
In the past decade, the South African government has been serious about combating 
corruption and has focused attention on it. The reasons for the government’s attention are not 
only that corruption undermines service delivery and hampers economic development; but 
also the threat that continuing corruption in the public sector can pose to the new democracy 
by undermining good government and leading to the misallocation of resources. However, 
proper management of these issues is critical for public trust in government. Therefore, that is 
the responsibility of the government to deal with and to confront these problems. 
 
Corruption has long been a characteristic of the South African public service. However, 
there is a widespread perception that corruption has increased during the period of 
political and economic transition that commenced in 1994 (Camerer, 2001:55). Besides, 
corruption is perceived as a problem at all spheres of government and at all occupational 
levels in South Africa. Poor systems and inadequate internal controls tend to provide 
opportunities for corruption to thrive. This enhances the opportunity for unplanned 
corruption to take place. At the same time there is evidence of syndicated, planned 
corruption in the public service (PSC, October 2000:8), though this has not been a 
dimension of corruption that I am able to address in this case study of Gauteng. While 
most corruption seems to be planned, unplanned corruption, in contrast, occurs when a 
public servant, without motive and instinctively, jumps on any opportunity to commit 
spontaneously or unexpectedly an act of corruption. 
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Robert Payne, the author of The Corrupt Society, asserts that corruption is contagious; it 
breeds on itself; once established, it is inhumanly difficult to remove. But unless a society 
collectively wants to degenerate, it must, once corruption has settled in it, grapple with the 
problem or perish (1975:ix). Evidence elsewhere shows how a country endowed with 
riches like the former Zaire has been left in tatters and reduced to despair after thirty years 
of corruption and looting by the former President Mobutu and his henchmen (Kalombo, 
1997). Therefore it is the duty of all governments to prepare themselves against its 
onslaught by taking proper precautions. However, historical evidence has also shown that 
attempts to curb corruption are about as old as corruption itself (Riley, 1998:132).  
 
In terms of causality, it should be emphasised that corruption is a complex phenomenon 
that is almost never explained by a single cause. If it were caused by a single cause, as 
Tanzi has argued, the solution would be simple (1998:30). Based on evidence, it is 
apparent that the struggle to root out corruption should take into account the many factors 
that influence it, some can be changed more easily than others. Because of the complexity 
of the phenomenon, the fight against corruption must be total war engineering on many 
fronts and sustainable, as it cannot be won in months or even in a few years. Containing 
corruption has become a primary concern of almost all organizations (states, multinational 
lenders, development agencies) and this a fight that involves fighting human nature. Thus 
the greatest mistake that can be made is to rely on a strategy that depends excessively on 
actions in a single area, such as increasing the salaries of the public sector employees; or 
increasing penalties; or creating an anti-corruption office; and so on, and to expect results 
quickly.  
 
Therefore, combating corruption can be seen as part of the broader goal of creating more 
effective, fair and efficient government. Rather, it has been suggested that the policy 
response to the struggle against corruption has several elements common to every society: 
the reform of substantive programs, changes in the structure of government and its 
methods of assuring accountability, changes in moral and ethical attitudes, and most 
importantly, the involvement and support of government, the private business sector, civil 
society and the international community. This has been called “social empowerment” by 
Johnston (1998) who perceives it as an essential element to preventing political corruption 
that includes the strengthening of “groups and interests that make up civil society – that is 
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organizations, enterprises, and informal social networks active in the realm between 
individuals and government”.  
 
11.2 Holistic Approach 
 
In Gauteng, as in the rest of the country, controlling corruption is one of the greatest 
challenges to the establishment and consolidation of democratic systems that should be 
confronted as a matter of urgency, a prelude to economic growth. When many provincial 
leaders and public managers choose to redress corruption by controlling fraud, bribery, 
extortion, embezzlement, tax evasion, kickbacks, and other forms of illicit and corrupt 
behaviour, they would like to eradicate this scourge that erodes their agency’s mission and 
the broader goals of sustainable development. Recognition of deleterious effects of 
corruption in Gauteng raises the practical problem of what can be done to eradicate it. 
What was the government’s reaction to the problem and how effective it has been in its 
fight against corruption?  
According to this survey, perceptions of government effectiveness in the handling of 
corruption was as follows: more than 68% of respondents believed that government is 
doing enough in combating corruption by maintaining transparency and accountability, 
while 26% disagreed and a mere 5% strongly disagreed and 5% were uncertain. In the 
same context, respondents were asked to rate the Gauteng management as excellent, good, 
fair or poor. The majority (58%) thought that government management was fair, 37% 
found it good against a mere 5% who had no opinion. This reflects the government’s 
seriousness in committing itself to fight corruption as shown by numerous anti-corruption 
programmes and projects that were initiated by the government in the wake of political 
scandals in 1997 and 1998.   
 
There have been many efforts, activities and strategies put in place to address public sector 
corruption at all levels of government (national, provincial, local). Transparency South 
Africa (T-SA) has singled out recent developments, as set out below: 
 
The Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) provides the basis for fighting 
corruption and promoting good governance in moving away from the apartheid and 
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colonialist past. Various pieces of legislation that explicitly address the issue of corruption 
were established, and others are in process of being promulgated (van der Merwe, 
2001:2). Some of the more recent ones include the: 
Corruption Act (1992), Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act (1992), Drugs 
and Drug Trafficking Act (1992), Public Protector Act (1994), Special 
Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act (1996), International Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters Act (1996), Criminal Law Amendment Act (1997), Witness 
Protection Act (1998), National Prosecuting Act (1998), Prevention of Organized 
Crime Act (1998), Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000), Protected 
Disclosures Bill (2000), Corruption Amendment Bill. 
 
Specific bodies and mechanisms have been established to deal with the issue of corruption 
in different ways. These include the: 
 
Independent Complaints Directorate, South African Police Service (SAPS) Anti-
Corruption Unit, Special Investigating Unit, Investigating Directorate for Serious 
Economic Offences, National Crime Prevention Strategy, National Intelligence 
Agency, Public Protector, Auditor-General, National Directorate for Public 
Prosecutions, Public Service Commission, Department of Public Service and 
Administration, SAPS Commercial Crime Unit, Directorate of Special Operations 
(Scorpions), Asset Forfeiture Unit, South African Revenue Service (SARS), 
National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF), Public Accounts Committee. 
  
Most of these agencies have established their offices in Gauteng and are operating at a 
provincial level. Strategies and efforts deployed revolve around a set of resolutions. These 
include: 
 
 The formulation and popularization of a code of conduct for public servants; 
 The creation of a Senior Management Service to promote optimal use of senior 
management; 
 The initiation of a range of internal departmental anti-corruption units; 
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 The creation of an Asset Register to monitor acquisition by public sector 
managers. 
(1) public awareness and transparency: different focus groups could in their own 
way undertake or participate in public awareness campaigns by different 
means, such as posters, stickers, leaflets, reports in the media and publications. 
Positive steps such as exposing corruption when it occurs, publicizing and 
highlighting the problem, including making public announcements and hosting 
anti-corruption forums and conferences. It would be vital to ensure that public 
awareness and actions to follow are well informed and go beyond mere public 
outcry and hysteria, mud-slinging or political point-scoring. 
 
In preventing and fighting corruption Gauteng Provincial Government adopted proposals 
and recommendations that emerged from the anti-corruption conferences held nationally 
in November 1998, April and October 1999 (TSA, 2001:38-42; Camerer, 2001:58-67) 
with the spotlight especially on: 
 
 
(2) policy interventions: are taking place – internally with organs of civil  society 
(e.g. to improve internal systems, cultures of integrity and individual 
behaviour), and externally with both the public sector (e.g. relevant policy and 
legislation on different tiers, departments and agencies of government, political 
ethics and public sector ethics) and the private sector (e.g. corporate 
governance, business ethics and economic ethics).  
 
(3) strengthening anti-corruption bodies and the criminal justice system: 
establishment of anti-corruption organizations and watchdog bodies such as the 
ex-Heath Special Investigating Unit and other Special Investigating Units, the 
Scorpions, the Public Protector’s Office committing themselves to playing 
their roles at all levels of government including regional and international 
networks of integrity against corruption. Establishment of commissions of 
enquiry, empowering and improving legislation to fight corruption in order to 
secure high level prosecutions and the proper follow-up of corrupt officials. 
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(5) improving of checks and balances: visible steps have been taken to improve 
checks and balances that include: decreasing incentives, more transparency in 
tenders, improving governance systems, financial controls and procedures, the 
putting in place of Codes of conduct for public servants and a toll free number 
to encourage whistle blowers. 
I. Conventional government or public sector-focused approach: the main 
characteristic of this approach is that a variety of instruments and mechanisms are 
implemented to ensure that the government and the public sector at large are being 
cleaned of corruption. The basic rationale would be that corruption is a problem in 
(or of ) the public sector and/or in interaction with other sectors. 
(4) anti-corruption strategies: the formulation of anti-corruption strategies, 
including the transformation of government policies and the prioritization of 
areas for strategic interventions is a step in the right direction. But more has to 
be done. 
 
 
(6) political will: the required political and social will of all role-players to address 
the phenomenon in all its forms and dimensions. This is an important 
component in the fight against corruption. The presidential engagement with 
his “zero tolerance” approach had been seen as a crucial step to coming down 
harshly on all forms of corruption. The involvement of senior management at 
national and provincial levels was viewed, as part of political will. As Koffi 
Annan put it, “we have the capacity and the means to resolve our problems, if 
only we can have the political will”. 
 
(7) cross-sectoral participation: the interaction between government’s actions to 
fight corruption and the participation of the civil society and the private sector 
involving business NGOs, the youth, religious bodies, women’s groups, media, 
professional bodies, human rights and other relevant stakeholders.  
 
In doing so, two approaches have been identified (van der Merwe, 2001:31), as follows: 
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a) A new corruption Act that provides a workable definition of corruption, that 
reinstates the common law crime of bribery, that cerates presumption of prima facie 
proof to facilitate prosecution, that extends the scope of the Act to all public 
officials and private citizens and their agents;  
II. An emerging holistic societal approach: the main element of this approach is to 
ensure that adequate and effective initiatives and mechanisms exist to address 
corruption and good governance in the different sectors. The basic rationale would 
be that the matter is a wider societal problem that is present in the different sectors 
in different ways with different challenges and priorities. Each sector needs to 
ensure that adequate measures are taken and processes are set in motion to address 
the problem. Consensual structures and programmes for cooperation and 
monitoring have to be put in place. 
 
All these strategies for combating corruption have been wrapped up into a unique 
document for the Public Service as a distinct sector of the South African society. The 
document, entitled the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy and published in January 
2002, is the product of the Department of Public Service and Administration. It has been 
developed in accordance with the resolution of the National Anti-Corruption Summit for 
the Public Service in order to give effect to expressed commitment of government to fight 
corruption in this sector. The Anti-Corruption Strategy revolves around nine 
considerations that can be summarized and outlined as follows:  
 
1. Review and consolidation of the legislative framework: the existing legislative 
framework though solid is however fragmented and requires review and 
consolidation to improve its efficiency. Obviously, the existing Corruption Act of 
1992 has proven to be ineffective and because the common law crime of bribery 
was repealed by this Act, prosecution of bribery cases has been insignificant. Then 
it has been proposed that a new legislative framework to fight corrupt be 
established and implemented by July 2003. But until now this long-awaited 
legislation is still being debated in Parliament. The objective of this framework is to 
provide for:  
b) A range of offences and obligations; 
c) A holistic approach to fighting corruption; 
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- Enable the process of conducting further investigation, detection and 
prosecution, in terms of prevailing legislation and procedures. 
d) Compliance with regional and international conventions; 
e) Civil recovery of proceeds and the ability to claim for damages; and 
f) Prohibition of corrupt individuals and businesses. 
 
2. Increased institutional capacity: there is proposition that the courts, existing 
national corruption-fighting institutions and departmental capabilities be improved 
for optimal functioning. Regarding the courts, it is proposed that there should be a 
review of the current proliferation of courts in order to assess and improve the 
efficiency of courts with particular attention being given to improving the 
specialized capacity of court officials to address corruption cases, rather than create 
additional specialized courts. Moreover, it has been proposed that: 
 
a) The efficacy of existing departments and agencies be improved through the 
establishment of appropriate mechanisms to coordinate and integrate anti-
corruption work. 
b) Departments create a minimum capacity to fight corruption by undertaking the 
following tasks:  
- Conduct risk assessment 
- Implement fraud plans as required in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act, which must include, as a minimum, an anti-corruption 
policy and implementation plan. 
- Investigate allegations of corruption and detected risks at a preliminary 
level. 
- Receive and manage allegations of corruption through whistle blowing or 
other mechanisms. 
- Promote professional ethics amongst employees. 
 
3. Improved access to report wrongdoing and protection of whistle blowers and 
witnesses: this focuses on improving application of the protected disclosures 
legislation, witness protection and hotlines. 
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• 
• Partnerships should be established with the Business and Civil Society 
sectors to curb corrupting practices; and 
• 
4. Prohibition of corrupt individuals and businesses: it has been proposed that 
mechanisms be established to prohibit (a) corrupt employees from employment in 
the Public Sector and (b) corrupt businesses and agents of such businesses from 
doing business with the Public Service for a maximum period of five years. It is 
also envisaged that the information system for prohibited employees should be 
established as well as a central electronic register of prohibited businesses. 
5. improved management policies and practices: management must be held 
accountable for preventing corruption as solid management practices have been 
widely recognized as the first line of defense against corruption. Thus 
improvements should be effected with regard to procurement systems, employment 
arrangements, discipline management, risk management, information management 
and financial management. The proposals include the extension of the system of 
disclosure of financial interests, screening of personnel, establishing mechanisms to 
regulate post-Public Service employment and strengthening the capacity to manage 
discipline. 
 
6. Managing professional ethics: development of a generic professional ethics 
statement for the Public Service that should be supplemented by mandatory sector-
specific codes of conduct and ethics. Professional ethics that will be supported by 
extensive and practical explanatory manuals, training and education. 
 
7. Partnerships with stakeholders:  partnering has been identified as a cornerstone of 
the national fight against corruption and for that purpose: 
The National Anti-Corruption Forum should be used to promote Public 
Service interests; 
Public Service unions should be mobilized to advocate professional ethics 
with members.  
 
8. Social analysis, research and policy advocacy: the role of civil society in fighting 
corruption is crucial. Thus the proposal that all sectors should be encouraged to 
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10. Nevertheless, responding to the development challenges posed by corruption 
requires an understanding of its causes and one of these causes, as seen, is poverty. 
The fight against poverty through the promotion of job creation policies, health 
policies, education policies and meeting basic needs are important strategies in 
poverty alleviation. Reducing poverty and inequality in South Africa will require 
substantial changes in the distribution of incomes, wealth and economic power. The 
elements of such redistribution revolve around access to livelihoods, housing, 
infrastructure, land and water. 
undertake ongoing analysis on the trends, causes and impact of corruption and to 
advocate preventive measures. 
 
9. Awareness, training and education: a comprehensive awareness campaign, 
supported by education and training, needs to be established and implemented. The 
campaign will be aimed at promoting South Africa’s anti-corruption and good 
governance successes domestically and internationally. The local part of the 
campaign will be hinged on the promotion of Batho Pele (people come first) 
initiatives and pride among employees.  
 
 
The challenge facing the new South African government is immense and from the 
perspective of implementation, however, current progress has not met expectations; 
the most important reasons for this relate to the underlying distortions in economic 
markets and social institutions introduced by apartheid, which continue to produce 
and reproduce poverty and inequality in South Africa.  
 
Despite the challenge, there is still hope. As Nelson Mandela argues:   
 
"Overcoming poverty is not a gesture of charity. It is an act of justice. It is the 
protection of a fundamental human right, the right to dignity and a decent life. 
While poverty persists, there is no true freedom. Sometimes it falls upon a 
generation to be great. You can be that great generation. Let your greatness 
blossom. Of course the task will not be easy. But not to do this would be a crime 
against humanity, against which I ask all humanity now to rise up. "Make Poverty 
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It should be noted that a review of the South African corruption literature shows clearly 
that in terms of international practices, the Public Service is outfitted with elements of a 
good anti-corruption strategy. On the one side the country has an ambitious and 
comprehensive legislative, regulatory and institutional framework thanks to the new 
dispensation put in place in 1994. Furthermore the Public Service utilizes good 
management practices, including a code of conduct, modern employment practices, 
financial disclosures, fair procurement and a progressive disciplinary system for ensuring 
economic utilization of all state resources. 
 
History in 2005. Make History in 2005. Then we can all stand with our heads held 
high” (Nelson Mandela, Trafalgar Square, London, June 2005). 
 
In order for the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy to succeed, all the above strategic 
considerations have to take place, as they are all interrelated and dependent on one-
another. Besides sufficient allocation of resources are needed for these “stepping stones” 
of the anti-corruption strategy, as labeled by the Department of Public Service, to achieve 
some results. 
 
 
On the other side this framework does however not function optimally at present for many 
reasons including the lack of sufficient resources to fulfill mandates in the light of more 
pressing problems such as unemployment and health delivery, the fragmentation of the 
legislative framework, inefficiencies within and between institutions with anti-corruption 
mandates, a lack of focused socialization programmes, inefficient application of the 
disciplinary system, underdeveloped management capacity in some areas and inequalities 
in the accumulation of wealth.    
 
In future, acts of corruption will be regarded as criminal acts and they could be dealt with 
either in the administrative or criminal justice system, or both if need be, as the 
Department of Public Service and Administration underlines. 
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After a decade in power, the record represents an improvement on what it was during the 
first term. These improvements, though not comprehensive are nonetheless impressive. 
Let us analyse different strategies adopted by individual departments in their onslaught 
against corruption.  
Chapter Twelve 
GAUTENG CORRUPTION RESISTANCE STRATEGIES 
 
12.1. Introduction 
 
At the time of political scandals and commissions of inquiry in the province between 1994 
and 1999, the government reacted quickly to stamp out corruption that was undermining 
the civil service. The battle against the rot began within the Department of Finance and 
Economic Affairs and was initiated by MEC Jabu Moleketi with the launching of an Anti-
corruption Hotline on 18 March 1998, known as the Gauteng’s corruption hotline. This 
was seen as a firm attempt by the Gauteng Provincial Government to get rid of corruption 
from the public service. 
 
 During 1998, some cases of illicit behaviour were reported on the Hotline including the 
case of a principal who had been charged for renting out his school’s electricity to 10 
surrounding shacks. He was running extension cords from the school and charged R100 
for each line. Small-time crooks like the electricity-purveying principal were nabbed. So 
were government employees who used official cars as taxis by night. A hospital 
superintended who received illegal cheques worth some R1,4 million had been suspended. 
The Finance department recouped R3,5 million of the estimated R6 million lost to fraud in 
1998 alone. A white board was updated daily with the amounts recovered. The hotline was 
only at the tail end of the fight against corruption, as rumoured in the Office of the MEC 
for Finance Department. Lower profile efforts include tightening up financial systems to 
cut down on fraud (Mail & Guardian, November 27 to December 3, 1998:46; Gauteng 
News, n° 2, November 1998:5).  
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According to the Head of Department (HoD), Thenjiwe Hlatshwako, in analyzing the 
situation in the first term of office, it became quite clear that the challenges facing the 
department were instilling financial discipline in the province and developing a policy that 
would inform economic interventions by government. This would facilitate the creation of 
an environment conducive for business to grow and create jobs (Annual Report 
2001/2002:3).   
12.2. Department of Finance and Economic Affairs: 
 
Between 1994 and 1998, most departments were overspending and bloated with 
unproductive public servants. The province was not attracting investment and businesses 
were leaving the city center in droves. In 1996, the MEC for Finance and Economic 
Affairs Department, Jabu Moleketi expressed his concerns by criticizing government 
departments, which in the middle of limited financial resources, practiced fraud upon each 
other and the national exchequer. These fraudulent practices from certain unfaithful 
government structures were seriously undermining the allocation of the state’s limited 
financial resources to needy departments. He noted the need for all budgeting to be done 
in honesty and integrity. In 1997, after a report by the provincial auditor-General, Mr. 
Shauket Fakie, had showed that the government had incurred unauthorised expenditure of 
some R404m in the 1995/96 financial year, Mr. Moleketi termed this a “mockery of 
accountability”. He announced early in the same year that the province would begin the 
1997/98 financial year ‘on a clean slate”. 
 
 
The department’s annual reports from 2000 to 2003 show that the sound financial 
discipline unequivocally adopted by Government contributed to increased capacity to 
improve the conditions in Gauteng. The implementation of the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) turned out to be a crucial point in ensuring sound public 
finances. A more optimistic outlook emerged, with heavy emphasis put on capital 
spending and the broad strategy was to speed up the delivery of economic infrastructure, 
as reflected by Blue Q projects, and contribute towards economic growth within the 
confines of fiscal sustainability. 
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Progress achieved to date on the implementation of the PFMA can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
The full implications of the Public Finance Management Act are beginning to dawn on the 
civil service. Treasury has focused on key areas of the implementation such as the 
appointment of chief financial officers, awareness and training, internal audit committees 
and internal audit. All of these initiatives have been implemented. Reporting deadlines 
have been met by the province and changes to budget formats and expenditure 
classifications in place. Gauteng continues to pioneer these initiatives in the country. 
 
 
 The establishment of an audit committee the department shares with two other 
departments, 
 The establishment of a provincial internal audit unit, 
 A departmental risk assessment was conducted in 2000/2001 and based on this four 
focused audits were conducted by the Internal Audit in 2001/2002. 
 All monthly and quarterly reports were submitted to Treasury timeously, 
 The implementation of the Act is progressing well and will be phased in gradually 
up to 2007, according to Treasury’s medium to long-term plan. 
 
In addition, the department also defined and adopted a strategy to address the economic 
challenges through a policy document referred to as the Trade and Industrial Strategy 
Policy. In terms of this policy, the challenges facing the Gauteng government at the time 
included: 
 
 Maintaining this financial discipline and ensuring sound financial management 
through the appointment of suitably qualified staff that is adequately supported. 
 Introducing a new resource management thinking as prescribed by the PFMA that 
requires the management of risk. 
 Introducing systems that will enhance and support management.  
Therefore, to address these challenges the department embarked on a process that began 
with the appointment of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) and its capacitation in terms of 
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staffing. This was followed by the training of non-financial managers on the PFMA; a 
change in the accounting system from the Financial Management System to the Basic 
Accounting System; the establishment of an internal audit function in the Shared Service 
Centre and the appointment of an Audit Committee. 
 
As a result, this process saw the province receiving the first six out of twelve unqualified 
departmental audit reports in 2001/2002. On 25 August 2003, the Gauteng Provincial 
Government received a clean bill of health from the Auditor General. All 12 departments 
as well as the Legislature received unqualified opinion from the Auditor General on their 
financial statements for the financial year 2002/2003. As announced by the Premier 
Mbhazima Shilowa, the Gauteng Government had fulfilled its promise, and did it a year 
ahead of the target that had been set. Gauteng remains the leading province in 
implementing the Public Finance Management Act. This has gone a long way in enabling 
the establishment of measurable objectives and outcomes, with a focus on outputs as 
opposed to inputs. 
 
The GSSC Hotline: launched on 18 March 1998, the Hotline was a firm attempt by the 
GPG to stamp out fraud and corruption from within its ranks. It brought allegations of 
corruption directly to the notice of government by enabling the public to inform them of 
any corruption they may have observed. At the end of 1998, an average of 33 calls was 
recorded daily, showing the interest the public had for the 24-hour hotline. When the 
Department began its anti-corruption campaign in October 2001, it had been found that 
the hotline was kept very busy, with more problems coming from the Education, Housing 
and Health departments. In education, principals were reported to be abusing schools 
funds, and there were complaints about the placement policy of teachers not being 
followed, especially in jobs-for-pals situation. Meanwhile, the Health Department 
constantly experienced the problem of staff stealing medicine and expensive equipment. 
Officials at the Housing Department were reported to be allocating people to “nonexistent 
houses or helping others to jump the waiting list”.  
 
According to the Department, after receiving any information tip on the hotline, officials 
acted by forwarding a report to the relevant head of department for further investigation 
before reporting back to the Finance Department. But most departments delayed 
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investigating themselves resulting in interminable backlogs. As the manager for forensic 
audit at the Gauteng Shared Service Centre (GSSC), Advocate Jacob Khetsi who is in 
charge of the hotline told me during my visits: “there is no database on corruption cases 
yet”. This is why officials engaged departments to supply them with information on 
corruption and fraud in the province, so that they could see the trends and patterns. A 
database building was under process in order to find solutions to the problems. 
Nevertheless, there was indication that so far only the Transport and Public Works 
Department had started submitting information on corruption with the main problems 
being the abuse of government vehicles. 
 
A PSC Report on anticorruption hotlines (April 2002) in the provinces shows that the 
main shortcomings were the lack of guidelines uniformity in the set-up and the 
administration of the hotlines. The end result was the absence of a coherent operational 
plan or organizational structure as well as no uniform data-capturing mechanisms that 
record the number of calls, the types of complaints, nor the way in which they had been 
dealt with.  
Table 40: PSC Survey of Provincial Hotlines (Gauteng): 
 GAUTENG PROVINCE 
Hotline No 0800 600 933 
Location  Department of Finance: Communication Section 
Public Awareness Mass media campaign including banners, stickers and radio talk 
campaigns. 
Operational 
Procedures 
- Calls are not recorded 
- There is voice-mail system that operates in the evenings to 
capture calls. 
Investigative 
Procedures 
- Information is passed to the HOD of Finance 
- The HOD passes the information to HOD of the Department 
where corruption is alleged. 
Budget  - Department of Finance pays for the line, facilities and staff 
- Unknown budget 
Human Resources 3 people: 
- 1 Call Operator 
- 1 Supervisor 
- 1 Manager 
Evaluation and Data 
Management 
- Cases are compiled monthly 
- No statistics on the number of cases 
Source: Hotlines: PSC Report, 2002:23. 
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Gauteng, as well as KwaZulu-Natal, does not have any investigative capacity attached to 
the hotline center. Instead officials refer all cases to the internal audit section of the 
particular department about which a concern has been raised. There are no mechanisms of 
checking whether any follow-ups do occur with these cases. Nor is there any guarantee 
that the audit section of the relevant department has capacity itself to undertake the 
investigation. Therefore, it becomes clear that if hotlines are to be successful, they must be 
seen as a part of a long-term strategy for combating corruption, which in turn requires a 
long-term commitment to public awareness building, to sum up the PSC hotline Report. 
 
12. 3. Department of Transport and Public Works 
 
 In most cases of corruption in the government, action is taken only after sensational 
media reports have exposed the case or after an independent investigation has published 
his findings on a specific one. As seen above, the Transport and Works Department was 
confronted by many claims of rampant corruption especially in the Licencing department 
in Johannesburg.  Scams in which traffic officers, clerks and supervisors were involved 
included the fraudulent issuing of licences, roadworthy certificates and registration 
documents. Administrative weaknesses also played a major role in this escalating problem 
with the computer system used by both traffic and police officials not connected and 
criminals taking advantage of the loophole. 
 
In 1999, the improvement of the National Traffic Information System (NaTIS) facilitated 
the identification of a marked car and of its owner, while with the old system it could take 
up to three months before a stolen car was/could be marked on the department’s computer 
system. Other measures taken to combat corruption included: 
 Registration of workers on a national list (similar to that used by doctors and lawyers) 
to ensure that anyone dismissed because of criminal activities – corruption is a crime – 
would be barred from working in a similar department. 
 Sending details of all duplicate cars to the anti-hijacking unit with the instruction to 
confiscate the vehicle and arrest the owner. 
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In his budget speech to the Gauteng Legislature on 22 May 2001, Mr. Mosunkutu tabled 
the situation encountered at most of the licensing departments in Gauteng as well the 
strategies of his Department to stamp out corruption. He pointed out that his Department 
in partnership with Business Against Crime (BAC), the Department of Safety and Liaison 
and the Department of Justice had embarked on a number of initiatives in the campaign 
against fraud and corruption in pursuit of clean governance. In most departments the main 
problems identified included: 
 To move the Diepkloof and Brixton vehicle units to Langlaagte testing station, where 
testing, registering and clearance of motor vehicles are done under one roof  (Sowetan, 
7 July 1999).  
 Visit by the Gauteng government to all local traffic departments (Department of 
Transport, 11 September 2002). This visit by a team tasked by the Gauteng 
Department of Transport and Public Works during August 2002 occasioned the 
finding of all sorts of irregularities including: the issuing of fraudulent licences and 
licences authorized by clerks instead of examiners; disorganized filing systems, 
missing files, unregistered examiners, incomplete forms, non-compliance of test yards 
and road tests done in less than 15 minutes. Irregularities were found also in the 
registering authorities on the estates of deceased people, repossessions and 
amalgamation transactions resulting in 1049 fraudulent estate transactions. As a result, 
six licence test centres were closed for three months as were many examiners 
suspended and nine other centres given 14 days to clean up their acts. Thousands of 
Gauteng motorists were on the brink of seeing their driving licences nullified after 
irregularities were found in the test centres. Police had to be called to investigate the 
crime syndicate operating at the Loveday Street centre in Johannesburg.  
The MEC was commended for his handling of his portfolio, as well as for other initiatives 
including a major purge that resulted in the firing of two officers and the suspension of 10 
officials on charge ranging from the misuse of official vehicles to breaching of tender 
regulations. In a statement to media, Mosunkutu said the move was part of a renewed 
determination to stamp out bribery and corruption in the province’s traffic law 
enforcement agencies and showed his department’s hard line by not taking the matter of 
corruption in government lightly (Citizen, 23 March 2001).  
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• Customer service characterized by long queues and a customer-staff interaction 
full of friction;  
• Staff shortages and lack of supporting systems;  
• Inadequate supervisory capacity and lack of managerial innovation;  
• Fraud and corruption involving some officials and some customers, as well as that 
facilitated by officials in other related government departments;  
• Lack of strategic financial management, including providing management 
information for collection of licence fees purposes;  
• Record-keeping methods that hamper quick service delivery to customers (i.e., 
files centralized in one of the 5 offices);  
• No mentorship of new generation managers;  
• Unnecessary referral of customers/public to the provincial department (Gautrans) 
on matters that fall squarely on the jurisdiction of the chief licensing officer 
(Department of Transport, 28 June 2001). 
To resolve these problems a project plan, accepted by all stakeholders, called “Best 
Practice Model” was put in place and was the outcome of countless strategic sessions 
between BAC and the Transport Department and the following changes were expected 
from the model: 
• Change of the physical/structural arrangements at each licence department;  
• Categorization of staff for different transactions;  
• Continuous management of password changes;  
• Using the supervisors as the backbone of the license office;  
• Document verification in the backroom, and installation of a document tracking 
system. 
 
The aim of this initiative was to provide managerial and supervisory support to the 
Licensing Departments in the city of Johannesburg in particular and to other licensing 
departments throughout the province. The total budgeted amount was approximately R11 
million. In partnership with BAC, Gautrans and the City of Johannesburg appointed a total 
of 10 supervisors and seven (7) managers on a contract basis of 6 months. This was done 
in terms of the Treasury Regulations and the Tender Board rules on the utilization of 
service provides on panels. The supervisors are highly trained in NaTIS, and provide 
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The project was expected to achieve in the 6-month period:  
• To aid managers on service delaying points or centres;  
NaTIS training themselves. Five (5) of these supervisors started on 02 May 2001, at the 
offices of Loveday Street, Roodepoort and Langlaagte where parts of the Best Practice 
Model were being implemented. The other five (5) supervisors started on Monday, 02 July 
2001 along with the managers (Department of Transport, 28 June 2001). 
 
The City of Johannesburg would appoint permanent staff, supervisors and managers 
during the project period. Revised job descriptions were put in place to assist in the 
process. As with already existing staff, supervisors and managers, an effective skill 
transfer process was activated.  
 
• Good customer service ensured by flowing back office operations and staff trained 
in service excellence;  
• Reduced/eliminated fraudulent or corrupt activities or dealing with them 
effectively;  
• Optimized financial and human resource management;  
• Correct staffing levels and mentorship of new generation managers;  
• Positive innovative capability in supervisors and managers; and  
• Licensing departments to be run as viable businesses and centres of service 
excellence, centres of the City of Johannesburg. 
 
Finally, the last initiative was that of long queues resolution that ended up in the setting up 
of “a queue management system” aimed at improving the management and assisting 
customers’ needs as follows:  
• To indicate to customers how long they will wait for service;  
• To identify slow and fast workers, and set reasonable benchmarking;  
• To identify training gaps and train staff who are below the benchmark; and  
• To provide other management information at provincial government level. 
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• 
• The replacement of the security company 
• 
• 
• 
The offensive against fraud and corruption did not stop here. The Department of Transport 
and Public Works in conjunction with the Gauteng Operating Licence Board, previously 
known as the Permit Board, started investigating in July 2001 several meter taxi operators 
who were engaged in illegal operations. They found for instance that RIXI Taxi, a 
meter/sedan operator and others had contravened the Law by renting out permits at an 
amount of R210 per week per taxi driver, under the guise of franchising.  RIXI Taxi was 
in possession of 74 permits, which they rented out to drivers for operations in the Pretoria 
Central Business District. The Board decided to cancel with immediate effect all operating 
permits held by RIXI Taxi and ordered the recall of the cancelled permits within a seven-
day period. The investigation was extended to other metered taxi operators reported to be 
contravening the law in a similar fashion (Department of Transport, 21 July 2001). 
 
The Department continued to focus on rooting out corruption and fraud within the 
departmental processes such as motor vehicle registration, licensing, roadworthy 
certificates, GG vehicle misuse, and financial related areas. In this context though 
measures were taken and implemented at the Johannesburg licensing department in July 
2001 to bring to an end the scams and corrupt practices that saw ordinary and honest 
citizens forced to queue for hours for documents. These measures were so successful that 
other metropolitan councils in Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and the Mogale municipality decided 
to adopt them. Even the national Transport Minister Dullah Omar commended the work 
done and said that because of the success, the control measures would eventually be 
implemented throughout the country. They were simple but though measures aimed at the 
removal of touts and crooks who were promising the public “fast service” and to clear the 
surroundings outside the Loveday Street offices. As reported by Saturday Star, 11 August 
2001, they included: 
 
The lock of fire escape doors that can be opened only in case of fire; 
Undercover metro police officers are to be present to watch staff and inspect suspect 
transactions between members of the public and staff; 
Reconfiguration of customers lifts to the relevant departments; 
Staff are subjected to daily body searches on entry, and are prevented from entering 
the area of the building in their cars; 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
 
 
Agents no longer get preferential treatment and should stand in queues like everyone 
else; 
Loitering has been banned, and on entry, members of the public are issued with 
vouchers authorizing their presence in the building and these must be returned to 
security when leaving; 
Every entrance is manned by a security guard who advises the public on where to go; 
Extra cashiers have been employed in order to process transactions speedily; 
Documents are now bar coded and are scanned at the entrance to record the time and 
date of arrival and can be traced at any time.  
 
To prevent corruption from shifting to other areas, the tough steps had been adopted in all 
areas of the province. As said by the MEC Mosunkutu, “despite tough measures put in 
place to root out corruption, it still existed” (Citizen, 19 March 2002). This is why 
financial accountability and the elimination of fraud and corruption remained key focus 
areas for the Gauteng public transport, roads and works department, as singled out in the 
departmental 2002 Annual Report tabled on 10 September 2002 in the Legislature. “We 
have reduced fraud and corruption; including the time spent by our customers at licensing 
departments. And above all, we have increased the revenue collected from licences to 
R708 million”. In addition, loitering inside licensing offices had also been stopped 
resulting in the elimination of staff bribery. As the result of the new strategies, 18 people 
had been arrested and 45 apprehended during inspections at various driving schools 
between 2001 and 2002.  
“These achievements, Mosunkutu states in the Report, were the result of the 
implementation of innovative Best Practice Model in the Licensing Offices and the 
partnership with Business Against Crime and local authorities”. Finally, he promised to 
regularly carry out the inspection of vehicle testing stations, driver licence testing centres 
and driving schools for compliance throughout the province. “This will be achieved via 
the implementation of more comprehensive policies and procedures combined with a 
bigger focus on inspections, investigations and internal audit”, (2003 Budget, 3 June 
2003).   
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The Commission was linked to a housing transfer programme, in terms of which 
government had agreed to give occupants of state homes a discount of R7 500 on the 
historic price of each property. Housing transfer bureaus were set up to oversee the 
programme. Corrupt councilors and municipal officials who made way for others who had 
paid bribes allegedly threw thousands of families out of houses. Others were overlooked 
during housing allocations because they had not paid bribes to councilors. Victims of 
corruption and mal-administration were given until the third week of January 1998 to 
submit complaints. The Commission concluded its hearings in March 1998 before 
completing its report in April 1998. At the end of December 1997, the Commission 
received 780 genuine submissions detailing alleged irregularities in the allocation of these 
houses, a sign of people’s confidence in the Commission and their readiness to “talk”. On 
the January 20 deadline, there were more than 6 000 complaints received by Gauteng’s 
Home Truths Commission (Business Day; The Star, 27 January 1998). Claims of 
irregularities included the sale of state-owned houses to councilors’ family members, 
people renting houses for 11c a month in Sandton and others being forced into marriages 
to secure housing. 
 
 
12.4. Housing Department 
 
Allegations of corruption and intimidation in the apartheid-era and allocation of up to 45 
000 state-owned houses with an estimated value of R3bn led the then Gauteng Premier 
Tokyo Sexwale to institute a commission of inquiry on December 1, 1997 to probe these 
irregularities.  This was followed by the appointment of commissioners to the commission 
known as “Home Truths Commission” headed by Jabu Dhlamini, a Germiston lawyer. 
The Home Truths Commission had been appointed to investigate the allocation of and 
eviction from state-owned homes for the period between January 1 1976 and March 31 
1994, during 20 years before the ANC-led government came to power. At the time 
Gauteng Housing and Land Affairs MEC Dan Mofokeng announced that about 150 000 
state-owned houses valued at R10bn were being transferred to their occupants in Gauteng 
and it was estimated that acts of intimidation and corruption in the allocation of these 
homes were up to 30% (Business Day, 31 December 1997).   
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Between 1994 and 2000, the continued shortcomings influencing housing delivery could 
be summarized as follows: there was little incentive for developers to finish projects on 
time, particularly during the last phase of construction; weak capacity and poor planning 
within the department slowed down spending and the 2000 local government elections and 
re-structuring towards newly demarcated municipalities slowed down housing 
development; lack of end-user finance to credit-linked beneficiaries and housing 
institutions delayed the implementation of several large projects; slow transfer of land and 
delays in township establishment procedures sometimes due to capacity constraints at 
local government level; delay of prescribed payments by conveyancers; poor performance 
by developers; legal technical issues related to section 118 of the Municipal Systems Act 
affecting the transfer of ownership; and slow approval procedures for Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs).  
 
However, as pointed out by MEC for Housing, Paul Mashatile, “the many obstacles in the 
path to achieving more effective and efficient housing delivery remain a challenge to us 
rather than a deterrent” (2001/2002 Annual Report). 
 
The Report reveals that the Gauteng response to the above-mentioned problems was the 
creation of delivery-oriented Agencies:  
• Gauteng Partnership Agency: primarily responsible for the establishment of the 
management of an appropriate finance mechanism and the management of housing 
stock owned and held by the Department.  
• Housing Development Agency: responsible for the implementation of housing 
projects. Acting as the developer of choice for all new projects approved from 1 April 
2002 so that the role of external developers is limited. 
• Urban Regeneration Agency: responsible for the implementation of large scale urban 
development projects that go beyond the provision of housing to providing the 
necessary social amenities, economic opportunities, etc. that contribute to the 
development of sustainable communities. 
 
The approach of setting up Agencies allowed the department to ring fence specific 
business with a view to creating increased effectiveness and greater accountability. 
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Other initiatives by the Department include the corrective measures taken on 10 December 
2002 – contained in a document called “Corruption Media Statement” - to avoid a 
recurrence of the same acts, after the findings of independent investigations into 
corruption and maladministration in 20 projects:    
 
• Undertaking of a major data clean up exercise to ensure that all decisions are based on 
accurate information (waiting list, Housing Subsidy System, etc); 
• Conducting a review of policies and procedures governing both the awarding and 
administration of contracts particularly with regard to the monitoring of the 
performance of developers; 
• Undertaking a contract review process which entailed not only the review of our 
current contracts but was also aimed at improving all contracts entered into by the 
Department and the safe keeping of all original contracts in one central point. 
• Establishing of an internal investigating unit in 2001 to look at cases that are brought 
to the attention of the Department from time to time. 
• Abolition of the former provincial advisory Boards and the replacement thereof by a 
more effective, efficient and transparent Advisory Councils. 
• Finalization of the Fraud Prevention Plan and the formation of the Fraud Prevention 
Committee that would entail the utilization of the GSSC hotline. 
• Establishment of a Customer Support Centre (CSC) on 28 May 2002 referred to as a 
“Place of Hope”. A toll-free number is also operational. Through this facility the 
Department is able to provide a mechanism to deal with complaints and to facilitate 
the investigation of allegations of irregularities. The CSC functions as common entry 
point for stakeholders to the department on various issues related to housing delivery. 
The center represents a critical ‘One-Stop Shop” through which relevant information 
on the core business of the department can be accessed and disseminated. Since its 
opening, the CSC has handled at the end of August 2003 in excess of 79 500 cases 
with a daily average of 500 people visiting the center. The Call Centre receives 
approximately 700 calls a day. For the past 12 months, the Call Centre agents have 
managed to handle 11 413 calls on average per month. Most of the cases lodged at the 
Centre relate to the Waiting List and enquiries on Subsidies. The establishment of the 
Centre resulted in transforming the Department from one that just hears its customers, 
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into one that actually listens and acts (Corruption Media Statement, 10 December 
2003; 7-8; Budget Vote Address, 3 June 2003).  
 
Finally, since the implementation of the above steps there has been a material decrease in 
the reported cases of fraud and corruption against all the role players and the non-
performance by developers, according to the Housing MEC.  
  
On 13 January 2004, the Gauteng Department of Housing (GDH) released a progress 
report to the media explaining some of the expenses used for forensic investigations into 
corruption. This followed the story published in the Saturday Star on January 10 2004, 
alleging that the GDH had spent millions of rands on investigations. The investigation and 
corrective measures by the department started in 2002 after a public outcry over the abuse 
of housing subsidies by developers and fraud by people who were not supposed to benefit 
from the housing scheme. 
 
The cases outlined by the GDH had been under scrutiny since 1994, eight years before the 
department's investigative unit was set up in February 2002. One of the cases in point was 
the South African Land Developers Organization, which received R41-million from GDH. 
After investigations it was found that only five houses had been completed. 
 
According to this report, between the April 2002 to March 2003 financial year, forensic 
investigations had cost the department R3,6-million. In the following financial year 
(March 2003 to March 2004) the department predicted the spending to be around R6,7-
million "including VAT, disbursement and external legal costs". This meant a spending of 
more than R10-million on investigations since 2002. "These investigations have been 
ongoing since 1994. We have completed more than 50 percent of the work and the 
outcomes vary. Sometimes there is evidence of fraud. Other times no one can substantiate 
the complaints," said Keith Khoza, GDH spokesperson. However, the committee of 
inquiry that was assigned to investigate in April 2003 had found irregular transactions to 
the value of R43-million that led to the dismissal of Peter van den Heever, a director of 
formal housing.  
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The department said fraud in the allocation of housing took many forms such as 
developers who demanded money from prospective homeowners even though developers 
had received payments from government. Other cases involved developers who received 
money from government but did not build houses; developers who overcharged 
government for housing projects; gangsters who evicted rightful owners from their houses; 
and officials who allegedly exchanged houses for bribes.  
The committee also completed an investigation of the South African Land Development 
Organisation (Saldo), a housing developer that had a number of subsidiaries, which 
received more than R70m for projects between 1994 and 1996. It received R31,5m for 
individual subsidies for 2400 houses, of which it built 318, some of which were only 
partially constructed. Saldo had used two legal firms to process individual subsidies on its 
behalf.  
"Civil claims have also been issued against the law firms. The value of these claims is in 
excess of R140m, plus the interest plus the cost of investigations," said the department's 
housing head Sibusiso Buthelezi. The committee had also filed more than 100 charges of 
corruption and fraud in connection with irregularities in the allocation of houses to non-
qualifying beneficiaries in a number of townships, such as Duduza, Katlehong, Lakeside, 
Braamfischerville and Tshepisong. "This has been a longstanding complaint in many 
communities," Buthelezi concluded. The latest outcome of corruption investigations done 
by the department was the arrest of four project managers and a crooked councilor from 
Ekurhuleni municipality on January 15, 2004.  
12. 5. Department of Social Services and Population Development 
Once an entity plagued by corruption and mismanagement and unable to deliver according 
to its mission, the Welfare Department, as it was known, has gone from strength to 
strength by improving the quality of its services in a period of two years. The Department 
put in place a comprehensive strategic management system – based on the Public Finance 
Management Act and the Public Service Regulations – that ensured that it accelerated its 
services delivery according to its national and provincial mandates. As disclosed by the 
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g) Is guided by a comprehensive policy analysis, formulation, evaluation and 
monitoring approach that provides a framework for the collection of baseline 
research information on the target population, i.e. children, women, youths, people 
with HIV/AIDS, disabilities, families and communities; 
h) Contributes to the development of a comprehensive social security system and an 
integrated poverty alleviation strategy; 
i) Forms the basis for analyzing national and provincial government priorities to 
inform the allocution and budgetary processes; 
j) Forms the basis for focusing the Department in terms of aligning its vision, 
mission, goals and objectives, strategies, programmes, resources and structures; 
 
 
• 
• Providing social grants to more than 750 000 families in Gauteng and all beneficiaries 
have the right to access banking facilities at no cost to the beneficiary. 
• 
MEC for Social Services and Population Development Department in her 2003 budget 
speech, the strength of this system lied in the fact that it: 
 
k) Provides for a holistic performance monitoring system that takes into consideration 
the Department’s capacity to deliver services to its citizenry, impact on the services 
rendered, the extent to which it uses its resources productively, as well as the extent 
to which it minimizes the effects of inflation. 
 As a result of this strategic system that put the vulnerable and the destitute at the centre of 
the government machinery, the Department has fully succeeded in “turning the tide 
against poverty and living up to its commitment to being a caring government”, in Angie 
Motshekga’s terms. Among other things, achievements for the year 2002/2003 included:  
Opening of 13 more offices closer to people in Alexandra, Vosloorus, Thokoza, 
Rathanda, Alra Park, Dobsonville, Orlando, Diepkloof, Daveyton, Kempton Park, 
Eldorado Park, Zonkezizwe and Lenasia.  
Conducting of an audit of social grants beneficiaries resulting in the clamping down 
on syndicates that provided medical certificates to healthy people. More than 3000 
people had been nabbed. 
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• The National Food Emergency Scheme has provided food and hope to more than 
5000 families in Gauteng in 2002. From October 2003, the Department started to 
dispatch food parcels to more than 28 000 families. 
• 
• The school uniform programme for orphans in distress and child-headed families has 
provided summer and winter uniforms to 1 500 children and this number was 
expected to reach 7 000 children by the end of 2003. 
• 
• The partnership between the Department and organized formations such as non-profit 
organizations (NPO’s), community-based organizations (CBO’s) and Faith Based 
Organizations, has enabled the empowerment of the aged, people with disabilities and 
women. 
• 
• Fight against HIV/Aids and support to people affected and infected with HIV/Aids 
thanks to the broad government’s funding. 
The Department whose R3.9 billion budget is the second largest in the province after 
Education, allocated up to 87% of it to care dependency, foster care, child support, old-
age care, disability and grants-in-aid, in short to people who cannot care for themselves.   
Other departmental strategies are related to poverty alleviation projects. Among other 
programmes, Gauteng had poverty alleviation projects to hire unemployed township 
residents to clean the streets. These workers do the same job as those workers employed 
by municipalities or private companies and in Johannesburg they reported directly to 
Pikitup. For example, the Gauteng government established the Zivuseni poverty 
programme in 2002. As part of this it hired workers to do waste management tasks which 
were linked to Pikitup’s Zondi depot in Soweto.  
In order to strength the poverty relief programme, the remaining 10 development 
centers – seen as the key instruments in reskilling and providing hope for people in 
the province – will be opened soon. 
 More than 788 organizations that serve the weak and vulnerable were funded to the 
tune of more than R295 million. 
Consolidation of the service level agreement with NGOs to ensure a broad funding 
model in order to incorporate all those formation committed to serving the poor and 
vulnerable. 
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The department and the NDA tried to integrate their programme initiatives in order to 
avoid difficulties but rather intensify development. Furthermore the NDA assisted the 
department to arrange conferences with local government aimed at promoting talks to 
support and strengthen the department's ability to perform its constitutional social 
development mandate. The aim of the partnership was to enhance, strengthen and expedite 
sustainable socio-economic development in the communities of Gauteng.  
Meanwhile the Department of Social Services was involved in two programmes of 
poverty alleviation: development centres and the Gauteng Intersectoral Development Unit. 
Development centres, whereby community members were engaged in projects like youth 
clubs, vegetable growing and art and craft, for example, were established in communities 
where poverty seemed very high and the Department had to cope with corruption. The 
Gauteng Intersectoral Development Unit (GIDU) was established in order to ensure 
appropriate, multi-sectoral contributions from all levels of government, civil society and 
the private sector. The GIDU was built on the opportunities provided by social capital and 
entered into innovative partnerships with business and civil society organisations to 
provide community based and community funded poverty alleviation and social 
In May 2003 the National Development Agency (NDA) and the Gauteng Department of 
Social Services agreed to work together to develop poverty alleviation projects in the 
province. The department set aside R16 million, while the NDA encouraged more funding 
commitments from other financial sources, including international ones. NDA is a funding 
agency aimed at establishing relationships and building networks with businesses, 
government, non-governmental organisations, agencies and communities involved in 
development. It is funded by government and the European Union and by the private 
sector.  
 
The department has identified three main areas of concern: health, education and 
economic development. The NDA offers training support to community members 
regarding the above-mentioned areas through workshops, establish ways to encourage 
more funding commitments from the other financial sources and see to it that the 
beneficiaries have access to the Gauteng provincial government's poverty alleviation 
programmes.  
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development programmes. GIDU's purpose was to coordinate policies, strategies and 
action plans to guide the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a comprehensive 
integrated provincial poverty alleviation strategy. 
Forced to deal with fraudsters who abused the system and posed a serious threat to limited 
resources available to assist deserving people in Gauteng, the Social Development 
Department announced in its Budget Vote presented to the Gauteng Legislature on 29 
June 2004 the existence of systems to weed out people who received grants when in actual 
fact, they were not entitled to receive them.  
 
 
To this end the Department cancelled 1380 grants that were fraudulently paid to 
beneficiaries who were not entitled to receive them. Out of this number, assisted by the 
Johannesburg Commercial Branch of the SAPS, 13 fraudsters were arrested and appeared 
in court. In addition, 4 syndicate leaders who assisted people to defraud the system were 
arrested and charged. 5 medical doctors were under investigation pending their arrest.  
 
To promote this aim, a Gauteng Poverty Targeting Report mapping poverty pockets at 
local government level was completed by GIDU. The Interdepartmental Poverty 
Alleviation Programme (IPAC), representing all government Departments, functions from 
the offices of this unit. The Integrated Food Nutrition Programme as well as 
Interdepartmental Social Sector response to the Expanded Public Works Programme is 
currently coordinated through IPAC. GIDU is also responsible for the MEC/MMC 
(Members of the Mayoral Committee) Local Government Forum set up to promote policy 
and coordinate social development initiatives of local and provincial government.  
 
However, the achievements above do not mean the end of misbehaviour in the 
Department as incidents of theft by officials are still reported. As evidence (The Star, 28 
February 2002), the Gauteng government was forced to close down 90% of its 368 
poverty-eradication projects after finding out in February 2002 that a few people 
channeled up to R7 million of its budget into their own pockets. The set up and the 
implementation of the new strategic system helped to stop the loot so far. 
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12. 6. Department of Safety and Security 
The national department of the SAPS that has control over provincial departments has 
identified in its 2002/2003 Annual Report, corruption, along with HIV/AIDS, as an 
internal risk. According to the Report, corruption is undermining the economic stability of 
various countries and compounding the impact of organized crime. Furthermore, 
corruption among police members severely compromises the functioning and credibility of 
the SAPS and internal corruption is detrimental to the morale of police members and 
causes the public to perceive the police as being unable to provide an effective policing 
service (p.8). 
 
This prompted the Department to establish a National Evaluation Service Division, which 
focused on evaluating operational activities in terms of their compliance with regulations 
and standing procedures. As a result the Service Integrity Strategy has been set up and 
forwarded to all provincial departments for implementation. The main goal of the Service 
Integrity Strategy is to enhance the levels of integrity among police officials in the SAPS. 
The Strategy focuses on addressing corruption in the Service and is essential for 
establishing and maintaining a management information system to successfully address 
service integrity in the SAPS. The Strategy was recently revised to ensure that initiatives 
are not undertaken in a fragmented manner, thereby ensuring coordination between the 
various role-players in the SAPS. The Fraud Prevention Plan was also included in the 
Service Integrity Strategy that has been rationalized into six tiers as follows: 
 
Regulatory development: focuses on the equipment of the SAPS with legal mechanisms to 
address corruption that includes various legal and policy instruments such as the United 
National Convention Against Corruption and the SADC protocol Against Corruption. 
 
Control and verification of services: addresses the management processes, including 
functional processes and procedures relating to, for instance, physical and information 
resources, in the SAPS. The verification of the integrity of members of the SAPS, 
including current SAPS members and recruits. 
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Preventive partnerships: this is about establishing and developing projects in the SAPS 
and external partnerships with key role-players in the community and private sector, 
including refining methods and procedures in the SAPS to prevent corruption in identified 
areas of police functioning.  
Disciplinary action: concerns complaints against members of the Service, disciplinary 
investigations and hearings and the restoration of integrity by dismissing offenders. A 
database will be created to assist the SAPS management with the correct placement of 
police officials to enhance integrity in the Service. 
 
Criminal investigations: investigation of criminal cases against SAPS members, and the 
prosecution of SAPS members in criminal cases. 
 
Intelligence: gathering reliable intelligence in respect of corruption and potentially corrupt 
activities. This is closely linked to risks relating to corruption in the SAPS. Such risks will 
be taken into account during intelligence tasking and gathering. 
 
 
All six tiers must be in line with the following aims: 
- Prevention of corruption 
- Detection of alleged cases of corruption 
- Investigation of cases of corruption 
- Implementation of restorative actions to deal with possible shortcomings which may 
have resulted in or contributed to corruption. 
 
In Gauteng this Strategy has had successful results with the investigation of more than 736 
cases of corruption involving members of the SAPS. After the disbanding of the Anti-
corruption Unit, investigations are now handled by the Organized Crime Unit through an 
integrated and holistic approach. The period April to June 2003 saw the arrest of 66 
suspects for alleged corruption. This included both members of the SAPS and civilians 
who allegedly bribed them. The Department through its monitoring and evaluation 
directorate had prioritized cases of corruption received from members of the public and 
was sending them to the provincial commissioner for quick intervention and further 
investigation. 
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12. 7. The Gauteng Department of Education 
 
Delivering the Department’s progress report on 15 November 2001, Gauteng Education 
MEC Ignatius Jacobs, disclosed that his department had developed a Fraud Prevention 
Plan to bring about change in employees’ attitudes towards corruption. The draft plan was 
finalized and implemented with effect from June 2001. The Department had also 
established a Fraud Prevention Operational Committee to steer and take responsibility for 
the Fraud Prevention Project (FPP) as well as to ensure effective project implementation, 
management and maintenance.  
 
The arrest of a senior manager and two other senior officials of the Gauteng West District 
in the wake of allegations of fraud and corruption in January 2003, had been seen by the 
Department as “its strategy to rid itself of fraud and corrupt practices in the Public Service 
and as part of its Fraud Prevention Plan that aims to encourage all officials and the public 
to engage in whistle blowing so that we can have a clean administration and good 
governance” (Department of Education, 28 January 2003).  
 
Finally, most Departments, including those we have not referred to in this section because 
of the laxity of their strategies, have adopted the Code of Conduct of the Public Service 
Administration, which set guidelines for the regulation of the working environment for 
public officials. 
 
Subsequently, the remarkable improvement that all the departments have made in 
managing public finances especially could not go hardly unnoticed by the Premier of 
Gauteng, Mbhazima Shilowa. In a statement issued on 25 August 2003, he praised and 
lauded the Gauteng Provincial Government’s commitment to prudent financial 
management, clean governance and accountability. As he pointed out,  
 
“this was indeed a remarkable improvement from the previous years when the 
Auditor-General, due to a variety of reasons, was unable to make an opinion on 
the financial statements of some of departments while giving qualified opinions on 
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some departments where there was improvement. This meant that there were some 
things about our finances which the Auditor-General felt needed tightening”.  
Thus, he proudly announced that for the first time, the Gauteng Provincial Government 
had received a clean bill of health from the Auditor-General with the 12 departments as 
well as the Legislature receiving unqualified opinion on their financial statements for the 
financial year 2002/2003 (Media Statement, 25 August 2003). 
 
“These achievements have been made, as Shilowa has earlier said, despite the fact that we 
have had to wage a determined struggle to overcome the terrible legacy of the apartheid 
system, which in many ways continues to define the nature of our society” (Mid-Term 
Report 1999-2002).  
 
12. 8. Strategies Constraints 
Undoubtedly, this remarkable improvement put the Gauteng Government in drive for a 
better life for all. But could it be contended that corruption has been overcome in 
Gauteng?  Frankly, there is still a long way to go. Can one conclude now that the 
strategies put in place in Gauteng to control corruption have really been effective? A close 
look at government response to thwart corruption shows some cracks in the citadel. As 
corruption literature has revealed, several limiting factors must be taken into account. This 
study finds that the lack of political will, the laxity in the protection of whistleblowers and 
the ignorance of international approaches can undermine all anti-corruption efforts. 
12.8.1. The Political Will:  
While all identified strategies are viewed as important in the fight against corruption, 
political will emerges as an underlying problem, a fundamental tool without which any 
concrete action cannot be achieved. In Camerer’s terms this is one of the “two factors 
identified as potentially “making or breaking” anti-corruption efforts. It refers to the 
demonstrated, credible intent of political actors to address an issue seriously” (2001:62). 
In the survey I only asked civil society respondents whether the need for ethical standards 
or leadership or political will was enough to combat corruption. The majority of them 
(67%) pointed out the importance of political will in the adoption of appropriate policies 
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and allocation of resources. Example provided by the leadership is a contributing factor to 
the incidence or the control of corruption. 
It is usual for members of the public to witness in some African countries the President 
who declines to dismiss a minister widely reputed to be corrupt or instead moves him to 
head another ministry or he could even appoint an individual widely reported to be corrupt 
to head an anti-corruption commission. These kinds of examples do not help create the 
climate for a corruption-free society. Obviously, the lack political will dilutes any 
mechanisms intended for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies. As Camerer 
has suggested,  “without this, the government’s statements on reforming the public 
service, strengthening transparency and accountability, and reinventing the relationship 
between government and the private sector, remain mere rhetoric. In all efforts to combat 
corruption, the commitment of senior elected representatives and other public officials are 
pivotal” (2001:63).  
 
However, suspicion of political interference exposes the limits of political will. President 
Mbeki’s “zero tolerance” campaign towards corrupt practice reached its peak with the 
“removal” of Judge Heath from investigating the so-called “Arms deal”. This case 
exposed the limits of his political will and showed that many anti-corruption mechanisms 
are hampered by a lack of independence, funding constraints and capacity limitations. 
Mbeki publicly denounced Judge Willem Heath and excluded the Heath Unit, as it was 
known from the arms scandal inquiry following a ruling by the Constitutional Court that a 
judge could  not head such a unit since this blurred the line between the executive and the 
judiciary. Heath subsequently resigned. He was the head of the Special Investigating Unit 
whose mandate was to investigate corruption cases and recover plundered public funds. 
Evidence has shown that most anti-corruption agencies report to the head of state, making 
them dependent on the will of a single political leader. Observers note that in South 
Africa, despite a sophisticated anti-corruption infrastructure, the independence of official 
anti-corruption bodies is limited by their politicization: all of the agencies authorized to 
participate in the arms procurement investigation, with the exception of the Auditor 
General, are headed by former senior ANC politicians. This prompts people to question 
the independence of these bodies regarding cases implicating prominent senior ANC 
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members in government, as illustrated by sensational cases of mismanagement, fraud and 
corruption that involved Allan Boesak, Winnie Mandela, Tony Yengeni, Deputy President 
Jacobs Zuma and in Gauteng Jessie Duarte, Dan Mofokeng and to some extent 
Motshekga.  In all these cases the ANC was accused of cover-up.   
Noria Mashumba of the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa discerns two forms of  
political will to fight corruption in public service provision: the “quantitative” and the 
“qualitative”. The first includes efforts to establish anti-corruption institutions, legislation 
and processes, and “tremendous progress has been made within the region. But beyond 
this, “qualitative” political will is also essential, she said. This means concrete action by 
those who make commitments to ensure the effectiveness of their policies” (Global 
Corruption Report 2001:58). Often the government has displayed a more limited 
determination to curb corruption, especially when it affects its own ministers or senior 
officials. 
One notes that while these efforts to clamp down on corruption are important and positive, 
claims of a poor success rate and long turn around times are hard to discount. In many 
cases the success is limited. Whatever the reasons, van der Merwe (2001) (:12-13) puts the 
blame on “blatant intellectual dishonesty” and points out that “the fundamental error in the 
current anti-corruption discourse, policies and strategies is that current solutions – 
effective as some may be in their own right – do not fit the extent and complex nature of 
the problem. Otherwise, current anti-corruption strategies are, at best, only partially 
successful since only a part of the problem, albeit important, is addressed. Success is 
praised and celebrated, while the problem in our society and the world at large is ignored 
or overlooked. Moreover, zones of comfort are created and maintained for certain 
perpetrators of corruption” (such as Jessie Duarte and Dan Mofokeng).  
In the same line, observers have noted that in recent years, anti-corruption rhetoric has 
been on the rise among governments, often as lip-service response to the increasing media 
attention and activism of civil society, as well as from actions taken by some international 
agencies to fight corruption (Kaufmann, 1999). Although there are many countries and 
institutions that have undertaken serious efforts against corruption, there are many whose 
commitment to addressing the problem is rather dubious. It is therefore important to be 
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Therefore, it is generally believed that the lack of successful anti-corruption campaigns is 
partly due to limited knowledge related to causes, effects and cures of corruption, and 
partly because the distant past appears to be more important than current policies. The lack 
of success in many anti-corruption reforms has at its core many public sector officials 
whose positions and actions have considerable impact on economic value for the society. 
Andvig et al., explain how, “in isolated incidences, the ones likely to discover corruption 
are often agents working with the corrupt agent (s). If they do not report it, this means they 
implicitly accept it. In this case misbehaviour is most likely to spread. Thus, the 
monitoring agent will end-up becoming a part of the corrupt system” (2000: 131). As a 
result, these role-players in the anti-corruption drive become part of the overall problem 
and need to be cited as such (van der Merwe, 2001:12).   
 
12.8.2.
aware of the fact that the fight against corruption can present few success stories. The only 
clear-cut successes, as stated by many scholars, have been Hong Kong and Singapore, 
both city-states that had fairly authoritarian governments when they initiated their anti-
corruption efforts. A few other countries, including Italy and Uganda, have made inroads 
in fighting corruption but have by no means destroyed the problem. Uganda, for instance, 
has in recent years improved its ranking in the corruption index, but remains below even 
Africa’s gloomy average, scoring a mere 2.1 for the CPI 2002 (94th out of 102) and 2.2 in 
the 2004 CPI (117th out of 133). 
 
 Protection of Whistleblowers: 
Whistle blowing is important because it is related to culture of freedom of association and 
human rights. More, it is a symptom of changed relationship between employer and 
employee. Therefore, it needs functioning international and external systems as well as an 
effective legislation for protection. Disclosure is one different type of efforts to control 
corruption. As Gene Ward put it, “disclosure is to politics what financial statements are to 
business”. Disclosure fulfils two very important functions: accounting and accountability, 
which serve as both preventive measures and monitoring tools in combating political 
corruption (2004:39). In South Africa, efforts are deployed for the promotion of staff 
awareness of the Protected Disclosures Act and of reporting mechanisms available to 
them, both internally and externally.  But, more importantly is the Protection of 
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whistleblowers, given the importance of whistle blowing as a source of information in 
corruption cases. 
 
The Protected Disclosures Act (no 26 of 2000) that came into force in February 2001 
made provision for procedures in terms of which employees in both the public and private 
sector may disclose information of unlawful or corrupt conduct by their employers or 
fellow employees. Therefore, they are protected from “occupational detriments”. In terms 
of the Act an occupational detriment is defined as being dismissed, suspended, demoted, 
harassed or intimidated, refused transfer or promotion, subjected to a term or condition of 
employment or retirement which is altered or kept altered to his or her disadvantage, 
denied appointment to any employment, profession or office, otherwise adversely affected 
in respect of his or her employment, profession or office, including employment 
opportunities and work security.  
  
However, should “occupational detriment occur and is found to be linked to the protected 
disclosure, the Act thus prohibits the employer from subjecting an employee to that, 
prompting the protection of the bona fide whistleblower and the interdiction of him being 
dismissed by the employer” (Camerer, 2001a). 
 
International and local experience has highlighted the importance of whistle blowing as 
illustrated by the following examples: 
 
a) In the United States of America, the persons of the year 2002 were whistleblowers and 
the year declared the “Year of the Whistleblowers” by the Time magazine (December 30, 
2002/January 6, 2003). Three American women, Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom, Coleen 
Rowley of the FBI and Sherron Watkins of Enron, risked all to sound alarms about their 
troubled institutions. They risked their jobs; their health and their privacy to bring to light 
badly needed word of trouble inside crucial institutions. They did not want glory, but tried 
to restore confidence in business and government. As Time wrote: 
 
“You could laugh about the CEOs in handcuffs and the stock analysts who turned 
out to be fishier than storefront palm readers, but after a while the laughs came 
hard…. Enron and WorldCom turned out to be Twin Towers of false promises. 
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They fell. Their stockholders and employees went down with them. So did a large 
measure of public faith in big corporations (p.38). 
 
b) In Gauteng, Mofokeng’s Department was the theatre of a witch-hunt against those 
suspected of leaking information to the media about corruption and maladministration. 
Earlier in February 1999, the department’s deputy director of administration, Prudence 
Matima-Mashile was suspended with full benefits and remunerations a day after the 
investigating units announced their collective forces would conduct the investigations 
within the Housing Department. She was suspended for allegedly urging residents of 
Soweto and the Vaal Triangle to expose some of the alleged corruption in the media. She 
was previously linked to axed former Housing Department head, Enos Ngutshane, who 
was fired for insubordination and alleged maladministration. He was the person who blew 
the whistle against corruption in the department while heading the department. It was 
reported (see City Press, 9 May 1999) that he uncovered a scam in which in one case a 
“developer” successfully tendered for low cost houses and then claimed to have built a 
certain number of units but on investigation it was established that no such houses had 
been built. The scam cost the provincial government R8,5 million and one of the most 
memorable prosecutions for corruption was that of Louis Botha, the Gauteng Housing 
Department official who was hit with a hefty prison sentence for stealing about R8-million 
from the subsidized housing kitty. 
 
Senior accountant Louis Botha handled the province's disbursements from the National 
Housing Fund - the central reservoir of funds for the government's low-cost housing drive. 
But lax controls within the provincial department enabled Botha to siphon cash into front 
companies for almost four years before he was exposed. Botha used some of the proceeds 
to buy properties in Johannesburg's eastern suburbs, where several of his friends were 
living rent-free. He was only caught in 1996 when Standard Bank noticed a strikingly 
large amount of money flowing into his credit-card account. The bank alerted the 
department, which then contacted the Transvaal attorney general's office. The Gauteng 
province accounted for roughly one-third of the R3-billion national housing fund budget 
for the 1996/97 financial year, and had been praised by central government for its speedy 
disbursement of low-cost housing funds. 
  
390
Botha was convicted on 95 counts of theft and 30 counts of fraud and corruption and 
sentenced to 11 years imprisonment in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court in May 1997, 
after handing over a full confession. He told the court he had "taken advantage of all 
opportunities" to pillage the fund from November 1992 until the middle of 1996, when he 
was caught. 
 
Botha set up a string of fictitious creditors on the department's computer, forwarded them 
cheques from the fund and printed fake invoices. He set up the front companies with the 
help of some of his friends, who shared the proceeds. The fictitious companies' titles 
included three variations on the name of top estate agent Lew Geffen (who was not 
connected to the scam). In his tell-all confession, apparently made in the hope of securing 
a lenient sentence, Botha also described how he drew up false invoices in the names of so-
called creditors. He either forged the second signature required for the cheques or asked 
one of his department colleagues to sign - without letting them in on the swindle. But as 
investigations e showed later, the scam by Botha was not an isolated incident. There were 
other bogus contractors who also skimmed the department of millions by claiming to have 
built houses that were never built (Sello: 1999).  
 
Subsequently Ngutshane was suspended after exposing corruption and accused of 
insubordination, dereliction of duty and of employing a consultant without following 
proper procedures. He was then offered another job within the provincial government, 
which he declined and settled for a substantial package. At the time of his suspension and 
subsequent dismissal, Ngutshane claimed the whole saga to be a “cover-up” involving 
corruption. This is this web of corruption that led to Mofokeng’s axing from the ANC 
provincial list where he was originally placed in second position. He fell, so did his 
credibility.  
 
c) There are a lot of cases involving whistleblowers in the Housing Department, like the 
sex-for-houses scandal that erupted in February 2003. Kate Nendouvhada who spoke out 
about the way she was forced to trade sex with an official in exchange for a house, said 
she “made a sacrifice to secure a house for her family” despite the repugnance of the act 
and her own humiliation (The Star, February 20, 2003). Nendouvhada is just one of the 
victims who consented to blow the whistle about corruption in the Housing Department 
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that had cost the province R60 million, according to a damning dossier handed over to the 
Scorpions by the then Housing Minister Sanki Mthembi-Mahanyele to probe corruption in 
the provision of low-income houses. Another case was that of the axing of the chairperson 
of the Gauteng Public Accounts Committee Johan Kilian of the NNP in February 2001. It 
was believed that he was fired because he had been investigating alleged 
maladministration and misuse of public money. He was the one behind Housing 
Department’s investigations.  
 
However, whistleblowers do not have an easy time. In South Africa, whistleblower 
legislation fails to provide the whistle blower with job security after reporting malpractice 
in the workplace. This has led a number of lawyers to advocate for a review of the 
Protected Disclosures Act, since it leaves employees vulnerable, especially if they are not 
aware of the legal requirements for “protected disclosure” as outlined in the Act. Martin 
Luther King Jr. once warned: “our lives begin to end the day we become silent about 
things that matters”. 
12.8.3. The International Dimension: 
In Gauteng, it is important to note that the fight against corruption is not distinct and 
independent from the reform of the state. Generally, the reason is that some of the 
measures to reduce corruption are at the same time measures that change the character of 
the government. Thus, keeping in mind the shortfalls of these measures special attention 
should be given to the globalization of anti-corruption strategies that have been proved 
and applied elsewhere in the world.  
 
 
Those applied in the province must suit those applied at the national level that must be in 
the same line with international practices. The majority of civil society respondents 
emphasized the need for international cooperation. They said that global dimensions of 
corruption implied regional and international cooperation if large-scale corruption is to be 
countered. 
A review of some current approaches to fighting corruption at the international level 
shows clearly that Gauteng is on the right path, but can do better to improve the general 
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situation in the province by adhering to new trends. Global anti-corruption strategies can 
be typologized in different ways, as suggested by scholars (Andvig et al. (2000:133-134): 
(A) By the type of policy instruments suggested, for example whether it is 
monitoring and controlled or focused on the motivation of the corrupt agents. 
(B) By the motivation of the campaign, for example whether its major aim is to 
improve the efficiency of government, or rectify injustices, or to get rid of 
political opponents. 
(C)  By the position of the agents targeted, for example whether they are 
clustered in a few sectors or are in high or lower level positions and so on. 
(D)  By the likely effect of the policy.  
(E) By the type of organization initiating the anti-corruption strategy. 
Table 41: Typologies of Anti-Corruption Strategies: 
1. INTERNATIONAL  
 World Bank and IMF policies  
 OECD efforts to criminalize transnational bribery 
 UNDP an UN policies 
 Transparency International’s interventions 
2. TRANSNATIONAL USA’s ‘Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (FCPA) 
3. NATIONAL  
 Procedures and training within state or public sector institutions 
 ‘Service culture’ approaches 
 ‘Island of integrity’ 
 Capacity-building to ‘design out’ corruption 
 Legal approaches, including state funding of parties and patronage 
appointments 
 Anti-corruption agencies 
 Auditor general and Parliamentary oversight 
 The police and ‘Inter agency’ co-operation 
4. LOCAL or ‘CITIZEN’ 
LEVEL 
 
 Minimizing petty-corruption by protecting against the extractive and arbitrary 
nature of the state 
 Structural reform, e.g. decentralization and deregulation 
 New administrative procedure (e.g. overlapping jurisdiction, customerisation 
of public services and service delivery surveys) 
 Complaints and redress 
 Community oversight 
 The media 
5. POPULIST  
 Purges (e.g. of civil servants) 
 Making examples (public humiliations and executions, quasi-official 
tribunals 
 Moral rearmament campaigns and ‘the new citizen’ 
Source: Doig and Riley (1998). 
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Currently, referring to type (E), four broad levels or types of anti-corruption strategies can 
be identified in operation in developing countries, as outlined in table 41: international, 
national, local or ‘citizen’ level, and populist. It can be observed that only levels 1, 3 and 4 
(international, national, local or ‘citizen’ levels) are operating in Gauteng. 
 
Another new approach includes the World Bank’s efforts to eradicate corruption. So far, 
the World Bank is the organization that has developed the broadest and most elaborate set 
of policies aimed at reducing corruption. However, international literature review 
underlines (Andvig et al. (2000) the fact that much of the present policy debate on anti-
corruption strategies has at its roots the principal-agent theory of corruption. 
Popularization of this approach by Robert Klitgaard in 1988 has been widely promoted 
and applied in a number of developing countries during the 1990s. 
 
Theoretically, this theory explains how public officials almost by necessity have a number 
of incentives and opportunities for engaging in corrupt exchanges. At the practical level, 
the approach indicates that the policy instruments may be fruitfully divided into those that 
influence the number of corrupt opportunities, and those that influence the incentives. 
These include policy instruments that influence the expected (gross) gain of the corrupt 
act, the probability of being caught and the size of the penalty if detected. If expected 
gains are higher than expected costs, the agent will, according to the theory choose to be 
corrupt. For example, the expected gains for public officials are higher when they have 
wide discretionary powers and considerable monopoly power in their jobs. The expected 
probability if detected is reduced by decreased accountability. This leads to a (E) type 
classification of anti-corruption policies as seen above. Hence the formula: C = M+D-A. 
 
Klitgaard’s work has been very influential and appears to be at the core of the World 
Bank’s approaches. Thus, a World Bank policy formulation prescribes that an effective 
anti-corruption strategy should (2000:21): 
1) encourage the reduction of rents by means of economic liberalization, 
deregulation, tax simplification, de-monopolization and macroeconomic stability; 
2) reduce discretion through administrative and civil service reform, including 
meritocratic recruitment and decentralization; and 
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3) increase accountability by building up institutions such as auditing and 
accountancy units, through legal reforms such as judicial strengthening, and by 
encouraging public oversight through Parliament and a more vibrant civil society. 
 
As shown by the figure below, while (1) and (2) are mainly believed to affect the number 
of corrupt possibilities arising in an economy and to reduce the gross grain, (3) influences 
the expected probability of being caught. In addition the Bank’s advocacy of wage 
increases in the public sector is also based on principal-agent theory. The Bank’s 
advocacy of scaling down the public sector to core areas will, according to theory, mainly 
reduce the number of corrupt opportunities. This figure summarizes the discussion above 
on current strategies. 
Figure 01: The World Bank’s “multi-pronged” anti-corruption strategy 
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The cluster of policy measures to fight corruption suggested above all rest on the 
assumption that the principal’s objective is to reduce corruption (Klitgaard,1998). These 
measures include the reforms in incentive systems and organizational procedures. 
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Globalization gives an opportunity to any entity to improve its marks in the fight against 
corruption. As the global economy has facilitated increases in cross-border corruption, 
anti-corruption strategies must take a global angle. There is a need to adopt cooperative 
arrangements at the national and regional levels to provide for an exchange of 
experiences, ideas and information. This includes: 
(3) Holding annual conventions to review the past efforts and progress and map out 
strategies for the future. 
 
 
 
I embrace, as an example of preventive strategy, the one suggested by the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) that was created in 1988, as an independent body 
by the New South Wales (NSW) government in Australia. Its aims are to protect the 
public interest, prevent breaches of public trust and guide the conduct of public officials 
by: 
- exposing corruption through investigations which can include public hearings, 
 
(1) effective coalitions bringing together provincial governments, national 
government, private businesses and civil society. This has been done with the 
formation of the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) but with very little 
result. 
(2) developing effective information sharing and networking capacities between 
agencies and governmental institutions.  
(4) And most important is the urgent need to set up a database on corruption, 
department by department.  
The three constraints discussed above - the list is not exhaustive - show that there is no 
“perfect model of strategies”. To succeed, any anti-corruption effort must take into 
account the limiting factors I have exposed in this section, the recommendations besides. 
12. 9. Recommendations: 
 
- preventing corruption by giving advice and developing resistance to corrupt practices 
in public sector organizations, 
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(2) Identify risks: identify what, why and how things can arise as the basis for further 
analysis. 
(4) Evaluate risks: rank risks to establish priorities; if the level of risk established is low, 
then risks may fall into an acceptable category and treatment may not be required. 
(6) Monitor and evaluate the performance of the risk management system and the 
changes that might affect it. 
 
- educating the public sector and the community about corruption and the role of the 
ICAC.  
In late 2001, the ICAC commenced a major research project to develop a snapshot of 
corruption-related issues facing the diverse NSW public sector. The findings were 
published in January 2003 under the title: “Profiling the NSW Public Sector: Functions, 
Risks and Corruption Resistance Strategies”. All organizations in the public sector are 
encouraged to adopt this strategy or the seven-step risk management process as a general 
approach to identifying and treating risks. Though encouraging the findings are, more 
however can be done to build corruption resistance within the public sector. 
In view of minimizing corruption Gauteng organizations should take solid steps by 
implementing this strategy described by ICAC as “building and sustaining corruption 
resistance”. The seven-step risk management process requires to: 
(1) Establish the context: set up the strategic, organizational and risk management 
context in which the rest of the process will take place, establish criteria against 
which risk will be evaluated and the structure of the analysis. 
(3) Analyze risks: determine existing controls and analyze risks in terms of the range of 
potential consequences and how likely those consequences are to occur. 
(5) Treat risks: accept and monitor low priority risks; for other risks develop and 
implement a specific management plan, which includes a consideration of funding. 
(7) Communicate and consult with internal and external stakeholders as appropriate at 
each stage of the process and concerning the process as a whole. 
The failure to appropriately implement this strategy by identifying and then managing and 
monitoring risks can have devastating consequences for any organization including loss of 
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Finally, other strategies or practices identified throughout this research that can further be 
of assistance to Gauteng institutions in building corruption strategies include: 
 
reputation, inefficient use of resources, poor service delivery, excessive waste and 
financial loss that are just some of the costs of poor risk management. 
 
 
(1) Dismantling over-regulation, for the overload of discretionary administrative rules 
and regulations provides officialdom at every level with the opportunity to exercise 
its authority not on the basis of objective requirements but rather in the specific 
interests of those (low-paid) officeholders empowered to decide. Discretion must 
be kept to the minimum. 
 
(2) Reform of the public service with a view to abolishing ponderous and nebulous 
ways of doing and deciding things. In their place introduce more precise and 
intelligible statutory and administrative regulations together with more efficient 
information flows; then translate them into real-life jurisprudence and practice.  
 
(3) Revised hiring and employment conditions in the civil service – for example, more 
competition for posts, time-limiting affirmative recruitment policy (e.g., 10 years 
period), better remuneration, and ombudsmen – plus reduction of arbitrarily 
exercised decision-making authority. 
(4) Public invitation of tenders for government and agency contracts and all planning 
and procurement or public purchasing contracts above a certain amount. 
Documentation to be made obligatory; public and open evaluation of all bids and 
justification of the decision taken. This means greater transparency that is 
absolutely essential to overcoming corruption. 
 
(5) Government’s unfailing commitment to prosecute. Effective, speedy and justly 
enforced disciplinary and punitive measures against corrupt officials and 
employees. Blacklisting businesses that have been found guilty of corruption and 
refusing to consider them for government contracts for a certain period – until they 
have mended their ways – can also be a useful tactic. 
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(6) Creation of independent commissions of inquiry and protection of freedom of the 
press. Even in industrial countries big cases of corruption have been brought to 
light only through free and independent media. More training for monitors and 
more education for public servants on corruption are required. 
 
It must be noted that each of the above strategies is an important base around which to 
build a dynamic anti-corruption strategy in accordance with accepted international 
practice in this area. The lack or absence of these strategies could lead to apathy and 
cynicism in developing adequate and effective anti-corruption strategies. Camerer has 
underlined the weaknesses of these strategies or government’s response to corruption 
when she argues: “they are all interlinked to an extent. Indeed, ineffective criminal justice 
responses, for example, are underpinned by a lack of expertise and resource constraints – 
which are linked, in turn, to political will in terms of the commitment to prioritize this area 
in the budget. These are all further linked to the general lack of management expertise to 
tackle the complicated phenomenon of corruption control as an underlying problem” 
(2001:62).  
But evidence elsewhere indicated that particular economies like that of Singapore, Hong 
Kong or Portugal, have managed to significantly reduce the incidence of corruption. In 
countries like Sweden or England corruption flourished in the 18th century and in the 19th 
century. Accordingly, notes Tanzi, “governments should not be fatalistic or passive about 
corruption. With well-focused and determined efforts, corruption can be reduced, though 
not to zero level. Trying to bring corruption to zero would be too costly in terms of 
resources and in other ways” (1998:30).  
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Chapter Thirteen 
MAJOR FINDINGS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
13.1. Introduction 
The study tackles the Gauteng experience during the last decade to explain corruption – 
through intensive field research – by investigating causes, effects and the effectiveness of 
its anti-corruption measures. In examining the Gauteng experience, this study has to some 
extent challenged the traditional political science perspective on formal institutions 
derived from the Weberian legal-rational model of democratic and bureaucratic rule by 
bringing in some broader political debates largely on the role of the civil society but also 
models from social anthropology and sociology to explain political corruption causality. 
Therefore, what lessons can be drawn from the Gauteng experience?  
 
Firstly, the big question in this thesis is whether corruption is the effect of democratization 
or not? Does democratization inhibit corruption or is the spread of democracy and 
transparency contributes to corruption? Finally, is corruption lower in democratic 
countries and those with a free press and strong civil associations?  In general, the 
evidence from the Gauteng case study indicates support for argumentation about a causal 
relationship between corruption and democracy. Both democracies and autocracies can be 
deeply corrupt. But there is a perception that a democratic system increases the incidence 
of corruption due especially to the openness of the system.  Although democracy is seen 
as an impediment to the incidence of corruption, it is however not an end in itself and is 
not invariably a cure for corruption, as corruption is not necessary caused by 
democratization. Instead some democratic systems can be more vulnerable to special 
influence than others, as some corrupt elements of the ruling party can use illegal means to 
obtain specific favours. While competitive elections help limit corruption as opposition 
candidates have a motivation to expose corrupt ruling elites, they are not sufficient to limit 
corrupt incentives. Consequently, there is a need for all democratic governments to 
establish strong means of public oversight. 
 
Evidence has shown that corruption in general terms will decrease with increasing levels 
of democracy or rather the different stages of political transition, as the case of Gauteng 
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illustrates. Thus, when authoritarian control such as apartheid is challenged and smashed 
through economic liberalizations and political democratizations, the level of corruption 
will increase and reach a peak (Duarte and Mofokeng cases) before it is reduced with 
increasing levels of democratic governance (anti-corruption strategies process).  
 
Secondly, why did we choose to look at corruption in Gauteng?  
 
Gauteng should be a “best case scenario”. It is the richest province in South Africa yet it 
was administrated or created from scratch. Therefore, it should be more free from 
corruption inducing values that might derive from rural patrimonial politics (associated 
with old homeland regimes) or with the habits of apartheid era central civil service. High 
levels of urbanization and a relatively strong civil society characterize Gauteng. The 
province is home to 70% of the country’s work force and is the vibrant business heart of 
Southern Africa since the discovery of gold in 1886 on the Witwatersrand. The 
concentration of financial, industrial and mining activities can justifiably highlight the 
dominant economic role Gauteng is playing in shaping the economic landscape of the 
country as a whole. Yet, poverty and inequality in the distribution of resources and 
opportunities are definitely encountered here. Finally there is a general agreement that 
political trends and styles in the province inevitably exert great influence on the rest of the 
country. Thus politics in South Africa cannot be properly understood without 
understanding the politics of Gauteng. 
 
Hence, it might be easier in Gauteng to identify those aspects of corruption that we can 
explain as the consequence of new political factors as opposed to the legacy of apartheid 
and older kinds of political behaviour. In particular, this study might cast light on those 
forms of corruption that may be the result of democratization.  
 
Thirdly, where is corruption located in Gauteng? 
 
The evidence collected from Gauteng enables this study to identify which aspects of 
public administration are vulnerable to corruption.  
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13.2. The new political sites:   
 
(1) Regulations and authorizations (licences, permits) that give a kind of monopoly 
power to the officials who must authorize or inspect the activities leading to 
frequent contacts between members of the public and civil servants who end up by 
colluding. The lack of competition in the granting of these authorizations gives 
bureaucrats a great amount of power and a good opportunity to extract bribes. For 
instance, several individuals in the Licence Department become middlemen or 
facilitators for obtaining these permits. This is a clear example that shows how 
government officials can use tactics to benefit from their monopoly power and 
administrative discretion by extracting bribes from those that need the 
authorizations or permits to engage in activities.  
 
(2) Affirmative Action or political transformation policy: translated as non-
meritocratic processes of bureaucratic recruitment and promotion that can lead to 
corruption. The period of bureaucratic transition generally brings about structural 
fragmentation or conflict in the public service between the “new men” in power 
and the older public servants. Here race is the rule of the game. Indeed, for many 
whites, Affirmative Action is nothing else than a form of discrimination while for 
the disadvantaged group; it represents hope for real socio-economic change and 
economic opportunity and a better future. In racial terms, achieving equity is an 
innermost ambition of the transformation policy. However, the government’s 
policy of favouring blacks makes it vulnerable to charges of favouritism, thus 
corruption. As evidenced by this study, less are recruitment and promotion based 
on merit, the higher is the extent of corruption. Further, depolitization of 
bureaucratic recruitment and promotions, lack of patronage and nepotism, and 
clear rules on hiring, all improve the quality of a bureaucracy. Therefore, the 
absence of political meddling in applications of employment and advancement 
along meritocratic principles has a strong negative impact on corruption levels.  
 
(3) Poor and lax management resulting in incompetence. Bad administration leads to 
mismanagement, maladministration and corruption that pave the way to poor 
services and delaying tactics in delivery terms. This was evidenced by Jessie 
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Duarte and Dan Mofokeng cases. Both ended up resigning their positions after 
having been exposed by commissions of inquiry appointed to investigate them for 
alleged corruption in the running of their respective departments. Other evidence 
from Gauteng showed that the appointment of senior staff in the Office of the 
Premier was what observers have called a “hair-raising” affair such as the 
appointment of a chief director after a senior interviewing panel had rejected her 
for “lacking in analytical and strategic thinking about issues”. The most striking 
case was that of the appointment by the Premier of his driver, as his assistant 
private secretary with a salary of about R110 000 a year. This while the advertised 
position called for a three-year university degree and relevant work experience – of 
which the driver apparently had none.  
 
(4) Decline in morals and ethics results in lack of institutional capacity. Every 
administration is run according to a set of rules. Any constraints on capacity 
hamper service delivery. Despite a political commitment to opening up the public 
service to greater scrutiny, it remains uncommunicative and opaque. For instance, 
in many Gauteng departments, forensic audit reports issued by the Auditor-General 
point out the lack of capacity as “one of the burning issues in government” that 
results in poor implementation process. There was the case of former Local 
Government MEC Sicelo Shiceka who failed to make Shilowa’s cabinet but found 
himself appointed as Chairperson of the Safety and Community Liaison Standing 
Committee in the Legislature. Despite being accused of gross mismanagement of 
his department and failing to honour the Code of Ethics he had signed. Another 
case was that of MEC Paul Mashatile who obtained in June 1997 an advance of 
some R34 000 on his salary for an alleged study trip to Australia, while he was still 
MEC for Public Transport and Roads. He never took the trip, but started repaying 
only in 1999 at a minimal rate of R2 883 per month – enjoying in effect a two-year 
interest free loan from Gauteng’s taxpayers.  
 
(5) Poor control and checks and balances: this is lack of transparency, impunity and 
poor/lack of monitoring. Public accountability is necessary for the control of 
corruption, especially with a dominant party like the ANC that is sure to win the 
vote. Although accountability and monitoring mechanisms exist on paper, they are 
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not properly implemented as evidenced by a Report of the Auditor-General 
(2001:2). In the Department of Education, an audit (March 1997) revealed that 
there were no proper management systems to either monitor accounts or maintain 
adequate internal checking and control measures. For instance, permanent as well 
as temporary employees with no banking details resulted in hand payments, which 
were necessarily more exposed to possible irregularities and incorrect payments.  
 
(6) Political and administrative leadership or the lack of political will or bad 
examples set by top public figures. Jessie Duarte and Dan Mofokeng cases fit well 
in this category besides those of former Local Government MEC Sicelo Shiceka 
and Paul Mashatile, the new MEC for Economic and Finance Affairs, as 
mentioned above.  
 
(7) Low levels of education on the part of many public servants that can be an 
impediment to the establishment of a professional public service. One of numerous 
challenges facing Gauteng and singled out by this study included: legacy of little 
training and development, particularly in response to a dynamic service 
organization; problems with discipline and mechanism to deal with transgressions 
speedily; lack of career management; lack of personnel delegated functions to 
enable managers to manage effectively and efficiently; lack of mechanism to retain 
skilled staff; lack of literacy skills for lesser skilled employees; procedures and 
processes not geared towards efficiency, poor morale of staff, particularly in period 
of massive transformation.  To quote Tom Lodge: “The exodus of skilled 
personnel from the public service as well as the appointment of under-qualified 
people to middle-management positions at a time when public service tasks have 
become increasingly complicated, has increased bureaucratic inefficiency and 
hence increased the incentives to bypass official procedures illegally. This may be 
a short-term problem, though” (2002:150).   
 
(8) Greed as personal determinant or a proclivity to self-enrichment. This is the main 
factor that explains the abuse of public power by those who must administer it. 
This study has highlighted many cases of the “privatization of state assets” by its 
elites for private benefits. Most corruption cases exposed advocate the prevalence 
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of greed as a corruption determinant. From the “matric debacle” to the mysterious 
“disappearance of court dockets” from Hillbrow Police station and courts of law as 
well to the “middlemen” in the Johannesburg licence department, all these cases 
suggest greed among public officials.  
 
(9) Tender procedures: unnecessarily complex and lax rendering them inefficient and 
creating opportunities for corruption. The Ncholo task team (1997) in the old 
Department of Corporate Services - now the Premier’s Office – revealed that the 
tendering system did not allow solutions to be requested, only products. The 
Department’s view was that the tendering system was at fault, and this meant that 
the best practice was often ignored. Similarly in the implementation of projects 
there was poor definition of the costs, time and resource requirements in tenders. 
In the meantime, the Auditor-General noted that there was non-compliance with 
tender procedures in the Department of Finance and Economic Affairs for the year 
ended 31 March 1997. In its 2000/2001 Annual Report, the department of Finance 
acknowledged that the management of the tenders had been quite a challenge 
which needed to be addressed so as to improve the quality of service it provided to 
other departments. This led to its reformulation in the form of new regulations.    
 
(10)  The size of penalty and administrative sanctions. Higher penalties may reduce the 
number of acts of corruption, but may lead to demands for higher bribes on the 
corrupt acts that still take place. Effective penalties tend to be more lenient and the 
administrative procedures followed are slow and cumbersome. The fact is that in 
the real world relatively few people are punished for acts of corruption, despite the 
extent of the phenomenon. Thus, there seems to be a wide gap between the 
penalties specified in the laws and regulations and the penalties that are effectively 
imposed. Duarte and Mofokeng escaped punishment for misbehaving in Gauteng, 
because both possessed good political credentials in the ANC circles as freedom 
fighters. Even the two Gauteng government officials, found by a commission on 
inquiry that cost taxpayers R1, 5 million, to have “dishonestly and by means of 
fraud tried to hide” Duarte’s involvement in an accident, could not be prosecuted. 
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13.3. How does official corruption affect society? 
 
 
It is clear that all these aspects or sites of corruption are especially connected with the 
more democratic or transformation dimensions of government. The more governments 
have changed the more likely it is that control structures may be absent.  
 
 
(1) Corruption increases poverty because it reduces the income earning potential of 
the poor by siphoning away a large chunk of public resources, which could have 
been productively employed elsewhere in the economy, as was the case of Jessie 
Duarte who was found to have used state funds to take a friend on an overseas 
visit. There were millions of rands misappropriated in the Gauteng Housing and 
Land Affairs Department headed by Dan Mofokeng. Meanwhile, 30% of 
Gauteng’s population of 8,8 million are destitute. Despite Gauteng’s affluence, the 
province has high levels of poverty with 48% of children in the province living in 
difficulty because of the lack of source of income in their houses.  
(2) Instills the culture of dishonesty by eroding ethics. Examples from Gauteng 
Province show that between 1994 and 1999, one of the laws most commonly 
violated with impunity was the finance law. Most departments were overspending 
and the Finance Department especially was bloated with unproductive public 
servants who had duplicating functions. Where the system of bribery is well 
established, as was the case in Johannesburg Licensing Department, income gained 
from bribes is no longer a windfall but becomes a part of expected wages in 
addition to the award of contracts for supplying, designing and construction by the 
public sector.  
(3) Loss/wastage of public funds in the face of scarce resources and lowered 
investment. A task team found in May 1997 that most departments of the province 
do not have a sufficient number of appropriately qualified senior financial 
managers. A situation that is conducive to corruption resulting in significant 
loss/wastage of public funds or resources. Evidence in the Province shows a total 
amount of between R161,5 million and R356,6 million that has been transacted in 
corrupt activities in Gauteng between July 1994 and June 1998.  
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(5) Distorting incentives as able individuals allocate their time and energies to rent 
seeking and to corrupt practices and not to productive activities. Generally, the 
resulting activities have a negative value added. This was the case at the 
Johannesburg Licensing Department where an internal investigation during March 
1997 revealed serious structural flaws in the system. As a result, a huge vehicle 
licence scam was rampant within the department where hundreds of false and 
forged clearance certificates were detected between March and July 1997.  
(6) Corruption effects render political system illegitimate in the sense that in many 
cases, corruption scandals, reports and debates have led to mobilization and 
political action from below. We saw how Dan Mofokeng and Mathole Motshekga 
were toppled in elections at the time where corruption issues were high on the 
agenda. In many cases there are just much talk on corruption but little action, 
making people deem the entire political system dishonest and illegitimate, with 
withdrawal and political apathy as the consequence.   
(7) Inappropriate or poor quality infrastructures. The purchasing of goods and 
services for the public service implies that certain decisions can only be made at 
higher levels of government. The allocation of public procurement contracts 
through a corrupt system may lead to lower quality of public infrastructure and 
services. For instance, corrupt officials could allow the use of cheap materials in 
the construction of buildings or bridges that would afterward collapse, as was the 
case in two Pretoria incidences in the recent past. These two cases highlight the 
lack of transparency, the transgression of procurement policy and the failure to 
 
(4) Misallocation of government resources resulting in the redistribution of assets 
from public sector to corrupt individuals. This results in generating allocative 
inefficiency by permitting the least efficient contractor or most costly supplier with 
the highest ability to bribe those who award government contracts, as seen in 
Ndinzani’s case. The awarding of contracts to high-cost bidders without following 
tender regulations result in decreasing state funds since it leads to higher spending 
on projects of often inferior quality.  
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comply with state tender and procurement procedures that raise the inevitable 
question of accountability.  
(8) Reduces state revenues by opening up loopholes in tax collection and by acting as 
an arbitrary tax. Tax evasion through corruption as well as extra expenditures, as 
seen above, are manifestation of lax administration and mismanagement that lead 
to some revenue “vanishing” before reaching government coffers. The 
consequences are often disastrous for the poor who suffer from it most in transition 
economies and in many developing countries, where, according to the World 
Bank, corruption may reduce revenue collection by driving firms (or their most 
profitable activities) out of the formal sector and by providing a moral justification 
for widespread tax evasion, as businesses in the informal sector do not report 
revenue and therefore do not pay taxes. Corruption destroys the state’s ability to 
extract taxes, to implement coherent and rational development policies, to 
redistribute resources among groups and regions, and consequently become 
destructive to its ability to transform the society and the economy according to 
political priorities.  
(9) Reduces investment and foreign direct investment (FDI) and as a consequence, it 
reduces the rate of growth.  The incidence of corruption at the national level has 
disastrous consequences in the province. Corruption affects growth hence FDI as 
this behaviour causes foreign investors to adopt negative sentiment that affects the 
whole country as investments become scarce. Mark Lowe, a DA spokesman, 
opined that “government should also address the risk perceptions that deterred 
investors, such as crime, corruption and uncertainty of property ownership”.  
(10) Reduces expenditure for education and health because they do not lend themselves 
easily to corrupt practices on the part of those making budgetary decisions. 
Corrupt politicians choose to spend more on those components of public 
expenditure on which it is easier to levy bribes. A report released by Parliament’s 
joint budget committee in June 2003, indicated that all provincial governments had 
underspent their budgets at the end of March 2003. The report was based on the 
preliminary figures released by the national Treasury, indicating spending trends in 
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government departments. Of the total of R16, 3 billion allocated to provinces for 
capital expenditure, generally associated with job creation, R2, 5 billion remained 
unspent. Gauteng received R3, 7 billion and failed to spend R391 million.  
In short the effects of corruption impact negatively on the political process by 
undermining the legitimacy of the state and economically by impeding developmental 
strategies, as “corruption leads to loss of much needed revenue and human talent for 
development, distorts priorities for public policy, and shifts scarce resources away from 
the public interest … Political instability, corruption, and underdevelopment are mutually 
reinforcing”, to quote Stephen Ouma (Elliot: 2001:926). Therefore, if corruption is so 
toxic in Gauteng, how bad its impact is on the rest of the country?  
13.4. Fourthly, why does corruption occur in Gauteng? 
As seen, areas such as affirmative action, tendering or the expanded provision of benefits 
(e.g. in Housing, Welfare or Education) are areas that are vulnerable to corruption and are 
all associated with transformation/democratization projects. However, the incidence of 
corruption in the province can be explained by Gauteng’s lack of a “traditional” culture 
base that may make leaders especially susceptible to acquisitive and individualistic forms 
of behaviour.   
Therefore, the study of corruption in Gauteng, through the case studies (Duarte and 
Mofokeng), highlights the fact that the perceived corruption in public administration by 
bureaucrats and elected politicians has thus found significant confirmation. Through the 
analysis of these cases, the exposure of what is the “hidden face” of public power, as 
termed by della Porta and Vannucci, “demonstrates that the market for corruption has, for 
many years, represented the determining factor for a vast range of (frequently illegal) 
activities based on the appropriation of public resources by state functionaries, in collusion 
with other role players outside public administration” (1999:13).  Moreover, nothing is as 
destructive to a society as the rush for quick and easy money, which makes fools of those 
who can work honestly and constructively. Profligacy and extravagance in the political 
arena suggest that greed in the contemporary South Africa has been “institutionalized” and 
“legitimized”.  
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13.5. Finally, to what extent does Gauteng have in place a viable anti-corruption 
strategy?  
How does its anti-corruption measures match up to general prescriptions for combating 
corruption?  On the prevention side, a review of current approaches to fighting corruption 
in the province shows clearly that Gauteng is on the right path, as anti-corruption 
measures applied in the province suit those applied at the national level that in turn are in 
the same line with international practices. The study argues that while anti-corruption 
measures in Gauteng have succeeded in reducing corruption levels, they have not stopped 
it, as new cases surface almost every week in the local press. Thus there is still room for 
improvement if the Gauteng government aims to succeed. Despite the government’s rapid 
response to corruption, it is believed that effective anti-corruption strategies should 
address the underlying causes of corruption to prevent it from occurring in the future and 
wider reforms are needed than those currently listed. Poor systems, poor socio-economic 
conditions, affirmative recruitment, procurement regulations and so on, are some of the 
key causes of corruption this study has identified that need to be firmly tackled with 
emphasis on economic growth and democratic practices.  
 
The study has established that internal processes and projects instituted by public service 
organizations and agencies vulnerable to corruption are generally weak and ineffective 
and that a greater momentum is often needed. As indicated before, addressing public 
sector corruption is the responsibility of the state and state institutions. While it must draw 
on its social partners, including civil society, business and others, in the final analysis 
government will be judged by the success of its own efforts to address the problem. The 
establishment of various anti-corruption bodies indicates the willingness of government to 
deal decisively with the corruption problem. 
 
The study highlights the lack or absence of a viable database that constitutes one of the 
weaknesses of the Gauteng administration.  Observations from fieldwork show that while 
Gauteng is trying its best to stop corruption, there is still some homework to be done. 
Until now, there is no standardized database within the government. This is rendering the 
task very difficult for any study of corruption in the province. Almost all departments, 
with the exception of the Finance Department, referred me to the Premier’s Office. 
  
410
Nonetheless, with the decentralization of all departments in 1999, there are no specific 
records on cases of corruption at the Premier’s Office, as each department is quasi-
autonomous. Monitoring cases of corruption becomes a challenge as information is drawn 
from sources including newspaper reports, Special Investigating Units, the Auditor 
General and Public Protector reports, transcripts of Public Accounts Committee or from 
whistle blowers. Requests to all departments for a list of current disciplinary actions 
involving misconduct did not bring about expected results due especially to the lack of 
cooperation and political will on the part of senior officials.  
 
Thus there is a need for common guidelines and coordination strategies amongst internal 
departmental anti-corruption units that have been established and the initiation in each 
department of its own monitoring and evaluation capacity. This means the build-up and 
the improvement of internal audits and controls by higher authority applicable to both 
officialdom and the business sector. Finally the study assumes that other strategies to fight 
corruption could be provided, however, the ones in place already seem sufficient. 
However, the fight against corruption cannot proceed independently of the reform of the 
state. In many ways it is the same fight.  
 
As a result, the study’s major conclusions concern those general assumptions about the 
relationship between democracy and good governance. The study shows that certain 
theories concerning the causation of corruption need to be revised.  Even the most 
authoritarian systems, as was apartheid, were able to control the levels of corruption and 
keep it at an economically viable level (consider examples of “controlled corruption” in 
the South East Asian countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines). Evidence has shown that, “the current degree of democracy in a country 
makes almost no difference to how corrupt it is perceived to be. What seems to reduce 
corruption is whether or not a country has maintained democratic institutions for a long 
continuous time (Treisman, 2000:439)  
 
To this end, other mechanisms such as accounting standards and audits and direct 
accountability of leadership in government need to be strengthened alongside the 
protection of whistleblowers. But the end result is that several factors associated with 
these mechanisms have highlighted the fact that transparency and the resulting exposure 
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have increased opportunities for graft. What emerges from this study is a common belief 
that incentives and opportunities of generating corruption are strongly linked with political 
institutions; therefore, the study of determinants of corruption includes many institutional 
factors among the potential causes of corruption. Thus the presence of democratic 
institutions proves to be crucial to prevent corruption.  However, corruption cannot be 
fought if it is not exposed. 
 
 In more democratic and open societies, besides greater civic engagement, the chance of 
closer monitoring and exposure of corrupt officials and politicians is higher than in non-
democratic society. Freedom of the press and of association leads public interest groups to 
expose abuses of power and political pressures on media could in fact inhibit the diffusion 
of news on corrupt acts, vanishing, in this way the theoretic negative impact of media on 
corruption. Otherwise, it seems that civic participation to political activities is effective in 
increasing the risk for corrupt incumbents being caught and punished. Therefore illicit 
governants’ behaviour can be prevented only when basic political rights are effectively 
guaranteed to citizens. As a result, many political institutions can indeed have some 
effects on corruption only if political rights are sufficiently guaranteed to citizens. The 
transition to democracy in South Africa has enabled citizens to use the vote and new-
found civil liberties to confront corruption, prompting ruling elites and opposition figures 
to show strong anti-corruption commitment.  
Such commitment suggests a need for more research on the actual effect of 
democratization in government departments that will serve the cause of anti-corruption 
campaign better.         
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APPENDICES 
 
A. LETTER REQUESTING ACCESS TO DATABASE IN GAUTENG PROVINCIAL   DEPARTMENTS 
 
NAME: 
FUNCTIONS: 
DEPARTMENT: 
ADDRESS: 
     
 
DATE: 
Re: Request for a Data Base  
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
As agreed this morning with your department, this is my request for a data base on misconduct 
and cases of corruption in the public sector in the Gauteng Government. 
 
 
Yours truly, 
I am a Ph.D. candidate in Political Studies at Wits University, Johannesburg. I am working on 
cases of misconduct in the Gauteng public sector post-1994. The study's core focus is to examine 
and to provide a better understanding of the causes and consequences of corruption on 
development in Gauteng in the post-apartheid era as well as to look at ways and means that are 
effective to prevent or fight it.  
 
In order to assemble a database of cases involving public sector misconduct and corruption in 
Gauteng, I would like to request from you a list of current disciplinary actions involving 
misconduct and cases of corruption investigated and under investigation in your department, if 
possible. The request for a Data Base is part of a research I am conducting since May 2000. 
 
I believe that initiatives from government since 1998 are clear indicators that South Africa has put 
the issue of corruption firmly on its agenda. It is not only encouraging but also an historical 
opportunity now to address the corruption issue openly in order to instill a sense of trust, 
confidence and commitment into democratic institutions and processes. 
 
In terms of development, a growing body of evidence suggests that corruption has a devastating 
economic and social impact. It impedes investor confidence with negative impact on the private 
and on foreign investment. Fundamentally, it undermines sustainable development and 
exacerbates inequality by affecting the poor disproportionately.  
I would like to thank you for your attention. Your contribution will be appreciated. 
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B. STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS 
1. 
 
 
NAME (optional)   : 
INSTITUTION   :  
POSITION HELD   :  
 
  
DATE: 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
I would like to ask for your contribution to the building of a new public administration in South 
Africa. This questionnaire deals with misconduct in Gauteng public sector post-1994. The study’s 
core focus is to examine and to provide a better understanding of the causes and consequences of 
corruption on development in the post-apartheid era as well as to look at ways and means that are 
effective to prevent or fight it. This cannot be done without your humble contribution. 
 
In each country, the public sector plays such a large and central role that cannot pass unnoticed. 
State and public officials are responsible for administering public resources on behalf of the entire 
community. The management of such a big sector requires some degree of accountability and 
efficiency. 
 
The survey’s outputs will contribute in three ways to corruption research in accordance with the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000): 
Base-line data: this study will provide a methodologically sound and comparable survey 
data on citizen’s experience of the Gauteng Provincial Government. 
2. Building local academic and research capacity. 
3. Policy implications: data and analysis will contribute to a more empirically based policy 
discourse by providing policy makers and the business community with a more robust 
understanding of public sector administration. 
 
I would like to ask you to answer to the following questions in full confidence. The questions are 
part of a survey I am conducting since May 2001. Therefore your responses will never be linked to 
any information that might reveal your identity. I promise to protect your confidentiality and to 
keep secret all collected data. Altogether, this survey should take about 20 minutes  
to complete. 
 
 
LIST OF QUESTIONS: 
 
1. Have you ever heard of government corruption in Gauteng? 
  Yes      No       Never      Uncertain  
 
If YES,  (a) From which source did you hear about government corruption in 
Gauteng? 
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□ somewhat harmful 
(b) Can you refer to any specific instance of corruption in the regional government? 
 
2. What is the actual extent of corruption in Gauteng? 
  Very serious    Serious    Not very  serious   
  Definitely not serious 
 
3. The extent of corruption in Gauteng is largely the result of poor and lax management and a 
lack of control within the administrative system that create an environment in which 
corruption can fester. Do you agree or disagree? 
 
  strongly agree    agree     disagree   
  strongly disagree 
 
4. Do you believe there is more or less corruption in Gauteng now than was the case under the 
old system of apartheid? 
 very much    not very much    less    not at all 
 none of the above 
 
5. What can be the root causes of corruption in Gauteng? From the following list, rank the most 
important causes that you think propel corruption in the public sector, starting by the first most 
important to the last most important: 
(a) low level of education 
(b) poverty  
(c) non-meritocratic employment critera such as “affirmative action” 
(d) apartheid 
(e) nepotism 
(f) clientelism 
 
6. How do you feel about Gauteng government officials accepting bribes from public members?  
□ very harmful 
□ not harmful 
 
7. How do you feel about someone who provides a job for an unqualified family member? 
 very harmful 
 somewhat harmful 
 not harmful 
 
8. Is corruption more prominent in the public or the private sector or is it about the same in both? 
 Public sector 
 Private sector 
 About the same in both 
 Don’t know 
 
9.  How many officials in Gauteng government do you think are involved in corruption? 
 Only a tiny insignificant minority 
 Only a few but – they hold important positions 
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 Quite a significant number at all levels 
 Mainly junior officials with senior provincial positions  
 Mainly senior officials with most junior provincial positions  
 
10. Elected politicians found guilty of corruption and fraud could face a number of situation. 
Which one of the following do you think is the most appropriate? 
 Lose their jobs and go to prison 
 Lose their jobs and have to pay a fine 
 Lose their jobs only 
 Pay a fine only 
 There should be no penalty for this 
 
11. How do you feel about the Gauteng Legislature passing a law that people  running for public 
office should publicly disclose their entire assets? 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
12. How much trust and confidence do you have in commissions of inquiry that investigate 
politicians after major corruption scandals? 
 A great deal 
 A fair amount 
 Not very much 
 None at all 
 
13. Do you think the government is doing enough in combating corruption by maintaining 
transparency and accountability? 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Uncertain 
 
12. Does the Gauteng Government have sufficient resources to fight corruption? 
 Enough resources 
 Need a little more resources 
 Need a lot more 
 No resources at all 
 
13. How do you rate the Gauteng management? 
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Fair 
 Poor  
 
14. How effective do you think Gauteng Anti-Corruption Unit is in fighting    corruption in the 
government? 
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 Very effective 
 Effective 
 Not very effective 
 Not at all 
 
15.  Do you know any others people I should interview? 
 Yes. Please give details 
 No 
 
16.  May I have some copies of documents, correspondence, or reports that are mentioned in our 
discussion?  
 Yes. Please give details 
 No 
 
Thank you for your contribution. 
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C. STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ACADEMICS, BUSINESS AND NGOs  
 
 
NAME (optional)   : 
INSTITUTION   :  
POSITION HELD   :  
 
DATE: 
 
 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
I am a Ph.D. candidate in Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in 
Johannesburg. The topic of my thesis is the understanding of causes and effects of political 
corruption on development in the post-1994 Gauteng public sector, as well as the strategies in 
place to combating it. I would like to ask for your contribution to the building of a new public 
administration in South Africa by answering the following questions. The questionnaire is part of 
a survey I have been conducting for the past two years. This cannot be done without your 
contribution. 
 
The survey’s outputs will contribute in three ways to corruption research in accordance with the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000): 
Base-line data: this study will provide a methodologically sound and comparable survey data on 
citizen’s experience of the Gauteng Provincial Government; 
 
Building local academic and research capacity; 
 
Policy implications: data and analysis will contribute to a more empirically based policy discourse 
by providing policy makers and the business community with a more robust understanding of 
public sector administration. 
 
I would like to ask you to answer to the following questions in full confidence. The questions are 
part of a survey I am conducting since May 2001. Therefore your responses will never be linked to 
any information that might reveal your identity. I promise to protect your confidentiality and to 
keep secret all collected data. Altogether, this survey should take about 20 minutes to complete. 
 
LIST OF QUESTIONS: 
 
1. Have you ever heard of government corruption in Gauteng? 
  Yes      No       Never      Uncertain  
 
If YES,  (a) From which source did you hear about government corruption in 
Gauteng? 
 
(b) Can you refer to any specific instance of corruption in the regional government? 
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10.  Do you see democracy and the rule of the law as an impediment to the incidence of 
corruption?  
 
 
2. What is the actual extent of corruption in Gauteng? 
  Very serious    Serious    Not very  serious   
  Definitely not serious 
 
 
3. The extent of corruption in Gauteng is largely the result of poor and lax management and a lack 
of control within the administrative system that create an environment in which corruption can 
fester. Do you agree or disagree? 
  strongly agree    agree     disagree   
  strongly disagree 
 
 
4. Do you believe there is more or less corruption in Gauteng now than was the case under the 
old system of apartheid? 
  very much    not very much    less    not at all 
  none of the above 
 
 
5. Is corruption increasing or decreasing, or remaining at about the same level? 
 
 
 
6. What are the root causes of corruption in Gauteng? 
 
 
 
7. Do you think that because of the global dimensions of corruption, regional and international 
co-operation is essential if large-scale corruption is to be countered?  
 
 
8. Do you believe that attempts to promote ethical standards, leadership and    political will are 
enough to combat corruption at the national or regional level?  
 
 
9. In the Gauteng context, is corruption the principal cause of poverty or poverty the principal 
cause of corruption? 
 
 
 
 
11.  To which extent could you assess the role of the whistleblower in the fight against corruption? 
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12. Most  black people directly affected by poverty in South Africa believe that apartheid is a 
backdrop to the problem of corruption. Do you share this point of view?  
 
 
13. How do you feel about the Gauteng Legislature passing a law that people running for public 
office should publicly disclose their entire assets? 
 strongly agree  
 agree  
 disagree  
 strongly disagree 
 
 
13. How much trust and confidence do you have in commissions of inquiry that investigate 
politicians after major corruption scandals? 
 a great deal  
 a fair amount  
 not very much  
 none at all  
 
14. What proportion of Gauteng government officials are corrupt?  
 only a tiny insignificant minority  
 only a few but - they hold important positions  
 quite a significant number at all levels  
 mainly junior officials with senior positions generally honest  
 mainly senior officials with most junior provincial positions generally honest 
 
15. Do you think the government is doing enough in combating corruption by maintaining 
transparency and accountability? 
 
16. How do you rate the Gauteng management in terms of combating corruption? 
 Excellent  
 Good  
 Fair  
 poor 
 
17.  Do you know any other people that I should interview? 
 Yes. Please give details  
 No. 
 
18.  May I have some copies of documents, correspondence, or reports that are mentioned in 
our discussion?  
 Yes. Please give details.  
 No. 
 
Thank you for your collaboration. 
 
